WIAS Seminar:
“Club good mechanisms: from free-riders to citizen-shareholders, from impossibility to characterization” (5/21)
講演者 / Speaker
MACKENZIE, Andrew (Assistant Professor, Maastricht University)
日 時 / Date & Time
2018年5月21日(月) 16:30~18:00
会 場 / Venue
主 旨 / Outline
“Club good mechanisms: from free-riders to citizen-shareholders, from impossibility to characterization”
Consider a community that shares a technology for producing a club good (Buchanan, 1965): any group of agents can “win” for an associated monetary cost. Who should win, and how should production be funded? To address this question, we seek rules (that is, direct mechanisms) where each agent participates voluntarily and is incentivized to report his valuation honestly, and where these reports are used to select winners efficiently without running a deficit.
We find that whether or not there are such rules depends on the production technology. If costs are even “somewhat concave,” then there are no such rules: the free-rider problem (Wicksell, 1896; Samuelson, 1954; Green and Laffont, 1979) persists even when agents who do not contribute can be excluded. If costs are symmetric and convex, however, then there are such rules that moreover satisfy no-envy-in-trades (Kolm, 1971; Schmeidler and Vind, 1972). We characterize this class, whose Pareto-worst member is the familiar minimum-price Walrasian rule (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973; Demange, 1982; Leonard, 1983); the other rules do better by treating the agents as equal shareholders in the technology and offering social dividends (Lange, 1936).
コーディネーター / Coordinator
周 愚 (早稲田大学 高等研究所 講師)
船木 由喜彦 (早稲田大学 政治経済学術院 教授)
対 象 / Prospected Audience
学部生・大学院生・研究者・教職員 等
主 催 / Organizer
早稲田大学 高等研究所
共 催 / Co-organizer
早稲田大学 現代政治経済研究所
申込み / Registration
事前申込み不要です。直接会場にお越しください。