

# Wartime Japan's Theater Movement

Sang Mi PARK

## Abstract

The paper discusses how wartime Japan's cultural policy functioned as an important means for total mobilization. While referring to Nazi German cases, the Japanese state produced its own cultural policies. Instead of direct control over film, theater, and entertainment, Japanese career officials collaborated with non-bureaucratic cultural specialists and the private industrialists. I focus on the practice of the people's theater movement. The massive participation of the ordinary people in the state-initiated theater campaign demonstrates how the government negotiated with both theater producers and audiences. Although the officials were unable to completely control the practice of the theater movement, the state's ideas of appropriate aspects of culture were spread and practiced among the people by performing and watching theater in public places. The movement attracted the people's attention to the state's goal and worked as effective social campaigns at the peak of the war.

## 1. Introduction

Common perceptions of the wartime Japanese state tend to highlight its oppressive policies toward culture. As supporters of this idea, some researchers of modern Japanese history have focused on how the state controlled thought, censored the media, closed theaters, and banned entertainment<sup>(1)</sup>. These examples might suggest that the state constrained people's ability to enjoy autonomous activities in order to gear up for total mobilization. This widely shared interpretation ignores the subtle approaches that the state took toward culture.

This paper examines how the state attempted to shape appropriate aspects of culture so as to contribute to the war effort. The state employed cultural programs to renovate the nation into a corporatist body. While disputing Western materialism and capitalistic selfishness, Japanese leaders educated the people to work for a public purpose rather than for private interest. The German concept of the leadership principle (*Führerprinzip*)<sup>(2)</sup> was useful for the Japanese leaders seeking to discipline the people as a body for group activities and to cultivate an ideal of harmony and public spiritedness. Emulating Nazi German cultural policy, Japanese officials and intellectuals encouraged indigenous values like sacrifice for the community,

obedience, thrift, public order, and cooperation. In order to practice those ideas among the people, Japanese bureaus used various cultural fields of film, literature, mass media, music, arts, and tourism<sup>(3)</sup>. And those cultural policies functioned as the government's propaganda strategy for mobilizing people's willing support of the state's goal<sup>(4)</sup>.

I focus on how the state spread its own idea of culture through the practice of the people's theater movement (*kokumin engeki undō*). As a part of cultural movement, theater played a role in attracting the people's attention to the state's goal of war mobilization. The state expanded amateur theater (*shirōto engeki*) and mobile theater (*idō engeki*) movements as effective social campaigns at the peak of the war. The people learned and practiced the state's ideologies by performing and watching theater programs.

The wartime theater movement suggests an enduring pattern of state-society relations in Japan. I found that the Japanese state's negotiation with various theater groups, and the state's involvement of the private sector in the public realm, characterized Japan's cultural practice in general. Instead of owning the entertainment industry, like its Nazi counterpart, the Japanese state took indirect control of theater and mobilized much human/material resources from cultural specialists (*bunkajin*)<sup>(5)</sup>, private theaters, and

ordinary people. The specific theater project initiated by the state exemplifies the fact that Japanese officials did not take an entirely top-down method in carrying out cultural policy. Consequently, the state's negotiation with theater producers and audiences who pursued autonomous activities paved the way for success in war mobilization. The first section discusses Japan's acquisition of Nazi German cultural policy, and in the ensuing sections, I discuss Japan's actual practice of culture through the promotion of amateur theater and mobile theater movements.

## 2. Japan Emulates the Nazi German Cultural Programs

The wartime Japanese government used culture to reshape the nation into a corporatist state. The dilemmas of Western-led industrialization and modernization under the Great Depression during the 1930s influenced Japan, which faced increasing economic tensions, labor disputes, and social fragmentation. Japanese social bureaucrats in the Home Ministry and some Marxist scholars like Miki Kiyoshi in the Showa Research Association (Shōwa Kenkyūkai) perceived that the existing condition constituted a crisis in modern politics. The SRA was a brain trust organized by future Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro<sup>(6)</sup>, and tried to reform the structure of the nation state. Progressive members of the SRA did not cast off modernization itself but considered alternative methods to solve common problems of capitalism in the corporatist ideology. They believed that by establishing a cooperative body of the Japanese nation through the state-led "New Order" structure, Japanese and East Asian nations could create social harmony free from Western control<sup>(7)</sup>.

However, these progressive camps in Japan had a contradictory attitude toward the West. While they endeavored to be independent of Western influence, Japanese leaders adopted from the West their methodology for renovating the nation. Japanese civil servants and intellectuals researched the cultural policies of Western developed countries, and tried to find the best model. Japanese researchers were not satisfied with the cultural programs of the United States where private organizations took a leadership role. They preferred the models of Western European countries, which exhibited relatively strong centralization. In Europe, the public institutions, religious organiza-

tions, and governments expanded cultural programs<sup>(8)</sup>. Some Japanese researchers also looked to the *Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro* (OND, literally "After Work"), which organized programs for leisure activities in Fascist Italy. However, the Italian case proved not to be sufficient for those who wished to establish a corporatist state in which no conflict existed between the state and society. Italian ministries and big companies organized ONDs, yet maintained separate management and thus lacked unification among ONDs.

Japanese researchers selected the German model rather than the Italian or other European models because they believed it be an ideal type of a corporatist state. Indeed, Japan's corporatist ideology was not distinctively Japanese, but rather the emulation of the German ideal of a classless *Volksgemeinschaft*. The Japanese had similar ideas to the Germans that nations can have freedom only when the people work for the public good. Gonda Yasunosuke and Kondō Haruo, Japanese ethnographers of popular culture and theater, were fascinated with the *Kraft durch Freude* (KdF, literally "Strength through Joy"), the state-controlled leisure organization in the Third Reich. The KdF was a part of a corporatist organization of the German Labor Front (*die Deutsche Arbeitsfront*). On November 27, 1933, Dr. Robert Ley, the leader of the Labor Front set up the KdF in order to inspire a sense of community or public-spiritedness (*Gemeinnutz geht vor Eigennutz*<sup>(9)</sup>). KdF presented diverse programs through its divisions of the Bureau of Sports (Sportamt), the Bureau of Travel, Walking, and Vacation (Amt für Reisen, Wandern und Urlaub), the Bureau of Entertainment (Amt Feierabend), the Bureau of Social Education (Amt Deutsches Volksbildungswerk), and the Bureau of the Beauty of Labor (Amt Schönheit der Arbeit). KdF encouraged the people to participate in collective activities like tours, sports, and cleaning up of the village, and the Bureau of Entertainment dispatched mobile theaters (*Wanderbühne*) to local cities and the countryside to inspire in the people the ideology of cooperation<sup>(10)</sup>.

The above German programs to uplift the morale of workers, youth, and peasants suggested to the Japanese counterparts that state ideology should be more than abstract concepts or rhetoric. Similarly, Japanese reformists believed that the ideology of the New Order should be implanted and practiced among the people, and by doing so, new policies could win the people's

minds (*kokumin no shinri*). On October 12, 1940, the Second Konoe cabinet (July 22, 1940-July 16, 1941) set up the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusankai; hereafter IRAA) within the Division of Information (Jōhōbu), which expanded into the Bureau of Information (Jōhō Kyoku) on December 6, 1940. The IRAA aimed to make the whole Japanese nation serve the public (*shokuiku hōkō*) and to abandon selfishness (*shikō*) or private mindedness (*shi*) under the state-led corporatist structure of a New System (*shin taisei*). By reforming a society that had been centered on liberalism and capitalism into one controlled by the state, the IRAA believed it could establish the people's morality (*kokumin dōtoku*)<sup>(11)</sup>.

Japan's cultural policy was not planned only by career officials. The Japanese officials involved prominent figures in arts and entertainment as commentators for the state's cultural policy. Both career officials and non-bureaucratic cultural specialists associated with the IRAA undertook a "positive guidance" (*shidō/josei no sekkyoku shugi*) for renovating the Japanese nation<sup>(12)</sup>. Kishida Kunio, a playwright, was one of the main activists. After he came back to Japan from France where he had studied theater, Kishida committed himself to politics and designed a far-reaching cultural policy throughout the war period. Kishida became a chief of the Division of Culture (Bunkabu) in the IRAA by the recommendation of Miki Kiyoshi<sup>(13)</sup>.

Like other cultural reformers, such as Gonda and Kondō, Kishida wished to emulate aspects of the KdF. What attracted Kishida the most was the fact that Germany applied theater to renovating its national polity. The Third Reich integrated theater under the state's control. It promulgated a national theater law (*Reichstheatergesetz*) in 1934, and under this law, it designated a large budget for theater; the state's expenditure for theater in 1934 was 58,500,000 marks<sup>(14)</sup>. With this budget, Germany established many theaters run by the state, including the Theater des Volkes in Berlin, to provide plays to people at reasonable prices. While entrance fees for the opera were generally 3 to 25 marks, KdF members were able to enjoy it for only 75 pennies to 4 marks<sup>(15)</sup>. Also, the state covered the average of 61.42 percent deficit suffered by theater management during the year of 1934 and 1935<sup>(16)</sup>. Along with strong support from the state, the KdF expanded activities enormously and facili-

tated greater participation. Both the number of events that the KdF hosted and the number of participants increased from 1934 to 1938: the total number of events increased from 24,672 in 1934 to 144,434 in 1938, while the total number of participants also increased from 9,111,663 in 1934 to 54,568,467 over the same years<sup>(17)</sup>.

