I. Introduction

The aim of this article is to consider the policy of the Russian colonial military authority in Central Asia toward the local elites of Kirghiz in Semirech’ë at the beginning of the twentieth century and examine the latter’s attitudes toward Russian rule.

The author of this article has examined the development of the military invasion and rule of Central Asia by the Russian Empire, focusing on influential local figures who became “collaborators.” More specifically, the author has reviewed the attempt of the Russian Empire to establish control over the Kirghiz nomads living in the mountains and highland areas around the Tian Shan Mountains from the mid-nineteenth to early twentieth century by considering how the Russian Empire managed to position the manaps—the tribal chieftain class—and how the manaps responded to the military expansion and rule of the Russian Empire. To conduct his research, the author has undertaken a life-history approach in examining a Kirghiz chieftain, concentrating on the life of a manap, Shabdan Jantay uulu (1840–1912), who experienced the entire period from the Russian Empire’s military invasion to their subsequent control as a “collaborator” with the Russian rule.

As has been pointed out in preceding articles—based on the assistance to the Russian military expansion into Central Asia, including the khanate of Khoqand in 1870s—Shabdan continued to impact Russian rule over Kirghiz even after the 1880s, remaining influential until the beginning of the twentieth century. He was granted the military title of Voiskovoi Starshina (Lieutenant Colonel) in 1883. However, the important point to note and emphasise is that, although Shabdan was a prominent collaborator with the Russian Empire, it does not necessarily imply that he completely agreed with the Russian rule. Although Shabdan himself never rose in revolt against the Russian Empire, there were deep rifts and conflicts between Shabdan and the Russian Empire. In fact, at the beginning of the twentieth century, when Semirech’ë became the main target of colonization by Slavic peasants in Central Asia under the strong leadership of the central tsarist government, Shabdan was faced with a significant land problem and succeeded in gaining a special allotment of land from the Russian colonial military authority, who feared the resistance of local nomads against the expropriation of land. Nevertheless, in this circumstance, the heart of Shabdan ironically tended to deviate from Russia. From the end of the nineteenth century, Shabdan begun to deepen his involvement with Islam. Indeed, he constructed a mosque and conducting hajj, and as a result, he was given the new title baatir haji by adding the new Islamic honorific title, haji, to the existing nomadic one, baatir, or hero. Regarding his Islamic involvement, it must not be forgotten that Shabdan was engaged in the Muslim modernist movement, or Jadidism. Among his sons, Kamal Shabdanov was educated at Galie medresë in Ufa and Khisametdin Shabdanov established a mederese at his father’s mosque and invited Tatar teachers. In spite of that, Russian colonial military authority could not disregard...
Shabdan, because it was obliged to rely on him for the maintenance of public order among the local society. The case of the special land allotment for Shabdan was typical, which clearly illustrates the dilemmas faced by the Russian colonial military authority.

Thus, it can be assumed that Shabdan’s death had a great impact on the regional order. Death or funeral ceremonies have generally been investigated from ethnographical and anthropological viewpoints to compile information on the traditional customs of “primitive” societies. In fact, a large number of articles and reports on the funeral rituals of nomadic peoples of Central Asia under Russian rule have been preserved. On the other hand, as social anthropologists have acutely pointed out, funeral rituals also exhibit political characteristics, represented by the social and power relationship concerning the deceased. This article considers how both the Russian colonial military authority and Shabdan’s sons accepted and handled the death. The first half of this article focuses on a series of funeral ceremonies for Shabdan, including the mass, called āsh that was held half a year after the death. The latter half addresses the circumstances after the series of ceremonies, revealing the processes, by which the collaborative relationship between the Russian colonial military authority and Shabdan’s sons collapsed until the revolt of 1916.

II. Russian Colonial Military Authority in Janāza

On 6th April 1912, Shabdan died at the age of 73. Immediately almost all of the people in Semirech’e were informed with the news. According to a report issued in the Tatar journal, Shūrā, named “From a deep basin of Tian Shan Mountains” written by Sabīr Gabdurmanov in 1913, which described a series of funeral ceremonies for Shabdan, “[having known the news of his death] riding on horses, his retainors (jigit)s started to spread the news in all directions. Until about the sunset the news arrived at all the towns and villages of Semirech’e, including even deep in the mountains”.

