WIAS Visiting Researcher Seminar:
Dr. GÓMEZ- RÚA, María & Dr. MOLIS, Elena
Joint Seminar (7/11)
Speaker
GÓMEZ- RÚA, María (Associate professor, University of Vigo)
MOLIS, Elena (Associate Professor, University of Granada)
Date & Time
July 11, 2023 (Tue.) 17:00 – 18:40
Venue
Building#7 Room#209, Waseda Campus, Waseda University
Language
English
Prospected Audience
Undergraduate, Graduate, Researchers, Faculty members, general audience
Organizer
早稲田大学現代政治経済研究所 船木部会研究会/ Waseda Institute of Political Economy, Funaki Laboratory
Co-Organizer
早稲田大学高等研究所 / Waseda Institute for Advanced Studies (WIAS)
Registration
Registration is not required to participate.
Session 1: “To acquit or convict: A social matter?”
Speaker
MOLIS, Elena (Associate Professor, University of Granada)
Outline
In all societies crimes are committed, with some people accused of them.A judicial system must design a verdict rule to decide whether the defendant must be acquitted or convicted and eventually punish offenders if their guilt is proved. However, not all societies have the same opinion about the requirement that the criminal code should have.
Even depending on the type of crime the way of measuring guilt also differs. The aim of this paper is to offer microfoundations of verdict rules based on individual preferences over the possible outcomes that can occur depending on whether or not the person accused of committing a crime is innocent and whether or not he is finally found guilty.
Session 2: “Stable and Weakly Additive Cost Sharing in Shortest Path Problems”
Speaker
GÓMEZ- RÚA, María (Associate professor, University of Vigo)
Outline
In a shortest path problem, agents seek to ship their respective demands; and the cost on a given arc is linear in the flow. Rosenthal (2013) and Bahel and Trudeau (2014) have proposed cost allocations falling in the core of the associated cooperative game. The present work combines core selection with weak versions of the additivity axiom, which allows to characterize a new family of rules. The demander rule charges to each demander the cost of their shortest path; and the supplier rule charges the cost of the second-cheapest path while splitting the excess payment equally between access suppliers. Moreover, with three or more agents, the demander rule is characterized by core selection and a specific version of cost additivity. Finally, convex combinations of the demander rule and the supplier rule are axiomatized using core selection, a second version of cost additivity and two additional axioms that ensure the fair compensation of intermediaries. With three or more agents, the demander rule is characterized by core selection and a specific version of cost additivity. Finally, convex combinations of the demander rule and the supplier rule are axiomatized using core selection, a second version of cost additivity and two additional fairnesss properties.
