高等研究所 訪問研究員 セミナー: A general definition of perfect equilibrium（12/3）
詳 細/ Details
We propose a general definition of perfect equilibrium, designed to be applicable to a wide class of strategic form games. Two key features in our definition enable this: a) the use of nets instead of sequences, and b) a new concept of completely mixed nets of strategies, drawing on a more detailed interpretation of the notion of a carrier of a strategy.
For finite action sets, our notion of perfect equilibrium coincides with the notion of perfect equilibrium defined by Selten (1975). In the compact-continuous case, our definition yields a nonempty and compact set of perfect equilibria, all of which are weak perfect equilibria in the sense of Simon Stinchcomb (1995). We examine the conditions under which perfect equilibrium meets game-theoretic desiderata such as limit undominatedness and invariance. We provide a variety of examples to motivate our definition, and to illustrate its applicability. Notably, the examples include applications to games with discontinuous payoffs and games played with finitely additive strategies.
講演者 / Speaker
共著者 / Co-author
János Flesch, Christopher Kops, Anna Zseleva
日 時 / Date & Time
2024年12月3日（火）17:00 – 18:30 / Dec 3, 2024 (Tue.) 17:00 – 18:30
会 場 / Venue
早稲田大学 早稲田キャンパス 7号館 209号室
Building#7 Room#209, Waseda Campus, Waseda University
言 語 / Language
英語 / English
対 象 / Prospected Audience
学生・研究者・教職員・一般 / Undergraduate, Graduate, Researchers, Faculty members, general audience
共 催 / Co-Organizer
早稲田大学高等研究所 / Waseda Institute for Advanced Studies (WIAS)
申し込み / Registration
事前予約不要
Registration is not required to participate.
