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早稲田大学大学院文学研究科

入学試験問題

【博士後期課程】

専門科目

哲学

コース

※解答は別紙 (横・縦 書)

以下の七問（1～7）の中から自分の専攻する分野の問題を一問選び、下線部を和訳したうえで（下線部が複数ある場合はそのすべてを和訳したうえで）、その課題文全体の論旨を踏まえて自由に論じなさい。

（解答用紙にある「専攻する分野」および「研究のために主として参照する一次文献の言語」の欄は、該当するものを一つ選び丸で囲むこと。また、選択した問題の番号を明記すること。）

1. 古代哲学

Suppose a man had moulded figures of all sorts out of gold, and were unceasingly to remould each into all the rest: then, if you should point to one of them and ask what it was, much the safest answer in respect of truth would be to say 'gold', and never to speak of a triangle or any of the other figures that were coming to be in it as things that have being, since they are changing even while one is asserting their existence. Rather one should be content if they so much as consent to accept the description 'what is of such and such a quality' with any certainty. Now the same thing must be said of that nature which receives all bodies. It must be called always the same; for it never departs at all from its own character; since it is always receiving all things, and never in any way whatsoever takes on any character that is like any of the things that enter it: by nature it is there as a matrix for everything, changed and diversified by the things that enter it, and on their account it *appears* to have different qualities at different times; while the things that pass in and out are to be called copies of the eternal things, impressions taken from them in a strange manner that is hard to express: we will follow it up on another occasion.

Be that as it may, for the present we must conceive three things: ① τὸ μὲν γιγνόμενον, τὸ δ' ἐν ᾧ γίγνεται, τὸ δ' ὅθεν ἀφομοιούμενον φύεται τὸ γιγνόμενον. Indeed we may fittingly compare the Recipient to a mother, the model to a father, and the nature that arises between them to their offspring. Further we must observe that, if there is to be an impress presenting all diversities of aspect, the thing itself in which the impress comes to be situated, cannot have been duly prepared unless it is free from all those characters which it is to receive from elsewhere. For if it were like any one of the things that come in upon it, then, when things of contrary or entirely different nature came, in receiving them it would reproduce them badly, intruding its own features alongside. ② διὸ καὶ πάντων ἐκτὸς εἰδὼν εἶναι χρεὼν τὸ τὰ πάντα ἐκδεχόμενον ἐν αὐτῷ γένη, just like the base which the makers of scented ointments skilfully contrive to start with: they make the liquids that are to receive the scents as odourless as possible. Or again, anyone who sets about taking impressions of shapes in some soft substance, allows no shape to show itself there beforehand, but begins by making the surface as smooth and level as he can. In the same way, that which is duly to receive over its whole extent and many times over all the likenesses of the intelligible and eternal things ought in its own nature to be free of all the characters. For this reason, then, the mother and Receptacle of what has come to be visible and otherwise sensible must not be called earth or air or fire or water, nor any of their compounds or components; but we shall not be deceived if we call it a nature invisible and characterless, all-receiving, partaking in some very puzzling way of the intelligible and very hard to apprehend.

※ ἐκδέχομαι, *take or receive from* another

Quod universale non sit aliqua res extra animam

Quod enim nullum universale sit aliqua substantia extra animam existens evidenter probari potest. [...]

Et ideo simpliciter concedendum est quod nullum universale est substantia, qualitercumque consideretur. Sed quodlibet universale est intentio animae, quae secundum unam opinionem probabilem ab actu intelligendi non differt. Unde dicunt quod intellectio qua intelligo hominem est signum naturale hominum, ita naturale sicut gemitus* est signum infirmitatis** vel tristitiae seu doloris; (a) et est tale signum quod potest stare pro hominibus in propositionibus mentalibus, sicut vox potest stare pro rebus in propositionibus vocalibus. [...]

Ex quibus aliisque multis patet quod (b) universale est intentio animae nata praedicari de multis.