Kishida, as an ambitious playwright himself, welcomed the German case where he saw the central role of theater in politics. Because it would integrate such diverse artistic fields as music, dance, literature, and pictures on stage, Kishida believed that the theater would be the most effective art form to define a nation-state's culture concisely (*chōkanzu*)<sup>(18)</sup>. The establishment of a new theater system controlled by the state could especially serve as the machinery to educate the people to follow the rules of the community as well as to discipline them in rituals (*girei*) of collectivity<sup>(19)</sup>. Furthermore, training the Japanese as a great people (*rippana Nihonjin*) was important in renovating the state's image in the external world<sup>(20)</sup>. Kishida argued that militaristic occupation and expansion in Asia was not enough to secure Japan's defense. To establish a Japanese high-level defensive state (*kōdo kokubō kokka*)<sup>(21)</sup>, it should not only be militarily "strong" (*tsuyoku*) but also culturally "beautiful" (*utsukushii*). Only when Japan expressed its cultural ability to guide the "backward" Asian nations, would they voluntarily follow the leader<sup>(22)</sup>. Thus, Japanese should express their dignity (*hin'i*) and prestige (*ishin*) as the leader of Asia<sup>(23)</sup>, and each Japanese should properly know that daily behaviors were connected to the making of the state's image (*kokufū*)<sup>(24)</sup>. In short, to beautify [Japan] meant to increase its power (*bi mo mata chikara nari*)<sup>(25)</sup>.

On December 21, 1939, the Japanese Ministry of Education (Monbushō) set up a committee to discuss the rehabilitation of the theater, the cinema, and entertainment (*engeki, eiga, goraku nado kaizen iinkai*)<sup>(26)</sup>. Among twenty-five committee members, most of them were prominent specialists in the fields of theater, film, and entertainment, including Konda Yasunosuke, Kishida Kunio, and Kawatake Shigetoshi, the director of the Theater Museum in Waseda University, while three were bureaucrats from the Ministry of Education: Omura Seiichi, the vice-minister, Tanaka Shigeyuki, the chief of the Bureau of Social Education, and Fuwa Suketoshi, the officer in

the Bureau of Social Education. The theater division of the committee held a meeting once a week and discussed the state's policy on theater. On November 26, 1940, the committee submitted the first draft of its theater renovation plan to the minister of Education. The members stressed the state's overarching control over actors, directors, agencies, and promotion, by establishing public institutions or schools for theater as well as the enactment of theater law (*engeki hō*)<sup>27</sup>.

The Japanese government failed, however, to enact theater law or to establish public institutions for theater as Nazi Germany did. This contrast may be explained in part by the fact that the Bureau of Social Education made personnel changes, and reshuffled Tanaka Shigeyuki and Oda Naritsugu, the head of a Section of Adult Education (*Seijin Kyōiku Ka*), both of whom worked on introducing a bill for theater law<sup>28</sup>. More critically, the IRAA experienced struggles in acquiring its own budget. Conservative political groups like the National Polity Protection Alliance (*Kokutai Yōgo Ren'gōkai*) and Hatoyama faction denounced this new political system organized by Kono, saying that it was based on "communism" (*kominterun no teeze*) and thus violated the imperial constitution. The criticism aroused disputes against establishing a budget for the IRAA, and the Imperial Diet (*teikoku gikai*) rejected the proposal of 37,000,000 yen and decided to provide the IRAA with only 8,000,000 yen for the year of 1941<sup>29</sup>.

In this situation, if the IRAA were to establish a formal institution and law for the direct control of theater, it would need to furnish strong leadership and funds. Even though German theater policies were extremely attractive to some Japanese officials, their Japanese counterparts did not have to completely adopt the same form as in Germany. Instead, the IRAA found an alternative way of controlling theater by cultivating traditional norms and values of cooperation and sacrifice. It collaborated with autonomous theater groups and mobilized the people's participation in a nation wide theater movement. The state educated the people through theater on how to renovate culture, and the people learned broadly how to use time and resources effectively, to assuage fatigue, to endure the hardships of the war, to regulate consumption, and to promote savings.

### 3. Work (*kinrō*), Entertainment (*goraku*), and Amateur Theater (*shirōto engeki*)

Theater was integrated into the state's labor policy under the war economy. Prominent Japanese economists and theater specialists agreed that labor disputes were more than an economic problem, and they raised the issue of adopting entertainment to improve work efficiency. They understood that laborers would express complaints if the government and company managers only focused on overworking workers. Exhorting workers to endure hardship would not be sufficient to raise productivity<sup>30</sup>. Thus, Ōkōchi Kazuo, professor in the Department of Economics at the Imperial University of Tokyo, stressed the critical role of leisure (*kyūyō*) at workplaces. Ōkōchi pointed out the fact that Japanese industries had exploited female workers in developing the spinning industry and textile industries, under the phrases of "move Japan forward" (*yakushin nippon*) and "increase export" (*bōeki shinchō*). These female workers did not have any leisure because they were worked too hard. Most light industries in Japan did not provide welfare, and thus created poor workplace environments. This affected workers' health conditions and brought about a decrease in both efficiency and quality<sup>31</sup>. As a cultural economist, Ōkōchi regarded consumption (*shōhi*) as a prerequisite for production. This meant that as far as it contributed to enhancing labor power, spending time on leisure would not be wasteful consumption. Leisure could be a safe device for the state to prevent worker's outrage and to facilitate production by giving them energy to labor day after day. Accordingly, the state should not discourage all forms consumption<sup>32</sup>.

In May 1940, the state set up the Society for the Study of Theater for Workers (*Kinrōsha Engeki Kenkyūkai*) within the *Kyōchōkai* (Harmonization Society)<sup>33</sup>. The *Kyōchōkai* was a semi-governmental organization set up in December 1919 for the purpose of promoting harmony between labor and management. This organization was a sophisticated device of the Japanese social bureaucrats to preclude radical labor movements that increased after World War I. Japanese officials, prominent industrialists, and academic specialists served on the board of directors and educated laborers in the "spirit of cooperation"<sup>34</sup>. The

Kyōchōkai established the Society to urge workers to organize their off-work time around leisure and entertainment activities at the workplace. State officials and the most representative scholars, artists, and critics in the field of theater in Japan joined the Society: Sonoike Kin'aru and Senga Akira from the Bureau of Information, Endō Shingo from the IRAA, and Itō Kisaku from the Japanese Federation of Mobile Theater. These figures, changing the name of the Society for the Study of Theater for Workers into the Society for the Study of Theater at the Workplace (Shokuba no Engeki Kenkyūkai) in February 1942, expanded theater programs for workers<sup>35</sup>.

Theater specialists in the Society had a leftist stance and previously promoted the New Theater (*shin'geki*) movement in the 1920s. Tsubouchi Shōyō in fact had been the leading figure in the progressive theater, and had expressed his interest in social problems on stage, like the strikes of urban laborers and rural peasants that lurked behind the façade of modern life. The new theater groups led by Tsubouchi developed public theater (*kōkyōgeki*) and pageant theaters. But they pursued somewhat art-oriented (*geijutsu shijō shugi*) theater, and only small numbers of the intelligentsia were involved with the New Theater<sup>36</sup>. Along with nationalistic sentiments in the 1930s, the state increased its oppression toward leftist ideology and dissolved these new theater groups<sup>37</sup>.

It is ironic then that former leftists actively participated in the state-initiated amateur theater movement. However, those progressives expected their ideals to be achieved under the new theater system (*engeki shin taisei*) by renovating the current entertainment for the working people (*kinrō kokumin*). In a temporary meeting of the IRAA, officials and theater specialists pointed out the unbalanced distribution of entertainment. It was apparent that the countryside had few theaters while cities had many. Commercial theaters were blamed for attracting urban bourgeois audiences through their profit motive, and this selfishness and private interest in turn aroused excessive competition among theaters. Entertainment under the old system did not function for factory workers and farmers who were, as the cultural reformers regarded, indeed laboring for the state. Cultural planners emphasized that the state was taking care of workers through its control (*tōsei*) of entertainment<sup>38</sup>.

The Society for the Study of Theater for Workers

set up a rule not to take entrance fees for amateur theater performance to encourage workers' easy access. If theaters charged entrance fees, they would have to pay a high tax. For example, the tax on entrance fees was 10% for ticket prices below one yen per person, 20% for ticket prices between one and three yen, and 30% for tickets over three yen<sup>39</sup>. In doing so, the state proclaimed its support for the producing classes (*seisan kaikyū*). It was able to propagate the idea that the state's control was for the people, which was different from commercial theater which served the consuming class (*shōhi kaikyū*) in cities<sup>40</sup>. Of course, the state did not intend to evoke leftist theater and to inspire a class ideology. It rather expected to be able to control the people, while advocating its efforts to provide the working people with welfare and to improve their working environment.

Like the German Labor Front, the Japanese state incorporated amateur theater activities into the industrial patriotic movement (*sanpō undō*). Group discipline and public order were especially emphasized in amateur theater, and the state paid the most attention to organizing the people within the cooperative body of community. The IRAA encouraged amateur theater groups to perform only in their own working places or villages. The promotion of the theater would thus be through such corporative organizations as the agricultural cooperatives (*sangyō kumiai*), the youth groups (*seinendan*), and the industrial patriotic units (*sanpō*, the abbreviation of *sangyō hōkokukai*)<sup>41</sup>. These groups were plan-level units modeled on German examples. Translating the German concepts of "shop community" (*Betriebsgemeinschaft*) and a classless *Volksgemeinschaft* (nation's community), the Japanese cultural planners evoked their own indigenous ideal of the organic village (*kyō dōtai*)<sup>42</sup>. The Japanese counterpart, furthermore, imposed the Japanese cultural characteristic of simplicity on stage in amateur theater. As opposed to commercial theater, amateur theater could not produce splendid stage sets, and the running time for each play was short at about twenty minutes<sup>43</sup>. Indeed, the very poor conditions under which these performances were conducted, lacking as they did sufficient human resources and theatrical accoutrements, was believed to cultivate a particularly Japanese cultural virtue. Participants in amateur theater would endeavor to maximize their limited resources and environment,

and thus the amateur stage could be a place to testify to the abilities and potentials of Japanese to overcome the peak of difficulty (*kunan no goku*)<sup>(44)</sup>.