After three days from his death, on 9th April 1912, his funeral was held in Chong Kemin (MAP 2). Although the number of attendees differs depending on sources, it is certain that several thousand people attended the funeral. The point to observe in this chapter is how the Russian colonial military authority was involved in the funeral, which was called janāza in 1867. Then, in 1882, the Governor-Generalship of Western Siberia was reorganized into the Governor-Generalship of Steppes, which coexisted with the Governor-Generalship of Turkestan until the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917. The authority of the Governor-Generalships was under the Ministry of War, and they were comprised of a few districts (oblast) and counties (uezd). From an administrative perspective, at the beginning of the twentieth century, Shabdan was under the jurisdiction of the administrative path: Ministry of War > Governor-Generalship of Turkestan > Semirech’e oblast > Pishpek uezd > Tokmok uchastok > Saribaghish volost (MAP 1, 2). Thus, it was the army officers of the Russian Empire who took charge of the local government, including both military and civil administration. That is why this article names the local Russian authorities in Central Asia the “Russian colonial military authority.”
the local-Islamic context.

The news of Shabdan’s death had a great impact on the Russian colonial military authority, which was clearly indicated in the fact that the news of his death was published in such colonial official newspapers as *Turkestan Gazette* (*Turkestanskie vedomosti*) and *Semirech’e oblast Gazette* (*Semirechenskie oblastnye vedomosti*). In addition to publishing the news in the colonial newspaper, the military governor of Semirech’e oblast M. Fol’baum instructed the Pishpek uezd commander to attend officially the funeral, considering that Shabdan had a military rank of *Voiskovoi Starshina* (Lieutenant Colonel). According to the instruction, the Russian colonial military authority, including the Pishpek uezd commander and the chief of the local police of Tokmok district (*uchastkovyi pristav*) with a unit of the Cossacks attended the funeral. After the funeral, Kutukov, the chief of the local police of Tokmok district, sent a report to Fol’baum as following:

A platoon of the Semirech’e Cossacks from the settlement of Samsonovka, attended the funeral under the command of the ataman Ivanov. They saluted to the body. And the Cossack guards were deployed at the gate of the tent, where the body was laid. When the body was taken off to the cemetery, the Cossacks were in a line on both sides of the body. In time of burial the Cossacks detached the military medals from the body. […] And they shoot blanks three times. The crowd of 4,000 *Kirgiz* gathering from all over Semirech’e was impressed with the much respect shown for Shabdan by the Cossacks. Shabdan’s sons and the other delegates of *Kirgiz* asked me to convey their gratitude to His Excellency [i.e., Fol’baum].

What is apparent in this extract is that the Russian colonial military authority organized Cossack burial rites and added them to the funeral, showing the respect to the family of the deceased. The attendance of the Russian colonial military authority at *janāza* had an impact on local people, as can be seen from the following description by Sabīr Gabdurmanov: “Besides various Muslims, gathering for *janāza*, there were Cossacks, Pishpek uezd commander and the chief of the local police.”

When considering the Russian colonial military authority in the funeral, the chief of the local police Kutukov is worthy of attention. Chief of the local police was a security-administrative authority which was set up under the *uezd* commander. We can perceive his unique existence in the funeral, which is expressed in the narration of an *akin*, or troubadour, when he recited: “In your [=Shabdan] funeral, not only *Kirgiz*, but also Russians including Kutukov cried with all their hearts. Oh! When Russians did mourning cries for *Kirgiz*!” The reason why Kutukov had built strong ties with Shabdan seems to be because he was an important collaborator in order to maintain the public order in the district. On this point, a Russian colonial officer, who worked in the Tokmok district pointed out as following: “To sustain ties with Shabdan’s family was a policy line of Kutukov and his predecessors since they were able to reduce significantly the administrative burden. […] Kutukov could never settle various issues within the district without support from the *manaps*. In fact, such a collusive tie between Shabdan and Kutukov or the representative of the local police came out clearly in the funeral, which can be seen in the memorial article for Shabdan, published in *Semirech’e oblast Gazette*.

In the funeral, having read aloud a telegram of condolence from the military governor [i.e. Fol’baum], Kutukov described the role of Shabdan as a mediator and reminded the attendees not to upset the bones of the deceased [i.e. Shabdan] by quarreling with each other. In response to this all the influential figures from the *Kirgiz volosts* pledged to follow the advice of their immediate supervisor [i.e. Kutukov] and not to sully the memory of Shabdan by their conspiracies.
Judging from this passage, it is apparent that for Kutukov the funeral was an opportunity not only to organize a Cossack funeral on the order from Fol’baum, but also to appeal the ongoing local governance through Shabdan’s family. After Shabdan’s death, Kutukov managed to keep his ties with the sons of Shabdan. As N.A. Gribanovskii, the police chief of the Pishpek city, explained, “Kutukov managed to inspire Kirgiz, or Kirghiz to respect and follow Shabdan’s family after his death.”

