Title：Incentivizing Deceased Organ Donation Under Blood-Type Compatibility Constraints: Theory and Experiment
Date: January 10, 2020 (Fri)
Venue: 1st Conference Room on the 10th floor, 3rd Building, Waseda Campus
Speaker：Eko Riyanto, Associate Professor, Nanyang Technological University
Registration：No registration required.
Co-organized：The Center for Positive/Empirical Analysis of Political Economy of the Top Global University Project, Waseda University
Organizers：Waseda Institute of Strong Political Economy (WINPEC) Research Group (Prof. FUNAKI Yukihiko)
Contact information: [email protected]
This paper studies the efficacy of the donor priority rule in promoting deceased organ donation under blood-type compatibility constraints in both theory and the laboratory. Compared with a scenario in which transplantations are operated only within the same blood-type cohort, we find that allowing cross-blood-type transplantations discourages the donation incentives of hard-to-match agents (type O), and hence reduces the supply of widely acceptable organs. Meanwhile, the easy-to-match agents (type AB) have higher incentives to donate. More importantly, at the aggregate level, both theoretical and experimental results suggest that the aggregate donation rate is lower with cross-blood-type transplantations under mild conditions.