THE SOURCES OF INSECURITY IN THE THIRD WORLD:
External or Internal?¹

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Abstract

The focal point of this essay aims to challenge the dominant accounts for the origins of insecurity in the Third World, which have mostly rested upon the contingent effects of the external factor, particularly the end of the Cold War. By emphasizing the importance of both external and internal sources of insecurity alike, the essay suggests two fronts of linking the internal and the external in order to depict the whole shape of insecurity that failed states face. The two linkage solutions include (1) the promotion of democratic, economic, and institutional capacities; and (2) the proactive consideration of local conditions and cultural differences, all of which external interventions need to pay more attention to when they proceed in the targeted countries.

Keywords: The Third World, insecurity, external-internal links, governability, cultural differences

Take up the White Man’s burden –
The savage wars of peace –
Fill full the mouth of Famine,
And bid the sickness cease.
(Rudyard Kipling, The Works of Rudyard Kipling, 1994)

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Introduction

Eric J. Hobsbawn (1994: 4) in his seminal book *The Age of Extremes* presents the prospect for the 21st century world system with his keen insight that the collapse of the Cold War system triggered a massive flow of “political uncertainty, instability, chaos and civil war” in zones of the Third World, particularly former communist regimes. The reshuffling global order in the post-Cold War era destroyed the old mechanism contributing to stabilizing the bipolar system of international relations for the four decades, and brought to the fore the shakiness of the domestic political statehood in the Third World which had rested on the structural stability under the Cold War system. Indeed, the breakdown of the Cold War system, as many scholars emphasize, generated a critical cut-off point in which the latent sources of conflicts in the Third World emerged from ethnic cleansing, religious separation, extreme right-wing nationalism, and the rampant terrorism across state borders (Mueller 2000; MacFarlane 2000; Rapley 2002). In short, it can be fair to conclude that the external variable of ‘the end of the Cold War’ is the most decisive factor to explain the sources and origins of insecurities in Third World societies.

However, such a single external impact itself does not suffice to describe a sea change in the historical social system forming the internal sources of conflicts and disorders in the post-Cold War Third World. The transformation of the power balance in the international society would not become a self-evident factor without a complementary course of action to

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2 Definition of the concept, the Third World, has always been problematic and slippery. Some scholars argue that the concept, in the period of the post-Cold War, is not relevant any longer as a useful category for analysis on the geographical area outside Western Europe and North America, thus suggesting the disuse of the concept (Ravenhill 1990; Goldgeiser and McFaul 1992). As replacements of the Third World, numerous alternatives have been proposed to tag this group of states – for instance, the South, the Periphery, and the Developing countries. Geographically speaking, however, any terms other than the Third World fail to cover the traditional cluster of states across Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America in a comprehensive manner. Some states which can be categorized as the Third World are located in the ‘northern’ areas of the globe. Some of Southeast Asian countries which have experienced the rapid economic growth are hardly named as the peripheral states; probably, at least, they should fall on the zone of the ‘semi-periphery’. Most Third World countries have also been far behind developing countries like South Korea and Taiwan, so that they need to be classified as a new term ‘underdeveloped’ or ‘less developed’ countries. All in all, given that the process of conventional conflicts has never been complete even in the post-Cold War era and they are still popping up in the areas classified traditionally as the Third World, the old term ‘Third World’ is adopted as the main concept describing a group of states which will be investigated in this essay.
investigate its interconnectedness to internal causes of local disputes embedded in a given historical condition of Third World states. As John A. Hall (1996: xii) aptly criticizes, the spectacular US/UN victory in the Gulf War, which has been highlighted as a good example of external contingencies restructuring domestic orders in postwar Iraq, was ironically discolored by widespread and escalating ethnic violence rooted in distinctive localities of the Iraqi religious and cultural institutions. Thus, understanding the social embeddedness of internal dynamics in the Third World is a necessary condition to represent an entire picture of insecurities that Third World societies have faced in the aftermath of the Cold War.