In the election of the administrator of Sarbagash volost, held soon after the funeral, in May 1912, one of his sons, Kamal was elected as a volost administrator with his brother Aman as the assistant, which reflected, it seems reasonable to suppose, the intention of Kutukov.

III. The Intention of Shabdan’s Sons on “Āsh”

According to adat, or local custom of Kirghiz and Kazakh, a memorial feast, called āsh was to be held after a certain decade from funeral ceremony. Āsh for Shabdan was held from 10th to 15th October 1912 in the place named Kichi Kemin (MAP 2). This chapter considers the intention of Shabdan’s sons regarding the holding of the āsh. It can be assumed that the āsh had two dimensions for them. The first dimension is to recollect the authority of late Shabdan himself. Another one is to appeal their influence over the local society by holding the āsh.

In the āsh the authority of Shabdan was unveiled in various ways. At the center of the venue Shabdan’s yurta, or the tent with his banner was delivered from Chong Kemin (FIGURE 1). Most of the attendees were Kirghiz and Kazakh. Having arrived at the venue, they set up their own tents around Shabdan’s tent and then they entered into the tent, crying out: “Our khan! Our father!”

FIGURE 2 is a photograph, which captured the inside of the tent. At the front we can see a group of women, who are performing kosbok, or ritual crying. On the surface of the tent we can see the saddle and several jackets of Shabdan. At the front of them there is a dummy, dressed in the prestigious caftan with a shoulder loop and the gold, silver medals that were awarded from Tsarist government to Shabdan during his life. Next to those, there is a reproduction painting of the photograph, taken at the coronation of Alexander III in 1883. Entering the tent, attendee recited a line from Koran and performed bata, or short grace and presented gifts.

Going out of the tent attendees would see akïns and dervish, who were celebrating Shabdan’s achievements and qualifications, including the construction of mosque, his bravery, generosity, affection to the masses, smartness and frankness. In

FIGURE 1. The tent of Shabdan with the banner

FIGURE 2. Inside the tent
(SOURCE: Dmitriev, “Baiga u karakirgizov po sluchayu smerti manapa Shabdana Dzhantaeva v Pishpekskom uzeze”: appendix)
the venue a series of games were held, including bayge, or horse racing, wrestling and sāysh, in which two men riding on horses with sticks were fighting until either of the two falls from his horse (FIGURE 3, 4, 5). Thus, it can be said that the attendees of the the āsh recollected the authority of Shabdan as a baatīr, or nomadic hero through a series of games and shows based on the traditional value of nomads.

On the other hand, the āsh was a test of whether sons of Shabdan could show off their power among the local community. In relation with this, we can find the significant passages in the article named “On the Kirghiz” in Shūrā:

…after a brief interval from the death of a manap, a young manap holds an āsh, or memorial feast for his father. If his father was a famous manap, guests will be invited at least from two uezd. Guests are received cordially for three days. In the āsh a series of entertainments including “bayge”, “yāmba ātū” [to throw a silver ingot] and “sāysh” are held. [...] From year to year it has come into fashion to hold āsh. It would be shameful [for manaps] not to hold āsh. If a manap does not hold āsh, his children would be insulted for his weakness and ignorance.27

Although the author of the article did not mention the reason why āsh has come into fashion among the manaps, it can be estimated that for manaps the importance of āsh as a means of showing their authority has increased, as they had almost lost their role as military commanders at the beginning of the twentieth century. We should consider such a point of view, when considering the āsh for Shabdan.

According to Sabır Gabdurmanov, a keness or meeting was held for organizing the āsh for Shabdan on 13 June 1912 at Chong Kemin. The keness was attended not only by sons of Shabdan but also the other prominent manaps of Sarībaghīsh tribe, including Choko [from Esengul subdivision], Dür and Sultan [from Tinay sub-division].28

In the keness the manaps reviewed the history of āsh, proposing to organize the greatest one with few equals in history. They estimated that its “vigorousness”
depended on the amount of the reward for the bayge, or horse racing, as can be seen in the following description of Sabir Gabdurmanov:

One manap said: “Why don’t we organize the āsh, adequate for the greatness of baatir hajji [i.e., Shabdan]. I can provide five hundred heads of white camel”. One manap said: “On the opening bayge for [the āsh of] a certain baatir, five hundred heads of sheep, one hundred heads of camel, one hundred heads of horse and one hundred pieces of yāmba [were provided]”. One manap said: “For the opening bayge of Satay baatir, one hundred sheets of cotton cloths, one hundred sheets of chapan [jacket] and one hundred pieces of yāmba [were provided].”

