

JOURNAL OF INTER-REGIONAL STUDIES: REGIONAL AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES

2020
vol.3

Invited Article

**-Legitimization & De-legitimization of Police: In British
Colonial & Chinese SAR Hong Kong**

Lawrence Ka-ki Ho

Perspectives and Reports

**-Japan and China in Competition or Cooperation?
Perspectives for Africa**

Takeshi Daimon-Sato

**-The Ukraine-Japan Security Dialogue as an Important
Contribution to International Peace and Security**

Violetta Udovik



Journal of Inter-Regional Studies: Regional and Global Perspectives (JIRS)/ vol.3

CONTENTS

<Invited Article>

- Legitimization & De-legitimization of Police:
In British Colonial & Chinese SAR Hong Kong 2**
Lawrence Ka-ki Ho

<Perspectives and Reports>

- Japan and China in Competition or Cooperation?
Perspectives for Africa 14**
Takeshi Daimon-Sato

- The Ukraine-Japan Security Dialogue as an Important
Contribution to International Peace and Security 26**
Violetta Udovik

- **Style Guide for Authors 34**
• **Internal Regulations on Submissions 36**
• **Peer Review Guidelines 38**

Legitimization & De-legitimization of Police: In British Colonial & Chinese SAR Hong Kong*

Lawrence Ka-ki Ho**

Abstract

The Hong Kong Police have been regarded as 'Asia's Finest' law enforcement unit for its professional outlook since the 1980s. It was gradually transformed to a 'well-organized', 'efficient' and 'less corrupted' police force before the sovereignty retrocession to China in 1997. However, there has been increasingly public frustration over its professionalism, neutrality, and competence of individual officers, accompanied by political vehemence emerging from controversies of electoral reforms since the 2010s. Rather than the 'politicization of society' and the 'institutional decay of the police', this paper argues the phenomenon could be explained by the abrupt and fundamental change of policing context accompanied by the realignment of Beijing's Hong Kong policy under the One Country Two Systems framework since 2014.

From 'Asia's Finest' in 1994 to 'Distrusted Law Enforcers' in 2019?

Hong Kong was under British colonial rule for more than 150 years. Authorities established a paramilitary policing system stressing the capacity of internal security management to ensure the 'law and order' of the territories (Sinclair, 2006; Ho & Chu, 2012). The concept of 'policing by stranger' could be seen when scrutinizing the police and community relationship in colonial Hong Kong: the hierarchical police force was headed by expatriates and had limited interaction with the local Cantonese population (Ng, 1999). The police force was widely considered as 'corrupted and incompetent' in its early years of operation (Sinclair & Ng, 1994). The Hong Kong Police (HKP) was hierarchically commanded, its relationship with citizens was not closed, and public trust towards it was very weak.

After the outbreak of two great disturbances in Hong Kong in the 1960s, the government introduced structural reforms to professionalize the police force,

* The author would like to thank Prof Madoka Fukuda & Prof Masaharu Hishida of Hosei University, Prof Toru Kurata of Rikkyo University, and Prof Naoyuki Umemori of Waseda University for their valuable comments on my seminar presentation for the draft of this paper in Tokyo in June 2019.

**Lawrence Ka-ki Ho is an Assistant Professor of Department of Social Sciences, The Education University of Hong Kong.

to eradicate syndicated corruption, streamline its operation, improve the quality of its personnel, and attempt to strengthen its ties to the community (Ho & Chu, 2012). The community policing practices were gradually introduced to promote an image of accountability to citizens in combating public order crime. In 1994, the police launched 'serving the community' pledges as part of government publicity to promote its 'service' to citizens (Lo & Cheuk, 2004). With reference to public opinion polls, public satisfaction to the police steadily maintained at above 50%. It attained a record high figure of 82% in 2005 after the police force's first encounter with transnational protestors in Hong Kong (HKU POP, 2006). Apparently, the Hong Kong Police had evolved from not only a law enforcement unit, to become a police unit responsive and in partnership with the citizens. The situation paradoxically overturned after the early 2010s. The Hong Kong Police were accused of being 'not accountable', 'not professional' and 'not neutral'. This was accompanied by the emergence of mass social conflict due the policy agenda related to the Central- Hong Kong integration. The public questioned for who, what and how do the police 'serve' under its propaganda of 'serving the community with pride and care'.

Colonial Policing: Between Consent and Coercion

Policing literature and analyses of formal social control systems in two major categories. The first is "policing by coercion", emphasizing force and control exerted by a government as it attempts to ensure peace and order. The government develops a strong law-enforcement apparatus to manage public order. The police would operate as a military or paramilitary force and use violence to control those who intend to disrupt the social order. The second approach

is "policing by consent.". The police would seek a collaborative partnership with citizens. The police are a civic department that aim to 'serve the community'. Violence is avoided and firearms are not considered necessary when discharging general duties (Sinclair, 2006, pp. 1-5).

Colonial policing is assumed to follow the "coercive policing" paradigm, in which both hard power (physical force) and soft power (autocratic legislation) would be adopted to secure the interest of colonial master. However, researches have suggested that some colonial administrators may not be overly coercive when managing subjects (Neep, 2012, p. 179). The colonial authorities used "divide and rule" tactics to avoid confrontation with local communities and maximize the effectiveness of colonial governance (Sinclair, 2006, pp. 1-15).

Policing in British Hong Kong

The case of Hong Kong is basically consistent with such arguments, albeit within unique historical, political and sociological context. Hong Kong was the British colony from 1842-1997 and London set up the Hong Kong Police Force since 1844 to maintain the social order and safeguard the British interest in the territories. The Hong Kong Police was established under the colonial policing model of the Royal Irish Constabulary featuring a highly centralized command, non-local leadership and segregation with the indigenous population. The police-citizen ratio was high: the force had about 30000 regular, auxiliary, disciplinary and civilian members. The Hong Kong Police (HKP) took up most internal security duties in its early years of establishment, ranging from policing to immigration, fire services, and prison (Ho & Chu, 2012, pp. 122-123). Apparently, the Hong Kong Police is a civil force, but it is equipped with paramilitary capacity to suppress social disturbances

after quick mobilization commanded by the colonial Governor, and the British military could be called upon to facilitate police operations if necessary. After the territory-wide disturbances lasted for six months in 1967, the Hong Kong Police were bestowed with the title 'Royal' by Queen Elizabeth of the United Kingdom, and it was renamed as the Royal Hong Kong Police (RHKP) until Hong Kong was reunited with the People's Republic of China (PRC) on 1 July 1997.

Paradoxically, the Hong Kong Police were harshly criticized in its early days by one governor of Hong Kong as 'the most corrupt and incompetent police force in the world'. However, it gradually transformed to a well organized, efficient and less corrupt police force before the sovereignty retrocession.¹ In 1997, the force did not undergo major institutional reform as widely speculated. Under the 'smooth transition principle, and directly accountable to the HKSAR government. After the World Trade Organization police encounters with the international protestors in December 2005, the Hong Kong Police has got the recorded high public satisfaction, 85%. However, there has been increasingly public frustration over its professionalism, neutrality and competence of individual officers accompanied by the political vehement emerging from the controversies of electoral reforms since the 2010s.

Organizational Features of Hong Kong Police

'Policing by strangers' was the typical organizational feature of Hong Kong policing until the 1970s (Ho, 2014, pp. 83-85). The British commanded the force while Russian, Indian, Pakistanis, Shantung Chinese

and local Cantonese personnel have served as frontline constables. Prior to the Second World War, racial segregation policies were in place in what may be described as 'apartheid' (Ng, 1999). Initially founded for the benefit of the European community, the Police Force was supplemented by a separate District Watchmen Force in 1886 due to Chinese demand. Chinese community groups raised funds along with some government financing. As more Chinese men in good physical health were recruited as watchmen for patrols and arrests, the administration's distrust and fears of usurpation were compounded by complaints from expatriates who found Chinese patrolmen in their segregated communities. Indian personnel were duly brought in (Ho & Chu, 2012, pp. 18-19). The glass ceiling was insurmountable for Indian and Pakistanis and sergeant for ethnic Chinese: ethnicities were independently trained in accordance with varying syllabuses.

Subtler shades of ethnicity were also distinguished. The Hong Kong Police recruited new members from Wei Hai Wei, a British lease in China's northern Shandong Province, before the WWII since 1922 (Ho & Chu, 2012, pp. 25-29). By 1946, there were about 300 recruits, but most were not fluent in Cantonese and could not communicate with the vast majority of residents (Hong Kong Secretary for Chinese Affairs, 1930). Post-war recruitment of local and Cantonese-speaking immigrants coincided with the promotion of some ethnic Chinese Probation Inspectors, but most command posts were still reserved for British colonial servants. Young inspectors without military or overseas exposure were also recruited from Britain and enjoyed better terms and condition of service than their local counterparts. After World War II, millions of Chinese civil war and economic refugees flooded the city and its indigenous population. Most showed

¹ In 1879, the police chief, Henry May, investigated corruption of the police personally. He seized a record of bribes to the police by syndicate leaders and revealed a 42-year history of corruption. Governor McDonald had also exclaimed, 'I had never seen nor heard of any colonial police force could be as corruptive, useless, unreliable and inefficient as the Hong Kong Police.' See Ng (1999)

limited trust towards the criminal justice system, the police, and government authority in general. In the 1970s around 270 Muslim Pakistanis were brought to Hong Kong and employed by the Force, despite their having little or no knowledge of the colony or the local language (Ho & Chu, 2012, pp. 18-25). Officers interacted within and seldom between ethnic cliques, and the situation was similar for the population.

Meanwhile, the Hong Kong Police had since its inception proclaimed political neutrality in its capacity as a law enforcement agency, discharging its duties in strict compliance with Hong Kong laws. Such boasts were severely tested during the 1956 riots between Nationalist and Communist civilians, when the administration questioned the allegiance of its largely Chinese police force under the command of British officers. The government introduced a more stringent vetting exercise for potential recruits to verify that they had no political connection with the Communists in mainland China and Nationalists in Taiwan. Police inspector candidates were even asked to produce two written references from serving civil servants or prestigious persons to prove their allegiance to the Crown (Ho & Chu, 2012, pp. 67-70).

Legitimization: Institutionalization of Policing by the Colonial government after World War II

There were 'events-driven' reforms of the Hong Kong Police in response to post-World War II social crises that undermined the force's legitimacy among the local population. The undesirable anti-riot action in 1956 exposed various issues: improper tactical training among officers for internal security management, outdated or insufficient police facilities and firearms,

and miscommunications amongst police stations and squads as well as between authorities and the citizenry. The military were called up for reinforcement and casualties resulted from the delayed and improper control of the disturbances (Lee, 1995).

In the following year the Police sought to modernize and strengthen its paramilitary capacity to deal with large-scale disorder by setting up the Police Tactical Contingent (PTC). Four companies, each with about 170 anti-riot police officers, served three key regions. New anti-riot tactics such as platoon formations were taught to PTC members in order to improve flexibility and effectiveness of crowd management. In addition, the practice of delegating riot drill training to each police division was revised on account of lax adherence, with the PTC assuming responsibility for training all frontline policemen in anti-riot tactics.² Logistics were better coordinated across the force, from such basic amenities as accommodation, and meals to processing large numbers of arrestees and keeping track of equipment and ammunition. The new Force would shortly find itself embroiled in the largest civil unrest in the colony's history, detailed in the coming pages. Ironically, the trigger for the deadly riots of 1967 came not only from across Shenzhen River in the vast expanses of China, but also from across the Pearl River in a peaceful Portuguese enclave.

The colonial police force was distant from the local Cantonese community, doubtful in personnel integrity, and limited trust from the public. Praise from overseas counterparts was attributed to the successful structural, almost missionary, reforms launched by British leaders after two territory-wide disturbances in the 1960s. Attempts were made to eradicate syndicated corruption in the police force and to improve relationships between the government,

² The old platoon could only break up into individual sections, and each section was equipped with only one type of riot weapon. Each officer could 'choose' whatever position he wished to take up. The new regime assigned each officer to a fixed post carrying a designated weapon.

the police, and society. After ratification of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984, the Hong Kong Police Force reduced the number of overseas inspectorate recruits, sent aspiring officers to the United Kingdom immersion and secondment,³ and commenced official liaisons with the Public Security Police of China. It also introduced a 'service-oriented culture' in 1992 after the arrival of the last colonial governor, Chris Patten. These steps increased the operational capacity of the RHKP and gradually won the trust of the public, which came to view the force as professional and competent.