Quod etiam ratione confirmari potest, nam omne universale, secundum omnes, est de multis praedicabile; sed sola intentio animae vel signum voluntarie institutum natum est praedicari et non substantia aliqua; ergo sola intentio animae vel signum voluntarie institutum est universale. Sed nunc non utor ‘universali’ pro signo voluntarie insituto, sed pro illo quod naturaliter est universale.

* gemitus, -us: うめき声

** infirmitas, -atis: 病気

3. 近現代英米哲学

According to Frege, when I grasp the way in which the reference, and thus the semantic role, of an expression is to be determined, then I grasp its sense; in particular, when I grasp the way in which the truth-value of a sentence (as uttered on a particular occasion) is to be determined, then I grasp the thought which it expresses. It is impossible to gain any grip on what it is to express a sense, or, more particularly, a thought, if we try to view the activity of expressing thoughts in isolation from the various kinds of linguistic acts which may be performed in relation to them, that is, the various kinds of force which may be attached to the expression of the thought. Until a connection is made between the truth-value of a sentence and the linguistic activities of asserting, questioning, etc., which can be accomplished by its utterance, we are in the dark as to what truth and falsity are, what is the difference between them, or what is the significance of ascribing them to sentences. Although it is not possible to claim Frege's authority for the dictum, it seems clear that sentences only have a sense in virtue of the practices of using them to make assertions, ask questions, etc. In the same way, there are winning or losing positions in a game only because the game is played, or at least is thought of as being played. If chess were never played, but the rules of chess existed solely in order to frame chess problems, there would be no sense in which checkmate was a winning position. True, many problems are of the form 'White to move and mate in three'; but equally good problems could be posed in which White had to force stalemate in three moves, or had to compel Black to checkmate him. In the same way, if a semantics is given for a language in the ordinary way save that the two possible truth-values of sentences are not labelled 'true' and 'false', but merely designated 'A' and 'B', there can be no sense in asking which value is truth and which falsity, except in relation to an actual or possible use of the language.

※WEB掲載に際し、以下のとおり出典を追記しております。

© Michael Dummett, 1981, Frege: Philosophy of Language, Bloomsbury Academic, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc.

4. 近現代ドイツ哲学

Um die Bedeutung zu ermitteln, die die Naturerkenntnis für die Entstehung und Gestaltung des modernen Weltbildes besitzt, darf man nicht bei der Betrachtung aller Einzelzüge stehenbleiben, die sie dem Inhalt dieses Weltbildes eingefügt und durch welche sie es entscheidend umgestaltet hat. Der Umfang dieser Einwirkungen scheint fast unermesslich zu sein; und doch erschöpft sich in ihm keineswegs das Ganze der bildenden Kraft, die von der Naturerkenntnis ausgegangen ist. Ihre entscheidende Leistung liegt vielmehr an einer anderen Stelle: Sie besteht nicht sowohl in dem neuen gegenständlichen Gehalt, der durch sie dem menschlichen Geiste vermittelt und zugänglich gemacht wurde, als vielmehr in der neuen Funktion, die sie ihm zuwies. Die Naturerkenntnis führt nicht schlechthin in die Welt der Gegenstände hinaus; sondern sie wird für den Geist zum Medium, innerhalb dessen er seine eigene Selbsterkenntnis vollzieht. Und damit setzt ein Prozeß ein, der wichtiger und bedeutsamer ist als alle Vermehrung und Erweiterung des bloßen Stoffes, mit welchem die neu erwachende Naturwissenschaft das menschliche Wissen bereichert hat. Das Wachstum und das ständige Anschwellen dieses Stoffes scheint, schon im sechzehnten und siebzehnten Jahrhundert, ins schlechthin Grenzenlose zu gehen. Die feste Form der antiken und der mittelalterlichen Weltansicht zerbricht; die Welt hört auf, ein »Kosmos« im Sinne einer übersehbaren, der Anschauung unmittelbar zugänglichen Ordnung zu sein. Raum und Zeit weiten sich ins Unendliche: Sie sind nicht mehr durch jenen festen Grundriß, wie ihn die antike Kosmologie in der Platonischen Lehre von den fünf regulären Körpern oder in dem Aristotelischen Stufenkosmos besaß, zu fassen noch in endlichen Maßen und Zahlen zu erschöpfen. An Stelle der einen Welt und des einen Seins tritt die Unendlichkeit der Welten, die ständig aus dem Schoße des Werdens neugeboren werden und deren jede nur eine einzelne vorübergehende Phase in dem unerschöpflichen Lebensprozeß des Universums bildet. Aber das Wesentliche der Umbildung liegt nicht in dieser grenzenlosen Ausbreitung; es liegt vielmehr darin, daß der Geist, in ihr und durch sie, einer neuen Kraft in sich selbst gewahr wird. Alles extensive Wachstum bliebe unfruchtbar und müßte ihn zuletzt ins Leere führen – wenn er nicht dadurch zugleich eine neue Intensität, eine neue Konzentration in sich selbst gewönne.