In this regard, this essay will tackle a fundamental question on security issues of the Third World in the post-Cold War period: where the main sources of insecurity in the Third World originate from - *internal* instability in the historical social system or the *external* transformation of the modern world system. By bringing together those two different subjects that have hitherto been examined separately, the essay rests on an alternative approach to weigh internal sources against outer changes in the external systems. To this end, the discussion proceeds in three steps. The first part touches upon the question whether the end of the Cold War increased or dampened instability and conflicts in the Third World. Secondly, external and internal dimensions for Third World conflicts are listed and assessed in a brief manner. Thirdly, it is suggested that a better frame to analyze the origins of bloody turmoil in the Third World is to filter external impacts through the prism of internal dimensions and integrate the internal and external into a more constructive frame for analysis.

**The Cold War Stability Thesis Revisited**

Some academic scholars or policymakers in the realist context like to view the end of the Cold War as the major cause of developing countries’ conflicts, primarily in the sense that the bipolar distribution of power during the Cold War era mostly contributed to mitigating conflicts in the Third World (Waltz 1979; Neuman 1998; Kalu 2001). The bipolar Cold War system played an important role in hushing up the tinderboxes of Third World conflicts at the inter- or intra-state level by making ideological propaganda aiming at the effective management of both US-led capitalist bloc and USSR-led communist bloc. Military and economic aids among allies had been utilized as a strategic apparatus for leading states in
each bloc to maintain peaceful coexistence of secondary states within the blocs and prevent them from bandwagoning (Walt 1987). In a similar vein, the world system theorists concur with this realist assessment by noting that power shifts in world hegemony created the political vacuum of global governance, which led security issues of the Third World in systemic crisis and brought about turbulence and chaos in world politics (Wallerstein 1995: 268; Silver and Slater 1999). The core value of the Cold War stability thesis, therefore, easily jumps to the conclusion that the main sources of insecurity in Third World countries are formed primarily by the transformation of external systems after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

However, it is obviously premature to assume that the fundamental dynamics of Third World conflicts have been changed in the wake of the end of the Cold War, and the resultant tensions among Third World states have been much more highly exacerbated. This assumption considering the one-sided dimension of Third World insecurities in the post-Cold War period is doomed to encounter the following flaws. Firstly, superpower rivalries during the Cold War made Third World conflicts even worse by presenting the external sources of political, military, and economic support to regional disputants, by which prompted local proxies to take on more hostile postures and make longer local conflicts with the equipment of ideological fillip (Loup 1983; MacFarlane 1985; Ayoob 1995). In other words, local conflicts in the Third World had been used as proxy wars steered by two superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union in order to test each superpower’s political intentions and strategic purposes in the areas where each side’s interest was extremely confronted. In cases of the 1950 Korean War and the 1965 Vietnam War, we now know that both civil wars in the Cold War period can be defined as proxy wars mobilized and controlled by superpowers for the sake of test cases for American resolve to withstand communist offensive in East Asia (Cumings 1990; Khong 1992). We now also know such hot wars devastated people and lands of proxy states so severely that the alleged virtue of the Cold War stability thesis can be rightly negated.

Secondly, it is worthy to note that the rising disarrays in Third World societies are deep-rooted in not only immediate repercussions of the demise of the Cold War but also the recurring outgrowth of longstanding historical shackles which the European powers during the imperial heyday implanted into the rest of the globe in the form of the system of national
states. Just as European empires, prior to the outbreak of the two World Wars, forced local authorities in the peripheral zones to adopt the Westphalian model of statehood without full consideration of native peculiarities under the rosy name of the Enlightenment, so the two superpowers – the US and the USSR – during the Cold War period, by way of decolonization and the alliance formation, coerced the newly-born states into demarcating their territorial boundaries and consolidating their political systems along with ideological frontlines imposed by the Cold War rivalry. In a nutshell, the expansion of international society, which proceeded with the ignorance of ethnic, religious and cultural differences in Third World societies, has inevitably been accompanied with chronic insecurities of the Third World throughout the 20th century (Watson 1984; Vincent 1986). The seeds of discontents in the post-Cold War Third World, therefore, result from the unrelenting expansion of international society since the epoch of imperial colonization, rather than a simple external contingency of the collapse of communism.