Professionalization Attempts since the 1970s

The Hong Kong Police Force was professionalized and embarked on a series of structural reforms since the 1970s. Consequently, it attained satisfactory outcomes towards bridging the force with the community and branding the Hong Kong Police as one of the most efficient, effective and accountable law enforcement units in Asia. The British Hong Kong administration made highly public attempts to eradicate syndicated corruption in the police force and attempted to improve relationships between the government, the police, and society.

The city-wide riots of 1967 exposed the necessity and urgency of policing reform, resulting in capacity

enhancement, command structure reorganization and the introduction of community policing practices. This brought crucial transformations to police organizations, and the relationship between the police and society at large. As a spill-over of the Cultural Revolution in China from 1966, rising revolutionary sentiments among leftists in Macau led to a general strike after a police-commuter disputes in Taipa. There was outcry to paralyze the colonial Portuguese administration and 'liberate' Macau.⁴ Eventually the Portuguese administrators in Macau 'surrendered', and it motivated the dedicated leftist counterparts in Hong Kong to duplicate the 'struggle with the British'.⁵ A territory-wide industrial action commenced in May 1967, turning to an appeal for a general strike in June and escalating to urban terrorism in July. The police were fully mobilized against leftist groups: encountering the mass protests, conducting raids and arrests in schools, presses, and unions. Government statistics stated that at least fifteen people were killed and many more were wounded.⁶

Governor of Hong Kong, Sir David Trench, introduced a series of reforms to the police (it was renamed to the Royal Hong Kong Police after its 'achievement' suppressing the riots in 1967). Apparently, the government noticed the legitimacy crisis of the police force during the crisis- in particular its anti-riot capacity, allegiance of Cantonese officers, and integrity of personnel. In fact, the general public were sympathetic to the strikers' calls for fair

³ After the mid-1980s, Hong Kong Superintendents were nominated for official duties in a UK force in order to expose them to the latest trends in policing. See Ho & Chu (2012, pp. 122-123)

⁴ On 3 December 1966 (hence 12-3), Chinese leftists confronted the Macau Police in a protest against government disapproval to the building of a 'patriotic' communist school in Taipa. The Portuguese government deployed anti-riot police to disperse the crowd, only to sign an extremely humiliating agreement with the 'people of Macau' after Beijing intervened. The agreement strictly limited the powers of the incumbent administration and marked the dawn of Beijing's direct influence on Macau. See Ho & Lam (2017).

⁵ Jin Yao-ru, the chief editor of pro-Beijing Hong Kong-based newspaper Wen Wei Po and member of Hong Kong and Macau Work Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1967, recalled that 'his comrades in Hong Kong's leftist organizations were encouraged by Macanese developments, and thought they could follow the footsteps of these leftists, ultimately triggering a struggle with the British colonial government' (Jin, 1998).

⁶ The colonial government's account said that the riots in 1967 should be understood in three developmental stages, with reference to the sequence of the following events: (1) Demonstrations to gain public support; (2) Stoppages of work to paralyze the colony's economy; and (3) Urban terrorism to undermine citizens' morale. See Hong Kong Police, Annual Departmental Report, 1967 (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1967). On the strengths of leftist organizations in Hong Kong. Government Information Service Hong Kong (1968) & Ho (2010).

treatment from employers. They granted 'conditional support' to the police to restore to social order until the disturbance worsened to indiscriminate urban terrorist bombing that caused numerous casualties. The reforms aimed at tackling syndicated corruption in the police force, rationalizing the police force, and increasing police and citizen communication, were launched by the new Commissioner of Police, Charlie Sutcliffe, in 1969 (Ho, 2010, pp. 189-190).⁷

To enhance internal security capacity, a regular anti-riot unit, the Police Tactical Unit (PTU) was set up. Policemen regardless of rank would be gradually and periodically called upon to undertake the anti-riot training and they would be immediately mobilized for crowd control or anti-riot assignments if necessary. A set of less confrontational public order control tactics learnt and developed from the 'negotiated management' protest policing philosophy in western democracies was taught to anti-riot squads and adopted in crowd control (Ho, 2010, pp. 194-197).

The police organization was also streamlined to devolve authority and responsibility to the lowest practical level (Jones & Vagg, 2007). The independent line of command of the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) was abolished and the plainclothes and uniformed officers were placed under the collective command in police stations (Ho & Chu, 2012, pp. 89-91).⁸ The structural reorganization effectively eradicated the powerful conglomerates inside the CID, which were generally regarded as borderline corruption syndicates (Ho & Chu, 2012, pp. 89-91).

Another key dimension of reform was to gain public recognition of the government, and not only the police. The government attempted to canvass and provide channels for the public to air their grievances about the administration. The Government

Information Service (GIS) was established. City district officers tasked with coordinating community liaison work were appointed, Chinese was recognized as an official language, and Cantonese elites were absorbed into newly established advisory and consultative committees in public policymaking process. This was an 'inclusion strategy' to improve the government's capacity to rule via 'administrative absorption' of politics, along with other proactive accommodative approaches by the formerly aloof state (Scott 1989; Jones & Vagg 2007).

The 'Smooth Transition & 50-year Unchanged' Principle

Both Beijing and London leaders agreed to keep 'minimal change' in the sovereignty retrocession of 1997. In fact Beijing also highly appreciated the institutionalization (efficiency and effectiveness) of Hong Kong's civil service system in the 1990s. Hong Kong people were also eager to see Beijing's appreciation to the 'status quo'-hope for minimal changes as in the 1980s. The Hong Kong Police, at the same time, did not undergo significant structural change since the above-mentioned reforms in the 1970s. The changes brought by 1997 were mainly in several dimensions- localization of chief officers, an end to recruitment of expatriate inspectors, formal dissolution of the 'political bureau' within the force, and the introduction of service accountability to the public (since 1992). From 1997 to 2014 there was no major structural change. Changes included ending pensionable new police constables and officers due to the financial constraints in 1999, increasing the connection and ties with mainland policing agencies

⁷ See also (Sinclair, 1994)

⁸ Meanwhile another structural transformation wrought by Sutcliffe was the abandonment of the old rank of Staff Sergeant. The holders of this rank were either promoted to officer grade as Probationary Inspector (PI), or re-titled as Station Sergeant (SS). At the same time, a large number of Sergeants were also promoted to SS.

and authorities, and reducing the communication with Commonwealth police agencies. In addition, the Police Training School was upgraded to the Police College, so it could provide more 'professional training' and cooperate with universities for academic credit bearing courses. New functional and specific units, such as the Negotiation Cadre, and the Technological Crime Bureau were also set up.

Delegitimization: Dilemmas under the New Policing Context in China's Hong Kong

Minimal changes after 1997 resulted in initial success at maintaining police legitimacy. However, there were changing public expectations towards the police, not only regarding efficiency and effectiveness of operations but also new 'requests' to include transparency, procedural justice, consistency, and more. Goldsmith (2005) argued that trust in policing cannot be examined separately from trust in government'. The changing expectations towards the police were mainly from the economic integration of Hong Kong and mainland, and thus developed to a fundamental debate on the power arrangement of the mainland and Hong Kong SAR. The police were regarded as the frontline agents of the SAR government. This explains the dynamics of police and community relations since the emergence of protest waves in the early 2010's. Three landmark years for the increasing tension of police and citizens confrontation were 2014, 2016, and 2019. The low level of satisfaction with the police reflected broader anxieties about Hong Kong's future, a broader crisis of governance, and a lack of trust in the mainland Chinese authorities (Ma & Fung, 1999).

Economic Integration & Wave of Protests

The outbreak of tragedy SARS epidemic in Hong Kong in 2003 was the first turning point of mainland China and Hong Kong relationship. The crisis and subsequent legislation work of anti-subversive laws proposed by the government under C. H. Tung's leadership eventually triggered a mass rally on 1 July 2013. To revive the weak economy after the hygiene and then governing crises, Beijing decided to introduce the Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), integrating Hong Kong SAR to the Chinese mainland by promoting human mobility and cross-border economic activity. The economic agreement not only brought huge monetary benefits for the retailing and tourism industries in Hong Kong, but also for policing issues as a result of the flourishing of legal and unlawful cross-border activities, including parallel trading, commodities smuggling, money laundering, and bogus marriage. There were controversies over the developmental strategies on the pace and scope of Hong Kong and mainland integration. This extended to the debates over the arrangement of administrative autonomy under the concept of One Country Two Systems, with appeals that included universal suffrage, economic equality, and social justice. A wave of protests gradually emerged since the 2010s.⁹

Mass demonstrations and gatherings after the 1967 riots were infrequent in the transition period since the mid-1980s, except for annual candlelight vigils on 4 June after 1989. Since the handover there was an increase in the frequency of mass demonstrations, rallies, and gatherings. These were mobilized by different civil groups to protest against the Chinese government, the Hong Kong administration, and often specific policy decisions. Police actions in protest management were under heavy public

⁹ Hong Kong government figures have shown an increase in the number of protest activities, from 2,300 events in 2002 to 6,878 events in 2011 (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 2012).

scrutiny as political overtones were projected into every interpersonal interaction between officers and protesters in Chinese Hong Kong. The operations of police were interpreted as the thin end of a communist wedge against long-held freedoms in the city. Extensive media coverage of protest activities was widely available, and civic-libertarian groups often filed complaints or otherwise accused law enforcers of using excessive and unnecessary violence when maintaining order at the events.

In response to the critics from civil groups, authorities usually claimed legal foundations for police actions; praised the 'excellent performance' of the front-line officers displaying 'maximum restraint', using 'minimum force' in operations; and referring to favorable public approval ratings of the police. Their defense stated that accusations are ungrounded and exaggerated, and some officers were humiliated when exercising duties. However violent confrontation between the police and protestors was not prevalent until the eruption of the 'Umbrella Movement' (or 'Occupying Central' civic obedience campaign) which lasted for 79 days starting in 28 September 2014.¹⁰ The saga in 2014 started triggering public doubt towards police accountability. They began to question who, what, and how the Hong Kong police served.

Skepticism over the Police Professionalism, Neutrality, and Accountability

Democratic policing is a type of police practice where political neutrality holds in domestic conflicts and a civilian democracy prevails (Manning, 2010). There are three major indicators of democratic policing

in prevailing literature and they explain how police obtain legitimacy: political neutrality (loyalty to the constitution, professional police culture and clear and defined mission of maintaining law and order etc.); democratic control (legislative and civic participation oversight and transparency of police activities) and social impartiality (demilitarization culture and reconciliation for the past abuse).

The Hong Kong policing system in the colonial era definitely had an 'authoritarian' nature, and the current system that inherited the post-reform features is also far from 'democratic'. The police establishment has exhibited its inheritance from a colonial policing model that could be very coercive. Police in the 1960s escalated their use of force for territory-wide suppression. Police authority, which could be overtly coercive under 'draconian legislation' was not illiberally used. The structural reforms carried out from the 1970s onwards brought in some community policing practices and successfully rebuilt the image of Hong Kong Police-less corrupt, more effective, more efficient, and apparently accountable. However, the reforms did not fundamentally change the nature of the police force. The traditional wisdom for institutional legitimacy for policing, in particular the appeal for procedural justice & transparency, was not fully realized in Hong Kong. The legitimization could be explained as 'conditional'-it satisfied public expectations towards policing in the territories.

