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  • 2026年11月18日(水) に産研講演会「Managing Investments under Bargaining in A Coopetitive Supply Chain」が開催されます。

2026年11月18日(水) に産研講演会「Managing Investments under Bargaining in A Coopetitive Supply Chain」が開催されます。

2026年11月18日(水) に産研講演会「Managing Investments under Bargaining in A Coopetitive Supply Chain」が開催されます。

1118

WED 2026
Place
ハイフレックス開催
Time
15:05~16:45
Posted
Wed, 21 Oct 2026

「Managing Investments under Bargaining in A Coopetitive Supply Chain」(英語でのご報告)

日時 2026年11月18日(水)15:05~16:45
開催方法 ①対面 *11号館 803教室
②Zoom*お申込み完了の自動返信メールにて、参加用URLをお知らせいたします。
対象 学生・教職員・一般
講演者 Michael Kopel 氏  (Professor, University of Graz)
要旨 We examine a hybrid supply chain in which a manufacturer distributes its product both directly to consumers via an online channel and indirectly through its affiliated retailer. Contract terms are determined through Nash bargaining. The manufacturer and the retailer make strategic upfront investments that increase the consumers’ willingness to pay. We focus on the parties’ asymmetric bargaining positions: the retailer can only profit when bargaining reaches an agreement while the manufacturer can still offer its product if bargaining fails. As a consequence, we find that the investments have opposite effects on the surplus that is shared between the supply chain partners. The retailer’s investment always increases the trade surplus, whereas the manufacturer’s investment reduces the trade surplus. This gives rise to counterintuitive results. The parties’ profits are reduced, if (1) the consumers’ common willingness to pay for the product increases, (2) the consumers’ “dislike” of online purchases from the manufacturer decreases, and (3) both firms’ investment efficiency increases. Our results hold under linear and nonlinear demands, under quantity and price competition, and with a linear and nonlinear supply contract. We further find that an increase in the manufacturer’s bargaining power can actually reduce the manufacturer’s profit, increase the retailer’s profit, but hurt the supply chain.
世話人 若林 利明(早稲田大学商学学術院 准教授)
参加申し込み方法 参加はこちらからお申込みください。※11月16日(月)17:00締切
共催 早稲田大学商学部・産業経営研究所・金子良太分科会・鈴木孝則分科会・会計研究所