In detail, the Society for the Study of Theater for Workers published guidebooks to explain how to act in amateur theater. It required all the players to maintain public order, and to participate in the process of making a play, including the writing of scripts, building stage sets, and cleaning up under the guidance of leaders. This group activity was encouraged to foster a consciousness of being a member of the Japanese nation, regardless of the players' social positions, and to train the participants to fulfill their own roles in groups. The state expected that this collective activity (*itchi kyōryoku*) could inculcate a spirit of cooperation (*wachū kyōdō or kyōwa no bifū*) with each person taking responsibility for a role (*yaku*) at their workplace<sup>(45)</sup>.

Adopting the German concept of the *Führerprinzip*, the Society called for submission to the community. The guidebooks in fact advised workers and farmers to obey their leaders (*shikisha*) in factories and plant-level units. The leader, in turn, should control theater participants. In terms of controlling people's behavior, amateur theater leaders did not have to be theater specialists. Leaders in the village or workplaces could participate in guiding plays<sup>(46)</sup>. In any case, however, it was required that leaders be qualified as "good" Japanese with upstanding public morality (*kokumin dōtoku*). They were responsible not only for play performances but also actors' manners (*fūgi*) and personality (*jinkaku*). Compared to professionals in the commercial theater, amateur theater directors should have a broader role as leaders to guide other participants to behave well on and off-stage. Keeping such details as actors' arrival time, running time, rest time, and ending time was emphasized as a way to train group activity<sup>(47)</sup>.

There were also guidelines regarding models for good scripts. The Society prohibited content such as intrigue against the Imperial House, corrupt costumes and brutality that evoked crime, and satire and vulgarity<sup>(48)</sup>. It recommended scripts to incorporate daily conversations and events from everyday life. In doing so, proper plays under conditions of war were meant to deliver the message that even small events in daily life could be linked to national benefit and to encourage morale at both the workplace and home<sup>(49)</sup>.

It is important, however, to note that the state was

negotiating with the audiences of amateur theater groups. The Society did not take direct control of programs, but allowed variation in genres and presentations. Comedy was welcomed to make plays interesting and to attract ordinary audiences' attention. For example, Tug of War (*Bōoshi*) was recommended by the Society as a good work. This play ran eighteen minutes, and was performed by members of the Central Association of Agricultural Cooperatives (*Sangyō Kumiai Chūōkai*) at the Japan Youth Hall (*Nihon Seinenkan*) in January 1941 and was also widely broadcast on the radio. It was a story about a conscript, and depicted not only the worries of the family left behind but also their hopes for the son who goes to the front.

Tetsuji (Younger brother): Why are you delaying your marriage?

Shōta (Elder brother): It is because I want to go to the battlefield without worries when I happen to get a draft paper (*shōshū*).

Tetsuji:...Don't you see that everyone, whether he has a wife or children, honorably goes to the battlefield?...Shizuka-san (fiancée of Shōta) is a woman of the empire...Would she shed tears effeminately even if you leave tomorrow?

Fujiheiei (Father): Don't worry...I still have the energy to take care of our home while you guys are away, and to farm. Go resolutely when you get call-up papers (*akagami*). Go, for the honored Emperor (*tenshi*).



Figure 1. A scene from Tug of War (*Bōoshi*). Source: '*Bō oshi*' *enshutsu tebiki: kinrōsha engeki* (Tokyo: Kyōchōkai Sangyō Fukuribu, 1941). Courtesy of The National Diet Library.

This play encouraged the people to willingly serve the state by joining in the nation's glorious struggle or by dying a proud death. But, actors did not explicitly embody war spirit, and militarism was not pervasive in this script. During the most of the play, actors were simply talking about their marriages, gossiping, and describing their families with a comic and bright touch, all while playing a game of tug of war. They only incorporated messages of the war effort into their conversations briefly at the end<sup>50</sup>.

Thus, the state was flexible in arranging the content of programs, whereas it was strict toward community activities in theater promotion. The state's ideal to construct a great Japanese culture meant programs to amuse the people to endure the hardships of the war. That said, merely repeating serious talk about the war effort was not effective in attracting the people to the theater. In most of the cases, what the ordinary Japanese people enjoyed making and watching was often not up to these lofty standards. Many amateur plays imitated professional entertainment, and they presented revues, sword fights, popular songs, and comic dialogues (*manzai*). Moreover, one critical problem that was often raised was workers' violations of the state's guidelines for amateur theater. In 1941, the Division of Culture in the IRAA announced its research on current amateur theater affairs, and pointed out that some workers went to other villages or working places, and made earnings through performances<sup>51</sup>. It is clear that the state did not always control the actual practice, and this contradiction within Japanese cultural policy was most apparent in mobile theaters because of the mediation of private commerce.

#### 4. The Mobile Theater Movement (*idō engeki undō*) and the War Mobilization

##### One) The Expansion of the State's Ideology via the Mobile Theater

Mobile theater shared similarities with amateur theater. In principle, commercialism was not allowed in those theaters because it pursued both private interest and consumption. Those theaters denounced individualism and aimed at harmonious group activity (*shūdan waraku no yorokobi*) within certain regions and workplaces. Also, they were entertainment for/

among the "working people" (*kinrōsha*), with an expectation of helping increase their productivity (*zōsan gekirei undō*)<sup>52</sup>.

However, "touring" differentiated the nature of mobile theater from that of amateur theater. To dispatch theaters from the center to local areas necessitated considerable resources, and it became a critical issue for the Japanese state to mobilize funds. Japanese cultural planners understood the effective function of mobile theater under war conditions after they researched *Wanderbühne* initiated by the Bureau of Entertainment in Nazi Germany. Mobile theater played a role as a public media through which the state was able to make relatively easy contact with the "isolated people" in remote places far from the central government. Visiting officials and theater groups delivered the state's ideas on war's purpose to the local people, and they also reported local conditions to offices in the cities. Identical in purpose to *Wanderbühne*, the Japanese mobile theater was designed to cultivate the indigenous moral virtue of mutual cooperation between the state and society.

Autonomous theater groups were motivated to cooperate with the state's project. The war situation called on commercial theaters to share burdens for the state and people. The state had been often criticizing commercial theaters for their pursuit of profit (*eiri shugi*), and contentment with the "old" system. Theater was expected to thereafter provide service for the public good. Because of the criticism from the state, commercial theaters first attempted to cut down their entrance fees so as to demonstrate their openness to the low-income classes. This led instead to a reduction in the number of performances to deal with any decreased profits and increased unemployment, and this tactic especially threatened the livelihood of nameless actors. Organizing mobile theater, from the perspective of commercial theaters, could be expected to appease criticism from the state as well as to solve their unemployment problem. Some denounced the intentions of commercial theaters as based on opportunism, suggesting that they sought to profit from cooperation with the state (*kokusaku binjō*). Others simply disregarded mobile theater actors as nuisances (*hana tsumami*) for top managers of theaters or famous actors because they did not provide financial benefits to the company. In any case, theaters decided to organize mobile theater troupes to provide unemployed

actors with chances to work, and to show that they were laboring for the state<sup>53</sup>.

Commercial theater companies managed by Kobayashi Ichizō, the president of the Hankyū Railway Co., were the first to organize groups for mobile theater activities. First, on September 27, 1940, Tōhō formed the Tōhō Mobile Culture Corps (Tōhō Idō Bunkatai; hereafter, the Corps), followed by other big theaters like Shōchiku and Yoshimoto. <Figure 2.> Under the leadership of Matsubara Eiji, a Tōhō actor, the Corps culled its members from Tōhō Theater (Tōhō Gekidan), Tōhō Dance Corps (Tōhō Buyōtai), and Tōhō Orchestra<sup>54</sup>. These Tōhō groups communicated messages that they were leading (*sossen*) welfare and cultural movements for the people (*kokumin kōsei undō*, *kokumin bunka sokushin undō*) by organizing the Corps. They claimed to be providing the “industrial warrior” (*kinrō senshi*) in the countryside, factories, and mines with “healthy” theater, which was meant to contribute to “expanding productivity, cheering up, and nourishing life.” These companies proclaimed that they were selling their labor as a public service (*kōeki*) to the nation through theater (*engeki*



Figure 2. The Tōhō Mobile Culture Corps (Tōhō Idō Bunkatai). Source: *Toho jūnenshi* (Tokyo: Tokyo Takarazuka Gekijō, 1943). Courtesy of Toho Company Ltd. (The image is partly edited by the contributor.)

*hōkoku*)<sup>55</sup>.

Since its first performance at the Hibiya Public Hall (Hibiya Kōkaidō) in Tokyo on October 19, 1940, the Corps held several performances in the Tokyo area hosted by Tokyo city and several of its wards (*ku*). Also, the Corps held its first provincial performance in Nagano prefecture on January 21, 1941. Touring many regions in the Japanese isles, the Corps participated in social events to promote savings, to increase food and coal production, and to comfort the people in disaster areas<sup>56</sup>.