In this way the manaps recognized the authority of Shabdan in the traditional nomadic context of the amount of the reward for bayge. Following the discussion, they agreed that each manap would collect money from their own subject people.

However, despite the intention of sons of Shabdan to show that they were also such influential manaps as their father, on the contrary, only to expose their weakness at the very day of the āsh. In this respect it is interesting to quote from Sabir ‘Abd al-Mannuf:

[in the venue of the āsh] the manaps were reluctant to submit own share of expenses [of the āsh they promised each other in the kenesb]. They haggled with each other, swearing: “First you must submit!” They managed to pocket the more amount of money they collected. […] As a result, the program of the āsh was simplified and the prize money was reduced. The sons of Shabdan, who wanted to become such a prominent manap as their own father, lamented the inadequateness of the āsh.

Indeed, other manaps managed to line own pockets on grounds of Shabdan. In other words, this seems to be that the sons of Shabdan had not so much influence among the Kirghiz.

IV. Russian Colonial Military Authority in “Āsh”

This chapter deals with the analysis of the attitude of the Russian colonial military authorities toward the āsh. When considering this matter, it must be pointed out that Shabdan’s sons managed to invite even Russians to the āsh. In fact, three months before the āsh, they made out the “program” of the āsh, which was sent not only to local population, including Kirghiz and Kazakh, but also to Russians. Although the original of the program does not exist, according to Dmitriev, who indeed received it, it was an “ordinary typewritten European invitation card.” In addition to that, the announcement of the āsh was published in Semirech’e oblast Gazette. It was written both in Arabic Turk and Russian (FIGURE 6). It reads: “The traditional bayge in the mass of Shabdan Jantaev is to be held from October 10th to 15th this year (Traditsionnaya baiga, na pominki Voiskovogo starshiny militsii Shabdana Dehantaeva nachnetsya s 10-go po 15-e oktyabrya [ego] g[oda]).”

Considering the above, it seems that in holding the āsh, the sons of Shabdan kept Russians, including colonial officers, in their view in that they intended to emphasize the distinguished services of Shabdan for the establishment of the Russian rule in Semirech’e. In fact, among Russian colonial officers, there were those, who attended the āsh according to the invitation,
Nevertheless, the Military Governor of the oblast, Fol’baum never intended to attend the āsh. While Fol’baum gave permission to holding the āsh, giving instruction to the commander of Pishpek uezd to send Cossack troops for the maintenance of security, he never let the Russian colonial military authority to participate in the āsh officially. In fact, on the first day of the āsh, Shabdan’s sons sent a telegram to Fol’baum to invite the āsh, he never agreed to do so, only to leave on the plane of the telegram the decision “Not to go” (Ne poedu). In thinking about the background of such a negative attitude of Fol’baum to the āsh, it is suggestive to quote from the memoirs of M. Tynyshpaev, when he says: “after the death of Shabdan, in the administration of Semirech’e oblast, it was decided to suppress the family of Shabdan.” Thus, it seems that Fol’baum had strong concern that his attendance at the āsh would encourage the family of Shabdan.

On the other hand, in addition to declining to attend the āsh, Fol’baum regarded the illegal tax and requisition of manaps for the āsh as serious problem, sending to the āsh the vice military governor as a special official to dig up the situation. Although the special official could not prosecute the manaps, including sons of Shabdan, it seems no exaggeration to assume that Fol’baum tried to disturb the āsh. In this relation, it is interesting to refer to a series of anonymous reports on the āsh published in Semirech’e oblast Gazette, because they did not so much objectively inform the situation of the āsh, but ridiculed the āsh and the sons of Shabdan, which is expressed best by an akïn, when he sang:

Now you [i.e., Shabdan] are lost. Such an outstanding figure as you. […] Your four sons are not able to accomplish any kind of enormous contribution that you have done and to get so much attention from the Russian authority. […] Several years before your death […] one of your sons [i.e., Mokush] was adjudicated guilty and was cast in jail for murder, which withered your vitality and hastened your death. Look at this! Your family has been living peacefully under your protection.