This era of low expectations was accompanied by a successful marketing strategy, as well as the timely reforms introduced in the 1970s. With the intention of Beijing to clarify the 'spirit' of One Country Two Systems since 2012, the era of ambiguity was prematurely finished. The emergence of controversies over the police's professionalism, neutrality, and

¹⁰The official press release issued by the Hong Kong SAR government did not use the term "Umbrella Movement" to describe the seventy-nine-day territory-wide mass demonstration that captured the attention of international media. The official line was that the demonstration and subsequent sit-in protests constituted "illegal occupation activities." It was emphasized as an offence that obstructed the law and order of Hong Kong beyond freedom of expression. The discourse was mirrored by Beijing's propaganda.

accountability challenged the deposited public imagination of the police- which was not principally formed by personal policing experience but rather from impressions derived from media and films. From 1997 to 2007, the public dissatisfaction of Hong Kong Police's performance was kept at a very low rate (below 10%). However, the public have become less satisfied since 2007. From 2013 to 2015, there was a rapid drop (10%) and the lowest public satisfaction (51.4%) towards HK police, with a rapid growth of dissatisfaction (13.6%). The highest rate of public dissatisfaction appeared in 2018 (28.1%) (HKU POP, 2018).

No Longer Unaccountable?

During the saga of 2014 there was a lot of accusations towards the police regarding improper use of force and irrational prosecution of protesters. Since those events, the media and public paid increasing attention to police misbehavior, so the professional image of Hong Kong Police (HKP) has been damaged. According to the Independent Police Complaints Council (IPCC), from 2014 to 2018, the average allegations it endorsed per year was 3282. Of these, 48.2% were charges of neglect of duty, 34.6% were charges of misconduct, improper manners, or offensive language, and 8.1% were charges of assault. From 2015 to 2018, a total 152 serving police officers were arrested. Among of them, 23 cases involved theft, 9 cases involved preventing the course of public justice, and 9 cases involved wounding or serious assault (Independent Police Complaint Council, Hong Kong, 2015 & 2017).

The Hong Kong Police Force has the power to investigate itself. Under Hong Kong's two-tier police complaints system, the Complaints Against Police Office (CAPO) receives reportable complaints, conducts investigations, and submits investigation

reports to the Independent Police Complaints Council (IPCC). The IPCC then reviews investigation reports by discussion and query. This has been criticized as the IPCC does not have power to investigate. It instead remained as an advisory and oversight body since its establishment in 2009 (Independent Police Complaint Council, Hong Kong, 2017).

The IPCC could only use reports and evidence submitted by CAPO when deciding whether endorse the investigation results. It may also request CAPO to reinvestigate a complaint if a report is rejected, but the power of investigation still held by the police. In 2017 to 2018, the total number of allegations was 2,872. Among 1,010 allegations that required full investigations, 41.5% were unsubstantiated, while among 1,862 allegations that did not require full investigations, 47.9% were not pursuable (Independent Police Complaint Council, Hong Kong, 2018).

Hong Kong police have therefore faced criticism over their professional image and doubts on whether they can conduct law enforcement in a neutral manner. The Report of "Police Power and Human Rights on 2014-2015 Umbrella Movement" has concluded 6 types of accusations about police law enforcement, including improper use of force, abuse of the police power to stop and search, indiscriminate arrest, driving away healthcare staff and reporters, police officer misbehavior, and improper prosecution. In 2014, only 48 out of 955 people arrested by the police were prosecuted, a prosecution rate of 5%. Among those prosecuted, the rate of conviction was 34%. Additionally, the rate of prosecution in 2005 (Anti-World Trade Organization Protest) and 2011 (Demonstration against the budget) were 0.6% and 12.2%. Thus, the Hong Kong police were criticized for abusing the power of arrest against protesters during mass demonstrations (Police Violence Database in Umbrella Movement, 2017)

Conclusion: Hybridity of Policing in China's Hong Kong

Policing in Hong Kong inherited paramilitary features in its early days of establishment emphasizing the capacity for 'internal security management'. Although the Hong Kong Police is a civil force in its daily operation, it can be quickly turned to be a force with anti-riot capacity for suppressing disturbances by force. Since 1969, members of the police force regardless of their rank had to undertake anti-riot training and be deployed to the Police Tactical Unit (PTU), a unit that is reserved for anti-riot policing duties. Theoretically all police would be called upon for PTU duty at least once in their tenure of service in the police force, and all members who received promotions would be subject to recall for PTU duty in order to acknowledge the anti-riot tactics of their new roles. This structural design implied that all 30,000 officers in the force were equipped with basic anti-riot skills and could be quickly turned into anti-riot platoons upon receiving a mobilization order from the Commissioner of Police. They would take up a supplementary role in different police regions for the maintenance of law and order in cases when there was not a territory-wide disturbance (Ho, 2019, pp. 224-225). In addition to the strength of police force, the anti-riot capacity of government is also powered up by 'draconian legislation' that substantially empowers police officers in exercising their duties.

This paper intends to respond to a simple but frequently asked and significant research question about Hong Kong policing- Why did the citizens perceive the police as accountable, professional, and neutral in the final chapter of colonial rule and the first decade of SAR era, but then have a drop in the satisfaction rate to below 20% in August 2019? (HKU POP 2019). While popular discourses highlighted the 'politicization of society' and 'institutional decay of the police', I would argue that this paradoxical

phenomenon could alternatively be explained by the abrupt and fundamental change of policing context accompanied by the realignment of Beijing's Hong Kong policy under the One Country Two Systems framework since 2014. The post-occupied context triggered reflection in Hong Kong society and thus demystified the public imagination of the HKP's 'professionalism', 'neutrality', and 'accountability'. With the redefinition of the Beijing and Hong Kong SAR relationship, the new policing context is no longer constituted by the 'politics of ambiguity' of the old days. The incorporation of the western managerial concept of 'accountability' got mutual exclusion with the fundamental nature of colonial paramilitary policing model inherited from the colonial Hong Kong.

References

- Goldsmith, A. (2015) Disgracebook policing: social media and the rise of police indiscretion, *Policing and Society*, 25:3, 249-267, DOI: 10.1080/10439463.2013.864653
- HKU POP (2019) *People's Satisfaction with the Performance of the Hong Kong Police, half-year average, 7-12, 1997-1-6, 2019*. Website URL https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/chinese/popexpress/hkpolice/halfyr/hkpolice_halfyr_chart.html, accessed 31 Jan 2020
- Ho, Lawrence Ka-ki (2010) *Policing the 1967 Riots in Hong Kong: Strategies, Rationales and Implications*. Hong Kong: Unpublished PhD thesis at the University of Hong Kong.
- Ho, Lawrence Ka-ki & CHU, Y. K. (2012) *Policing Hong Kong 1842-1969: Insiders' Stories*. Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press.
- Ho, Lawrence Ka-ki (2014) "Policing in Hong Kong and Macau: Transformations from the Colonial to Special Administrative Region" in Campbell, J. & Miller, V. (eds.) *Transnational Penal Cultures: New Perspectives on Discipline, Punishment and Desistance*. London:

- Routledge, pp. 83-85.
- Ho, Lawrence Ka-ki & Lam, Agnes I. F. (2017) Policing Macau: From “the Territory under Portuguese Administration” to China’s “Special Administrative Region” in O’ Reilly (ed.) *Colonial Policing and the Transnational Legacy: The Global Dynamics of Policing Across the Lusophone Community*, Routledge, UK.
- Ho, Lawrence Ka-ki (2019) “Policing Transnational Protests in an Asian Context: The WTO Sixth Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong”. *Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal*. Vol 5 (1), pp. 224-225.
- Hong Kong Legislative Council (2012) *Legislative Council Press Release 19 December 2012*. Retrieved 10 February, 2020, from <http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201212/19/P201212190442.htm>
- Hong Kong Government (1968) *Events in Hong Kong, 1967: An Official Report*. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
- Independent Police Complaint Council (2019) *IPCC Annual Report 2018*. Website URL <https://www.ipcc.gov.hk/doc/tc/report/2017/chapter2.pdf>, Accessed 31 Jan 2020.
- Jin, Y. (1998) *Zhonggong Xianggang zhengcemiwenshili: Jin Yaoruwushinianxiangjiangyiwang (The Secrets of the CCP’s Policy in Hong Kong)* [in Chinese] Hong Kong: Tianyuan Shuwu.
- Jones C. & Vagg J. (2007) *Criminal Justice in Hong Kong*, London: Routledge-Cavendish.
- Lee, C.H.N (1995) *Society and Policing in Hong Kong: A Study of the 1956 Riot*. Hong Kong: Unpublished thesis at the University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong.
- Ma, E. & Fung, A. (1999) Re-sinicization, Nationalism and the Hong Kong Identity, in So, Clement & Chan Joseph (eds.), *Press and Politics in Hong Kong: Case Studies from 1967 to 1997*. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, pp. 497-528.
- Manning, Peter (2010) *Democratic Policing in a Changing World*, New York: Routledge.
- Neep, D (2012) *Occupying Syria under the French Mandate: Insurgency, Space and State Formation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 179.
- Ng Chi-wa (1999) *Establishment and Early Development of the Police System in Hong Kong* (in Chinese). Unpublished PhD thesis, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
- Police Violence Database in Umbrella Movement (2017) Website URL <https://drive.google.com/file/d/0Bx4UPgWniSxQamFiN184blVBTVk/view>, Accessed 31 Jan 2020.
- Scott I. (1989) *Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong*. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.
- Secretary for Chinese Affairs, Hong Kong (1930) ‘Report of the Secretary for Chinese Affairs’ in Appendix C, *Hong Kong Administrative Report 1929*. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
- Sinclair, K. (1994) *Royal Hong Kong Police: 150 Anniversary Commemorative Publication, 1884-1994*. Hong Kong: Police Public Relations Branch, Royal Hong Kong Police.
- Sinclair, S. (2006) *At the End of the Line: Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame 1945-80*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Wong, C.Y. (2001) *The Communist-Inspired Riots in Hong Kong, 1967: A Multi-Actors Approach*. Hong Kong: Unpublished M. Phil Thesis at the University of Hong Kong.

Japan and China in Competition or Cooperation? Perspectives for Africa

Takeshi Daimon-Sato*

Abstract

This paper asks if and to what extent cooperation between Japan and China is feasible and desirable in the rise of Chinese presence in African continent. These two countries compete with each other in Africa over aid, trade, and investment. In the aid area, in particular, they have competed over markets for construction works in infrastructure. At the policy level, both countries have pledged massive aid for Africa without consulting with each other. The analysis shows that Japanese aid, while still focusing on infrastructure, can fill in areas in which China has little advantage, especially in designing development projects from participatory approaches, as demonstrated by projects in Kenya and Tunisia.

1. Introduction

July 2019 marked a memorable period for Chinese aid in Africa. The month saw the inauguration of the luxurious trans-continental railway — Rovos Rail — between Tanzania and Angola via the Congo Republic,

with massive lending from China. For decades, China has been constructing railways in the African continent; some examples are Djibouti-Ethiopia, Kenya-South Sudan, Nigeria, and so on. Since 2010, China has been the number one investor and financier in the continent. However, where are Europe and Japan? Although they were colonialists and lenders in the past, they have now, if not completely withdrawn from, have at least significantly decreased direct lending on infrastructure investments, especially since the 2008 global financial crisis. There was a time when Japan was playing the role China plays today, and politically at least, Japan still does not want to surrender in its geo-economic competition with China in the continent.

Chinese influence in the continent goes beyond the economic sphere. Politically too, China is assuming a leadership role in the 'African League of Non-democracies.' In some parts of the continent, especially in the North and Central, more governments are becoming non-democratic in terms of free elections and governance structure. According to the well-known Freedom House Report, the overall score of democracy in North Africa (Maghreb) remains low,

* Takeshi Daimon-Sato is a professor of School of International Liberal Studies in Waseda University

with the exception of Tunisia (which had the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2010). Algeria, Libya, and Egypt are non-democratic, and most central African countries in Sub-Saharan Africa such as Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and so on, are in this category. To be sure, it is not correct to describe the whole continent as non-democratic, as many countries in Southern countries (such as South Africa, Namibia, and Botswana, to name a few), have nurtured democracy. The trend in Africa is clearly mixed. However, there are some Western media reports warning that even democratic countries such as Tanzania and Senegal have been arguably shifting towards less democratic and more authoritarian regimes.¹ China has strengthened its diplomatic and economic ties with these countries in recent years.