※WEB掲載に際し、以下のとおり出典を追記しております。

Ernst Cassirer: Die Philosophie der Aufklärung. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2007.

5. 近現代フランス哲学

Ainsi, Aristote, parti pour définir le temps de ce que nous appellerions une considération d'ordre psychologique, ayant commencé par faire remarquer que, sans un fil intérieur des faits de conscience, il n'y aurait pas pour nous de temps, Aristote, s'étant d'ailleurs beaucoup éloigné de cette considération, pour arriver de proche en proche à définir le temps par une certaine mobilité du mouvement du premier ciel, pour conclure, Aristote revient à son point de départ et nous dit que s'il n'y avait pas d'âme, il n'y aurait pas de temps (ἀδύνατον εἶναι χρόνον ψυχῆς μὴ οὐσίας * [...]).

Comment comprendre cette affirmation ? Elle rend un son très moderne; elle donne au temps une apparence, comme nous dirions aujourd'hui, de subjectivité, ou, tout au moins, de relativité par rapport à notre esprit. Certainement, Aristote a soin de nous dire que le temps, ce n'est pas l'acte de compter, c'est le nombre nombré, ce n'est pas le nombre nombrant, et par conséquent, le temps n'est pas l'acte intérieur subjectif par lequel on compte ; pour que le temps soit complet, il faut que le nombre soit complet. Or, tant qu'il n'y a que le ciel tournant et accomplissant des révolutions, le nombre n'est là qu'en puissance, comme dirait Aristote ; il y a la matière du nombre ; pour que le nombre soit complet, pour qu'il soit, non pas simplement puissance, mais acte, il faut que l'acte intervienne et par conséquent le nombre n'est complet que lorsque ses deux éléments sont donnés à la fois: le nombrant et le nombré.

En ce sens, le nombre qui est le temps est bien quelque chose d'extérieur, d'objectif, et cependant il y a cette affirmation tout à fait précise d'Aristote que, s'il n'y avait pas d'âme, il n'y aurait pas de nombre. Et il semble assez difficile, si on s'en tient à cette affirmation, de faire une différence précise entre la doctrine moderne du temps qui considère le temps comme subordonné à l'existence de l'esprit humain ; de telle sorte que, l'esprit humain étant supprimé, le temps disparaît aussi.

* il est impossible que le temps existe si l'âme n'existe pas.

※WEB 掲載に際し、以下のとおり出典を追記しております。

Bergson, Henri. Histoire de l'idée de temps : cours au Collège de France, 1902-1903.
Edited by Camille Riquier, Presses Universitaires de France, 2016, pp. 160-161.

Just as romanticism is a philosophy of unbounded hope, so pragmatism is a philosophy of finitude. Romanticism tells us that past experience is insufficient to show the impossibility of change for the better—that the results of past experiments should not discourage us from trying new ones. Pragmatism tells us that we shall never know for sure whether what now looks like progress is actually regression. Romanticism encourages us to transcend the present by walking as the prophecies of the next age. Pragmatism reminds us that there is no intrinsic value in novelty—that the only test of prophecy is whether the new age turns out to be an improvement on the old.

