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- 2026年7月22日(水) に産研講演会「Mandatory vs voluntary disclosure in the dynamic market for lemons.」が開催されます。
2026年7月22日(水) に産研講演会「Mandatory vs voluntary disclosure in the dynamic market for lemons.」が開催されます。
Dates
カレンダーに追加0601
MON 2026- Place
- ハイフレックス開催
- Time
- 13:10~14:50
- Posted
- Thu, 21 May 2026
「Mandatory vs voluntary disclosure in the dynamic market for lemons.」
| 日時 | 2026年7月22日(水)13:10~14:50 |
|---|---|
| 開催方法 | ①対面 *11号館 1112教室 ②Zoom*お申込み完了の自動返信メールにて、参加用URLをお知らせいたします。 |
| 対象 | 学生・教職員・一般 |
| 講演者 | Cyrus Aghamolla 氏 (Rice University, Jones Graduate School of Business, Associate Professor of Accounting) |
| 要旨 | We consider a dynamic adverse selection setting where a privately informed seller can choose to reveal or withhold past trade information to privately informed buyers. Buyers naturally receive less information when the seller can strategically withhold negative news relative to a setting where current buyers always observe the seller’s history of trade, i.e., mandatory disclosure. Despite the informational disadvantage, we find that strategic disclosure by the seller can be welfare-increasing relative to mandatory disclosure, under which past trade is always disclosed. This occurs because voluntary disclosure attenuates the seller’s incentive to engage in destructive signaling and can lead to more efficient trade.
Our model of repeated trade has applications to financial markets, particularly over-the-counter markets. Various OTC markets have been subject to increased post-trade transparency regulations in recent years, including a number of debt securities markets through TRACE, the European bond market through MiFID II, and the municipal bond market through MSRB Rule G-14. The empirical literature examining the impacts of these regulations has been mixed, with studies generally documenting both positive and negative effects of increased transparency depending on factors such as liquidity or yield of the asset. Our setting sheds light on possible improvements to transparency regulations, where permitting voluntary disclosure of past trade for certain asset types can improve trade frequency and welfare. In particular, when interpreting parameters of our model in the context of the OTC bond market, our results imply that voluntary disclosure can be advantageous relative to mandatory disclosure when adverse selection frictions are not too severe for high- and low-inventory cost bonds. |
| 世話人 | 若林 利明(早稲田大学商学学術院 準教授) |
| 参加申し込み方法 | 参加はこちらからお申込みください。※7月20日(月)17:00締切 |
| 共催 | 早稲田大学商学部・産業経営研究所・金子分科会・鈴木分科会・谷川分科会 |
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