{"id":81497,"date":"2025-07-15T16:14:02","date_gmt":"2025-07-15T07:14:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/inst\/research\/?p=81497"},"modified":"2025-07-18T09:41:18","modified_gmt":"2025-07-18T00:41:18","slug":"when-fairning-and-its-implications-for-peace-negotiations%ef%bc%88published-in-journal-of-conflict-resolution-july-2025%ef%bc%89","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/inst\/research\/news\/81497","title":{"rendered":"When Fairness is Unfair: Norm Abandonment in Bargaining and Its Implications for Peace Negotiations\uff08Published in Journal of Conflict Resolution, July, 2025\uff09"},"content":{"rendered":"<table class=\"table table-bordered table-colored-tbhd\" style=\"height: 550px; width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse; border-style: solid;\" border=\"1\">\n<tbody>\n<tr style=\"height: 78px;\">\n<td style=\"width: 19.0523%; height: 78px;\">Journal Title<br \/>\n\/\u63b2\u8f09\u30b8\u30e3\u30fc\u30ca\u30eb\u540d<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 80.849%; height: 78px;\">Journal of Conflict Resolution<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr style=\"height: 65px;\">\n<td style=\"width: 19.0523%; height: 80px;\">Publication Year and Month<br \/>\n\/\u63b2\u8f09\u5e74\u6708<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 80.849%; height: 80px;\">July, 2025<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr style=\"height: 55px;\">\n<td style=\"width: 19.0523%; height: 79px;\">Paper Title<br \/>\n\/\u8ad6\u6587\u30bf\u30a4\u30c8\u30eb<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 80.849%; height: 79px;\">When Fairness is Unfair: Norm Abandonment in Bargaining and Its Implications for Peace Negotiations<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr style=\"height: 85px;\">\n<td style=\"width: 19.0523%; height: 85px;\">DOI<br \/>\n\/\u8ad6\u6587DOI<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 80.849%; height: 85px;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1177\/00220027251356643\">10.1177\/00220027251356643<\/a><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr style=\"height: 59px;\">\n<td style=\"width: 19.0523%; height: 80px;\">\u00a0Author of Waseda University<br \/>\n\/\u672c\u5b66\u306e\u8457\u8005<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 80.849%; height: 80px;\"><span style=\"font-family: inherit; font-size: inherit;\">KAMIJO, Yoshio(Professor, Faculty of Political Science and Economics, School of Political Science and Economics):Last Author<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-family: inherit; font-size: inherit;\"> PHAM, Vinh (Doctoral student, Graduate School of Economics): First and Corresponding Author.\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr style=\"height: 68px;\">\n<td style=\"width: 19.0523%; height: 86px;\">Related Websites<br \/>\n\/\u95a2\u9023Web<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 80.849%; height: 86px;\">&#8211;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr style=\"height: 138px;\">\n<td style=\"width: 19.0523%; height: 148px;\">Abstract<br \/>\n\/\u6284\u9332<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 80.849%; height: 148px;\">Fairness perceptions can significantly impact the instigation and resolution of conflicts. To examine how fairness norms shape agreements, we conduct an experiment, where participants first select a preferred rule between equal division, equal gain, and proportional division. When paired with another sharing the same norm, participants decide whether to adhere to the projected division or negotiate a different outcome. Experimental results reveal that participants renege on the agreement more frequently when allocations are perceived as unfair to the self: high contributors in equal division and low contributors in proportional division. Furthermore, attachment to the initial norm is sturdiest for strict equality and weakest for proportionality. Equal gain, coinciding with the Nash bargaining solution, is the most favored at both preselection and negotiation outcomes. We discuss several applications of our findings in resolving international conflicts.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Journal Title \/\u63b2\u8f09\u30b8\u30e3\u30fc\u30ca\u30eb\u540d Journal of Conflict Resolution Publication Year and Month \/\u63b2\u8f09\u5e74\u6708 July, 2025 Paper Title [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[],"tags":[218,217],"class_list":["post-81497","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","tag-impact-en","tag-impact"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/inst\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/81497","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/inst\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/inst\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/inst\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/inst\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=81497"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/inst\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/81497\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":81513,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/inst\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/81497\/revisions\/81513"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/inst\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=81497"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/inst\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=81497"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/inst\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=81497"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}