English follows Japanese.
以下の通り3/12人事経済学ワークショップの開催をお知らせします。
日時：3月12日（火） 17:00～18:30
開催形式：ハイブリット
開催場所：早稲田大学 7号館 307号室
ワークショップ終了後は懇親会を予定しております。
参加を希望される方は3/8(金)までに下記URLのフォームにご入力ください。
https://forms.gle/uR2egLcEJhTxxjZW9
オンライン参加URL: 以下より登録お願いします。
https://list-waseda-jp.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJcufuihrTIjHterw556A13WVUdNZ-OF-kGI
報告者：桃山学院大学 濱村純平先生
発表言語：日本語
報告タイトル： Effort allocation under the action spillover on the performance indicator in the multi-task environment: Theory and experiment
要旨：
In this study, first, we consider the multi-task by a single agent with a single principal based on the LEN model. The agent decides the level of actions, and these actions improve the level of outputs. This study assumes that actions affect the other output. In other words, actions have a spillover effect. Additionally, we assume that the case in which one action does not have a spillover effect on the other output in our analytical model. Consequently, we demonstrate, in this case, while its action cannot have an impact on the other output, the level of its action increases as the other action’s spillover effect increases from the model analysis. This is because, depending on the economic environment, we can obtain several outcomes and must consider the features of equilibrium outcomes based on comparative statistics. Next, in this report, we investigate the effect of the choice of performance indicators and the correlation among indicators using the laboratory experiment. In the experiment, we assume that we use three performance evaluations (i.e., profit, profit + sales, and sales and cost) and manipulate the correlations among the error terms of cost and sales, and therefore, we employ a 3×2 experiment in this study. Consequently, contrary to the prediction we obtain when participants are evaluated by profit + sales, they allocate less effort on sales than the optimal level. On the other hand, when we employ the indicator as sales + cost, then participants allocate the excessive effort on sales in the experiment than the effort under the profit case. Additionally, the correlation does not play an important role in our experiment. Lastly, we find that the high accounting knowledge accelerates its bias in our experiment.
人事経済学ワークショップでは以下の通りウェブサイトを運用しております。
今後の予定については下記URLも併せてご確認ください。
https://sites.google.com/view/peworkshop/home
問合せ：早稲田大学 大湾研究室 [email protected]
大湾秀雄・高橋孝平
Dear all,
We are happy to have the Personnel Economics Workshop on March 12th as follows.
Date: 12th March (Tue.) 17:00-18:30
Venue Room: 307 in Building 7, Waseda Campus, Waseda University
Format: Hybrid
We are planning to have a dinner after the workshop.
Please fill in the following form by 8th Mar. (Fri.) if you would like to participate.
https://forms.gle/uR2egLcEJhTxxjZW9
Please register the following Zoom link for participants online.
https://list-waseda-jp.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJcufuihrTIjHterw556A13WVUdNZ-OF-kGI
Speaker: Associate Prof. Jumpei Hamamura, Momoyama Gakuin University
Language: Japanese
Title: Effort allocation under the action spillover on the performance indicator in the multi-task environment: Theory and experiment
Abstract:
In this study, first, we consider the multi-task by a single agent with a single principal based on the LEN model. The agent decides the level of actions, and these actions improve the level of outputs. This study assumes that actions affect the other output. In other words, actions have a spillover effect. Additionally, we assume that the case in which one action does not have a spillover effect on the other output in our analytical model. Consequently, we demonstrate, in this case, while its action cannot have an impact on the other output, the level of its action increases as the other action’s spillover effect increases from the model analysis. This is because, depending on the economic environment, we can obtain several outcomes and must consider the features of equilibrium outcomes based on comparative statistics. Next, in this report, we investigate the effect of the choice of performance indicators and the correlation among indicators using the laboratory experiment. In the experiment, we assume that we use three performance evaluations (i.e., profit, profit + sales, and sales and cost) and manipulate the correlations among the error terms of cost and sales, and therefore, we employ a 3×2 experiment in this study. Consequently, contrary to the prediction we obtain when participants are evaluated by profit + sales, they allocate less effort on sales than the optimal level. On the other hand, when we employ the indicator as sales + cost, then participants allocate the excessive effort on sales in the experiment than the effort under the profit case. Additionally, the correlation does not play an important role in our experiment. Lastly, we find that the high accounting knowledge accelerates its bias in our experiment.
Please check the website of the Personnel Economics Workshop below for the upcoming workshops.
https://sites.google.com/view/peworkshop/home
If you have any questions, please contact the Owan lab, Waseda University at [email protected]
