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¡ÚÂê̾¡Û¡§Estimating a Cooperative Game of Bargaining: The Case of Government Formation
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¡¡This paper estimates a cooperative bargaining model by using data from government formation. We compare our results with those of Adachi and Watanabe (2008), who use a non-cooperative bargaining model. Although the estimates of the ministerial ranking are similar in Adachi and Watanabe¡Çs (2008) and our studies, the relative weight for the Prime Minister is estimated lower based on our cooperative bargaining models. In addition, our Vuong test suggests that cooperative formulation has a better fit to the observed data than Adachi and Watanabe¡Çs (2008) non-cooperative formulation does.
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