Visiting Researcher Seminar: Efficiency of the Minimum Approval Mechanism with heterogeneous players（11/22）
Details
We explore, theoretically and experimentally, how endowment inequalities affect the effectiveness of the Minimal Approval Mechanism (MAM) at improving the level of provision of a public good. We find that the mechanism is still Pareto-improving under endowment heterogeneity, but that its efficiency diminishes as inequality is increased. Our experimental findings indicate a significant weakening of the mechanism under endowment inequalities, surpassing our theoretical predictions. A close examination of individual behaviors reveals a significant drop in contributions compared to the uniform case, prompted by even minor inequalities. Intriguingly, our findings challenge conventional assumptions by showing that inequality aversion drives contributions in a public good game with endowment disparities only under certain assumptions. We explore the impact of beliefs about the contributions of advantaged player as potential motivations through guilt aversion and Kantian preferences.
Speaker
WILLINGER, Marc (Professor, University of Montpellier, Center for Environmental Economics of Montpellier (CEE-M))
Date & Time
Nov 22, 2024 (Fri.) 17:00 – 18:30
Venue
Building#3 Room#909, Waseda Campus, Waseda University
Language
English
Prospected Audience
Undergraduate, Graduate, Researchers, Faculty members, general audience
Organizer
早稲田大学現代政治経済研究所船木部会研究会
Co-organizer
Waseda Institute for Advanced Studies (WIAS)
Registration
Registration is not required to participate.
