

以下の七問（1～7）のなかから自分の専攻する分野の問題を一問選び、下線部を和訳したうえで（下線部が複数ある場合はそのすべてを和訳したうえで）、その課題文全体の論旨をふまえつつ自由に論じなさい。

（解答用紙にある「専攻する分野」および「研究のために主として参照する一次文献の言語」の欄は、該当するものをひとつ選び丸で囲むこと。また、選択した問題の番号を明記すること。）

1 古代哲学

I wish, he said, that you would hear me as well as him, and then I shall see whether you and I agree. For Thrasymachus seems to me, like a snake, to have been charmed by your voice sooner than he ought to have been; but to my mind the nature of justice and injustice have not yet been made clear. Setting aside their rewards and results, ①ἐπιθυμῶ γὰρ ἀκοῦσαι τί τ' ἐστὶν ἐκάτερον καὶ τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐνὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. If you, please, then, I will revive the argument of Thrasymachus. And first I will speak of the nature and origin of justice according to the common view of them. Secondly, I will show that all men who practise justice do so against their will, of necessity, but not as a good. And thirdly, I will argue that there is reason in this view, for the life of the unjust is after all better far than the life of the just — if what they say is true, Socrates, since I myself am not of their opinion. But still I acknowledge that I am perplexed when I hear the voices of Thrasymachus and myriads of others dinning in my ears; and, on the other hand, I have never yet heard the superiority of justice to injustice maintained by any one in a satisfactory way. I want to hear justice praised in respect of itself; then I shall be satisfied, and you are the person from whom I think that I am most likely to hear this; and therefore I will praise the unjust life to the utmost of my power, and my manner of speaking will indicate the manner in which I desire to hear you too praising justice and censuring injustice. Will you say whether you approve of my proposal?

Indeed I do; nor can I imagine any theme about which a man of sense would oftener wish to converse.

I am delighted, he replied, to hear you say so, and shall begin by speaking, as I proposed, of the nature and origin of justice.

They say that to do injustice is, by nature, good; to suffer injustice, evil; but that the evil is greater than the good. And so when men have both done and suffered injustice and have had experience of both, not being able to avoid the one and obtain the other, they think that they had better agree among themselves to have neither; hence there arise laws and mutual covenants; and that which is ordained by law is termed by them lawful and just. This they affirm to be the origin and nature of justice; — it is a mean or compromise, between the best of all, which is to do injustice and not be punished, and the worst of all, which is to suffer injustice without the power of retaliation; ②τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἐν μέσῳ ὄν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἀγαπᾶσθαι^{※1} οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀρρωστία^{※2} τοῦ ἀδικοῦν τιμώμενον.

※1 ἀγαπάω, *tolerate, put up with*

※2 ἀρρωστία, *weakness, sickness*

※WEB掲載に際し、以下のとおり出典を追記しております。

Used with permission of Andrews UK Ltd., from "The republic" by Plato ; translated by Benjamin Jowett, pp.178-179, 2012.

Manifestum est autem ex praedictis quod considerationem circa creaturas habet doctrina fidei Christianae inquantum in eis resultat quaedam Dei similitudo, et inquantum error in ipsis inducit in divinorum errorem. Et sic alia ratione subiiciuntur praedictae doctrinae, et philosophiae humanae. Nam philosophia humana eas considerat secundum quod huiusmodi sunt: unde et secundum diversa rerum genera diversae partes philosophiae inveniuntur. Fides autem Christiana eas considerat, non inquantum huiusmodi, utpote ignem inquantum ignis est, sed inquantum divinam altitudinem repraesentat, et in ipsum Deum quoquo modo ordinatur.

Et propter hoc etiam alia circa creaturas et Philosophus et Fidelis considerat. (a)Philosophus namque considerat illa quae eis secundum naturam propriam conveniunt: sicut igni ferri sursum. (b)Fidelis autem ea solum considerat circa creaturas quae eis conveniunt secundum quod sunt ad Deum relata: utpote, quod sunt a Deo creata, quod sunt Deo subiecta, et huiusmodi.

Unde non est ad imperfectionem doctrinae fidei imputandum si multas rerum proprietates praetermittat: ut caeli figuram, et motus qualitatem. Sic enim nec Naturalis circa lineam illas passiones considerat quas Geometra: sed solum ea quae accidunt sibi inquantum est terminus corporis naturalis.

... It seems to me a surprising thing that so few philosophers, while saying a great deal as to what material things *are* and as to what it is to perceive them, have attempted to give a clear account as to what precisely they suppose themselves to *know* (or to *judge*, in case they have held that we don't *know* any such propositions to be true, or even that no such propositions *are* true) when they know or judge such things as "This is a hand," "That is the sun," "This is a dog," etc. etc. etc.