In the 1980s and 1990s, Japan used to be the top donor to some of these African countries, and it has tried to remain relevant in various areas.

In August 2016, the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI) was held in Nairobi, Kenya - the first time ever in Africa since its inception in 1993. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe pledged USD 30 billion for developing quality infrastructure, building resilient health systems, and laying the foundations for peace and stability. One of the pillars of pledge was the so-called “quality infrastructure investment” of USD 10 billion for the Mombasa/Northern Corridor and Nacala Corridor Growth Area in Kenya. Unfortunately, for Japan, China is pledging doubled that amount for roads, ports, power plants, and other infrastructure in the continent. Africa is an integral part of the BRI strategy today, insinuating that China has been high in quantity of infrastructure but not in quality. Does it make sense for Japan to compete in Africa? If yes, then in what manner, and where in Africa?

Africa is culturally divided into Northern Arabic Africa (or ‘white’ Africa) and Sub-Saharan Africa (or ‘black’ Africa). One can further divide Sub-Saharan Africa into prosperous and democratic southern, middle income and relatively free eastern, relatively free, but poor, western, and poor and non-democratic central. From the Chinese perspective, East, South, and North Africa are an integral part of the BRI, especially in its maritime and land infrastructure. However, its apparent correlation with authoritarian regimes is worrying.

2. Chinese Aid in Africa

Less Democratic Africa

Democracy is facing its challenges across the world. Freedom House scores countries according to “political rights and civil liberties ratings” (PL) and “civil liberties indicators” (CL).² The following is a list of the “Best 15” and “Worst 15” in terms of score:

	The Best 15	The Worst 15
1	Finland	Syria
2	Norway	Turkmenistan
3	Sweden	South Sudan *
4	Canada	Eritrea *
5	Netherlands	North Korea
6	Australia	Equatorial Guinea *
7	New Zealand	Sudan *
8	Uruguay	Somalia *
9	Denmark	Saudi Arabia
10	Ireland	Uzbekistan
11	Belgium	Tajikistan
12	Japan	Libya *
13	Portugal	Central African Republic *
14	Switzerland	Yemen
15	Chile	China

¹ For example, series of China-Africa relations in *France Culture* (radio program), *Le Temps du débat*, broadcast in August 2019 (with exact date not able to be specified and traced).

² See Appendix for methodology of Freedom House for democracy.

The starred countries are from African continent. The list of countries with the least PL and CL scores has seven African countries, and this list includes China. Hence, they are sometimes called the 'League of Non-Democracies.' Note also that non-African nations (North Korea, for example) are also pro-PRC regimes. Japan is the only Asian country with one of the best PL and CL scores. The list does not contain the US or the UK, as those countries' scores have been declining over recent years.

Some other African countries, such as Ghana, Benin, South Africa, Namibia, Senegal, and Tunisia have above average scores. However, scores for Senegal, Namibia, and Benin have declined over the years. For example, in Senegal, the incumbent President was re-elected in 2017 with an overwhelming majority. However, scholars have cast doubt on the election result.

China is also keen on expanding its cultural influence by expanding the number of its so-called Confucius Institutes. China is increasingly becoming a soft power in the continent. Meanwhile, the port of Djibouti is now a Chinese military base. Thus, China is becoming a military power as well. What is China trying to achieve in the continent? The following section examines this question from a historical perspective.

History of Chinese Aid for Africa

Western or Japanese observers often do not know that China began assisting Africa long before its recent expansion. It began in 1964, when Premier Zhou Enlai visited Africa to propose the 'Eight Principles' of Chinese aid to Africa. Until the late 1980s and early 1990s, Chinese aid in Africa was not a serious topic of discussion, and even today, there remains much misunderstanding of Chinese aid strategy in Africa. Therefore, it is important for us to understand how and why China has assisted Africa for such a long time.

Historically, there are three stages of Chinese commitment to African nations in the past 60

years. The first stage, from about 1955 to 1979, corresponds with China's state-building stage under Mao Zedong, before it adopted radical economic reform led by Deng Xiaoping, largely motivated by political propaganda than economic interests. Many African colonies became independent during this period, when African leaders were seeking alternative, non-Western governance structures, and the Chinese model or 'Maoism' fitted such a model. Another influential factor was the 'non-alliance movement,' stemming from the well-known 'Bandung Conference' that took place in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955. The non-alliance movement was a 'third' way, instead of allying with the US-Western capitalist bloc or the Soviet-Eastern communist bloc. Although the Chinese Communist Government was established in denial of Western capitalism in 1949, at the start of the Cold War period they had no intention to be under the Soviet bloc either. Another factor was that China had territorial disputes with the Soviets in those days. They wanted to become the leader of the Third World. Even today, the Chinese identify themselves as a 'South' (or the third world) member of the world, and when discussing foreign aid from China, they prefer to use the term 'South-South Cooperation.'

From the Chinese perspective, a 'new' China or the PRC was founded on the basis of anti-imperialism, with imperialism symbolized by Japanese forces before the end of the World War II and by American military presence in Asia after the war. Hence, the preamble of the PRC's Constitution states as follows:

"China's future is closely linked with the future of the world. China upholds an independent foreign policy, and adheres to the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence, and develops the diplomatic relations and economic and cultural exchanges with the various

countries; consistently fights against imperialism, hegemony and colonialism, strengthens solidarity with peoples of the world, supports the oppressed nations and the developing countries in winning and safeguarding their national independence and developing their national economies, making continuous efforts to safeguard world peace and promote human progress.” (Preface to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, as cited by Zhang (p. 102, footnote 3).

In other words, helping newly independent Asian and African countries was largely the *raison d’être* of the new China. In a street shop in Conakry, Guinea, one can see portraits of international sport stars and political leaders, among which are Che Guevara, Nelson Mandela, and Mao Zedong. In the 1950s, China was in direct military confrontation with the US during the Korean War. In Chinese eyes, the US was taking over colonial status by sending Peace Corps and military advisors in the 1960s. Until 1971, the PRC was not a formal member of the United Nations, as Taiwan (ROC) was a member. Therefore, for the PRC, assisting non-aligned nations in the third world was virtually the only way to demonstrate the legitimacy of their own regime. In a sense, this motive remains valid to this day. The PRC’s aid to Africa was motivated by the number of countries that would vote for China at the UN. Indeed, the PRC won over the ROC to replace its representation at the UN, becoming one of the Big Five permanent membership nations (with veto power) at the Security Council. Since then, the PRC’s long-standing position of ‘One China’ has been the *fait accompli* in its international relations. Although no data are available to the public, there is little doubt that Chinese aid to Africa achieved its peak by the early 1970s.

Overview of Chinese Investment in Africa

Since 2009, China has become the largest investor in Africa. In 2017, it opened its first military base abroad, in Djibouti. In 2013, Chinese banks lent 3.3 billion USD for railway construction between Djibouti and Addis Ababa (Ethiopia). Between the two countries lies a gas pipeline, also financed by China. In other African countries, China has offered finance by lending for various infrastructure; for example, the Tanzania-Angola railway, the South Sudan-Uganda-Kenya railway, Mombasa Port (Kenya), Dar es-Salaam Port (Tanzania), and Djibouti Port (Djibouti), to name a few. Chinese aid to African countries accounts for more than 50% of all aid flow to developing countries.

In China, economic aid is defined as (a) grant aid (including project, materials, technical assistance, medical assistance, emergency humanitarian aid), fund for South-South cooperation, (b) interest-free loan (0% interest rate, 10 years of repayment, 5 years of grace period), (c) Chinese EX-IM Bank Loan (2-3% interest rate, repayment 20 years, grace period 5-7 years), (d) scholarship, and (e) subsidy for interest rate. Multilateral contributions are also part of economic assistance.

A frequent criticism of Chinese aid is its reliance on lending rather than grants. Many indebted poor countries have requested rescheduling or refinancing their debt with creditors (including China) through the Paris Club, of which China is not a member. China could possibly join the Paris Club or the OECD, and Chinese aid will be required to undergo major scrutiny under the OECD-DAC guidelines.

In recent years, the Chinese government is recognizing international criticism of the debt trap caused by Chinese lending and has noted they “also need to take into account debt sustainability in mobilizing finance”³ as one of the guiding principles of the BRI, signed in May 2017. In September 2018,

³ Government of the PRC, “Guiding Principles on Financing the Development of the Belt and Road,” May 16, 2017, Section 14. <https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/13757.htm>

the China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) adopted a declaration in Beijing that stated, “China is committed to the principles of no political strings, mutual benefits and efficient development, supports Africa’s pursuit of diversified and sustainable development, and will make active efforts to help African countries improve debt sustainability and achieve internally-driven development and mutually-reinforcing economic and social development.”⁴

To heavily indebted poor countries in Africa, Xi Jinping said in September 2018 speech delivered at FOCAC Beijing Summit that China “will extend US\$15 billion of grants, interest-free loans, and concessional loans to Africa. For those of Africa’s least developed countries, heavily indebted, and poor countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing countries that have diplomatic relations with China, the debt they have incurred in the form of interest-free Chinese government loans due to mature by the end of 2018 will be exempted.”⁵ This exemption is very similar to the actions of OECD countries in terms of heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) since 2000.

By 2012, China had already cancelled debts for 27 billion RMB, and provided 83.8 billion RMB in interest-free loans, both of which are expected to increase in the face of international criticism against the Chinese ‘debt trap.’

More recently, in September 2018, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed confirmed that China agreed to extend the debt repayment period for the Addis Ababa-Djibouti cross border railway. According to him, China has pledged to extend the debt repayment period for a loan it has acquired to construct the Ethiopia-Djibouti railway from 10 to 30 years. Apparently, China does not want to be considered a contributor to debt in Africa.

3. Japanese Aid for Africa through TICAD Initiative

At the end of August 2019, leaders of African nations gathered in Yokohama, Japan for the 7th Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD). The TICAD initiative was begun in 1993 as Japan’s first step in expanding African partnerships, as Japan had become the top donor in infrastructure lending to several African countries by the end of the 1980s. One of the main motives for Japan to assist at that time was to gain support from African nations, as Japan needed their help to secure permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council, a dream for Japan in those days.

Today, Japanese leaders may no longer pursue this political motive as in the 1980s and 1990s because it has no support from its major Asian neighbors (China and Korea) for such a position. Furthermore, the UN has become a less attractive place. The US has been boycotting its financial contributions and has withdrawn from major UN organizations. Overall, in the 21st century, the UN plays a much less significant role.

Initially, the TICAD was held every five years in Tokyo. It was a big event for Japan to host delegates from African nations. However, the FOCAC initiative by China became increasingly influential and visible. The FOCAC meets every three years, alternating between Beijing and an African city. Given this rival movement, Japanese policy makers decided in 2016 after TICAD 6 in Nairobi, to meet every three years in alternating locations.

Back in 1993, when the TICAD was held in Tokyo for the first time, I remember I went to see President Rawlings from Ghana, then in his late 40s, who flew to Tokyo on his private jet. He struck me as somebody

⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan” (2019-2021)”, September 5, 2018, Section 3.9.2. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1593683.shtml

⁵ Xinhua Net, September 3, 2018, internet article. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-09/03/c_129946189.htm

possessed with natural charisma; simultaneously, he was an open-minded technocrat who, unlike President Moi of Kenya, knew how to set things right. Ghana was a good student of the World Bank and IMF in the 1980s and 1990s, when it tries to implement the Structural Adjustment Policies as suggested by the Breton Woods Institutions. Dr. Botchway, a Harvard trained economist, advised President Rawlings to enter dialogue with Washington economists. Ravi Kanbur, who was the World Bank resident representative in Ghana, was a good advisor.

