実証ミクロ経済セミナーご案内 Empirical Microeconomics Seminar　（Workshop Announcement: May 12, 10:40-）

日時：５月１２日（火）１０：４０−１２：１０
場所：３号館１２階ディスカッションルーム
発表者：Matia Vannoni　Senior Lecturer (Associate Professor) in Public Policy, Department of Political Economy, King’s College London
題：Personnel is Policy: Delegation and Political Misalignment in the Rulemaking Process
著者：
Luca Bellodi (Stanford University)
Massimo Morelli (Bocconi University)
Jörg L. Spenkuch (Northwestern University)
Edoardo Teso (Northwestern and Bocconi)
Matia Vannoni (King’s College London)
Guo Xu (UC Berkeley)

アブストラクト：
We combine comprehensive data on the rulemaking activities of the U.S. federal government with individual-level personnel and voter registration records to study delegation and principal-agent frictions in the development of new regulations. We present three main results. First, even important pieces of new regulation are frequently delegated to career bureaucrats who are politically misaligned with the president. Second, rules that are overseen by misaligned regulators take systematically longer to complete, are more verbose, generate more negative feedback from the public, and are more likely to be challenged in court. Third, in assigning regulators to rules, agency leaders often face a sharp trade-off between political alignment and expertise. Agency frictions notwithstanding, they tend to resolve this trade-off in favor of expertise.

コンタクト：　政経・福元（[email protected])
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Date and Time: May 12 (TUE)     10:40-12:10
Location： Building 3, 12th floor Discussion Room
Presenter: Matia Vannoni　Senior Lecturer (Associate Professor) in Public Policy　Department of Political Economy　King’s College London
Title: Personnel is Policy: Delegation and Political Misalignment in the Rulemaking Process
Authors:
Luca Bellodi (Stanford University)
Massimo Morelli (Bocconi University)
Jörg L. Spenkuch (Northwestern University)
Edoardo Teso (Northwestern and Bocconi)
Matia Vannoni (King’s College London)
Guo Xu (UC Berkeley)

Abstract
We combine comprehensive data on the rulemaking activities of the U.S. federal government with individual-level personnel and voter registration records to study delegation and principal-agent frictions in the development of new regulations. We present three main results. First, even important pieces of new regulation are frequently delegated to career bureaucrats who are politically misaligned with the president. Second, rules that are overseen by misaligned regulators take systematically longer to complete, are more verbose, generate more negative feedback from the public, and are more likely to be challenged in court. Third, in assigning regulators to rules, agency leaders often face a sharp trade-off between political alignment and expertise. Agency frictions notwithstanding, they tend to resolve this trade-off in favor of expertise.

Contact for this seminar（[email protected])