As a final point, such a notion of the international society paradigm requires us to reconsider the Cold War stability thesis and pay more attention to the internal dimension of insecurity sources in the Third World (e.g. Bull 1977). Against the imposed process of the territorial demarcation, various ethnic or religious groups right after the end of World War II began to claim their own rights of ‘self-determination’ in the wake of decolonization, which was ironically instilled by the former imperial states. Likewise, the post-Cold War epoch was also characterized by the upsurge of independent voices for establishing ethnic self-governments in the region of the former communist countries. The common aspect of these two historical phenomena – the end of both World War II and the Cold War – endorses the persistent existence of internal causes for the Third World insecurity whilst external conditions, in marked contrast, had been undergoing the roller-coaster moves in the rise and fall of the power structure at a given international system (Abu-Lughod 1993). The upshot is that the incidence of internal conflicts has been constant, no matter how the external shield to maintain international order and neutralize the latent sources of Third World crises has been varying over time.

The importance of internal factors notwithstanding, it would not be a qualified conclusion that external factors do not have any important impacts on the emergence of
insecurity in the post-Cold War Third World. The worthy role of external dimensions should be well counted as one of key triggering sources by which the latent conflicts in the Third World began to awake from long sleep, even if they are not sufficient accounts for the sources of insecurity. All in all, we need to regard both internal and external dimensions as the main sources of insecurity despite the variation of relative weights across them, and further attention needs to be given to the interconnectedness between the two dimensions. The subsequent sections will look through them one by one with selected issues.

External Dimensions
An essential source of insecurity in Third World societies has been forcibly structured by the external world system and its impacts on sovereign governance in domestic politics. Some new outer pressures which are locking the Third World into insecurity in the post-Cold War period can be classified as the following three fronts in world politics.

The Unipolar Transformation of the Power Structure
One of remarkable changes in external dimensions comes from the fact that international system in the post-Cold War era is not run by bipolar confrontation any longer; instead, a few plausible scenarios such as the unipolar system and a concert of the great powers are suggested as its replacement. The current transformation of world order demonstrates that the United States is the only major power with the will and the military capabilities to perform the role of policeman for the Third World. Nor does any agreement exist on who, if not the United States, has the leverage, influence, and money to bring the kind of pressure that produces positive results on security issues of developing countries (Ruggie 1994; Wohlforth 1999).3

As a result, Third World countries which want to be protected from the internal conflicts by invoking the superpower’s engagement become more dependent on American strategic interests and foreign policies than they did during the Cold War era (Acharya 2000: 97). Otherwise, weak or failed states in the Third World are more likely to take an extreme

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3 As regards the further debates, particularly argument criticizing the stability of the unipolar system in the post-Cold War period, refer to Christopher Layne (2006).
measure to challenge America's unilateral ventures by procuring or producing weapons and even nuclear weapons, all of which aim at guarding state sovereignty against US-led interferences. As is well known, we can witness clearly such a radical challenge in the cases of North Korea's nuclear development when the Bush administration accused North Korea of one of rogue states and the Iranian pursuit for nuclear weapons after Hussein-led Iraq was tumbled down by the United States. The emergence of global terrorism, whose conception has been popularized after the September 11 attacks, could be also interpreted in the similar context as the far most extreme counterblow made by the Third World. Indeed, the retreat of the bipolar protection and the advent of the one-power domination in world politics drive the dependent Third World to choose its way on whether or not it will be aligned with the US grand strategy. Namely, going with America is good and right; if not, it will be deemed unjust. Such an enforced discrimination between right and wrong, however, eventually boils down to the undesirable result of situating Third World states on even more mired impasse regardless of their original intentions.

**Humanitarian Intervention**

Humanitarian intervention, despite its enlightened rationale for minimizing the suffering of civilians in Third World states, could turn easily into another external sources undermining domestic security of its targeted countries. Given that the missions of humanitarian intervention are selected and spearheaded mostly in accordance with strategic concerns of the United States and other leading powers, manipulating the processes of the target selection comes up with detrimental interventions which can be rather escalating the magnitude of insecurity and vulnerability in Third World societies. It is primarily due to the lack of consideration on domestic conditions of the targeted countries, which would thereby result in reducing the effectiveness of humanitarian interference (Wheeler 2000).

