Organized by the Center for Positive/Empirical Analyses of Political Economy of the Top Global University Project at Waseda University, the seminar of Associate Professor Eko Riyanto of Nanyang Technological University was held on January 10, 2020. He has published many papers in experimental economics. Faculty members and graduate students who study experimental economics and other researchers joined his seminar.
The title of the seminar was “Incentivizing Deceased Organ Donation Under Blood-Type Compatibility Constraints: Theory and Experiment,” and he reported the recent theoretical and experimental results of donors’ incentives in organ donations. Those results are directly applicable for our problem of organ donations.
One of the problems in organ transplants is blood compatibility. In other words, if the blood of the recipient and the donor do not match, the transplant cannot be performed. Associate Professor Eko Riyanto presented the results of his study on which transplant rules would increase incentives for donors to provide organs and whether these rules were socially efficient.
In conclusion, it was shown that a policy of giving priority to donor of blood type O, which match all blood types, lowers the incentive for them. It was also reported that it is more socially efficient to use donors’ organs with less compatible blood types, such as A, B, and AB, followed by organs of the more compatible blood type-O. Moreover, it was reported that the most efficient rule is to use only donors’ organs with the same blood type.