To cover the Western areas (*kansai*) of Japan, the Takarazuka Girls' Revue organized a mobile troupe. The Revue created a small team called the Takarazuka Music Service Corps (Takarazuka Ongaku Hōshitai), which mainly consisted of newcomers. Later on, the Revue increased the number of actors and musicians in the troupe, and added stars and famous singers<sup>57</sup>. Later changing its name to Takarazuka Song-Dance Service Corps (Takarazuka Shōbu Hōshitai) and Takarazuka Revue Mobile Corps (Takarazuka Kageki Idōtai), the Revue provided popular song, dance, and variety shows to the people in factories and hospitals. The girls in the Revue visited the Glico factory and Matsushita Electronics (Matsushita Denki), and taught workers national songs and dances such as *kokumin shingunka* (marching song of the people), *sangyō hōkokuka* (song of the industrial patriotic units), and *kenkoku ondo* (the lead-in song for the founding of a nation). In addition to Western Japan, they also actively visited industrial areas in Kawasaki city and Kanagawa prefecture<sup>58</sup>. <Figure 3.>

However, the state was not yet entirely satisfied that a couple of prominent theaters began to organize mobile theaters. Both the officials and theater specialists in the IRAA understood that public service eventually would not be the primary goal of commercial theaters and that each private theater would hesitate to continue its tour if the tour did not bring about much profit. Thus, they considered “laissez-faire” to be unreliable<sup>59</sup>. Starting from February 1941, the Division of Culture in the IRAA made frequent discussions with the top managers of theaters and officials in the Bureau of Information on the issue of integrating current troupes into the corporatist structure directed by the state. The participants of the meeting thought that through one corporate body, theaters could be fairly distributed into local areas<sup>60</sup>. On



Figure 3. Performances in the countryside. Source: *Toho jūnenshi* (Tokyo: Tokyo Takarazuka Gekijō, 1943). Courtesy of Toho Company Ltd.

June 9, 1941, the Bureau of Information and the IRAA established the Japanese Federation of Mobile Theaters (Nippon Idō Engeki Renmei; hereafter, the Federation), a corporate organization. Kishida Kunio became chairman (*iinchō*) of the Federation, and Itō Kisaku, a prominent figure in the field of stage management, became bureau chief (*jimukyokuchō*)<sup>(61)</sup>. The Japanese representative figures from the Cabinet, corporative organizations, commercial theaters, and media participated as members of the Federation. They included: 1) officials from the Bureau of Information, the IRAA, and several ministries; 2) corporative organizations such as the Great Japan Industrial Patriotic Units (Dai-Nippon Sangyō Hōkokukai), the Central Association of Agricultural Cooperatives, the Cultural Association of Farming and Fishing (Nōsangyoson Bunka Kyōkai), and the Great Japan Youth Group (Dai-Nippon Seishōnendan); 3) commercial theaters such as Tōhō, Shōchiku, Yoshimoto, and Shinkō; and 4) Tokyo Daily Newspaper (Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun) and Osaka Daily Newspaper (Osaka Mainichi Shinbun). The Federation consisted of six departments of distribution, production, propaganda, education, research, general affairs, and accounting. With official and non-official support, the Federation was able to incorporate the current

mobile troupes into the affiliated theater groups (*kamei gekidan*)<sup>(62)</sup>.

Mobile theater activity was a state-initiated cultural movement. Accordingly, state officials believed that Japanese culture should be distributed only through the state's network. Corresponding with corporative organizations and theaters, the Federation arranged schedules and checked the routes of performance. The state controlled both supply and demand of theater productions<sup>(63)</sup>, because it allowed only affiliated theaters to provide their plays to the working people while only corporative organizations were able to host mobile theaters. The state's authorization differentiated mobile theater from autonomous itinerant troupes (*tabimawari*), which had been performing without any control from the state<sup>(64)</sup>.

At the same time, Japanese culture was shaped through the state's control of the actors' bodies. Leaders of the Federation argued that the very practice of group training (*dantai rensei*) demonstrated the characteristics of the Japanese culture. This was not invoked by *tabimawari* troupes because they did not emphasize actors' behaviors off-stage. Similar to amateur theater, discipline was an important issue for mobile theater. The Federation emphasized that the disciplined attitude (*setsudo*) of actors would become

the basis from which Japanese culture would be propagated (*bunka fukyū*). It was required that actors behave as models (*mohan*) of good people (*rippana kokumin*) because they could influence the local people during their stay. Thus, actors were to present good performances off-stage as well. With this purpose, from mid June to early July in 1941, the Federation held comprehensive education programs to train actors as leaders of cultural propaganda. The program included not only public morality (*kōshū dōtoku*) but also daily etiquette. For example, they were instructed to say *itadakimasu* (I will help myself) and *gochisōsama* (I have enjoyed the dish very much) before and after having a meal, and to salute (*keirei*) when they passed by shrines (*jinja*). The program also trained actors in time management, physical drills, and duties in cleaning, dining, and bedding. These trainings were designed to bind individuals together into a group. Also, mobile theater actors were required to wear a national uniform (*kokumin fuku*) and perform solemn national ceremonies (*kokumin girei*) before their main performances. They were required to worship the Imperial House (*kōkyo yōhai*), perform silent prayer (*mokutō*) for the soldiers, and sing a national song (*kokka seishō*), ending with *banzai hōshō* (shouting “long live the emperor!”). In the sense of disciplining the body, performing mobile theater was beyond mere entertainment. By practicing this collective ritual, the Federation expected to inspire in actors ideas of endurance (*nintai*) and self-control (*kokki*)<sup>(65)</sup>.

Audiences also participated in the practice of culture. After watching theater performance, the local people and actors organized “informal discussions” (*kondan*). Participants not only reviewed stage performances themselves, but also discussed how to manage their household, to keep public order, and to discipline their bodies. Off stage actors were supposed to educate their audiences in their daily practices. Those off-stage performances were encouraged in the example of practicing air raid evacuation drills, too. The hosts were required to mobilize audiences in an orderly fashion through “neighborhood associations” (*chōnakai and tonarigumi*). With the end of each performance, the Bureau of Research (*chōsakyoku*) in the Federation distributed questionnaires to check the details of the group training. Those questionnaires included not only audiences’ comments on perfor-

mances but also the method of mobilizing audiences and the behavior of actors and audiences. They became critical documents for the Federation to oversee the actual outcome of the discipline training<sup>(66)</sup>.

Besides the off-stage rules, the Federation also designed guidelines for theater promotion. The Federation considered “touring” to be the specific condition of mobile theater. In 1941, the Federation set up the following rules for mobile theater scenarios: the running time should be from thirty minutes to an hour; the number of characters should be no more than ten people; stage equipment should be easy to carry; and the content of the script should be interesting to amuse the audiences. It also recommended that the running time for the whole performance be three to three and a half hours<sup>(67)</sup>.

Under the guidance of the state, the mobile theater movement expanded all around Japan. During the year of 1941 when the state set up the Federation in June, Japan had a total number of 1,071 tours and performed to a total audience of 1,411,675 people. This meant that three or four troupes had recitals everyday somewhere in Japan, and daily mobilized about 3,870 people as audiences<sup>(68)</sup>. Also, during the two and half years after the Federation was established, the mobile theater movement achieved the following results: a total itinerary spanning 612,200 km, 3,500 performances, and a total audience numbering 4,498,000. To further enumerate, from June 1941 to August 1943, each commercial troupe provided the following number of performances: 304 by the first team of Shōchiku Kokumin, 126 by the second team of Shōchiku Kokumin, 332 by Tōhō Mobile Culture Corps, 310 by Yoshimoto Mobile Theater, 318 by Shōchiku Kansai, 463 by Takarazuka Revue, and 75 by Kansai Yoshimoto<sup>(69)</sup>. Activities performed by the Corps and the Revue were noticeable. The Corps had a total number of 488 performances from October 1940 to December 1943. It participated in 181 events hosted by the agricultural cooperatives, 114 by the industrial patriotic units, 133 by the IRAA, and 60 by others<sup>(70)</sup>. The Revue also held a hundred performances during 1941, which increased to a total number of 495 performances and mobilized a total audience of 729,000 people during 1943. This meant that the Revue performed on average at least once a day and mobilized audiences of about 1,470 people each time<sup>(71)</sup>.

It was ironic that service (*hōshi*) to the state was

only possible with the firm support of commercial theaters, which were often denounced as a part of Western cultural influence<sup>(72)</sup>. Commercial theater was deployed as a powerful instrument to mobilize the people, and that was why the state did not close theaters until the very last stage of the war<sup>(73)</sup>. In 1944, the mobile theater movement saw its peak with a total audience of 4,580,000 people in Japan<sup>(74)</sup>. The Federation succeeded in impartially distributing mobile theaters to diverse local areas without focusing on any particular region. In short, the expansion of the mobile theater movement was possible only through the state's involvement of the private sector in the public realm. Japanese officials and theater specialists negotiated with both theater providers and audiences. Behind the success in terms of the quantity of performances, however, the mobile theater movement had its own dilemmas and problems.