For Kenya too, the TICAD worked well. There were long discussions about debt sustainability in Kenya. If Kenya was categorized as an HIPC, as was likely at that time, major OECD-DAC countries would stop assisting it due to its poor human rights records. The TICAD provided an opportunity for Kenya to continue receiving funds from Japan and escape becoming an HIPC. As examined here, the famous hydraulic power plant in Western Kenya (Sondur-Miriu project), assisted by a Japanese ODA loan, could not have been completed if the country had fallen into HIPC status at that time. In a sense, Japanese aid saved Kenya.

Kenya Scandal in Both Ends

President Daniel Moi, known a 'Nyayo,' a Swahili nickname, was not very popular among Washington economists in the 1990s. Born in 1924, he served as the President of Kenya (after the first President Kenyatta) from 1978 to 2002.

Moi was not popular among international NGOs because of corruption and human rights abuses charges against him. No multiparty election was held for presidency until 1991. Amid foreign criticism, he was forced to allow plural party elections starting in 1991 and was re-elected twice under a 'democratic' system, although opposition parties claimed corruption of votes, and therefore, the election results were dubious. In 2002 he retired after serving two

terms as president, as per the constitution.

Moi was unpopular among Washington economists, because unlike leaders in Ghana or Uganda, he was reluctant to accept the 'conditionalities' set forth by the World Bank and IMF SALs. These conditionalities, ranging from increase in Value Added Tax (VAT) to privatization of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), were often drafted by economists in those institutions who did not understand local realities. Thus, he gained local support but lost international support. International donors have stopped assisting the country since the late 1990s. Naturally, Kenya was in huge deficit because of its large public investments, as was common in other neighboring countries, and it became difficult to repay debts from international lenders. This led to the vicious circle of a debt trap.

The TICAD provided an opportunity for Kenya to return to an international donor community circle, and perhaps saved Kenya from becoming an HIPC. Chinese aid has followed the Japanese example. The FOCAC met every three years while the TICAD met only every five years. The FOCAC met in Africa and in Beijing alternately, while the TICAD was meet only every three years in Tokyo. Increasingly, the FOCAC became more visible than the TICAD.

In 2001 and 2002 a scandal within the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) erupted and attracted huge media attention. This was also called the 'Muneo Scandal,' named after the former Vice-Minister for MOFA Muneo Suzuki who had strong influence over decision-making in ODA allocations. He was charged with corruption in an African ODA project, namely, the Sondur-Miriu Hydroelectric Power (to be explained below).

Suzuki was an influential politician at that time on African ODA issues and was locked in battled with another political superstar, Ms. Makiko Tanaka, daughter of former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, over MOFA reforms. The issue was taken up in the Japanese Diet (parliament) over several days. Did

Suzuki receive money from a Japanese construction company involved in Sondu-Miriu? Was Tanaka capable of implementing MOFA-ODA reforms to make ODA allocations and principles crystal clear? Ultimately, Suzuki was arrested on another charge and Tanaka was fired. The Deputy Vice Minister of MOFA (career diplomat) had to leave office before the end of his term.

Therefore, the Sondu-Miriu project became muddled with politics, giving it a very bad name in Japan and abroad. NGOs on both ends have protested against the project on different grounds. For a Kenyan NGO, the project neglected local voices; a prominent local NGO leader was arrested on the premises of the project site. A Japanese NGO has highlighted the violation of human rights and environmental considerations, as the construction of the dam changed the ecological system of the river.

4. Case Studies of Japanese Aids in African Continent

(1) Kenya – Sondu Miriu Hydroelectric Power Project

Background

This section presents a comparative overview of Japanese assistance for economic infrastructure sector in African nations, with the example of a hydraulic power plant in Sondu-Miriu, a Western region of Kenya, which has received assistance through a Japanese ODA loans since the early 1990s. This symbolic project of mutual friendship provides an example of consensus-based institution building through Japanese infrastructure lending, which contrasts with massive capital flow from China since around 2010.

The long Presidency of Moi (1978–2002)

destabilized Kenya's policy base in the early 1990s, when the country faced anti-corruption and pro-democracy campaigns from both Kenya and Japan. Further, the delay in implementation of the structural adjustment programs since the 1980s worsened its relations with the World Bank and IMF. When Kenya was internationally isolated in the late 1990s over its human rights records and structural adjustments, Japan helped it out.

The Sondu-Miriu Project, a hydroelectric power plant based in Western Kenya, was originally intended as a concessional loan project in March 1997, but took more than a decade to complete, including a suspension of a few years in the early 2000s, when Kenya was under discussion of being classified as an HIPC, exempted from repaying debts to international creditors. The loan resumed politically when President Moi met with Vice-Minister Suzuki of Foreign Affairs of Japan, expressing his intention to repay the debt from Japan, regardless of the application of HIPC debt relief. Fortunately, for both countries, Kenya was not classified as an HIPC. As mentioned, the project also went through political scandals in both countries. In Kenya, an NGO leader was arrested at the project site, and in Japan, the Vice-Minister was arrested for corruption charges on an ODA project. However, the project had resumed by 2005.

The Project

Given these events, both Kenya and Japan decided to take a cautious approach and implement the project through 'consensus-building.' In 2011–12, the author conducted an evaluation study on this project, examining 'relevance,' 'efficiency,' 'effectiveness,' 'impact' and 'sustainability,' in compliance with the guidelines set forth by the OECD-DAC (Development Assistant Commission).⁶ We conducted a sample survey of 200 households

⁶ OECD-DAC, "Evaluation Criteria" web site. <https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/dacriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>

near the project to understand their perception of the project. To our surprise, only 23 households (or 11.5%) had electricity contracts with the power plant. The non-contractors did not sign the contract because of the lack of electricity supply to their community (50 households), high electricity bills (where the community is served) (111 households), and other reasons (5 households). Further, many households recognized the employment generation and business opportunities during construction, and the new infrastructure (power station and related facilities) as major positive impacts. The noise and pollution during construction, and the loss of employment after construction were perceived as major negative impacts.

Overall, the rate of satisfaction with the project shows that 140 households (70%) were “very much satisfied” or “satisfied,” far exceeding the 55 households (27.5%) that were “unsatisfied” or “very much unsatisfied.”⁷ A major reason for this satisfaction was the economic benefits, such as employment (132 households), while a major reason for dissatisfaction was the non-economic costs, such as worsening of the environment during construction (45 households).

When the project was in suspension, a Technical Committee was established to discuss requests from stakeholders, including NGOs, community representatives, government and company representatives, and JICA. The beneficiary survey revealed a relatively low level of recognition of the committee (16), while people were nearly equally “aware of” (105 households) and “unaware of” (91 households) it. Among those who recognized the committee, 86 households (81.9%) replied that they were either “unsatisfied” or “very much unsatisfied,” far exceeding the 18 households (16.6%) who replied that they were either “satisfied” or “very much satisfied.”

The reasons for satisfaction included “opinions and interests were reflected” (9 households), “problems were solved” (10 households), while the reasons for dissatisfaction included “opinions and interests were not reflected” (17 households), “problems were not solved” (49 households), and “participatory, democratic and transparent process was not available” (27 households).⁸

These results suggest that overall, residents were satisfied with the project, while they were not aware of the Technical Committee, and unfavorable opinions dominated even among those who recognized the committee because the problems raised were not solved (49 households), and so on. However, based on requests from local people and NGOs, the committee recommended and conducted additional surveys (on fishery and livery standards, as well as other issues). This suggests that the monitoring by the committee of impacts on fishery and health damage caused by dust and other factors have reduced public concerns. However, most likely, these actual contributions by the committee were not fully shared with the locals.

CSR activities by the company include efforts related to water supply, education, and the environment. About 20,000 people in the downstream area of the Sondu River receive water supply through standpipes, as treated water, and by establishing a rural water supply association, thus, contributing to the supply of safe water. Initially, the company assumed that local communities should supply water through self-help efforts. However, following discussions and a recommendation by the Technical Committee, the company funded the entire water supply. Water provided through water kiosks and standpipes is used for drinking or agricultural purposes, improving the standard of living by reducing the labor involved in fetching water and by providing safe water.

⁷ JICA (2011), “Ex-Post Evaluation of Japanese ODA Loan “Sondu-Miri Hydropower Project I, II”” https://www2.jica.go.jp/en/evaluation/pdf/2011_KE-P21_4.pdf, pp. 9-10.

⁸ JICA (2011), *ibid*, pp. 9-10.

Communities living downstream of the Sondu River also receive water supply (31 water kiosks and 3 standpipes) as do communities near the outlet channel (5 standpipes). In addition, locals within the base camp receive free water, which is open to the local community. The locals have appreciated these activities.

Overall Evaluation

There is no serious negative impact on the natural environment; further, there are no severe problems involving relocation and pollution and related effects on health. The project cost slightly exceeded the plan, and the project period significantly exceeded the plan — there was a delay of more than five years in the signing of the Loan Agreement (L/A) — which translated to low efficiency. There is no major problem in the structure, finance, technique, or current status of operation and maintenance; hence, the sustainability of the project is high. Therefore, this project is evaluated to be satisfactory.

In conclusion, with a process of trial and error, Kenya and Japan collaborated closely to build consensus on this controversial project, but much remains to be done to incorporate this consensus into actual decision making. This is an important lesson learned, no matter who finances the project. If anything, Chinese aid should also learn from this project so that their assistance can reflect local needs.

(2) Case Study Tunisia

Background

One-half of Tunisia is arid, its yearly overall precipitation is scarce, and in terms of geography, precipitation, and annual available surface, water supplies are unevenly distributed. Moreover, the Greater Tunis Area, which is in the northern region and the center of Tunisia's economic development, has suffered from impending demands for drinking water because of its rapidly increasing population

and lack of irrigation water in the dry seasons. Thus, the Tunisian government has been implementing an integrated water development plan for the entire northern region (Water Resources Development Master Plan in Northern Tunisia, of 1975) to secure drinking water, industrial, and irrigation water resources. Based on this master plan, the government has installed major water-supply channels and water conduits to each city. One example is the Cap Bon Canal, which connects the Medjerda River with Cap Bon (an area that produces citrus fruits, which are major agricultural exports) in the southwest peninsula of Tunisia; another is the Sejnane–Joumine–Medjerda pipeline, which was built in the course of this project. In 2004, water resource development in Tunisia helped satisfy 80% of the developable water demand, and in the northern region, the resources exceeded the gross demand. A dearth of pipelines, however, meant an insufficient distribution of these developed water resources to areas in need (i.e., the Greater Tunis area and its environs, Cap Bon, Sahel, the Greater Sfax Area, etc.).

Project Outline

The scope of this project was to source the financial aid necessary to construct water pipes (a total extension of about 90 km), extend existing pump facilities, and source consulting services in the north of Tunisia. The goal was to provide high-quality drinking, industrial, and irrigation water to the Greater Tunis Area and to the areas surrounding Tunis, Tunisia's capital city.

The project was not completed as scheduled, primarily due to the 'Arab Spring' in Tunisia at the end of 2010. All administrative procedures stopped for several months and project implementation was delayed in this period. Residents refused to provide land for the previous offer by the government.

The project involved an important component of building 65,000 m³ of pondage, supposed to be ready by the time of the appraisal; however, construction

was suspended because of a neighboring resident's refusal. During this suspension, an additional survey was conducted to examine geometrical problems. Ultimately, the decision was to build a pondage with reduced capacity (30,000 m³), in consideration with soft-soil conditions and residents' opinions. Thereafter, attempts were made to initiate construction, but this had to be canceled, as the construction would not be completed before the expiration of the ODA loan terms. As of this ex-post evaluation, some parts of the building site have been dug, and machines intended for use were left behind, ready for resumption of construction.

Evaluation Result

There were several obstacles after, or because, of the Arab Spring, in implementing this project. National rights awareness and an anti-government attitudes led to sabotage by residents. Because local residents prevented the construction of the water-supply pipe from Sidi El Barrak to Sejnane by force, construction was suspended. In addition, many executives were exiled following the 2011 revolution, leading to overall stagnation in administrative procedures. However, this does not mean a total absence of administrative organization: indeed, line ministries in charge of basic infrastructure, including police, fire departments, and military, continued to hold their function. Therefore, in evaluation, no subperiods should be removed from the project period as forces majeure.