However, Third World concerns about the growing frequency of international intervention in conflicts, particularly intra-state turmoil, surpass the apprehension that such intervention may be launched to serve the political goals of one or more of the great powers. James Mayall (1996: 6) asserts that the concerns are fundamentally entrenched in tensions between the UN- or the U.S.-led humanitarian intervention vis-à-vis internal conflicts and the
cardinal rule of the international society of states – the equal sovereignty. Armed interference with humanitarian objectives has been justified by the elastic interpretation of the Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter in the face of the Third World’s condemnation that the great powers and intergovernmental agencies, under the superficially attractive slogan of ‘humanitarianism’, have been violating the United Nations Charter’s principle of noninterference in the exclusive right and domestic jurisdiction of an individual state (Jonah 1993). As a result, the external inputs of humanitarian intervention are more likely to create internal turbulent outputs mobilizing and militarizing social forces against foreign agencies, particularly United Nations peacekeepers. The UN-led peacekeeping mission in Sudan’s Darfur region in recent years demonstrates evidently that foreign troops dispatched to halt the Darfur genocide have frequently encountered severe physical threats, even attacks to kill United Nations peacekeepers, from local insurgents.

Moreover, another negative effect of the external intervention in Third World politics arises from the notion that the excessive intervention of external forces in domestic conflicts would hamper the targeted states to initiate and consolidate the state building process, thereby destabilizing the legitimate authorities of political regimes and generating anti-government movements calling for civil wars in the end. Now that humanitarian engagement per se would be easily galvanized and overdone when foreign actors see any possibilities of geopolitical, economic, and resource-based significances in the targeted countries, Western efforts to help the world’s most dangerous and desperate countries, as William Easterly criticizes, become the ‘white man’s burden’ for his own deed (Easterly 2006). It is in the sense that such efforts do seldom succeed in reducing insecurity and conflicts in the domestic arena of the Third World so that they bring about a boomerang effect requiring further more international intervention as a solution to diminish the humanitarian backfire.

**Securitizing International Politics**

The final category of external sources involves a new trend of redefining the concept of security in international relations. In the wake of the end of the Cold War, the coverage of security has been increasingly broadened from the military-based traditional conception into economic, political, societal, and environmental versions of security dimensions (Buzan 1991;
Katzenstein 1996; Buzan et al. 1998). As regards the unit of analysis in security studies, non-state actors have been also highlighted as the referent of security, with a variety of linkages and tensions between the unitary entity of nation states and multifaceted non-state entities. This new approach to international security contributes to blurring the conventional borders which has been clearly drawn between domestic agendas and international issues.

However, the danger on this stretched concept of security is that all things could be considered threat to security if one perceives them as the potential sources of insecurity, and would-be threats, thereby, could be securitized by one's strategic intention or ill will. Given that the process of securitization is more likely to be undergone beyond the boundary of political procedure within the internal mechanism of a state, new security agendas open to any issues beyond the traditional ones can be imposed on Third World states by leading powers and intergovernmental organizations. Following the discourse of securitization, once a certain issue is set up as an urgent security agenda endorsed widely by the international community, a series of extraordinary measures to tighten up the development of securitization would be claimed by the great powers in order to make secondary states accommodating themselves to such a new concept of security. Indiscrete securitization, thus, would throw unfavorable drawbacks to Third World countries which are not well ready to respond to economic, societal, and even environmental care taking for their constituencies or still have trouble with ethnic, religious and tribal conflicts. For instance, Western powers’ thrust to link trade with international labor standards (Blue Round) or environmental standards (Green Round) results in aggravating the Third World’s insecurity as Third World states have no sound governments and civil societies to deal with such external pressures aiming to carry through new security agendas. Indeed, they are severely exposed to securitization on those issues of labor and eco-friendly business, all of which are designed and implemented by external actors. In consequence, international efforts to broaden the concept of security following the end of the Cold War, paradoxically, end up with the broadened range and density of insecurities in Third World states.

**Internal Dimensions**

External dimensions of insecurity in the Third World become much more complicated if they
face the internal sources of Third World conflicts. As Mohammed Ayoob (1995: 165) demonstrates, the problematic factors of insecurity in the dimension of internal aspects are, by and large, divided into two categories: (1) increasing legitimacy accorded to ethnic nationalism by the international community; and (2) the increasing incidence of failed states. These two internal factors, which are frequently interrelated, have emerged as the major post-Cold War challenges to security and integrity of Third World states.

