4月25日（土）人事経済学ワークショップ開催のお知らせ/ Personnel Economics Workshop on 25th April

Abstract:

In economies where corporate norms are traditionally employee-centric, boards of directors often function as the pinnacle of the employee hierarchy and thus represent their interests, not just those of shareholders. This dual loyalty suggests a firm’s internal logic—its unwritten rules and power dynamics within organization—play a decisive role in shaping formal corporate governance, a process overlooked by standard agency perspectives. To test this mechanism, I quantify five dimensions of these informal institutions that create organizational frictions, applying textual analysis to a large corpus of employee reviews in Japan: sectionalism, bureaucracy, accountability avoidance, conformity pressure, and internal politics. Results reveal that higher levels of organizational frictions are negatively associated with both governance improvements and equity valuation during periods of shareholder-focused reform in Japan. These findings suggest that the impediment to reform is not a rational trade-off between stakeholder and shareholder interests, but a spillover of internal organizational inefficiencies that structurally stifles the adoption of shareholder-oriented architecture.

Language: Japanese

Please check the website of the Personnel Economics Workshop below for the upcoming workshops.
https://sites.google.com/view/peworkshop/home

If you have any questions, please contact the Owan lab, Waseda University, at [email protected]

Best regards,
Yuji Kawata (Personnel Economics Workshop)