We conducted a beneficiary survey for 90 households. Many survey respondents had experienced no water-supply outage. However, a portion — especially those living at high altitudes — had experienced a drop in water pressure. One-half of residents drank tap water, while the other half did not because they do not trust its quality. One-half of the residents were satisfied with the quality of the drinking water. Ultimately, we rated this project to be satisfactory, largely because the economic return from

the project was positive and significant. There was an increased profit from sales of oranges and other citrus products in Cap Bon, generating positive income for farmers. Of course, this is highly dependent on rainfall, and calculation was subject to various technical constraints. Nevertheless, the water pipeline provided additional capacity of water transportation in the end.

Challenges

The issue of land acquisition cannot be overlooked. Land used to construct water conduits between Joumine and Medjerda were expropriated by Tunisia's government in 1987 when the first water conduits were constructed in the same region. Therefore, land acquisition did not take place during this project. Local residents protested further land expropriation in a neighboring area before the start of the 1987 project. Their descendants again raised this issue and demanded compensation after the start of this project. In April 2011, these residents sabotaged the construction of a water-supply pipe from Joumine to Medjerda; thus, although materials had been procured in July 2012, the construction had yet to start. Eventually, the construction of the water-supply pipe started at the behest of an administrative order; it was completed in July 2016 and transferred to a new executing agency in January 2017. As opposing action did not occur after project completion, one can confirm that any negative impact was minimal.

Japan faces a dilemma in economic assistance. To emphasize the effectiveness or efficiency of a project, one can rely on the 'black cat, white cat' policy; in an extreme case, one might use the most authoritarian method to complete the project most effectively and efficiently. Tunisians had the capacity to do so before the revolution. However, after the revolution, they decided to examine and focus on the procedural aspects, namely, accountability and transparency. One might as well call it project governance. Nonetheless,

it is difficult to achieve procedural justice without sacrificing effectiveness and efficiency. This requires huge costs and time.

5. Concluding Remarks - Can China and Japan Cooperate on Aid for Africa?

As seen above, there are many differences and similarities in the aims of China and Japan in the African continent. They are competing in similar areas, which also could imply that there are possible areas for cooperation between the two countries. There is however one fundamental distinction between the two countries; China is not a member of OECD-DAC while Japan is, meaning that China does not have to comply with various guidelines set forth by OECD-DAC, i.e., environmental guidelines, corruption guidelines, procurement guidelines, etc.⁹ Japan cannot assist countries with poor human rights records, while China seems to be actively pursuing collaborating with 'dictatorial league of nations' in Africa.

There are common areas in which both countries can collaborate. Both China and Japan have invested in economic infrastructure, which requires massive capital investments that need co-financing from various financiers. ODA alone is not sufficient to cover financial gap in infrastructure, and private capital must be filled in the gap. In this context, China and Japan can complement with each other.

In recent years, China has been very active and vocal in contributing to the international public goods. One area is the contribution to UN Peace-Keeping Operations (PKO). After the retreat from South Sudan, Japanese contribution to UNPKO reached a negligible level, while China has increased its

presence in this field. As mandated by the UN, these activities are quite consistent with Japanese principles of international cooperation. Hence, there is no point of competition in this area.

China has been also expressive about its role in SDGs, which Japan is also pursuing actively. SDGs are also international development goals that all signing countries adhere to as common goals toward 2030. It is therefore possible for both countries to at least share SDGs as common goals.

In conclusion, mutually beneficial cooperation for Africa could be possible in many areas, especially when multilateral agencies can play an intermediate role. However, it is not desirable to Japan to be part of 'league of Chinese friends' --- Japan should probably be more vocal about its partnership with African people who aspire to be part of 'league of democracies.'

References

- Chan, G. *China's Compliance in Global Affairs: Trade, Arms Control, Environmental Protection, Human Rights* (New Jersey, London, Singapore, Beijing, Shanghai, Hongkong, Taipei, Chennai: World Scientific, 2006).
- Chen, Zhimin "Soft balancing and reciprocal engagement: International structures and China's foreign policy choices". In David Zweig and Chen Zhimin (eds.) *China's Reform and International Political Economy*. London and New York: Routledge (2007).
- Hirono, M. and M Lanteigne, "Introduction: China and UN peacekeeping," *International Peacekeeping*, vol.18, no.3 (2011).
- Kent, A. *Beyond Compliance: China, International Organizations, and Global Security* (Stanford: Stanford University, 2007).
- McCord, E. "Confucius Institute: Hardly a Threat to

⁹ OECD Web Site (<https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>), accessed January 10, 2020.

- Academic Freedoms," *The Diplomat* (March 27, 2014).
- Muchler, B. "Go East, young man", *The Africa Report*, No 67(February 2015) p20-24.
- Shi L, 1989, *Foreign economic cooperation of modern China*. China Social Sciences Press.
- Stahle, S. "China's shifting attitude towards United Nations peacekeeping operations," *The China Quarterly*, vol.195 (September 2008), pp.631-655.
- Teitt, S. "The Responsibility to Protect and China's Peacekeeping Policy," *International Peacekeeping*, vol.18, no.3 (2011), pp.298-312.
- Zhang, J. "China's Aid to Africa," Chapter 3 in Zhou, Hong, ed., 2017, *China's Foreign Aid: 60 Years in Retrospect*, Singapore, Springer.

Appendix Freedom House Index

Freedom House asks the following questions to determine political rights:

- "Was the current head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections?"
- "Were the current national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?"
- "Are the electoral laws and framework fair, and are they implemented impartially by the relevant election management bodies?"
- "Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system free of undue obstacles to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?"
- "Is there a realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?"
- "Are the people's political choices free from domination by the military, foreign powers, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group that is not democratically accountable?"
- "Do various segments of the population (including ethnic, religious, gender, LGBT, and other relevant groups) have full political rights and electoral opportunities?"
- "Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government?"
- "Are the safeguards against official corruption strong and effective?"
- "Does the government operate with openness and transparency?"
- "Are there free and independent media?"
- "Are individuals free to practice and express their religious faith or nonbelief in public and private?"
- "Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free from extensive political indoctrination?"
- "Are individuals free to express their personal views on political or other sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution?"
- "Is there freedom of assembly?"
- "Is there freedom for trade unions and similar professional or labor organizations?"
- "Is there an independent judiciary?"
- "Does due process prevail in civil and criminal matters?"
- "Is there protection from the illegitimate use of physical force and freedom from war and insurgencies?"
- "Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population?"
- "Do individuals enjoy freedom of movement, including the ability to change their place of residence, employment, or education?"
- "Are individuals able to exercise the right to own property and establish private businesses without undue interference from state or non-state actors?"
- "Do individuals enjoy personal social freedoms, including choice of marriage partner and size of family, protection from domestic violence, and control over appearance?"
- "Do individuals enjoy equality of opportunity and freedom from economic exploitation?"

The Ukraine-Japan Security Dialogue as an Important Contribution to International Peace and Security

Violetta Udovik*

Abstract

In 2018 security consultations between Ukraine and Japan were held for the first time, becoming their newest area of bilateral cooperation. This paper reviews when and under what circumstances Ukraine-Japan security dialogue commenced. It follows the timeline of defense contacts, putting emphasis on common interests such as tackling the issue of the territories occupied by Russia, ensuring freedom of navigation, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, development of armed forces, and participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). The paper explores the position of President Zelenskyy on security cooperation with Japan and concludes with an assessment of its significance in the context of international peace and security.

Introduction

On October 12th, 2018, for the first time in the history of Ukraine-Japan bilateral relations, “anpo kyogi” or security consultations were held in Tokyo. Ukraine

was represented by Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Vasyl Bodnar and Deputy Minister of Defense for European Integration, Lieutenant General Anatoliy Petrenko. On behalf of Japan Deputy Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Uyama Hideki and Director General for International Affairs of the Ministry of Defense Suzuki Hideo participated in the consultations.

As reported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, the sides discussed a wide range of issues of mutual interest, including those related to security and defense policies of both countries, the security situation in their respective regions, as well as bilateral cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 2018). During the visit of Ukrainian delegation to Japan, the Memorandum between the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Japan on Cooperation and Exchanges in the field of Defense was signed. As stated by Vasyl Bodnar in his twitter account, Ukraine has become the first country in its region with which Japan signed a memorandum on defense cooperation (Vasyl Bodnar, 2018).

Notwithstanding the significance of this historic event, security dialogue between Ukraine and Japan

* Violetta Udovik is an academic fellow at the Institute for Languages and Cultures of Europe and Asia, Japan. She holds PhD (World History) from I.I.Mechnikov Odesa National University, Ukraine.

has not received due attention of research community. Therefore, this paper can be considered to be the first attempt to analyze current state of Ukraine-Japan cooperation in defense sector, find common interests of both countries in security area, as well as evaluate its significance in the context of international peace and security.

Initial Steps: Ukraine-Japan Relations, 1992-2014

It should be noted that Ukraine-Japan relations have been gradually developing since their establishment in 1992. In 1994, after Ukraine denounced its nuclear arms, which represented the third biggest nuclear arsenal in the world after the United States and Russia, Ukraine and Japan signed the Agreement Concerning Cooperation for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Reduced in Ukraine and the establishment of a committee on this cooperation, which paved a way to a closer cooperation between the two countries.

In 1995 Ukraine President Leonid Kuchma visited Japan for the first time as a head of Ukrainian state, and in 1997 Japan started providing Ukraine with the Official Development Assistance consisting of loans, grant aid, financial assistance, technical cooperation, green investment and Chernobyl related projects, which in February 2018 totaled 3.1 billion US Dollars (Embassy of Japan in Ukraine, 2018).

Multilateral cooperation was strengthened after Minister for Foreign Affairs Aso Taro proclaimed the “Arch of Freedom and Prosperity” as the fourth principle of the foreign policy of Japan, based on which a dialogue between Japan and GUAM – Organization for Democracy and Economic Development consisting of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova – was established in 2007. In 2012, following the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear plant accident, Ukraine and Japan signed first ever Agreement on the Cooperation to

Advance Aftermath Response Activities for Accidents at Nuclear Power Stations.

Amidst deterioration of Ukraine’s security environment due to the temporary occupation of the Crimean Peninsula and Donbas region by Russia in 2014, the following year Japan’s Prime Minister Abe Shinzo visited Ukraine reassuring Japan government’s support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and announced the provision of assistance totaling 1.84 billion US Dollars (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015). Japan implemented sanctions against Russia and has been supporting United Nations General Assembly Resolutions regarding the human rights situation in Ukraine’s Crimea. As an active member of G7, Japan has made its utmost effort in order to push for Ukraine agenda within the G7 Ukraine Support Group.

As can be seen from above, Ukraine and Japan managed to develop close relations in a wide range of areas such as political dialogue, economic affairs, nuclear safety, and humanitarian cooperation. However, the international crisis of 2014 brought by the occupation of Ukraine’s territories by Russia urged both countries to seek closer ties in a completely new area of bilateral cooperation which is related to security and defense matters.

Building Common Interests: from Cyber Security to Broader Defense Cooperation

In December 2016 Ukraine and Japan launched bilateral dialogue on the cyber security by holding first consultations in Ukraine’s capital Kyiv. During its visit to Ukraine, the Japanese delegation, headed by Ambassador-at-large Mizushima Koichi, familiarized Ukrainian counterparts from the competent authorities with Japan’s achievements in monitoring and neutralizing of the cyber incidents and introduced

Japan's National Strategy in cyber security domain. Parties have also discussed major contemporary strategies and tendencies in the field of cyber security, basic mechanisms of its reinforcement including further perspective directions of Ukraine-Japan bilateral cooperation in this strategic area (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 2016).

For Japan, which saw its total number of cyber attacks explode from 12.8 billion in 2013 to 128.1 billion in 2016 – a 900% increase in just three years (Volodzko, 2018), the issue of cyber security has been gaining more and more importance. In 2014 the Defense Ministry of Japan set up a cyber defense unit within the Self-Defense Forces to respond to the large number of cyber attacks (The Asahi Shimbun, 2018), and in 2015 the government of Japan adopted the Cyber security strategy (The Government of Japan, 2015). Currently, Japan has bilateral dialogues on cyber security with the following countries: the US, Australia, the UK, France, Germany, Russia, India, Republic of Korea, Israel, Estonia and Ukraine (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2018).