**Ethnic Self-Determination**

Along with the end of the Cold War, the renewed acceptance of ethno-national self-determination by the major European powers and the United Nations, symbolized by the prompt recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by the European Union, the separation of Slovakia and the Czech Republic, and the division of the former Yugoslavia into three ethnic nation-states, is likely to give a fillip to demands for ethnic separation in the Third World. The international community's endorsement of the self-determination doctrine on the ground of ethnic nationalism is bound to pose warnings against the existing principle of international society - territorial boundaries among states must be inviolable. Given the ethnic mixtures of populations in most Third World countries and the fact that few pure ethnic nation-states exist, it would be fair to state that the separation movements or attempts for territorial restoration under the sensitive rhetoric of ethnic self-determination encounter drastic resistance from ethnic minorities in presumed ethnic homelands. Looking at the inherent nature of ethnic self-determination, common ethnicity does not create social cohesion or communitarian accord so that nationalist regimes are necessarily impelled to maintain unity by force rather than by consent (Ignatieff 1994: 1-11). This is the main reason why ethnic nationalist regimes are more authoritarian than democratic.

In reality, new nations such as Serbia and Croatia, the Baltic States, and the new Asian republics, have institutionalized ethnic majority domination in ruling authorities, rather than democratic governance on top of the respect for ethnic minorities. Particularly, ethnic nationalism has been flourishing in Eastern Europe because forty years of communist single-party rule effectively destroyed civility and democratic culture which once had been in the region. When the Soviet empire and its satellite regimes collapsed, the nation state
structures of the region also collapse, leaving hundreds of ethnic groups at the mercy of each other; since none of these groups had the slightest experience of conciliating their disagreements by democratic discussion, violence or force primarily resting on ‘their own blood and belongs’ became their arbiter (Halperin et al. 1992; Ignatieff 1994). This brings to us a working proposition that ethnic nationalism does not anchor its roots in societies with extensive democratic values and traditions. In this context, new states reach an impasse on their security matters: while they carved out in the name of ethnic nations, the ethnic mixtures of populations would be always an explosive warehouse addressing the contradiction between their claims to ethnic nationalism and the substantive existence of the other ethnic minorities. In addition, these new states have not experienced in managing ethnic conflicts by adopting democratic conciliations. Accordingly, the linkage between the doctrine of malleable self-determination and the metamorphosis of ethnicity causes Third World countries to be more vulnerable to the internal insecurity predicament.

Failed States: The Lack of Institutional Capacity
The second internal origins of insecurity in the Third World, as Francis Fukuyama (2004: 23-32) elaborates, can be found in the corrosion or breakdown of institutional infrastructures. Shaky foundations of institutional framework would necessarily provoke the deterioration of state governance, thus paralyzing a complex set of institutional constraints including the formal and legitimate rules nested in the hierarchy of social order (North 1990: 83). In fact, the invocation of ethnic self-determination has been closely interconnected with the breakdown of institutional apparatuses designed for state governance in Third World countries. Ethnic nationalism becomes far more rampant when institutions collapse – more specifically, when existing institutions are not fulfilling people’s basic needs and satisfactory alternative structures are not readily available (Snyder 1993: 5). The presence of malfunctioned statehood calls for the rebirth of ethnic atrocities that could provide ethnic groups with a new institution characterized by the ethnic discrimination and majority predomination, and in doing so, the ethno-centric politics can give ethnic groups the belief of

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4 According to Fukuyama (2004: 23-32), institutional capacity consists of four nested aspects of stateness: (1) organizational and management, (2) political system design, (3) basis of legitimization, and (4) cultural and structural factors.
In this regard, Robert Jackson (1990: 13) asserts that the failure of consolidating state institutions in a robust and effective fashion takes responsible for the emergence of ‘quasi-states’ in the Third World. A mixed chain of external and internal events – the end of the Cold War, its entailing disappearance of ideological, political, and economic shields from superpowers, and more importantly, the prevalence of ethnic self-nationalism in domestic arenas of the Third World – has been catalyzing the process of transformation of quasi-states into even more worsening configuration of the so-called ‘failed states’. Despite the ongoing controversy over the declaration whether or not a state has ‘failed’, a failed state, whose central government is so weak or ineffective that it has little practical control over much of its territory, is obviously deemed as the internal sources of insecurity in the Third World.5

