Waseda Institute of Political Economy早稲田大学 現代政治経済研究所


12月18日(火)現政研セミナー(敦賀 智裕先生)のご案内 the WINPEC Seminar

【日時 / Date】12月18日(火): 10:40-12:10 / December 18, Tueseday, 10:40-12:10

【対象/ Audience】学生・教職員・一般 /students, faculty members, and the general public

【報告者 / Speaker】敦賀 智裕   先生  (日本銀行)

【テーマ / Theme】Central Bank Communication on Inflation Target: The Value of Public Information under Unknown Priors

【概要 / Abstract】

Anchoring of long-run inflation expectations of economic agents has received considerable attention in macroeconomics literature. Existing empirical studies indicate that the inflation target (public

information) announced by a central bank does not firmly anchor the expectations of the agents in that the expectations are sensitive to fluctuating inflation rates and highly dispersed. Against the background, we investigate what friction hinders effective information transmission from the central bank to the agents. We present the empirical evidence indicating two important patterns that the expectations of firms with less incentive to acquire information about long-run inflation rates by themselves are more unstable and heterogeneous. We then develop a dynamic model of expectations formation of Bayesian firms. Our model includes one friction in communication that the central bank’s potentially biased prior is unknown for the firms, and they need to learn the prior utilizing their own information set. Under such an environment, public information by the bank provides information only on changes in long-run inflation rates, and we show that the friction plays a key role in explaining the empirically observed patterns. Finally, we show that, under such informational frictions, the public information facilitates the use of information on past inflation rates in firms’

expectations formation and thereby instability has positive relations with the reliance of agents on the public information


【招聘教員 / Organizers】小枝淳子/Junko Koeda

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