Ukraine, in its turn, has experienced numerous cyber attacks including ransomware hits in June 2017, and has been strengthening its capabilities to protect itself from such attacks in the future. It ranks 8th among the world's top countries with the best programmers compared, for example, to the 34th place taken by India (Goncharov, 2018) known for its IT specialists. Thus, it is natural that Ukraine has become Japan's partner in terms of cyber security cooperation. In the context of holding of 2020 Tokyo Olympics and introduction of super-smart 5.0 Society by the government of Japan, its cooperation with Ukraine in cyberspace gains significant importance.

Ukraine-Japan contacts regarding cooperation in national security and defense areas commenced in 2017. In March, Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Parliament of Ukraine Andriy Parubiy paid a visit to Japan, during which he held meetings with the Prime

Minister of Japan Abe Shinzo, Crown Prince Naruhito, and State Minister of Defense Wakamiya Kenji. Besides bilateral cooperation and Japan's support for Ukraine, the parties discussed characteristics of the Japan Self-Defense Forces and the armed forces of Ukraine, analyzed security threats, focusing mainly on modern hybrid war (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2017). Andriy Parubiy also visited a naval base in Yokosuka (112 International, 2017).

In continuation of this dialogue, Japan's Vice Minister of Defense for International Affairs Manabe Ro visited Ukraine in August 2017, where he held talks with First Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine Ivan Rusnak. As the parties exchanged opinions on defense policy, the military-political situation in the region, and other defense related issues, they agreed to promote exchange between defense authorities and further develop Ukrainian-Japanese defense relations (Ukraine Government Portal, 2017). Practical realization of this agreement was achieved during the first Ukraine-Japan security consultations held in October 2018 and is reflected in the signing of the Memorandum on Cooperation and Exchange in the Field of Defense.

Fast and smooth formalization of this document shows profound interest on both sides in promoting close cooperation in defense and security sectors. It is clear that Japan and Ukraine not only respect common values such as democracy, market economy, and rule of law, but also share common threats. Dr. Olena Mykal, President of Ukrainian Center for Asian Studies, states that both countries share such challenge as "Russian annexation of the territories of Ukraine and Japan" (Mykal, 2018). The illegal occupation of the Crimea and its militarization by Russia, as well as Russia's military aggression in Eastern Ukraine which resulted in occupation of Donbas, have been main challenges for Ukraine's government since 2014.

In case of Japan, Prime Minister Abe has been making consistent efforts aimed at resolution of the

“Northern Territories” issue and signing of the peace treaty with Russia. At the same time, the Ministry of Defense of Japan informs that Russia maintains a considerable size of military forces in the Far East including nuclear capabilities such as anti-ship missile systems “Bastion” and “Bal”, reportedly installed on the islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri (Japan Ministry of Defense, 2019). Russia has also been active in upscaling military drills with participation of Chinese troops such as Vostok-2018, which were not held on the Northern Territories because of request made by Japan (Mainichi Japan, 2018). These facts show that both countries face territorial issues with Russia and share the problem of Russia’s pursuit of militarization of their surrounding regions. In this regard, Ukraine and Japan clearly call for adherence to the norms and principles of international law and emphasize the non-recognition of change of the status quo through the use of force.

Both Japan and Ukraine have profound interest in ensuring of freedom of navigation. According to Ambassador of Japan to Ukraine Sumi Shigeki (2014-2018), Japan has long insisted on the need to respect the freedom of navigation in the East China Sea and other seas and considers it “extremely important” (Ukrinform, 2018). For Japan, situation around the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea as well as growing military potential of China have been posing a serious concern (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2016). Pointing out the direct connection between the security situation in East Asia and Europe, Ambassador Sumi stated that freedom of navigation under international law in the Kerch Strait, the Sea of Azov, and the Black Sea cannot be violated. It is worth to mention that practical implementation of such a position is reflected in Japan’s support for UN General Assembly Resolutions on the Problem of militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, which were

adopted in 2018 and 2019.

An important point of contact in the area of international peace and security for Japan and Ukraine is a common position regarding the urgent need for complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and abolishment of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. Since 2016 North Korea has conducted three nuclear tests and launched as many as 40 ballistic missiles. The position of Japan’s Ministry of Defense is that these military trends in North Korea pose an unprecedentedly serious and imminent threat to Japan’s security as well as peace and security of the region and the international community (Defense of Japan 2018). Ukraine, sharing the position of the government of Japan, in its official statements has resolutely condemned North Korea’s launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles and called upon Pyongyang to stop provocations immediately and restart dialog with the international community (Embassy of Ukraine in Japan, 2017).

Ukrainian expert on foreign policy and security in the Asia Pacific region from Ukraine’s National Institute For Strategic Studies Serhiy Koshovyy holds that preferred areas of cooperation for Ukraine might be cyber security, strengthening of the defense sector, access to the advanced technologies in the production of military products, implementation of joint research and production projects with Japan on manufacturing of precision and high-tech weapons. He thinks that Ukraine’s interest is connected with the fact that its defense complex is currently being modernized, and states that Japan could take note of Ukraine’s unique combat experience in the face of Russian aggression. In Koshovyy’s opinion, deep trust between Ukraine and Japan needs to be converted into real projects related to common geopolitical challenges as annexation of the territories, demand for further development of national armed forces, and the defense-industrial complex (Ukrinform, 2018).

It should be added that both Ukraine and Japan

have taken part in UN Peacekeeping Operations. As of 2019, as many as 45,000 Ukrainian military and civilian personnel have participated in 27 peace support operations all around the world since 1992 under the auspices of the United Nations and NATO (Kyiv Post, 2019). Japan, in its turn, was the second largest contributor to UN Peacekeeping Budget as of 2014 and dispatched about 9,300 Self-Defense Forces and police personnel to UN PKO missions in Cambodia, Mozambique, Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, and Haiti (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2014).

After the victory of Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the Presidential elections held in Ukraine in April 2019, the course for further strengthening of bilateral relations with Japan, including security dialogue, has been confirmed by both sides. In September 2019, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Lieutenant General Serhiy Bessarab had a working meeting with the Director General for International Affairs of the Ministry of Defense of Japan Suzuki Hideo (General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 2019). In October same year, Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine Oleksiy Danilov held a meeting with Ambassador of Japan to Ukraine Kurai Takashi, during which the parties exchanged views on development of the security situation in global and regional dimensions (National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, 2019).

International security matters were also discussed during the visit of President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy to Japan in October 2019. At the meeting with Prime Minister Abe, carried out with the participation of Secretary General of the National Security Secretariat of Japan Hasegawa Eiichi, President Zelenskyy expressed gratitude to Japan for its consistent policy of support for Ukraine, non-recognition of the illegal occupation of Crimea, and maintenance of sanctions against Russia. Volodymyr

Zelenskyy informed his Japanese counterpart regarding security situation in Donbas and recent developments towards achieving the peace (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2019). Both countries' intention to develop exchanges in the area of security was further confirmed at the meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and Japan Vadym Prystaiko and Motegi Toshimitsu (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 2019).

Conclusion

Drawing conclusions, one should mention that significance of Ukraine-Japan defense cooperation is connected not only with the strengthening of bilateral relations and political dialogue, but also with formation of the strong security triangle between Ukraine, Japan and the United States, which is strategic partner for both countries. In this way, Ukraine-Japan defense exchanges could harmonically add up to Japan's partnerships with the US and NATO as well as Ukraine's cooperation with this organization.

Bilateral collaboration between Ukraine and Japan in the security sector proves that relations between the two countries are based on profound trust which is provided for by the absence of issues in bilateral relations as well as sharing of universal democratic values and an understanding of importance of adherence to the principles of international law. It provides a valuable opportunity for interregional defense cooperation, as well as opinion exchange on the challenges which exist in Europe and Asia's security environments.

Cyberspace security related cooperation is another important element that could contribute to stable functioning of domestic and international transaction systems, ensuring of both countries' nationals' security, as well as boost further smooth digitalization of Ukrainian and Japanese societies including public

and private services.

Ukraine-Japan security dialogue can be considered equally important for ensuring of international peace and security given that closer cooperation between the two countries may lead to better coordination of their participation in UN activities.

Considering that Ukraine-Japan cooperation in security and defense areas has all prerequisites necessary for its further successful development, preparation of detailed plan for the practical realization of such cooperation and its smooth implementation can be expected to be further steps that could contribute to securing a more stable future for both Ukraine and Japan as well as for the whole international community.

References

1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (2018): First Ukraine-Japan Bilateral Consultations on Security Issues held in Tokyo, <https://mfa.gov.ua/en/press-center/news/67780-v-tokio-vidbulisya-pershi-ukrajinsyko-japonsyki-konsulytaciji-z-pitany-bezpeki>, accessed on September 12, 2019.
2. Vasyl Bodnar (2018): Ukraine and Japan signed a memorandum on cooperation in defense area, <https://twitter.com/vasylbodnar/status/1050828761501851648>, accessed on September 12, 2019.
3. Embassy of Japan in Ukraine (2018): Japan's Assistance to Ukraine, <https://www.ua.emb-japan.go.jp/files/000336611.pdf>, accessed on September 12, 2019.
4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2015): Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Visits Ukraine, https://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/c_see/ua/page2e_000029.html, accessed on September 12, 2019.
5. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (2016): First in bilateral history Ukrainian-Japanese consultations in the field of cyber security strengthening were held in Kiev, [21-grudnya-2016-r-u-kijevi-vidbulisya-pershi-v-istoriji-dvostoronnih-vidnosin-ukrajinsyko-japonsyki-konsulytaciji-u-sferi-zabezpechennya-kiberbezpeki](https://mfa.gov.ua/en/press-center/news/53377-21-grudnya-2016-r-u-kijevi-vidbulisya-pershi-v-istoriji-dvostoronnih-vidnosin-ukrajinsyko-japonsyki-konsulytaciji-u-sferi-zabezpechennya-kiberbezpeki), accessed on September 12, 2019.
6. David Volodzko (2018): Japan's Cyberterrorism Crisis Threatens Us All, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidvolodzko/2018/11/26/japans-cyberterrorism-crisis-threatens-us-all/#143ff8a16878>, accessed on September 12, 2019.
7. The Asahi Shimbun (2018): Japan faces legal snags in building defense against cyber-attacks, <http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201812020006.html>, accessed on September 12, 2019.
8. The Government of Japan (2015): Cybersecurity Strategy, <https://www.nisc.go.jp/eng/pdf/cs-strategy-en.pdf>, accessed on September 12, 2019.
9. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2018): Japan's Cyber Diplomacy, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000412327.pdf>, accessed on September 12, 2019.
10. Ilya Goncharov (2018): The state of software development outsourcing in Ukraine in 2018, <https://agileengine.com/software-outsourcing-ukraine/>, accessed on September 12, 2019.
11. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2017): Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Andriy Parubiy visited Japan, https://www.rada.gov.ua/en/news/top_news/141165.html, accessed on September 12, 2019.
12. 112 International (2017): Parubiy visited naval base and discussed military cooperation in Japan, <https://112.international/politics/parubiy-visited-naval-base-and-discussed-military-cooperation-in-japan-14565.html>, accessed on September 12, 2019.
13. Ukraine Government Portal (2017): Discussions on Ukraine defense relations held in Kyiv, <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/250175757>, accessed on September 12, 2019.
14. Olena Mykal (2018): Chomy Yaponiya zatsikavlena v Ukraini? (Why is Japan interested in Ukraine?), <https://nv.ua/ukr/opinion/chomu-japonija-zatsikavlena-v-ukrajini-2512444.html>, accessed on September 12, 2019.