## Two) Dilemmas and Negotiations of the Mobile Theater Movement

The "success" of the expanding mobile theater movement partly derived from overworking (*jūrōdō*) actors. The theater companies were not motivated to consider their laborers' welfare because most of the mobile theater actors came from non-popular groups. Indeed, mobile theater activities required physical strength. Troupes moved around nationwide, and schedules were tight. Because it was difficult to revisit the same place, when it went to an area, a troupe normally had one or two performances around the area every day over a span of a week or ten days<sup>(75)</sup>. Also, because the size of troupes was so small – they generally consisted of less than twenty members – actors were obliged to handle other tasks besides their main job of stage performance. When they arrived at a region, actors worked on stage sets by themselves. After performances, they participated in social activities with the local people, and wrapped up their facilities to move onto another region. Their main concerns were how to rationalize their equipment and utilize simple stages sets. Poor working conditions also tired them out. They took the cheapest seats on trains, and moved by truck and on foot even in bad weather<sup>(76)</sup>. Actors had to take care of themselves or else risked getting sick, which could bring about a failure in their travel schedule<sup>(77)</sup>.

Some managers in theaters and the Federation

were concerned with bettering the life of actors. It was not enough only to appeal to actors to understand the state of affairs (*jikyoku ninshiki*) and to demand sacrifices for the state (*shokuiki hōkō*). Because most of the actors had families in Tokyo, and some of them were quite popular in the big theaters<sup>(78)</sup>, the state was asked to provide health insurance (*kenkō hoken*) and pensions (*yōrō nenkin*) to support them<sup>(79)</sup>. Nevertheless, the state did not provide any practical welfare policy for them. The mobile theater movement did not in fact make participants healthy, but rather exhausted them.

Actors' complaints arose. After the war, Nagai Tomoo, an actor of Mizuho Theater, one of the mobile theater troupes at the time, published diaries written by his fellows during 1943 and mid 1945. They complained of hardships they faced during performances. They criticized the Federation for only emphasizing group etiquette such as greetings (*ojigi*) and courtesy (*gyōgi*), as well as the number of performances rather than quality of plays (*shibai*). They felt so tired not only physically but also mentally that they lost the motivation to improve their performance techniques. Diaries became the place where mobile theater participants could complain about the government and theater planners<sup>(80)</sup>.

Despite overworked conditions, mobile theater witnessed a sharp increase since the establishment of the Federation in 1941, in numbers of performances and audiences, as noted above. The reason was partly because the state negotiated with audiences, as in the case of amateur theater. Just as the war situation was becoming critical in the early 1940s, it was important to mobilize audiences into the realm of the state's propaganda. Compared with its strictness in terms of discipline and network, the Federation showed a flexible attitude toward the arrangement of programs. The Federation gave autonomy in both content and organization of programs to theaters, and allowed each troupe to present its own specialty. Performances did not have to concentrate on war inspiration itself. They were recommended to be interesting enough to attract the people's attention, and the Federation allowed comic dialogues (*manzai*), light comedy (*keiengeki*), and variety shows<sup>(81)</sup>.

Theaters variously decided the contents and topics of plays through discussion with each corporative organization to meet its goal. For example, the indus-

trial patriotic units preferred scenarios that inspired industrial warriors to increase coal production (*sekitan zōsan undō*). Because of its theme, *Toward Increasing Production (Zōsan e)*, a play by the famous playwright Agi Osuke, was most often hosted by the industrial patriotic units<sup>(82)</sup>. As if reflecting the urgency of coal production, the industrial patriotic units hosted more theater performances than any other corporative organizations. From June 1941 to June 1943, the industrial patriotic units hosted 1,730 performances and reportedly mobilized a total audience of 2,248,139 people. This number was much more than the agricultural cooperatives (609 performances and 693,880 people), the IRAA (718 performances and 866,828 people), and all the rest (386 performances and 578,220 people) among a total of 3,443 performances and 4,387,067 people<sup>(83)</sup>.

The IRAA, the corporatist political organization, emphasized the idea of unifying the government and the people into one body (*kanmin ittai*). When the IRAA prepared an election of the House of Representatives (*shūgiin*) scheduled on April 30, 1942, it attempted to mobilize the people to vote for candidates recommended by the IRAA (*yokusan senkyo*). The IRAA expected entertainment shows not to arouse antipathy among the people against politics but to attract audiences to go to see plays on seemingly boring issues like the political system or elections. The Corps presented a variety show, the Power to Establish Greater East Asia, This One Ballot (*Daitōa Kizuku Chikara da, Kono Ippyō*) written by the famous playwright Ima Uhei. This consisted of ten scenes—Scene One: A song of the imperial assistance election, Scene Two: An election for the head of an elementary school class, Scene Three: Solo, Scene Four: Corrupt practices in a countryside election, Scene Five: A speech of a teacher criticizing corrupt election practices, Scene Six: News of Greater East Asia, and music, Scene Seven: *Manzai*, Scene Eight: The imperial assistance system in the countryside, Scene Nine: An oath of the imperial assistance election, and Scene Ten: A play<sup>(84)</sup>.

The problem was that some of the interesting programs could not necessarily satisfy all officials and theater specialists. Sonoike Kin'aru, who was a progressive theater critic and guided amateur theaters, reviewed the Corps' performance in Kanagawa prefecture. In the sense of entertaining the local people

who would have little chance of enjoyment otherwise, ventriloquism and magic shows by the Corps were valuable to present, and they were indeed well received. However, those programs, complained Sonoike, did not deal with critical issues such as the state's corporative system and increasing production<sup>(85)</sup>. The main purpose of the mobile theater movement was to propagate these issues, but the Corps did not always follow the guidance of the Federation. Takahashi Kenji, a chief of the Division of Culture and Welfare (Bunka Kōseibu) in the IRAA critically reported in his observation of one local performance that mobile theater did not provide better quality in terms of both style and content than the commercial productions<sup>(86)</sup>.

It is ambiguous as to what extent critics evaluated programs as good enough to present Japanese culture. One of the main concerns would be the Western cultural influence from the urban visitors. Some critics warned that mobile theater could provoke consumption among the people in the countryside because many mobile theater groups presented commercial-style shows such as skits, tap-dancing, *rakugo*, *manzai*, and variety shows<sup>(87)</sup>. The Corps even presented a dance-play, *Bōshibari* that the Takarazuka Girls' Revue had performed in its overseas tour, with Western instruments. However, Sugawara Tarō, a member of the Bureau of Information commented in his observation of the Corps' performance in Kanagawa prefecture that the performance was generally "healthy" because it avoided Western elements. For instance, the Corps did not use the Western imported term "tap-dancing," but called it "rhythmic movement" (*ritsudō undō*) instead. It did not use jazz in tap-dancing, but, rather, adapted the sounds of tap-dance to evoke trains, drums, and running horses in battlefields<sup>(88)</sup>.

The state did not demand clear criteria in the quality of the presentation style as long as the program was entertaining enough for the people. Loose control of the program reflected a dilemma that the state faced in administering the movement. First, the Federation did not manage enough troupes to cover all regions of mainland Japan. Considering that there were about 12,000 towns and villages in Japan, the Federation would have required at least 60 troupes, assuming that one troupe could give 200 performances per year. If it counted factories and mines as well, more troupes

would be necessary. But, only a total of eleven troupes had become involved in the Federation by April 1943. More importantly, as the process of establishing the Federation suggests, the mobile theater movement was based on the critical support of private organizations. Most of the mobile theater groups came from commercial theaters. The Federation owned only one team of Kuroganetai under its direct control (*senzoku gekidan*), and added two more troupes, called Azusatai and Hogarakatai when it set up a branch in Osaka in September 1941<sup>69</sup>.

Thus, the Federation had to share the cost with corporatist organizations and private theaters in the course of theater promotions because it lacked its own theaters. The Federation paid the fee for conveyance and transportation from Tokyo to the nearest station of the visiting area; hosts paid for the transportation fees from the arrival station to the site of performance, as well as the performance fees, stage rent, food, and lodgings; and theater companies handled the stage facilities and personnel expenses<sup>90</sup>. Those three groups paid almost equal amounts of 60 to 130 yen for each performance, which cost about 250 to 300 yen total<sup>91</sup>.

The state's dilemma was more critical in that the Federation sometimes could not always control the behavior of its audiences. Critics often pointed out the bad manners of the audiences who disturbed performances and disordered public spaces. When he went to see the Corps' performance for female workers in a raw silk factory, Sonoike criticized the fact that audiences were more interested in the male actors than in the content of the performance. At the time, a couple of famous actors, Ogino and Sumikawa of Nihon Theater, temporarily joined in the performance, and female audience members shouted during even the sad scenes, and disturbed the performance<sup>92</sup>. The audiences were apparently happy just to see such famous actors from the city<sup>93</sup>. Children also made the performing environment messy. Disorderly audiences and their low level of appreciation of performances discouraged some of the actors from memorizing their scripts. Some actors were seriously concerned over the decline in their performing techniques<sup>94</sup>.

Despite its efforts to control the network of mobile theater distribution, the Federation could not always oversee the promotion process, either. The communication among the Federation, corporations,

and theaters did not always go well, and sometimes the Federation did not give enough information regarding its guidelines to the countryside. Even though the Federation strongly prohibited earning private profits, some hosts took entrance fees from audiences. One host invited a mobile theater group without any contact with the Federation and held its own production in order to make money<sup>95</sup>.