Although they were anonymous reports, it is assumed that they no more less reflected the intension of the oblast government of Semirech’e, including Fol’baum. In other words, it seems reasonable to suppose that those reports can be regarded as a kind of “negative campaign” to prevent the sons of Shabdan to have influence in the local society by holding the āsh successfully.

Nevertheless, disarray among the Russian colonial military authorities in semirech’e oblast over how to deal with the āsh came to the surface. In fact, in contrast to the attitude of the oblast government, the chief of the local police Kutukov actively cooperated with the sons of Shabdan in organizing the āsh, especially in collecting money, as can be seen from the following petition of a Kirghiz, Alike Alimbekov, submitted to the Governor General of Turkestan in 1913: “after the official who was sent by the military governor [of Semirech’e oblast], had left the āsh, the sons of Shabdan collected a lot of money from us, […] which was done by the volost administrator in witness of the patrol officer, Smirnov.” As can be seen in this extract, the Russian colonial military authority in the local level even managed to support the sons of Shabdan.

V. After Āsh: Russian Colonial Military Authority Strengthens its Intervention

The oblast government of Semirech’e had already assumed the oppressive attitude toward Shabdan and his family even in his later years. As Tynyshpaev remarked in his report to the Governor General of Turkestan in 1916, “in 1909, on the grounds of partiinaya bor’ba, or the factional strife with the family of Shabdan, [a Kirghiz named] Sultan Dalvaev demanded [the oblast administration] to divide the
Sarībaghīsh volost. Despite the mixed and complicated land use (smeshannoe zemlepol’zovanie), [the oblast administration] permitted the request. Furthermore in 1911, when one of Shabdan’s sons, Mokush was arrested because of murder, the military governor of Semirech’e oblast Föl’baum fired the administrator of Sarībaghīsh volost, one of Shabdan’s sons Khisametdin, appointing as a new volost administrator a Kazakh from Vernyi uezd Musakhan Altispai. In parallel with the dismissal farce, the Resettlement Administration in Semirech’e oblast carried out to expropriate land in the volost, organizing two settler villages.

With the death of Shabdan as a motivation, the Russian colonial military authority, including the oblast government, managed to strengthen its intervention. In practice, after the death of Shabdan, the Russian colonial military authority did not permit the inheritance of the rank of Voiskovoi Starshina, or the Lieutenant Colonel, expropriating the privileges given to Shabdan. In May 1913 the honorable caftan and military medals were given away to the Museum of the Cossack army. In addition to those, the focus for the discussion was the issue of the special allocation of land to Shabdan. As mentioned above, according to the decision of Sovet ministrov, or the Council of ministers, Shabdan was given “the right to use 400 desyatins for life.” Nevertheless, Shabdan was dissatisfied with the decision in that it was not allowed for his descendants to inherit the land. Before half a year from his death, Shabdan sent a petition to Nicolas II, claiming that “hereditary ownership (potomstvennoe vladenie)” of the land must be allowed.

It was after five months from the death of Shabdan, or in September 1912 that the petition received the answer from the Russian colonial military authority. The Military Governor of Semirech’e oblast Föl’baum with the chief of the Resettlement Administration in Semirech’e, S. Veretskii, announced the policy of permitting the inheritance under the condition that sons of Shabdan will agree to depart from Sarībaghīsh volost and not to participate in the affairs of the volost, not using the land within the volost and settling within the allocated land. To put it another way, the oblast government of Semirech’e managed to divide the family of Shabdan from the local community, removing their influence. In response, sons of Shabdan denied the suggestion, showing their anger, when they say: “…far from being a reward to the achievements of our father, such a measure might be equivalent of a punishment.” The Turkestian Governor-General, A.V. Samsonov, who had been eager to placate Shabdan himself, also had a different line toward his descendents, as can be seen in his report to the Department of the Army General Staff: “…now that Shabdan was dead, his sons and family have no attainment deserving of the special allocation of the land.” With the agreement of the Department of the Army General Staff, the case was totally rejected, as a result of which the land was confiscated by the Resettlement Administration of Semirech’e, being distributed to the Russian settlers.

On the other hand, the descendants of Shabdan never gave up appealing to the Russian colonial military authorities the restoration of the land. As far as confirmed in the archive documents, their last appeal was dated May 16th 1916, in which they complained bitterly of the unreasonable confiscation of the land, demanding for compensation on the legal grounds of the regulations for the resettlement policy.