15. Japan Ministry of Defense (2019): Development of Russian Armed Forces in the Vicinity of Japan, https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/sec_env/pdf/ru_d-act_201909_e.pdf, accessed on October 18, 2019.
16. Mainichi Japan (2018): Russia didn't hold drills on N. Territories at Japan's request: defense chief, <https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20181009/p2a/00m/0na/006000c>, accessed on September 12, 2019.
17. Ukrinform (2018): Shigeki Sumi Posol Yaponii v Ukraini, Zberezennya Yaponiyeyu sanktsiy proty Rosii – pytannya pryntsupy ne lyshe dlya Krymu i Donbasu (Shigeki Sumi, Ambassador of Japan to Ukraine, Japan's retention of sanctions against Russia is a matter of principle not only for Crimea and the Donbas), <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-world/2606025-sigeki-sumi-posol-aponii-v-ukraini.html>, accessed on September 12, 2019.
18. Diplomatic Bluebook (2016): Japan's Foreign Policy that Takes a Panoramic Perspective of the World Map, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000177713.pdf>, accessed on September 12, 2019.
19. Defense of Japan (2018): https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2018/DOJ2018_Digest_1204.pdf, accessed on September 12, 2019.
20. Embassy of Ukraine in Japan (2017): Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the ICBM launch by the DPRK, <https://japan.mfa.gov.ua/en/press-center/news/59495-zajava-mzs-ukrajini-shhodo-zapusku-kndr-mizhkontinentalnoji-balistichnoji-raketi>, accessed on September 12, 2019.
21. Ukrinform (2018): Bez zaivogo rozgolosu. Yak Ukraina I Yaponiya spivpratsuvatymut' u sferi oborony (Without unnecessary publicity. How Ukraine and Japan will cooperate in defense area), <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-world/2564237-bez-zajvogo-rozgolosu-ak-ukraina-i-aponia-spivpracuvatimut-u-sferi-oboroni.html>, accessed on September 12, 2019.
22. Kyiv Post (2019): 45,000 Ukrainian troops participated in peacekeeping missions globally since 1992, <https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/45000-ukrainian-troops-participated-in-peacekeeping-missions-globally-since-1992.html?cn-reloaded=1>, accessed on September 12, 2019.
23. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2014): Japan's contribution to United Nations peacekeeping operations, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/pdfs/contribution.pdf>, accessed on September 12, 2019.
24. General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (2019): Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Lieutenant General Serhiy Bessarab had a working meeting with the Director General for International Affairs of 防衛省 (Japan Ministry of Defense) Hideo Suzuki, <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/1359242724244981/>, accessed on September 25, 2019.
25. National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (2019): Secretary of the NSDC of Ukraine Oleksiy Danilov meets with Ambassador of Japan to Ukraine Takashi Kurai, <http://www.rnbo.gov.ua/en/news/3397.html>, accessed on October 18, 2019.
26. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2019): Meeting between Prime Minister Abe and President of Ukraine Zelenskyy, https://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/c_see/ua/page1e_000289.html, accessed on October 21, 2019.
27. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (2019): Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Vadym Prystaiko met with Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan Toshimitsu Motegi, <https://mfa.gov.ua/en/news-feeds/foreign-offices-news/75531-ministr-zakordonnih-sprav-ukrajini-vadim-pristajko-zustrivsvya-z-ministrom-zakordonnih-sprav-japoniji-tosimicu-motegi>, accessed on October 24, 2019.

Style Guide for Authors

Waseda ORIS, Committee of Journals and HP

30 July 2018

1. Language

All manuscripts submitted to the *Journal of Inter-Regional Studies: Regional and Global Perspectives (JIRS)* must be written in English. The editorial board of the journal will not offer language editing or proofreading services. Before submission, authors must ensure that their manuscripts are proofread by native English speakers.

2. Word limits

Main text

The journal accepts three types of submissions, namely (1) research articles, (2) research notes, and (3) book reviews. Research articles and research notes will undergo a double-blind peer-review process.

Research articles and research notes should be no longer than 7,000 words.

Book reviews should be no longer than 3,000 words.

Manuscripts that substantially exceed the word limits will not be considered for publication. The word counts include footnotes and references and exclude figures, tables, and charts.

Abstract

Research articles and research notes must be accompanied by a separate file that contains a title and an abstract. The abstract should be no longer than 100 words.

3. How to submit

Please submit three files by email, namely (1) a Word file containing the main text, (2) a Word file containing the title and abstract, and (3) an anonymized PDF file for peer review (please include your name only in the title of your file as shown below).

The three files should be named as follows:

- (1) Main Text-(Author name here)-(Paper title here).doc/docx
- (2) Title and Abstract-(Author name here)-(Paper Title here).doc/docx
- (3) Main Text-(Author name here)-(Paper title here).pdf

4. Fonts

Please use Times New Roman, 12 points, single spaced.

5. Printing

Upon request, each author will receive a certain number of hard copies of the journal as well as an electronic copy of his/her contribution. Paper-based offprints will not be provided.

6. Publication frequency

In principle, the journal will be published in paper once a year. Once fully accepted, the digital version will be uploaded through the journal webpage.

7. Numbering of headings

The following style of numbering headings is recommended.

1.

1.1

1.1.1

1.1.2

1.2

2.

8. Figures, tables and charts

The source of figures, tables, and charts must be referenced clearly and accurately. They must be numbered (e.g. Table 1, 2, 3...). Ensure that all figures, tables, and charts are complete and accurate because, in principle, they will be printed as they are. Pictures will be treated as figures.

Examples:

Figure 1: Figure Title

Note:

Source:

Table 1: Figure Title

Note:

Source:

9. References

We do not have absolute rules concerning reference style. That being said, we recommend widely accepted standards such as a parenthetical scheme (e.g. brackets according to the author-year-page scheme), for example, (Gemma 2017: 12). A complete list of notes and references should appear at the end of the text.

10. Proof reading

Authors can proofread their manuscripts only once after acceptance. The editorial board of the journal will not offer any editing or proofreading services.

Internal Regulations on Submissions to *Journal of Inter-Regional Studies: Regional and Global Perspectives (JIRS)*

Waseda ORIS, Committee of Journals and HP

30 July 2018

1. Purpose

These internal regulations set out submission and publication rules for the *Journal of Inter-Regional Studies: Regional and Global Perspectives* (hereafter, *JIRS*), published by the Organization for Regional and Inter-regional Studies at Waseda University (Waseda ORIS). *JIRS* aims to publish academic papers that offer research findings, ideas, analysis and discussions concerned with inter-regional studies. Please note that this journal only publishes manuscripts in English.

2. Publication

JIRS is a peer-reviewed journal. Manuscripts submitted to *JIRS* must be original work. Those already accepted or published elsewhere will not be accepted for publication. Simultaneous submissions to *JIRS* and other journals are strictly prohibited. Two anonymous referees review the manuscripts, but the final decision on their acceptance shall be made as indicated in the below item, “6. Decision to publish”.

3. Category

Authors should indicate within which one of the following categories their academic papers fall:

- (1) Research articles
- (2) Research notes
- (3) Book reviews

4. Pledge concerning publications

Those who submit manuscripts to *JIRS* need to ensure that all of the following conditions are fully met.

- (1) The authors guarantee that their manuscripts do not violate the copyright of others and take full responsibility in case any problems arise concerning copyright issues. (2) In the case of co-authorship, the consent of all authors is guaranteed by submitting the form “Consent and Pledge Form Concerning Publications in the Journal of Inter-Regional Studies: Regional and Global Perspectives (JIRS)”.

(3) In the case of reproduction of material owned by others, the authors have obtained all necessary permissions from the copyright holder/s.

5. Style guide

Guidelines for authors will be provided in a separate document, “Style Guide for Authors”.

6. Decision to publish

The Committee of Journals and Homepage (HP) shall make final decisions on the publication of manuscripts. The committee may request that the author/s revise the manuscript before publication.

7. Copyright notice

Authors retain the copyright of their publications in *JIRS*. Waseda ORIS retains the right to upload electronic copies of academic papers in its publications to its website, Waseda University Repository, and other open-access websites, in order to publicize its research accomplishments. With the permission of each author, Waseda ORIS also has the right to republish these works in its publications other than *JIRS*.

8. Revision of the internal regulations

Revisions of these internal regulations require an initiative by the Committee of Journals and HP and a decision made by the Steering Committee of Waseda ORIS.

9. Others

When necessary, the Committee of Journals and HP may discuss and make decisions on the issues which were not addressed in these internal regulations.

Supplementary provision: these internal regulations will take effect on 30 July 2018.

Peer Review Guidelines for *Journal of Inter-Regional Studies: Regional and Global Perspectives (JIRS)*

Waseda ORIS, Committee of Journals and HP

30 July 2018

The committee sets out peer review procedures for the manuscripts (research articles and research notes) submitted to the *Journal of Inter-Regional Studies: Regional and Global Perspectives (JIRS)* as follows.

The editorial board will select two peer reviewers for each manuscript. In principle, authors will receive review results from the editorial team within one month after their submission. The format of the review report can be modified by reviewers.

Reviewers are requested to pay particular attention to the following criteria when evaluating the manuscript.

1. Clarity of the research question and the answer
2. Appropriateness of the literature review
3. Logical consistency of the argument
4. Appropriateness of the research method
5. Originality of the research findings
6. Format and clarity of writing

These are guidelines, however. The reviewers are expected to make an overall assessment of the manuscript from academic and pedagogical perspectives.

Reviewers make one of the three evaluations:

1. Accept
2. Revise and resubmit
3. Reject

Authors may express their opinions on the results of the review. They can communicate with the reviewers only through the editorial team of the journal.

If necessary, the Journal and HP Committee of Waseda ORIS can revise these Peer Review Guidelines.

Journal of Inter-Regional Studies: Regional and Global Perspectives

vol.3

Publisher : Organization for Regional and Inter-regional Studies (ORIS), Waseda University

Editor in Chief : Hidetoshi Nakamura, *Head of European Research Unit, ORIS / Faculty of Political Science and Economics*

Editors : Takashi Yoshino, *ORIS Director / Faculty of Political Science and Economics*
Masahiko Gemma, *Head of American Research Unit, ORIS / Faculty of Social Sciences*
Naoyuki Umemori, *Head of Asian Research Unit, ORIS / Faculty of Political Science and Economics*
Shinzo Hayase, *Faculty of International Research and Education*
Tomoaki Ikeya, *Faculty of Social Sciences*
Kazuo Kuroda, *Faculty of International Research and Education*
Jeffrey James Hall, *ORIS Junior Researcher*
Yoshihiro Nakano, *ORIS Junior Researcher*
Kiyotaka Yasui, *ORIS Research Associate*

Managing Editor : Mina Chiba, *ORIS Junior Researcher*

Assistant Managing Editor : Nicholas Peeters, *ORIS Research Assistant*

International Board of Editors : Tanja A. Börzel, *Freie Universität Berlin*
Verena Blechinger-Talcott, *Freie Universität Berlin*
Martin Holland, *University of Canterbury*
Christopher William Hughes, *University of Warwick*
Hartmut Mayer, *University of Oxford*
Frederik Ponjaert, *Université Libre de Bruxelles*
Thomas Risse, *Freie Universität Berlin*
Mario Telò, *LUISS / Université Libre de Bruxelles*
Anne Weyembergh, *Université Libre de Bruxelles*

Editorial Staff : Taro Kaneko, *ORIS Administrative Director*
Takahiro Matsumoto, *ORIS Administrator*
Sanae Yamazaki, *ORIS Administrator*
Megumi Kuratani, *ORIS Administrator*

Printing : SEIBUNSHA Inc.

Organization for Regional and Inter-regional Studies (ORIS), Waseda University

Floor 3, Bldg.No.9 Waseda Campus, Waseda University,
1-6-1 Nishiwaseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, 169-8050 JAPAN
TEL: 03-5286-1458 FAX: 03-5286-9830 E-Mail: oris-jimu@list.waseda.jp
ISBN Print 978-4-9908584-3-8 ISBN Online 978-4-9908584-4-5



WASEDA University

ISBN Print 978-4-9908584-3-8

ISBN Online 978-4-9908584-4-5