From the perspective of commercial theaters, the mobile theater movement was dealt a blow because they could not earn financial profit. Theaters spent about 30,000 yen per year to maintain their mobile theater troupes. But, the number of performances that each troupe provided during the year was about 150 to 200 at the most because they spent off-days for travel (*idō*), rest (*kyūyō*), rehearsal (*keiko*), and training (*rensei*)<sup>96</sup>. When the Corps performed at eight places in Nagano prefecture, it brought the company a total deficit of 420 yen because its total earning was only 400 yen while the total expenditure was 820 yen. The detailed breakdown of the expenditure was as followed: 150 yen for costumes, 50 yen for stage properties, 30 yen for wigs, 50 yen for stage sets, 160 yen salary for actors (1 yen per person a day), 120 yen for two temporary musicians, 100 yen transportation fee from Tokyo to Matsumoto, 60 yen in accommodation charges, 20 yen remuneration for script, and 80 yen for miscellaneous expenses<sup>97</sup>. Even when the Corps earned a profit, the amount was exceedingly small. For example, their total earnings for performances at eighteen places in Kanagawa prefecture was only 930 yen while the total expenditure was 908 yen<sup>98</sup>.

Even though mobile theaters did not make a financial profit, they benefited from state patronage. The theaters had an opportunity to gain publicity nationwide and to expand the range of their audiences into local areas. The theaters propagated their public role as state messengers and as providing a service for the people. Local audiences sent letters to the Federation, and expressed their impressions on performances and their gratitude toward actors' providing entertainment services and amusement for the local people for free. Some audiences even expressed how beautiful the language of Tokyo was, and expected mobile theater activity to spread the standard Japanese language throughout all of Asia<sup>99</sup>. The mobile theater movement did not simply spread urban culture. Actors from

the cities learned about local cultures, including folkish dances, music, food, and legendary stories by participating in informal discussions and entertainments with local people. Actors reported on their experiences in the countryside, and expressed gratitude for the welcome and kindness with which they were greeted by the local people<sup>(100)</sup>.

Theaters were also expected to propagate their public activities for the state to the people in Tokyo. Even though the local areas were the main sites for mobile theaters, the Federation sometimes allowed the theaters to perform in Tokyo. It held the first comprehensive event for mobile theater at the People's New Theater (Kokumin Shin'gekijō) in Tsukiji from January 9 to 15 in 1942. Theaters presented programs performed in local areas and displayed an exhibition on their off-stage activities<sup>(101)</sup>. The Tokyo performance was expected to make up for the theaters' deficits incurred in local areas<sup>(102)</sup>. It was not for free but was in fact quite expensive. When the Federation hosted a special event to celebrate its success over two years at Hōgakuza (the Theater for Japanese Music) in Tokyo from June 20 to 29 in 1943, the entrance fee (tax

included) was 3.80 yen for first-class seats and 1.60 yen for second-class seats, and even a discounted ticket for industrial warriors (*sangyō senshi*) was 1.00 or 2.00 yen<sup>(103)</sup>.

Furthermore, mobile theaters expected to publicize themselves outside of mainland Japan, and they looked for promotional opportunities in Asia. Takarazuka dispatched theater corps to North China from August to September 1939, right after its U.S. tour team had returned to Japan from America in July<sup>(104)</sup>, and Takarazuka expanded its theater activity into Mongolia, French-Indochina, and later the South Seas. <Figure 4.> Takarazuka collaborated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to invite female dancers from Thailand and French-Indochina to Takarazuka. They developed cultural relations with those Asians, and attempted to absorb the diverse dances of Asia into the unified cultural sphere of the Japanese empire<sup>(105)</sup>. Tōhō Dance Corps also had its first performance in Chosen in June 1940, and went to Manchuria, China, and French Indochina in 1941 to amuse soldiers. On March 14, 1943, Shibusawa led 55 members of this troupe to Central China. Members of the Tōhō Dance Corps had about eighty performances at big theaters in Shanghai and Nanjing over thirty-seven days, and mobilized a total audience of 100,000 people. They also had sixty-eight performances for Japanese soldiers in China<sup>(106)</sup>. <Figure 5.>

Dispatching cultural troupes to Asia coincided with the state's goals. With the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, Japanese officials strengthened war mobilization in the colonies and increased efforts to expand Japanese imperialism into the empire. In the 17<sup>th</sup> meeting for trustees (*hyōgiin*) on June 27, 1941, Nagai, the managing director (*rijichō*) of the KBS emphasized propaganda within the Greater Sphere of East Asia. The KBS seemed to revise its policies that had focused on the activities toward the Western powers. The Bureau of Information set up the Committee of Cultural Affairs for the Southern Area (Nanpō Bunka Jigyō Iinkai) within the KBS and expanded human networks in occupied regions like French Indochina and Thailand. Moreover, the KBS made a cultural treaty with Thailand in October 1942, and set up the Center for Culture of Japan and Thailand (Nichi-Tai Bunka Kaikan). The Bureau of Information and the KBS invited scholars, artists, and translators from Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, Philip-



Figure 4. Performances in French-Indochina. Source: *Toho jūnenshi* (Tokyo: Tokyo Takarazuka Gekijō, 1943). Courtesy of Toho Company Ltd.




Figure 5. Performances in China. Source: *Toho jūnenshi* (Tokyo: Tokyo Takarazuka Gekijō, 1943). Courtesy of Toho Company Ltd.

pinos, Java, and Sumatra, and they promoted exchanges of books and arts. By expanding this Asian network, it aimed to deliver messages to Asians about Japan's superior aspects. The KBS published documents such as "Elementary School Education" (*kokumin gakkō kyōiku*) and "Heavy Industries" (*jūkōgyō*) in the languages of East Asia for propagandizing Japan's industrial development and modern schooling. Japanese language education programs for Asians also increased in importance, with the government's ambition of confirming it as a common language (*kyōtsūgo*) within the East Asian cultural sphere<sup>(107)</sup>.

Japanese cultural propagandists emphasized Asianness, too. Asian cultural expressions were encouraged for the benefit of the empire. The ideology of New Japanism was expected to spread throughout Asia by seducing the colonized people into watching and participating in mobile theaters<sup>(108)</sup>. The Federation dispatched troupes to Hokkaidō, Sakhalin, Chosen, Taiwan, Ryūkyū, Manchuria, China, and Nanyō<sup>(109)</sup> to amuse soldiers of the empire (*kōgun*) on the front and to mobilize the audiences in occupied territories<sup>(110)</sup>. However, programs for Asian audiences were not exactly the same as that for Westerners. For

example, the Revue focused on the mixture of Western techniques and traditional elements when it performed in Western Europe and the United States. On the other hand, the "folkishness" (*junboku*) of the Japanese nation was much emphasized for Asian performances<sup>(111)</sup>. Local dances, music, costumes, and songs from the countryside of Japan and around Asia were presented, though it is not clear whether they used Western techniques like tap dance and jazz<sup>(112)</sup>.

With the end of the war, mobile troupes ended their theater activities to mobilize the imperial subjects in Asia. Some of the members of the troupes, who were scattered all over Asia, waited for a chance to return to Japan while being forced to find a way to make a living. They performed for the Soviet soldiers and the Japanese workers in Asia, or worked at cabarets, casinos, and military bases<sup>(113)</sup>. Other Japanese troupes then adapted themselves to a new audience, the American occupation forces.

### 5. Conclusion

In the wartime context, the meaning of culture was contested among the officials and social commentators, theater groups, and the ordinary people. The state officials produced the term culture as a tool of

war mobilization, which was expected to reduce social discontent, to improve manpower, to save money, and to control the people. Sharing most of these purposes with the officials, social commentators interpreted the notion of culture as a kind of welfare for the people. People in cities and the countryside learned the state ideology by watching mobile theater actors' performances, as well as practiced those ideas of cooperation, thrift, public order, and sacrifices for the state by participating in amateur theater activities themselves. This paper proves that the Japanese state succeeded to persuade commercial theaters to share financial burdens and human resources in expanding the theater movement. This provided the private sector with partial autonomy, and the state encountered the dilemma that it could not control the whole practice of the movement.

#### NOTE

This essay originated as a chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation, which I completed in the spring of 2007. I wish to acknowledge two anonymous reviewers who provided me with warm-hearted encouragement and insightful advice. I also give special thanks to the National Diet Library and Toho Company Ltd. who kindly provided invaluable materials, as well as to staffs at WIAS who fully supported me during the publication process.

