高等研究所 訪問研究員 セミナー: Efficiency of the Minimum Approval Mechanism with heterogeneous players（11/22）
詳 細/ Details
We explore, theoretically and experimentally, how endowment inequalities affect the effectiveness of the Minimal Approval Mechanism (MAM) at improving the level of provision of a public good. We find that the mechanism is still Pareto-improving under endowment heterogeneity, but that its efficiency diminishes as inequality is increased. Our experimental findings indicate a significant weakening of the mechanism under endowment inequalities, surpassing our theoretical predictions. A close examination of individual behaviors reveals a significant drop in contributions compared to the uniform case, prompted by even minor inequalities. Intriguingly, our findings challenge conventional assumptions by showing that inequality aversion drives contributions in a public good game with endowment disparities only under certain assumptions. We explore the impact of beliefs about the contributions of advantaged player as potential motivations through guilt aversion and Kantian preferences.
講演者 / Speaker
WILLINGER, Marc (Professor, University of Montpellier, Center for Environmental Economics of Montpellier (CEE-M))
日 時 / Date & Time
2024年11月22日（金）17:00 – 18:30 / Nov 22, 2024 (Fri.) 17:00 – 18:30
会 場 / Venue
早稲田大学 早稲田キャンパス 3号館 909号室
Building#3 Room#909, Waseda Campus, Waseda University
言 語 / Language
英語 / English
対 象 / Prospected Audience
学生・研究者・教職員・一般 / Undergraduate, Graduate, Researchers, Faculty members, general audience
主 催 / Organizer
早稲田大学現代政治経済研究所船木部会研究会
共 催 / Co-organizer
早稲田大学高等研究所 / Waseda Institute for Advanced Studies (WIAS)
申し込み / Registration
事前予約不要
Registration is not required to participate.