It is of great importance to note that the most central component in the emergence of failed states corresponds to the extent of how fragile and ineffective the basic institutional arrangements to protect people from dangers of everyday life as well as external threats are (World Bank 1994). The difficulties of failed states, therefore, vary considerably in accordance with the degree of institutional capacity that Third World regimes can marshal to maintain social order. The contemporary Iraq’s social unrest after the Second Gulf War could be interpreted in line with such institutional difficulties, in that the low profile of institutional capacity in postwar Iraqi government failed to control internal disputes and neutralize assertive demands for religious differences in the process of state building. As a result, the weak governance of the Iraqi new political regime resulted in dragging the US military presence in the Iraqi territory, even though Washington has always been pressed by the hot debate over when American troops should be retreated from Iraq. All in all, the prevalence of insecurity caused by internal weaknesses of institutional capacity is necessarily bound to incur the intervention of external forces and even the prolongation of their stationing.

5 With regard to the debate over the concept of failed states, the extremely radical stance toward its definition can be found in Noam Chomsky’s recent book Failed States (2006). In this book, Chomsky argues that the United States is becoming a ‘failed state’ so that the current pattern of governance in the United States would be perceived as a danger by both its own people and the world.
Linking the Internal and the External

As seen in the foregoing section, both internal and external dimensions of insecurity in the Third World are so profoundly interpenetrated that internal instability, as a result of ethnic nationalism or fragile governance, called outside interference such as humanitarian intervention, on the one hand, and external contingencies stemming from the collapse of the Cold War brought about the upsurge of ethnic conflicts in the Third World, on the other. Any single approaches to insecurity of the Third World would be dashed to the ground because they have seldom been qualified to show the whole picture of the origins of insecurity in the post-Cold War period. Without a comprehensive approach to integrate two dimensions in a symbiotic shape, any sequential explanations from the external to the internal (or vice versa) would produce no more than an *ex post facto* report on what has already happened in Third World conflicts. A vicious cycle of insecurity in the Third World, therefore, is unrelenting with the effect of enlarging the divergence in economic and democratic development in different regions. Alternatively, more attention should be given to how to bridge internal and external dimensions for better solutions to deal with Third World problems in a more systematic way. In this essay, two conceivable ways to link them together are suggested as policy prescriptions.

Maximizing Governability

First of all, all external commitments – humanitarian intervention or international aid – are required to prepare the following three elements in association with the governability of the targeted states: (1) the establishment of democratic governance; (2) the promotion of economic development; and (3) the enhancement of institutional capacity to strengthen the two preceding elements. The establishment and consolidation of democratic governance are necessary conditions to reduce the incidence of ethnic and religious turmoil in Third World societies. In the post-Cold War era, making democracy work and finding a democratic means through which outsiders can help remain a high priority in the terrain of humanitarian commitments for poverty-stricken Third World states. Western policymakers use various methods to spur the targeted countries toward democracy, from economic sanctions to the force of arms. Their most common and effective tool, however, is democracy assistance – aid programs explicitly designed to bolster democratic institutions, processes, and principles
### Table 1. Ten Worst Per capita Growth rates in the Third World (1980-2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Freedom indicator*</th>
<th>Per capita growth (%)</th>
<th>Aid/GDP (%)</th>
<th>UN peacekeeping operations**</th>
<th>Time under IMF program (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congo, Democratic Republic of</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
<td>4.69</td>
<td>MONUC (1999)</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>6.14</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>UNOCI (2004)</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
<td>9.41</td>
<td>MINUSTAH (2004)</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>5.95</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
<td>11.94</td>
<td>UNMIL (2003)</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>10.78</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>6.01</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>13.15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>5.41</td>
<td>-5.8</td>
<td>15.37</td>
<td>UNIOSIL (2006)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>6.36</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>11.18</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>19.98</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>5.98</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>10.98</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


** Data on UN peacekeeping operations refer to the UN official website (www.un.org/Depts/dpko/factsheet.pdf).

(Carothers 1999). Democratic institutions, once established, contribute to slowing down ethnic conflicts by filtering them through democratic processes to find a way of narrowing widened
gaps between different ethnic groups. In actual fact, ten Third World countries, whose median freedom indicator is 5.98 (see table 1), have been, for more than two decades, mired in nondemocratic dictatorships imposing restraints on political freedom and civic participations in social movements against governments’ corruption and electoral frauds. The lack of the democratic rule necessarily ruined the possibility of mutual concession through peaceful dialogues, so that the existing political order was always challenged and disturbed by internal violence and conflicts. Such an internal instability is more likely to invite external forces as surrogates for domestic authorities to repair political vacuum and humanitarian disasters, as table 1 confirms that five out of ten failed states have been under the humanitarian protection of UN peacekeeping operations. In a nutshell, the even further weakening of governability in the Third World would be unavoidable unless humanitarian intervention or foreign aid is explicitly connected with the conditionality that the recipient government should ensure democratic reforms in return for outer assistance from the international community (Killick et al. 1998).

