China spent much of 2025 “re-living 1945.” At the Moscow Victory Day parade, President Xi Jinping extolled the Sino-Russian partnership as a pillar of geostrategy and advocated for defending the antifascist triumph. While associating Russia with stability amid its war on Ukraine presents a jarring juxtaposition, the demand for a “correct understanding of WWII history” was a recurring motif throughout Beijing\u2019s own memorial events. In November, following the Japanese Prime Minister\u2019s characterization of China\u2019s naval blockade of Taiwan as a \u201csurvival-threatening situation\u201d for Japan, President Xi called on President Donald Trump to \u201cjointly safeguard the victory of WWII.\u201d Notably, amidst this escalating row with Japan, China held a low-key memorial of the Nanjing Massacre\u2014a hallmark of its WWII suffering\u2014signaling a tactical departure from the victimhood discourses that have long anchored its national identity.
\nWhy has China\u2019s historical narrative at least partially pivoted from victimhood to “victorhood,” and how is this shift mobilized to justify its domestic rule, its contemporary vision of international order, and its foreign policy? This article addresses these questions through the practice approach in International Relations, treating historical narration, commemoration, and diplomatic speech acts as socially meaningful patterns of action that reproduce and contest international order. By tracing the evolution of these commemorative practices from 2015 to 2025, I argue that China\u2019s performance of victorhood\u2014as a claim to authorship and guardianship of the postwar system\u2014intertwines discursive and material acts to advance both domestic and strategic objectives.
\nDomestically, elevating the Communists as the central pillar of the Chinese war effort against Japan\u2014at the expense of the Nationalist Party\u2014serves to legitimize the former\u2019s rule. While this is par for the course, the international ramifications of this reinterpretation deserve closer parsing. Rhetorically, China presents itself as a great power “present at the creation” of the United Nations-centered postwar order and thus as a legitimate guardian of its principles. Materially, this narrative frames Taiwan\u2019s return to Chinese sovereignty as an integral outcome of the 1945 settlement, thereby rationalizing China\u2019s current coercive posture and de-legitimizing foreign intervention as a violation of the postwar legacy. By shifting attention from victimhood to victorhood, this article shows how China deploys historical memory not merely as nationalist rhetoric, but as an active practice of global order-making.<\/p>\n