Professor Itoh joined WBS in 2017. Prior to joining WBS, he served as professors at Kyoto University, Osaka University, and Hitotsubashi University. He was visiting professors at University of California at San Diego, Stanford University, and Columbia University. He received MA and BA in commerce from Hitotsubashi University, and Ph.D. from Stanford University. Professor Itoh has broad research interests in organizational economics and contract theory, and has widely published in academic journals. He is the 2003 recipient of the Nakahara Prize from Japanese Economic Association.
Google Scholar: https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=WHbC5OwAAAAJ&hl=en
Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect (joint with Hodaka Morita). American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7 (2015), 318-346.
Complementarities among Authority, Accountability, and Monitoring: Evidence from Japanese Business Groups, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 22 (2008): 207-228 (joint with Tatsuya Kikutani and Osamu Hayashida).
Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences, Japanese Economic Review 55 (2004), 18-45. Reprinted with an newly written addendum in Shinsuke Ikeda, Hideaki Kiyoshi Kato, Fumio Ohtake, and Yoshiro Tsutsui (eds.), Behavioral Interactions, Markets, and Economic Dynamics: Topics in Behavioral Economics. Springer (2016), Chapter 17, 483-517.
Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents, Review of Economic Studies 68 (2001), 1-20 (joint with Shingo Ishiguro).
Business Portfolio Restructuring of Japanese Firms in the 1990s: Entry and Exit Analysis, in Masahiko Aoki, Gregory Jackson, and Hideaki Miyajima (eds.), Corporate Governance in Japan: Institutional Change and Organizational Diversity. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 2007, Chapter 8, 227-256 (joint with Tatsuya Kikutani and Osamu Hayashida).
Japanese Human Resource Management from the Viewpoint of Incentive Theory, in Masahiko Aoki and Ronald Dore (eds.), The Japanese Firm: The Sources of Competitive Strength. Oxford University Press (1994), Chapter 9, 233-264.
Coordination, Specialization, and Incentives in Product Development Organization, in Masahiko Aoki and Ronald Dore (eds.), The Japanese Firm: The Sources of Competitive Strength. Oxford University Press (1994), Chapter 10, 265-284.
Courses in Charge
Economics for Business Administration
Personal Website: https://sites.google.com/site/hideshiitoh/