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- (2) David Welch, *Propaganda and the German Cinema, 1933-1945* (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).
- (3) Akazawa Shirō and Kitagawa Kenzō, ed., *Bunka to fashizumu: senjiki Nihon ni okeru bunka no kōbō* (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha, 1993).
- (4) Gregory J. Kasza, *The State and the Mass Media in Japan, 1918-1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
- (5) Literally "cultural persons" and generally including intellectuals, artists, and social commentators.
- (6) Sheldon Garon, *The State and Labor in Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 212.
- (7) William Miles Fletcher, *The Search for a New Order: Intellectuals and Fascism in Prewar Japan* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982); Miki Kiyoshi, "Tōa shisō no konkyō," *Kaizō*, December 1938, 8-20.
- (8) Kishida Kunio, "Bunka seisaku tenkai no hōkō (1/2)," in *Kishida Kunio zenshū*, vol. 25 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1991), 188-191; originally published in *Shinano mainichi shinbun*, January 11/12, 1941; Hoshina Atsushi, *Kokumin kōsei undō* (Tokyo: Kurita Shoten, 1942), introduction, 95-310.
- (9) It literally means "the need for the common good prevails over personal needs."
- (10) Kondō Haruo, *Doitsu no kenmin undō* (Tokyo: Fuzanbō, 1943), 11-18; Gonda Yasunosuke, *Nachisu kōseidan* (KdF) (Tokyo: Kurita Shoten, 1942), 10-24, 73-80; Niizeki Ryōzō, "Doitsu kdf no katsudō," *Bunka Nihon*, October 1940, 74-78.
- (11) Kamiizumi Hidenobu, "Kokunai shin taisei to goraku bunka," *Kaizō*, September 1940, 88-91; Miki Kiyoshi, "Bunka seisakuron," *Chūō kōron*, December 1940, 4-15.
- (12) Miyahara Seiichi, *Bunka seisaku ronkō* (Tokyo: Shin Keizaisha, 1943), 1-6.
- (13) Kitagawa Kenzō, "Senji ka no chihō bunka undō," in *Bunka to fashizumu*, 209-210.
- (14) Sugino Kitsutarō, "Doitsu kokumin engeki," in *Engekiron: engeki undō* (Tokyo: Kawade Shobō, 1943), 233-260.
- (15) Kondō, *Doitsu no kenmin undō*, 216-229.
- (16) Sugawara Tarō, "Gaikoku ni okeru idō engeki," in *Idō engeki no kenkyū*, ed. Itō Kisaku (Tokyo: Nihon Denpō Tsūshinsha Shuppanbu, 1943), 78.
- (17) Kondō, *Doitsu no kenmin undō*, 230-240.
- (18) Kishida Kunio, "Engeki to seiji," in *Kishida Kunio zenshū*, vol. 26 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1991), 3-31; originally written on November 20, 1942.
- (19) Iizuka Tomoichirō, *Kokumin engeki to nōson engeki* (Tokyo: Shimizu Shobō, 1941).
- (20) Kishida Kunio, "Kinrō to bunka," in *Kishida Kunio zenshū*, vol. 25, 246-253; originally written in May 1941.
- (21) Kishida Kunio, "Bungei no sokueiteki ninmu," in *Kishida Kunio zenshū*, vol. 25, 136-150; a radio lecture originally announced on October 29, 1940.
- (22) Kishida Kunio, "Bunka no shin taisei," in *Kishida Kunio zenshū*, vol. 25, 170-178; a lecture originally held on November 19, 1940; Kishida Kunio, "Kokubō to bunka," in *Kishida Kunio zenshū*, vol. 25, 197-206; a radiobroadcast originally announced on January 24, 1941.
- (23) Kishida Kunio, "Bunka to wa: chikara to shite no bunka (dai 1 wa)," in *Kishida Kunio zenshū*, vol. 26, 134-172; originally written on June 20, 1943.
- (24) Kishida Kunio, "Chikara to shite no bunka: maegaki," in *Kishida Kunio zenshū*, vol. 26, 127-133; originally written on June 20, 1943.
- (25) Kishida Kunio, "Nōson no bunka ni tsuite," in *Kishida Kunio zenshū*, vol. 26, 357-365; originally written on February 1, 1944.
- (26) Fuwa Suketoshi, "Engeki, eiga, ongaku nado kaizen iinkai no setchi to sono katsudō," *Shakai kyōiku*, vol. 11, no. 2 (1940): 7-11.
- (27) Fuwa Suketoshi, "Engeki gyōsei," in *Engekiron: engeki to bunka* (Tokyo: Kawade Shobō, 1942), 211-270.
- (28) Baba Tatsumi, "Engeki shin taisei to idō engeki," *Nihon engeki gakkai kiyō* 23 (1985): 51.
- (29) Itō Takashi, *Konoe shin taisei: Taisei Yokusankai e no michi* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1983), 187-193.
- (30) For example, the government enacted the "temporary wage measures act" (*chingin rinji sochirei*) on October 18, 1939. This act planned to control inflation by freezing wages at the level of September 18. It failed, and only aroused workers' complaints. Takaoka Hiroyuki, "Dai-Nihon Sangyō Hōkokukai to 'kinrō bunka'," in *Senji ka no senden to bunka*, ed. Akazawa Shirō (Tokyo: Gendai Shiryō Shuppan, 2001), 40.

- (31) Ōkōchi Kazuo, "'Kyūyō' no shakaiteki igi," in *Ōkōchi Kazuo shū*, vol. 6 (Tokyo: Rōdō Junpōsha, 1981), 181-194; originally published in October 1938.
- (32) Ōkōchi Kazuo, "Kokumin seikatsu no kōzō," in *Kokumin seikatsu no kadai*, ed. Ōkōchi Kazuo (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha, 1943), 3-35.
- (33) Sonoike Kin'aru, *Kinrōsha engeki no tebiki* (Tokyo: Kyōchōkai Sangyō Fukuribu, 1940), 19.
- (34) Garon, *The State and Labor in Modern Japan*, 51-52.
- (35) Takaoka, "Dai-Nihon Sangyō Hōkokukai to 'kinrō bunka'," 59.
- (36) Iizuka Tomoichirō, "Engeki to kyōiku," in *Engekiron: engeki to bunka*, 99-136.
- (37) Kan Takayuki, *Sengo engeki: shingeki wa norikoeraretaka* (Tokyo: Shakai Hyōronsha, 2003), 47.
- (38) Taisei Yokusankai, *Rinji chūō kyōryoku kaigi kaigiroku* (Tokyo: Taisei Yokusankai, 1940), 132-138; Taisei Yokusankai Bunkabu, ed., *Shirōto engeki undō no rinen to hōsaku* (Tokyo: Yokusan Tosho Kankōkai, 1942), 3-28.
- (39) Shirōto engeki kōza (Tokyo: Nihon Bunka Chūō Renmei, 1941), 160-166.
- (40) Sonoike Kin'aru, "Shirōtogeiki no mondai," in *Shirōto engeki no hōkō* (Tokyo: Sakagami Shoin, 1942), 56-60; Sonoike Kin'aru, "Chihō bunka to goraku," in *Shirōto engeki no hōkō*, 61-68; originally published in *Shin bunka*, April 1941; Sonoike Kin'aru, "Engeki no torubeki taisei ni tsuite," in *Shirōto engeki no hōkō*, 112-124; originally published in *Kaikan geijutsu*, November 1941.
- (41) Taisei Yokusankai Bunkabu, ed., *Shirōto engeki undō no rinen to hōsaku*, 29-37.
- (42) Garon, *The State and Labor in Modern Japan*, 212-213.
- (43) Kameyabara Toku (original work); Sonoike Kin'aru (commentary), *'Bō oshi' enshutsu tebiki: kinrōsha engeki* (Tokyo: Kyōchōkai Sangyō Fukuribu, 1941), 1.
- (44) Ōba Saburō, "Butai geijutsu no tanjūka: buyō to butai geijutsu," *Buyō geijutsu* 8, no. 8 (1942): 25-27.
- (45) *Shirōto engeki kōza*, 2-15, 160-166; Sonoike, *Kinrōsha engeki no tebiki*, 19. The issue of public morals often attracted social attention, and violations of public order became the target of attack from the mass media. On February 11, 1941, laborers in Tokyo had a ceremony to celebrate the National Foundation Day (kigensetsu). Their sudden convergence on the center of the city caused a massive crowd. The mass media raised this issue, criticizing the ensuing disorder as a demonstration of the people's lack of group discipline. See Sonoike Kin'aru, "Kinrōsha no engeki no mondai," in *Shirōto engeki no hōkō*, 69-79; originally published in *Gekkan mingei*, July 1941.
- (46) Taisei Yokusankai Bunkabu, ed., *Shirōto engeki undō no rinen to hōsaku*, 37-42.
- (47) *Shirōto engeki no seishin* (Tokyo: Dai-Nihon Sangyō Hōkokukai, 1942), 20-21, 40, 47-48; Endō Shingo, "Shirōto engeki no hakobikata," in *Shirōto engeki no hōhō* (Tokyo: Dai-Nihon Sangyō Hōkokukai, 1942), 1-21.
- (48) *Shirōto engeki kōza*, 160-166.
- (49) See Kikuta Kazuo, "Uguisu no sato," and Matsumoto Tsuneo, "Nami takaki hi," in *Uchiteshiyaman taishū engeki kyakuhon*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Dai-Nihon Kōgyō Kyōkai, 194-), 1-74.
- (50) Kameyabara; Sonoike, *'Bō oshi' enshutsu tebiki*, 1-23.
- (51) Taisei Yokusankai Bunkabu, ed., *Shirōto engeki undō no rinen to hōsaku*, 29-37.
- (52) Itō Kisaku, *Idō engeki jikkō* (Tokyo: Kenbunsha, 1942), 226-227; Murasaki Toshiro, ed., *Idō engeki undō to sono hankyō* (Tokyo: Tansei Shobō, 1943), 3-10.
- (53) Baba, "Engeki shin taisei to idō engeki," 47-48, 50-51.
- (54) Regarding the process of organizing the Corps, see Matsubara Eiji, "Tōhō Idō Bunkatai no kiroku," in *Idō engeki undō to sono hankyō*, 68-102; Toyama Shizuo, ed., *Tōhō 10 nenshi* (Tokyo: Tokyo Takarazuka Gekijō, 1943), 13, 27-32, 69, 71-72.
- Most of the members in the Corps came from Tōhō Dance Corps. Tōhō Dance Corps was established in September 1935 when Hata Toyokichi, one of the top managers in the Tōhō-Takarazuka groups, reorganized a dancing team in Nihon Theater (*Nichigeki*), one of the business chains of Kobayashi. This team imitated commercial shows in America and specialized in group dancing (*gunbu*) and variety shows. See Hata Toyokichi, *Gekijō 20 nen* (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1955), 57-62.
- (55) Toyama, ed., *Tōhō 10 nenshi*, 27.
- (56) *Ibid.*, 13, 27-32, 69, 71-72; Matsubara, "Tōhō Idō Bunkatai no kiroku," 68-102.
- (57) "Keiongakudan mo hensei," *Osaka asahi*, August 17, 1941; "Nōsangyoson e shinshutsu," *Kōbe*, August 29, 1941.
- (58) "Takarazuka sutaa kōjō de utau," *Taishō nichinichi*, November 27, 1940; "Miura Tokiko wo shishō ni jokōsan buyō renshū," *Osaka nichinichi*, November 27, 1940; "Jokōsantachi to isshoni kenkoku ondo odori," *Kōbe*, November 30, 1940; "Shokuba no otome ni staa ga te wo totte Takarazuka Shōbutai Kanebō Imazu kōjō e," *Osaka mainichi*, November 30, 1940; "Kōin, tomoni odoru," *Tokyo nichinichi*, February 26, 1941; "Shokuba tanoshiya, 'sanpō odori'," *Miyako*, February 26, 1941; "Akaruku tanoshii 'sanpō odori'," *Kokumin*, February 26, 1941; "Shokuba tanoshiya, 'sanpō odori'," *Hōchi*, February 26, 1941; "Nigiyaka ni hogaraka ni hakui yūshi ga minyō taisō, Takarazuka seito ga Kaneoka byōin de tehodoki," *Osaka mainichi*, January 25, 1941.
- (59) Endō Shingo, "Engeki jihyō: idō engekitai no mondai," *Tōhō*, October 1940, 74-76; Senga Akira, "Idō engeki ni kansuru dansō," *Tōhō*, December 1940, 48-52.
- (60) "Goraku wo nōson e kōhei ni bunpai: Yokusankai to Jōhōkyoku, idō bunkatai no tōsei e," *Kokumin shinbun*, February 14, 1941; "Shokuba e idō gekidan," *Tokyo nichinichi shinbun*, April 17, 1941.
- (61) *Shadan hōjin Nihon Idō Engeki Renmei teikan narabi gyōmu kitei*, 1-2.
- (62) Itō, *Idō engeki jikkō*, 27-54; Murasaki, ed., *Idō engeki undō to sono hankyō*, 15.
- (63) Toyama, ed., *Tōhō 10 nenshi*, 27-32.
- (64) Itō, *Idō engeki jikkō*, 19-21.
- (65) *Ibid.*, 165-194; Toyama, ed., *Tōhō 10 nenshi*, 27-32.
- (66) Nihon Idō Engeki Renmei, *Idō engeki zushi* (Tokyo: Geijutsu Gakuin Shuppanbu, 1943), 64-76; Murasaki, ed., *Idō engeki undō to sono hankyō*, 18; Nihon Idō Engeki Renmei,

