” Move-the-Goalpost as a Response to Negative Performance Outcomes and Low Inferred Controllability” by Hitoshi Mitsuhashi (Waseda University), July 25 at 14:30-

Dear all,

We are happy to announce that the upcoming Personnel Economics Workshop will be held on Saturday, July 25th.
Please note that this month’s session will begin at 2:30 p.m., which is 30 minutes earlier than usual.

Date: July 25th (Sat.), 14:30 — 17:45

Venue: Room 709 in Building 3, Waseda Campus, Waseda University
*The elevator in Building 3 does not stop at the 7th floor, so please use the escalator.
Format: Hybrid
We are planning to have dinner after the workshop.
Please fill in the following form by Friday, July 17th, if you would like to participate.
https://forms.gle/rjgZECD3oFNt2E3N7

Please register the following Zoom link for participants online.
https://list-waseda-jp.zoom.us/meeting/register/bY4idDGuRou_Vbvd00tp5Q

1st Session: 
Speaker: Hitoshi Mitsuhashi (Waseda University)

Title:  Move-the-Goalpost as a Response to Negative Performance Outcomes and Low Inferred Controllability

Abstract:
While prior research in organizational learning and performance feedback theory emphasizes adaptive and corrective search following performance shortfalls, emerging work suggests that organizations may instead disengage from learning. This study examines when organizations respond to negative performance outcomes by “moving the goalposts” (MTG)—lowering performance standards rather than engaging in corrective search. Drawing on attribution perspectives, we theorize that MTG is more likely when managers infer limited controllability over performance outcomes. Such inferences arise when external causes dominate internal ones, when internal and external causes are interdependent, and when performance exhibits high variability over time. We test these arguments using data from U.S. domestic airlines and exploit a regulatory change requiring airlines to report delay attributions. We operationalize MTG as schedule padding, or extending scheduled flight durations to buffer against delays. Using a 24-month panel, we find that schedule padding is more likely under conditions of low inferred controllability and high operational complexity. Our findings also suggest that performance improvements sometimes occur on routes where firms extend scheduled durations. This study challenges the dominant view that organizations primarily respond to poor performance through adaptive search, highlighting conditions under which managers instead redefine performance standards.

Language: English

Time: 14:30 ~ 16:00

2nd Session：
Speaker: Keisuke Kawata (University of Tokyo)

Title: The wage-mismatch index: A new indicator of labor demand in the job search market

Abstract:
Motivated by persistent labor shortages in developed economies, this study proposes a novel indicator of labor demand, the wage-mismatch index, which captures wage-related mismatches often overlooked by conventional metrics such as vacancy counts or labor market tightness. The index is defined as the share of job postings offering wages acceptable to job seekers. As a case application, we construct an index using administrative data from Japan’s public employment service. We further decompose this into its underlying components to identify the sources of change over time. Finally, we demonstrate its empirical relevance by using aggregate data from Tokyo and Osaka, Japan’s two largest metropolitan labor markets.

Language: Japanese

Time: 16:15 ~ 17:45

Please check the website of the Personnel Economics Workshop below for the upcoming workshops.
https://sites.google.com/view/peworkshop/home

If you have any questions, please contact the Owan lab, Waseda University, at [email protected]

Best regards,

Hibiki