人事経済学ワークショップご登録の皆様
*English follows Japanese.
以下の通り9/28(土)人事経済学ワークショップの開催をお知らせします。
日時：9月28日（土） 15:00～17:15
*今回は院生２名による報告により、通常より30分早く終了いたします。
開催形式：ハイブリット
開催場所：早稲田大学 3号館 306教室
*3号館エレベータは３階には止まりませんので、エスカレータにてお越しください。
ワークショップ終了後は懇親会を予定しております。
参加を希望される方は9/20(金)までに下記URLのフォームにご入力ください。
https://forms.gle/7LxpvfLzM1Ea9z6X6
オンライン参加URL: 以下より登録お願いします。
https://list-waseda-jp.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJcoceihrzIiGNfWsk8_tMc_ScCcW5mn3RU_
第１セッション： 15:00～16:00
報告者： 早稲田大学経済学研究科 金山隼人様
発表言語：日本語
報告タイトル：Minimum Wage Hikes and the Heterogeneity of Labor Supply
要旨：
This study investigates the heterogeneous effects of minimum wage hikes on the labor supply of married women in Japan, particularly those eligible for the spousal deduction. The Japanese income tax exemption system for spouses has a nonlinear eligibility threshold, which incentivizes low-wage married female workers to limit their annual earnings to 1.05 million yen. When the minimum wage is raised, those workers near the threshold are expected to decrease their labor supply to adjust their annual earnings, while other workers may increase their labor supply or do not respond due to the substitution effect. We utilize an individual-year-month panel data and employ a novel staggered adoption to estimate the effect of binding minimum wages. We find that minimum wage binding has positive impact on income for workers who have no incentive to limit their earnings but not-clear impact for workers who are incentivized. Furthermore, the income effect seems to dominate over the substitution effect for workers with high earnings. We also document a significant labor supply response at the extensive margin while such adjustments at the intensive margin are less pronounced. These findings are strong evidence that the minimum wage impact on income is highly heterogeneous largely due to the dynamics of labor market entry and exit rather than adjusting hours worked.
第２セッション：16:15～17:15
報告者：一橋大学 経済学研究科 博士課程 礫石恭吾様
発表言語：日本語
報告タイトル： The New Role of Non-compete Agreements in Startups: Their Relationship to Acquihiring
要旨：
Non-compete agreements (NCAs) are crucial for startups as they prevent employees from joining competing firms, thus reducing the risk of the hiring firm misappropriating the startup’s intellectual property. I propose an additional significant role of NCAs in startups: acting as a defense against acquihiring. By granting a startup monopsony power over its employee, an NCA increases the startup’s outside payoff in acquisition bargaining, making it more challenging for an acquirer to finalize the deal. The NCA can improve worker allocation by either preventing inefficient acquihiring or facilitating efficient acquihiring. Moreover, by preventing acquihirng, the NCA promotes labor market competition and improves worker welfare as long as it does not entirely restrict labor mobility. Finally, I will discuss the optimal regulation of NCAs in industries with high acquisition potential.
人事経済学ワークショップでは以下の通りウェブサイトを運用しております。
今後の予定については下記URLも併せてご確認ください。
https://sites.google.com/view/peworkshop/home
問合せ：早稲田大学 大湾研究室 [email protected]
大湾秀雄・森田公之・佐藤香織・高橋孝平・川太悠史
Dear all,
We are happy to have the Personnel Economics Workshop on Sep 28th as follows.
Date: 28th Sep (Sat.) 15:00-17:15
*The workshop will end earlier than usual since the workshop has two 1-hour presentations.
Venue Room: 306 in Building 3, Waseda Campus, Waseda University
*The elevator in Building 3 does not stop at the 3th floor, so please use the escalator.
Format: Hybrid
We are planning to have a dinner after the workshop.
Please fill in the following form by 20th Sep. (Fri.) if you would like to participate.
https://forms.gle/7LxpvfLzM1Ea9z6X6
Please register the following Zoom link for participants online.
https://list-waseda-jp.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJcoceihrzIiGNfWsk8_tMc_ScCcW5mn3RU_
1st Session: 15:00-16:00
Speaker: Hayato Kanayama, Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University
Language: Japanese
Title: Minimum Wage Hikes and the Heterogeneity of Labor Supply
Abstract:
This study investigates the heterogeneous effects of minimum wage hikes on the labor supply of married women in Japan, particularly those eligible for the spousal deduction. The Japanese income tax exemption system for spouses has a nonlinear eligibility threshold, which incentivizes low-wage married female workers to limit their annual earnings to 1.05 million yen. When the minimum wage is raised, those workers near the threshold are expected to decrease their labor supply to adjust their annual earnings, while other workers may increase their labor supply or do not respond due to the substitution effect. We utilize an individual-year-month panel data and employ a novel staggered adoption to estimate the effect of binding minimum wages. We find that minimum wage binding has positive impact on income for workers who have no incentive to limit their earnings but not-clear impact for workers who are incentivized. Furthermore, the income effect seems to dominate over the substitution effect for workers with high earnings. We also document a significant labor supply response at the extensive margin while such adjustments at the intensive margin are less pronounced. These findings are strong evidence that the minimum wage impact on income is highly heterogeneous largely due to the dynamics of labor market entry and exit rather than adjusting hours worked.
2nd Session: 16:15-17:15
Speaker: Kyogo Tsubuteishi, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
Language: Japanese
Title: The New Role of Non-compete Agreements in Startups: Their Relationship to Acquihiring
Abstract:
Non-compete agreements (NCAs) are crucial for startups as they prevent employees from joining competing firms, thus reducing the risk of the hiring firm misappropriating the startup’s intellectual property. I propose an additional significant role of NCAs in startups: acting as a defense against acquihiring. By granting a startup monopsony power over its employee, an NCA increases the startup’s outside payoff in acquisition bargaining, making it more challenging for an acquirer to finalize the deal. The NCA can improve worker allocation by either preventing inefficient acquihiring or facilitating efficient acquihiring. Moreover, by preventing acquihirng, the NCA promotes labor market competition and improves worker welfare as long as it does not entirely restrict labor mobility. Finally, I will discuss the optimal regulation of NCAs in industries with high acquisition potential.
Please check the website of the Personnel Economics Workshop below for the upcoming workshops.
https://sites.google.com/view/peworkshop/home
If you have any questions, please contact the Owan lab, Waseda University at [email protected]
Best regards,
