【発表者】ジョンボ・メデル（ZSOMBOR Z. MEDER）様（Singapore University of Technology and Design (SUTD).准教授）
Randomness, Predictability, and Complexity in Repeated Interactions
Shuige Liu, Zsombor Meder
Nash equilibrium often requires players to adopt a mixed strategy, i.e., a randomized choice between pure strategies. Typically,
the player is asked to use some randomizing device, and the story usually ends here. In this paper, we will argue that: (1) Game
theory needs to give an account of what counts as a random sequence (of behavior); (2) from a game-theoretic perspective,
a plausible account of randnomness is given by algorithmic complexity theory, and, in particular, the complexity measure
proposed by Kolmogorov; (3) in certain contexts, strategic reasoning amounts to modelling the opponent’s mind as a Turing
machine; (4) this account of random behavior also highlights some interesting aspects on the nature of strategic thinking.
Namely, it indicates that it is an art, in the sense that it cannot be reduced to following an algorithm.