



政治と外交の対外情報発信に関する国際共同研究

## Collaborative Research On Political Information Transmission

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### 2019 July CROP-IT Workshop

# *Gaining Credibility: Alliances and U.S. Overseas Deployments*

【Date】 2019年7月1日(月) July 1st (Monday), 14:45-16:15

【Place】 早稲田キャンパス 3号館 10階第一会議室

Build. #3 10F Conference room #1, Waseda Campus

【Speaker】 **Professor Erik Gartzke**

University of California, San Diego

#### 【Abstract】

A substantial portion of U.S. military forces are stationed abroad, on allied territory. This effort is costly and appears redundant if alliances perform a similar role more cheaply. Deployments of this type are also typically too small to adequately defend an ally. What then do they achieve? We refine existing insights in the literature, presenting a formal model in which deployments signal U.S. resolve. We then provide the first systematic evidence for extended deterrence success through costly signaling. By holding alliance status constant, we are able to assess different attributes of deployments. Time-series analysis of the U.S.-Japan security treaty further isolates deployment from endogeneity or reverse causation. As predicted by the model, the proportion of military expenditures tied to U.S. deployments in Japan accounts for extended general deterrence outcomes much better than the total number of troops stationed in the country. Our findings further suggest that the United States can continue to deter in a period of relative decline, as long as withdrawals of overseas troops are smaller than the relative decline of the U.S. economy.

【連絡先】 政治経済学術院・多湖研究室 [tago@waseda.jp](mailto:tago@waseda.jp)

【後援】 早稲田大学スーパーグローバル大学創成支援事業実証政治経済学拠点  
現代政治経済研究所・政治実験研究部会

【Contact】 Atsushi Tago, Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University

【Co-sponsor】 TGU Positive/Empirical Analysis of Political Economy, Waseda University  
WINPEC Experiments in Political Science Research Group