In contrast to the oppressive and negative attitude of the superior element of the Russian colonial military authority, including the oblast adominstration and Turkestian governor-generalship, the chief of the local police still continued to take not only lukewarm, but also even collaborative attitude toward the descendents of Shabdan. In this regard, it is interesting to refer to a case on division of Sarībaghīsh volost. In 1915 a brother of Shabdan, Alagush intended to divide Sarībaghīsh volost, which was ardently supported by the oblast government. Judging from the above, it can be assumed that the oblast administration instigated Alagush to the division. To proceed the division, the oblast administration ordered the local police of Tokmok district to conduct the examination of the
land use of 700 kibitok, or tents of Kirghiz, who agreed to follow Alagush. In spite of the order from the oblast administration, the chief of the local police gave up the examination. According to the petition of Alagush, to prevent the division, the volost administrator, Kamal fooled the uezd administration by mixing the follower of Alagush with other Kirghiz in land use. Kamal’s tactic bearded the fruit. Indeed, on October 1915 the assistant director of Pishpek uezd, Rimshevich, based on the opinion of the chief of the local police, reported to the oblast administration that the petition of Alagush could not be recognized. In response to this the oblast administration ordered Rimshevich to travel directly (not through the chief of the local police) to Sarbaghish volost to examine the land use. Nevertheless, Rimshevich only repeated his previous opinion not to recognize the petition of Alagush. In the end the oblast administration was obliged to dismiss the case.

VI. Summer 1916: The Decisive Collapse of the Collaboration

As seen in this article, the Russian colonial military authority, including the oblast government managed to strengthen the oppressive and negative attitude toward the descendants of Shabdan. It must be reasonable to assume that the descendants of Shabdan felt dissatisfied with the oppressive policy of the Russian colonial military authority. In spite of the strong antipathy, they never took up arms against the Russian Empire. Nevertheless, in summer 1916 the situation became serious.

After the tsarist government suddenly issued a degree to mobilize into worker’s battalions inorodtsy, or the aliens in 25th June 1916, who had not been obligated to serve in the military, a great revolt occurred throughout Russian Central Asia. In the revolt of 1916 the southern part of Semirech’e oblast is famous for mutual massacre between Kirghiz and Slavic settlers under the severe land relationship. What is to be expected, the descendants of Shabdan were obliged to be drawn into the turmoil of the revolt. Among them, Mokush Shabdanov was installed as a khan, becoming a leader of the revolt among Kirghiz of Semirech’e. The reason why Mokush was selected as the leader seems to be that he had experienced himself the suppression from the Russian colonial military authority, as can be seen in the case of his arrest in 1911. Gathering at the mosque of Shabdan, the rebels, including Mokush swore to unite for the revolt, distributing a manifesto over a wide area to rally rebels in the name of “baatir bajji,” or Shabdan. What is apparent from this process is that Shabdan was no longer the symbol of integration into the Russian Empire, transforming into the symbol of revolt against the Russian rule. In the Islamic context, this process also shows the collapse of attempts of Shabdan and his sons at social reform through the new tide of Islam, or Jadidism. In addition to that, in spite of their modernist intention, it never spread among the Kirghiz mass, which seems to be a reason why the sons of Shandan was obliged to hold āsh according to the local custom of nomads.

At the same time, it must be added that the sons of Shabdan were not necessarily united over the attitude toward the revolt. In fact, in contrast to Mokush, who rose against Russia, Kamal managed to assume the exactly opposite attitude. As a volost administrator, Kamal prepared the list of workers, submitting it to the commander of Pishpek uezd. In addition to that, he and his brother Aman tried to control the rebels including Mokush, trying to protect the villages of Russian settlers from the attack. Due to the lack of material, it remains uncertain how Kamal tried to persuade Mokush from taking arms against Russia. This is only a speculation, but Kamal must have emphasized the necessity to maintain the Russian rule as a base for their existence. In spite of the efforts of Kamal, the rebels carried out attacking and burning the villages of Russian settlers. The levels left the Russian Turkestan, crossing the the Tian Shan Mountains to Eastern Turkestan, or Xinjiang province.
of the Republic of China.