Likewise, linking international aid with developmental projects tailored for domestic economies of the Third World is also considered one of critical methods to enhance the governability, since the revitalization of the retarded economies, in part or in full scale, leads ethnic or other untamed groups to cooperate with the government. Until the mid-1980s, the primary response of the aid community to conflicts in Third World states was to provide emergency assistance designed as a palliative for the humanitarian crises. In the post-Cold War period, however, a new orthodoxy emerged that humanitarian aid could play a significant role in the management of conflict by adopting developmental principles and approaches in a longer term of the recipient economies (Duffield 1994; Macrae 2001). The ten worst failed states in the domain of economic growth rates show negative 1.9 percentage of per capita growth on a median average, and international aid provided for them consumes at a median average rate of 10.98 percent of GDP (see table 1). More strikingly, table 1 also illustrates that the median time assigned to supervise those failed states in Africa and Asia under the IMF programs is no less than 54 percent of 23 years – namely, 12.4 years between 1980 and 2002 – with some variation from 16.6 years for Togo to 4.6 years for Nigeria. It signifies that economic assistance programs prescribed by the IMF have not made positive effects on the real path of
economic development in local economies of failed states, or the IMF programs would be unilaterally imposed on the recipient countries without due reflection of local conditions (Stiglitz 2002). The pivotal point here we can envisage is that the better way to maximize the efficacy of external aid programs would be to marry international aid to some specific and long-term development projects designed to vitalize economic infrastructure on the basis of local conditions; otherwise, external interventions would undermine the governability of local authorities, extending internal instability to an unlimited extent.

Finally, the first two patterns of external-internal links – democratic governance and economic development – can get on the right track only under the third condition that they should be accompanied with the rich soil of institutional apparatuses in the new born regimes. The poverty of transparent and sound institutions to deal with external interferences is directly related to institutional failures in enhancing the effectiveness of external aid programs by either democratic reforms or development projects. Maximizing the governability, therefore, depends upon the degree of the institutional control over politics in Third World societies (Ringen 1987: 70-75). According to World Bank reports (see figure 1), in countries with good macroeconomic management and efficient public institutions, donor-financed projects were 86 percent successful, with much higher rates of return. Conversely, in failed states with weak policies and institutions, the corresponding figure is a measly 48 percent. These findings highlight that the most critical contribution of World Bank-initiated projects is not to increase just funding for particular recipient countries, but to help improve service delivery by strengthening sectoral and public institutions. In this sense, the World Bank (1998: 3) calibrates the value of its aid projects to development projects aiming to strengthen the overall quality of institutions and policies in the recipient country. Making institutional capacity strong and efficient, therefore, is at the core of external-internal links, as well as the fundamental foundation for promoting democratic reforms and economic developments in the Third World. In short, the integrative efforts to diminish internal insecurity by means of the utilization of external aid should begin with the reinforcement of institutional infrastructures where democratic governance and economic growth projects can, then, be positively engrafted on local actors suffering failed stateness.
### Minimizing Differences

The governability could be further more maximized when the external-internal linkage adopts the second element of minimizing cultural differences by the proactive consideration of local peculiarities. Borrowing Mark Granovetter’s notion of ‘social embeddedness’ (1985), we can analogize that internal sources of insecurity in failed states are embedded in the context of institutional capacities, which are also affected by historical contingencies in which they are set. In this sociological sense, a Third World country’s cultural and historical conditions – particularly, ethnic, religious, or tribal circumstances – may profoundly affect the character of external-internal insecurity relations by either encouraging or discouraging domestic actors’ cooperation with external intervention. Formal schemes of democratic order or economic reform plans imposed by external agencies are untenable without some elements of the practical knowledge on the local scene that they tend to dismiss. When ignoring essential features of any real, functioning social values in the targeted country, certain kinds of external interferences, driven by the utopian humanitarianism or strategic objectives, would be a
mortal threat to human well-being in the Third World (Scott 1998). Thus, more desirable strategy of external-internal links is to promote home-based development embedded in the local, the traditional, and the customary, rather than prearranged plans rooted in Western experiences of modernization (Easterly 2006: 341). By doing so, external actors like international relief agencies, also, can tighten the grip of conditionalities by successful cooptation of some powerful groups representing indigenous values and cultures.