- Idō engeki to wa* (Tokyo: Tokyo Kōenkai Shuppanbu, 1943), 34-39.
- (67) Murasaki, ed., *Idō engeki undō to sono hankyō*, 20; Itō, *Idō engeki jikkō*, 144.
- (68) Murasaki, ed., *Idō engeki undō to sono hankyō*, 10-14.
- (69) Nihon Idō Engeki Renmei, *Idō engeki zushi*.
- (70) Toyama, ed., *Tōhō 10 nenshi*, 27-32.
- (71) “Engei hōshi mo saishuppatsu,” *Osaka asahi*, September 14, 1941; “Takarazuka no shōbu hōshitai naiyō totonoete nōson e kōjō e jungun,” *Osaka mainichi*, September 14, 1941; “Kantōsuru Takarazuka imon engekитай,” *Osaka*, December 22, 1943.
- (72) Itō, *Idō engeki jikkō*, 25.
- (73) Dai-Nihon Kōgyō Kyōkai, *Kōgyō hijō sochi ni tsuite* (Tokyo: Dai-Nihon Kōgyō Kyōkai, 1944).
- (74) Kan, *Sengo engeki*, 49.
- (75) Toyama, ed., *Tōhō 10 nenshi*, 27-32.
- (76) Matsubara, “Tōhō Idō Bunkatai no kiroku,” 72-102; Nihon Idō Engeki Renmei, *Idō engeki to wa*, 13-26.
- (77) Itō, *Idō engeki jikkō*, 45-46.
- (78) Sugawara Tarō, “Idō engeki zuisō,” *Bunka Nihon*, April 1941, 84-88.
- (79) “Idō engeki undō no shōrai e no kōsō,” *Tōhō*, March 1943, 25-27.
- (80) Nagai Tomoo, “Idō engekитай no nikki,” *Nihon Engeki*, 1946, 50-56; Nagai Tomoo, “Idō engeki no jidai to ima,” *Bunka hyōron*, no. 303 (1986): 132-133. It would be valuable to research how wartime Japan’s exploitation of mobile theater actors in the name of constructing a great culture influenced the Cultural Revolution in the People’s Republic of China.
- (81) Itō, *Idō engeki jikkō*, 55-80; Murasaki, ed., *Idō engeki undō to sono hankyō*, 24-26.
- (82) Murasaki, ed., *Idō engeki undō to sono hankyō*, 24-26.
- (83) Nihon Idō Engeki Renmei, *Idō engeki zushi*.
- (84) Matsubara, “Tōhō Idō Bunkatai no kiroku,” 178-188.
- (85) Sonoike Kin’naru, “Tōhō Idō Bunkatai wo mite,” in *Shirōto engeki no hōkō*, 132-135; originally published in *Miyako shinbun* in March 1941 and *Katei seikatsu* in May 1941.
- (86) “Konnichi no engeki wo kataru (sono 3),” *Nihon engeki*, November 1944.
- (87) Ōyama Isao, “Idō engeki no tenkai to sono shin rinen,” *Tōhō*, August 1943, 22-25.
- (88) Sugawara, “Idō engeki zuisō,” 84-88; Matsubara, “Tōhō Idō Bunkatai no kiroku,” 72-136.
- (89) Nihon Idō Engeki Renmei, *Idō engeki to wa*, 13-26.
- (90) The Federation claimed that it paid for transportation fees in order to ensure impartial distribution to theaters; if commercial theaters or hosts paid the fee, they argued places remote from Tokyo would find it more burdensome to invite theaters than places near Tokyo. See Itō, *Idō engeki jikkō*, 27-54; Murasaki, ed., *Idō engeki undō to sono hankyō*, 33-55.
- (91) Nihon Idō Engeki Renmei, *Idō engeki to wa*, 13-26.
- (92) Sonoike, “Tōhō Idō Bunkatai wo mite,” 132-135.
- (93) Matsubara Eiji, “Tōhō Idō Bunkatai Kanagawa ken ka junkaiki (2),” *Bunka Nihon*, June 1941, 80-84.
- (94) Furuya Tsunatake, “Idō engeki no shomondai (sono ni),” *Tōhō*, May 1942, 70-73.
- (95) Sonoike Kin’naru, “Idō engeki no jissai mondai,” in *Shirōto engeki no hōkō*, 136-139; originally published in *Nihon gakugei shinbun* in September 1941.
- (96) Nihon Idō Engeki Renmei, *Idō engeki to wa*, 13-26.
- (97) Matsubara, “Tōhō Idō Bunkatai no kiroku,” 72-102.
- (98) *Ibid.*, 102-136.
- (99) *Ibid.*, 188-194.
- (100) Nihon Idō Engeki Renmei, *Idō engeki to wa*, 40-47.
- (101) Itō, *Idō engeki jikkō*, 162-164; Nihon Idō Engeki Renmei, *Idō engeki zushi*.
- (102) Sugiyama Makoto, “Idō engeki no koto nado,” *Tōhō*, February 1943, 56-57; Yamaji Nobuo, “Idō Engeki Renmei ni kiku,” *Tōhō*, May 1943, 34-36.
- (103) “Idō engeki tōkyō tokubetsu kōen,” *Tōhō*, June 1943, 18.
- (104) “‘Gambarimasuwa’ Takarazuka musume shōto e, fukusō mo miokuri mo jishuku,” *Osaka asahi*, August 22, 1939.
- (105) “Revyū ‘tōa kyōeiken’ kakuchi no odori wo toriirete,” *Osaka mainichi*, May 28, 1941.
- (106) Toyama, ed., *Tōhō 10 nenshi*, 14, 71-72, 76.
- (107) KBS, *Shōwa 15 nendo jigyō gaikyō* (Tokyo: KBS, 1941); KBS, *Shōwa 16 nendo jigyō gaikyō* (Tokyo: KBS, 1942); KBS, *Shōwa 17 nendo jigyō gaikyō* (Tokyo: KBS, 1943); KBS, *Shōwa 18 nendo jigyō gaikyō* (Tokyo: KBS, 1944).
- (108) Robertson, *Takarazuka*, Ch. 3.
- (109) Murasaki, ed., *Idō engeki undō to sono hankyō*, 47.
- (110) Itō, *Idō engeki jikkō*, 51.
- (111) “Takarazuka Shōjo Kageki, shin Nihonteki no sōzō ni saishuppatsu,” *Osaka nichinichi*, August 30, 1940; “Takarazuka hanagumi, shōrai kaigai shinshutsu ni sonaete, Nihon minyōshū,” *Taishō nichinichi*, August 27, 1940.
- (112) Hata Toyokichi, “‘Nihon minzoku buyō no kenkyū’ ni tsuite,” in *Nihon minzoku buyō no kenkyū*, ed. Satani Isao (Tokyo: Tōhō Shoten, 1943), 2-5.
- (113) “Manshū zairyū no geinōjin no shōsoku: genki de imon ya kōen,” *Tokyo shinbun*, July 26, 1946.