The Russian colonial military authority could not avoid getting a shock to know the circumstance in Semirech’e. A.N. Kuropatkin, who was appointed as the governor-general of Turkestan in August 1916 in order to settle the disorder, had to see the shocking and ironical spectacle: the sons of a former collaborator, Shabdan, whom Kuropatkin himself had supported, now rouse against the Russian Empire, which is clearly expressed in his letter to the War Minister, dated 16 August 1916:

...forty one years ago, during the conquest of Ferghana, Kirgiz, who are now roused into action, crossed over the mountains to Ferghana with their renowned leader Lieutenant Colonel Shabdan Dzhanatav, assisting Skobelev in the subjugation of the population that had settled there.\textsuperscript{59}

The Russian colonial military authority under the initiative of Kuropatkin, decided to send military troops to subjugate the revolt. As a result of the operation, the mosque, which had been constructed by Shabdan in Chong Kemin, was destroyed and burned down.

![MAP 1. Russian Central Asia.](image)
MAP 2. The Kirghiz volosts in Semirech’ë (at the beginning of the twentieth century)

Pishpek uezd (Tokmok uchastok): Atake volost-1, Saribaghish volost-2, Tinay volost-3, Shamsi volost-4; Pishpek uezd (Belovodski uchastok): Borokbay volost-5, Issek-Ata volost-6, Uzimgir volost-7, Tolkan volost-8, Suukuluk volost-9 (In 1910, this volost was divided into Eastern and Western Suukuluk volosts). Jamansart volost-10, Baghish volost-11, Karabalta volost-12; Pishpek uezd (Zagornyi uchastok): Kochkor volost-13, Jumghar volost-14, Suusamir volost-15, Karakech volost-16; Przheval’sk uezd (Zagornyi uchastok): Narin volost-17, Sayaq volost-18, Choro volost-19, Esengul volost-20 (SOURCE: TsGA RK, f.689 (Kollektsiya kart), op.1, d.33: Schematiceskaya karta Semirechenskoi oblasti)

NOTES

1 This article is an English translation, with some revisions, of Chapter 7 of my book  Yūboku eiyū to roshia teikoku: aru kuruguzu shuryō no kiseki [Nomadic Hero and the Russian Empire: The Path of a Kirghiz Leader] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2016).

2 According to their autonyms, they called themselves “Qirghiz.” However, this article uses the term “Kirghiz” in accordance with customary practice. In official documents dated to 1925, Kirghiz and Kazakhs were generically called “Kirgiz.” Occasionally, while Kazakhs were called “Kirgiz-Kaysak” or “Kirgiz-Kazak,” Kirghiz were called “Dikii Kirgiz” (wild Kirgiz), “Kamennyi Kirgiz” (mountain Kirgiz),” and “Dikokamennnyi Kirgiz” or “Kara-Kirgiz” (black Kirgiz).


On the system of Governor-Generalship in the Russian Empire, see Matsuzato, Kimitaka, “General-gubernatorstva v rossiiskoi Traditsionnaya baiga,” Dmitriev, “Baiga u karakirgizov po sluchayu smerti manapa Shabdana Dzhantaeva v Pishpekskom uyezde”:


Nestnye izvestiya,” Semirechenskie oblastnye vedomosti 38, 1912.

Tsentral’nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Respubliki Kazakhstan (TiGA RK), f.44 (Semirechske oblastnoe pravlenie), op.1, d.4125, II.9-90b.

Shabdan baatyr: epokha i lichnost’: sbornik dokumentov i materialov (Bishkek, 1999): 172.

Shabdan baatyr: 157-158.

Although the number of the participants varies depending on the various sources, at least it reached into the tens of thousands. One of the participants B. Kenesarin from Solto tribe, regarding it as “the biggest ash” he had ever seen, flashed back as following: “Then I was sixteen years old. I saw the ash from the first to the last. From the Eastern Suukuluk valley, eighty-one people with three race horses got off under the direction of my older brother Jantay. Camping for two nights along the way, we arrived at the site of the ash, the hill named Boroldoi. We put up at four tents. Twenty-one of us did at the tent of Shabdan’s adopted son, Maichi Adzhi, who slaughtered for us a mare and two bullocks. From top of the hill to the Kichi Kemin River, there were standing a row of tents. Aksakal, or elders said that there was standing about a thousand. The number of visitors was thought to be around twenty thousand in average.” Kenesarin, B., “Ash-toylor,” Kirgizdar: sanjira, tarikh, maras, salt, Tom 2, (Bishkek, 1993): 566-567.

“Malaya Keben’ (s nashego korrespondenta),” Semirechenskie oblastnye vedomosti 225, 1912.

