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We are pleased to announce a workshop.
We look forward to your participation.
日程[Date&Time] ：2023年7月11日（火）[11(Tue.) July, 2023] 17:00-18:40
開催場所[Place]：7号館209号室 [Room 209 of Building 7 (Waseda campus, Waseda Univ.)]
使用言語[Language]：英語[English]
プログラム[Program]
(1)
報告者[Speaker]：Elena molis(University of Granada)
講演タイトル[Title]：To acquit or convict: A social matter?
概要[Abstract]:In all societies crimes are committed, with some people accused of them.A judicial system must design a verdict rule to decide whether the defendant must be acquitted or convicted and eventually punish offenders if their guilt is proved. However, not all societies have the same opinion about the requirement that the criminal code should have.
Even depending on the type of crime the way of measuring guilt also differs. The aim of this paper is to offer microfoundations of verdict rules based on individual preferences over the possible outcomes that can occur depending on whether or not the person accused of committing a crime is innocent and whether or not he is finally found guilty.
(2)
報告者[Speaker]：Maria Gomez Rua (University of Vigo)
講演タイトル[Title]： “Stable and Weakly Additive Cost Sharing in Shortest Path Problems”, with Juan Vidal Puga (University of Vigo) and Eric Bahel (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University).
概要[Abstract] ：In a shortest path problem, agents seek to ship their respective demands; and the cost on a given arc is linear in the flow. Rosenthal (2013) and Bahel and Trudeau (2014) have proposed cost allocations falling in the core of the associated cooperative game. The present work combines core selection with weak versions of the additivity axiom, which allows to characterize a new family of rules. The demander rule charges to each demander the cost of their shortest path; and the supplier rule charges the cost of the second-cheapest path while splitting the excess payment equally between access suppliers. Moreover, with three or more agents, the demander rule is characterized by core selection and a specific version of cost additivity. Finally, convex combinations of the demander rule and the supplier rule are axiomatized using core selection, a second version of cost additivity and two additional axioms that ensure the fair compensation of intermediaries. With three or more agents, the demander rule is characterized by core selection and a specific version of cost additivity. Finally, convex combinations of the demander rule and the supplier rule are axiomatized using core selection, a second version of cost additivity and two additional fairnesss properties.
申込方法[Application]：事前申し込みは不要です。直接開催場所までお越しください。
No advance registration is required.Please come directly to the Place.