To acknowledge human finitude is simply to grant there is no way of knowing, at any given moment in history, whether humanity is heading in the right direction. The pursuit of criteria which transcend the social practices of a time and place is an attempt to evade this finitude. So is the attempt to philosophize at a wholesale level—to say something general about the relation between social institutions and human nature, or between the various things that different sorts of men and women have found valuable and The Good Life for Man.

Critics of pragmatism have often said that if we give up the attempt to think in a wholesale way, we are betraying something essential to our humanity. The point of being human, these critics say, is to have a reach that exceeds our grasp. But there is a difference between retail sociopolitical goals that we may never succeed in realizing and wholesale philosophical ideals. All of us here believe that we have a duty to work for a future in which the entire population of the planet will have freedom and the security that the middle classes of Europe and North America presently enjoy. None of us are clear about how this can be done, any more than ancient Roman idealists were clear about how the work of the world could get done if slavery were abolished. But there is considerable agreement among us on what counts as a step in the right direction, and we share the hope that a sequence of such steps will, sooner or later, achieve the desired end. There is no such agreement when it comes to wholesale ideals like “universal validity” or “the achievement of true happiness” or “the fulfillment of God’s plan” or “the rule of reason.” A retail ideal is one that we can put to work. But the only function of a wholesale ideal is to puff ourselves up, to give us the sense that we are associated with something that does not share our finitude.

※WEB掲載に際し、以下のとおり出典を追記しております。

Permission for Philosophy as Poetry, by Richard Rorty, pp 58-59.
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7. 現代倫理学・応用倫理学

It is a commonplace that modern science has given us a disenchanted conception of the natural world. A proper appreciation of science makes it impossible to retain, except perhaps in some symbolic guise, the common mediaeval conception of nature as filled with meaning, like a book containing messages and lessons for us. The tendency of the scientific outlook is to purge the world of meaning—the object of reason, in an old sense that is threatened by just this development.

Hume is the prophet *par excellence* of this tendency, although he is quite unconscious of the historical explanation for it. Reason, Hume insists, does not find meaning or intelligible order in the world; rather, whatever intelligible order there is in our world-picture is a product of the operations of mind, and those operations are themselves just some of what goes on in nature, in itself meaninglessly, as it were.

From this standpoint, Kant looks like a desperate reactionary. He insists that intelligible order is found in the world, but he makes this out only by reconstruing the world as partly constituted by mind. This looks like an image of Hume's picture in a distorting medium. It looks inferior, by the lights of what seems a merely sane naturalism, in that it conceives the meaning-yielding operations of mind transcendently rather than as part of nature. And it looks unconvincing in its insistence that the order is there to be found; it seems to undermine that by suggesting that we constitute the order ourselves.

This view of the Kantian alternative provokes an understandable recoil. A familiar response is to retain Hume's picture of the meaning-yielding operations of mind, but to discard his responsiveness to scepticism, which keeps Hume himself from a scientific realism. According to the sort of outlook I mean, reality is exhausted by the natural world, in the sense of the world as the natural sciences are capable of revealing it to us. Part of the truth in the idea that science disenchant nature is that science is committed to a dispassionate and dehumanized stance for investigation; that is taken to be a matter of conforming to a metaphysical insight into the character of reality as such. (The fact that the natural sciences reveal the world as intelligible has to be glossed over somehow; I shall return to this in §7 below.) Any candidate feature of reality that science cannot capture is downgraded as a projection, a result of mind's interaction with the rest of nature.

Against this background, it will seem that a putative operation of the intellect can stand up to reflective scrutiny only if its products can be validated on the basis of the facts of nature, conceived in the disenchanted way that is encouraged by modern science. For if we are to understand what is in question as an operation of the intellect at all, we must make room for objectivity: for there to be a difference between being right and seeming right. And science has presented itself as the very exemplar of access to objective truth.

※WEB 掲載に際し、以下のとおり出典を追記しております。

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——これより先の余白には絶対に記入しないこと——