In practice, the correspondents in the Third World to the call for cultural cooperation from external actors are mostly identified with public institutions administered by local governments. However, given that most governments in the Third World have been undergoing the spread of corruptions in managing public institutions, civil society is fast becoming one of dominant alternatives replacing the tainted government (Bickford 1995; White 1995). In the 1990s, many intergovernmental organizations such as the World Bank, IMF, and UNDP seemed to pay more attention to linking aid projects with reliable internal actors through civil society in order to reduce the cultural differences and enhance the effectiveness of aid programs. The amount of money allocated to strengthening civil society is very small against the backdrop of aid; civil society organizations (CSOs) play an important role in promoting social justice that is culturally modified by the reflection of actual localities. Accordingly, external-internal links through CSOs present the lure of emancipatory promise that civil society is used to mean all good things in all places and at all times (Kumar 1993). Nevertheless, many scholars warn that the flood of Western funds for such organizations has produced too much or too wrong kinds of growth (Van Rooy 1998: 198-205). Financial shakiness is more likely to generate corruptions within CSOs; amateurish staffs in CSOs are not qualified to secure the sustainability of aid projects; and the lack of policy consistence results in decreasing accountability. Such a downside of the CSO-based external-internal nexus leads the ‘going local’ trend to be reconsidered and the benevolent Tocquevillean vision is required to revise itself by adopting a new device to orchestrate local CSOs in line with donors’ aid plans. It is in this regard that ‘civic education’ programs have been a mandatory element of US democracy aid portfolios worldwide over the past fifteen years (Carothers 1999: 231). Indeed, the idea of teaching citizens of the Third World basic values, knowledge, and skills relating to democracy is a logical outgrowth of the proactive recognition of civil society
as a key partner who can work together to minimize differences between external agencies and internal actors.

**By Way of Conclusion**

On the one hand, the most extreme view, in the camp of proponents of the external sources, presents Gramsci’s hegemonic insights applied to insecurity in the Third World, which mean that after the collapse of the Cold War only the Third World remains a highly visible target of American force in order to reconstruct American supremacy, whereas during the Cold War period any alliance members in capitalist bloc became the target of force from American hegemony (Augelli and Murphy 1993: 133). On the other, the very opposite excessiveness emerges from the viewpoint of internal insecurity: historical inequalities in the design of colonial institutions, even since the fifteenth century, constitute the most important source of current disparities in living standards across countries in the Third World (Acemoglu et al. 2001). Dialectically, the common element of two extremities stems from the notion that “the Third World is an identity based on a perception of peripheralization and victimization” (MacFarlane 2000: 19).

With this three-pronged fronts Third World countries face in the post-Cold War period, this essay is an academic effort to construct the fabric of the external-internal nexus as a middle-range solution for the sources of insecurity in the Third World. By deconstructing the analytical wall standing between external and internal approaches to the Third World insecurity, the essay suggests two possible scenarios of integrating the two dimensions: maximizing governability on the basis of democratic governance, economic development, and institutional capacity; and minimizing cultural differences by inviting local CSOs as key partners. Particularly, domestic factors such as ethnic self-determination, failed statecrafts, and the utility of civil society are highlighted as a critical platform on which the external dimension that we have long regarded as the main sources of insecurity in Third World countries could be reinterpreted and reproduced. Characteristically, we now know at least that the end of the Cold War is just one of important factors, not a sole structure revealing the whole sources of insecurity in Third World states.

As a final remark, the tasks ahead are fairly suggested: academic efforts to integrate
Third World studies into development studies are essentially requested. Taking into consideration the Third World's failed stateness in many aspects, the discourse of external-internal links should provide further discussion about how to rebuild up the sound statehood through the constructive cooperation between external aid agencies and internal institutions. It should go beyond the nonproductive debate over the origins of the Third World. This is also the best way to reduce or terminate white man's burden whose ending is seldom anticipated in due course of time.
References