“Malaya Keben’ (s nashego korrespondenta),” Semirechenskie oblastnye vedomosti 227, 1912; Kenesarin, “Ash-toylor”: 566-567.

Dmitriev, “Baiga u karakirgizov po sluchayu smeriti manapa Shabdana Dzhantaeva v Pishpelskom uyezde”: 6; “Malaya Keben’ (s nashego korrespondenta),” Semirechenskie oblastnye vedomosti 225, 1912.

Sh., V., “Qirgizlar tugrusinga,” Shurâ 4, 1911: 103.

Shabdan baatyr: 157-158.

28 Shabdan baatyr: 157-158.

29 Shabdan baatyr: 157-158.

30 Shabdan baatyr: 157-158.

31 Shabdan baatyr: 157-158.


33 “Traditionnaya baiga,” Semirechenskie oblastnye vedomosti 212, 1912.
34 Abramzon, “Manapstvo i religiya”: 94-95.; According to the memoir of Belek Soltonoev, “a total of 50,000 people from Kazakh, Kirghiz, Dungan, Russian, Nogai [i.e. Tatar], Uyugur, Cossacks and Russian colonial officials participated.” Soltonoev, Kirgiz tarīkhī: 284.

35 Shabdan haautyr: 158; “Malaya Keben’ (s nashego korrespondenta),” Semirechenskie oblαstrαne vedomostи 227, 1912.

36 TsGA RK, f.44, op.1, d.4125, l.15.


38 TsGA RK, f.44, op.1, d.4125, l.15. It may be worth pointing out that the official news of Shabdan’s death published in Semirechena oblast Gazette included negative evaluation, as can be seen in the following quotation: “…for Kirgiz Shabdan was a typical example of patriarch, manap. In the eyes of Russians, he was not free from disadvantages as a manap.” “Mestnye izvestiya,” Semirechenskie oblastne vedomosti, 82, 1912.

39 B. Kenesarin had a close-up view of all the details: “…soon after arriving at the āsh, the vice military governor, the uezd commander and other Russian officials called all the manaps who were in the venue. The uezd commander, with a paper in his hand, told that a Kirghiz, named Alike Alimbek handled a petition to the military governor to complain that Shabdan’s āsh was leading common people to destruction. On the other hand, my brother Jantay, citing Shabdan’s attainment of persuading the Kirghiz nomads to subject to Russia, answered: “On this occasion I came with eighty people. We are helping to organize the āsh-toylor by bringing our own foods”. And he said that the petition was a lie. Having heard this, the uezd commander and other officials concluded that it was a lie.” Kenesarin, “Ash-toylor”: 567.

40 “Malaya Keben’ (s nashego korrespondenta),” Semirechenskie oblastne vedomosti 227, 1912.

41 Tsentral’nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Respubliki Uzbekistan (TsGA RUz), f.1-1 (Kantselyariya Turkestanskogo general-gubernatora), op.17, d.935, l.20ob.; Soltonoev, Kirgiz tarīkhī: 284.


45 Shabdan haautyr: 160.


47 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv (RGVIA), f.400 (Glavnii shtab, Aziat ska chast’), op.1, d.3267, l.99ob.

48 TsGA RUz, f.1-1, op.13, d.430, l.25.

49 RGVIA, f.400, op.1, d.3267, l.87.

50 RGVIA, f.400, op.1, d.3267, l.83.

51 RGVIA, f.400, op.1, d.3267, l.96.

52 TsGA RK, f.19 (Zaveduyushchii pereselencheskim delom v Semirechenskom raione Glavnogo upravleniya zemleustroistva i zemledeliya), op.1, d.2603, l.8.

53 TsGA RK, f.44, op.1, d.25583, ll.4-4ob.

54 TsGA RK, f.44, op.1, d.25583, ll.4-4ob.

55 TsGA RK, f.44, op.1, d.25583, ll.4ob-5.

56 Vostanie 1916 goda v Srednee Azii i Kazakhstane: 381.

57 At the beginning of the twentieth century, several Īdīds of Turkestan, including Mahmundkhodja Behbadidi, criticized local life-cycle rituals as a sign of backwardness. See, Khikmatullaev, Jasur, “20 seiki shōto no toruikusun ni okeru shakai mondai: Tokuni jinsei girei (satna, tōy, aza) ni tsuite,” Quadrante: Areas, cultures and positions 17, 2015: 193-207.

58 Vostanie 1916 goda v Srednee Azii i Kazakhstane: 381.