Two things only seem to me to be quite certain about the analysis of such propositions (and even with regard to these I am afraid some philosophers would differ from me) namely that whenever I know, or judge, such a proposition to be true, (1) there is always some *sense-datum* about which the proposition in question is a proposition—some sense-datum which is a subject (and, in a certain sense, the principal or ultimate subject) of the proposition in question, and (2) that, nevertheless, *what* I am knowing or judging to be true about this sense-datum is not (in general) that it is *itself* a hand, or a dog, or the sun, etc. etc., as the case maybe.

Some philosophers have I think doubted whether there are any such things as other philosophers have meant by "sense-data" or "sensa." And I think it is quite possible that some philosophers (including myself, in the past) have used these terms in senses, such that it is really doubtful whether there are any such things. But there is no doubt at all that there are sense-data, in the sense in which I am now using that term. I am at present seeing a great number of them, and feeling others. And, in order to point out to the reader what sort of things I mean by sense-data, I need only ask him to look at his own right hand. If he does this he will be able to pick out something (and, unless he is seeing double, *only* one thing) with regard to which he will see that it is, at first sight, a natural view to take that that thing is identical, not, indeed, with his whole right hand, but with that part of its surface which he is actually seeing, but will also (on a little reflection) be able to see that it is doubtful whether it can be identical with the part of the surface of his hand in question. Things of the sort (in a certain respect) of which this thing is, which he sees in looking at his hand, and with regard to which he can understand how some philosophers should have supposed it to be the part of the surface of his hand which he is seeing, while others have supposed that it can't be, are what I mean by "sense-data." I therefore define the term in such a way that it is an open question whether the sense-datum which I now see in looking at my hand and which is a sense-datum of my hand is or is not identical with that part of its surface which I am now actually seeing.

※WEB 掲載に際し、以下のとおり出典を追記しております。

Muirhead, J.H. (2003). Contemporary British Philosophy: Personal Statements Second Series (1st ed.). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315830506>, pp.217-218; permission conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc.

Es giebt zwei Arten von Leugnern der Sittlichkeit. – „Die Sittlichkeit leugnen“ – das kann einmal heissen: leugnen, dass die sittlichen Motive, welche die Menschen angeben, wirklich sie zu ihren Handlungen getrieben haben, – es ist also die Behauptung, dass die Sittlichkeit in Worten bestehe und zur groben und feinen Betrügerei (namentlich Selbstbetrügerei) der Menschen gehöre, und vielleicht gerade bei den durch Tugend Berühmtesten am meisten. So dann kann es heissen: leugnen, dass die sittlichen Urtheile auf Wahrheiten beruhen. Hier wird zugegeben, dass sie Motive des Handelns wirklich sind, dass aber auf diese Weise Irrthümer, als Grund alles sittlichen Urtheilens, die Menschen zu ihren moralischen Handlungen treiben. Diess ist mein Gesichtspunct: doch möchte ich am wenigsten verkennen, dass in sehr vielen Fällen ein feines Misstrauen nach Art des ersten Gesichtspunctes, also im Geiste des La Rochefoucauld, auch im Rechte und jedenfalls vom höchsten allgemeinen Nutzen ist. – Ich leugne also die Sittlichkeit wie ich die Alchymie leugne, das heisst, ich leugne ihre Voraussetzungen: nicht aber, dass es Alchymisten gegeben hat, welche an diese Voraussetzungen glaubten und auf sie hin handelten. – Ich leugne auch die Unsittlichkeit: nicht, dass zahllose Menschen sich unsittlich fühlen, sondern dass es einen Grund in der Wahrheit giebt, sich so zu fühlen. Ich leugne nicht, wie sich von selber versteht – vorausgesetzt, dass ich kein Narr bin –, dass viele Handlungen, welche unsittlich heissen, zu vermeiden und zu bekämpfen sind; ebenfalls, dass viele, die sittlich heissen, zu thun und zu fördern sind, – aber ich meine: das Eine wie das Andere aus anderen Gründen, als bisher. Wir haben umzulernen, – um endlich, vielleicht sehr spät, noch mehr zu erreichen: um zu fühlen.

L'homme est Conscience de soi. Il est conscient de soi, conscient de sa réalité et de sa dignité humaines, et c'est en ceci qu'il diffère essentiellement de l'animal, qui ne dépasse pas le niveau du simple Sentiment de soi. L'homme prend conscience de soi au moment où – pour la « première » fois – il dit : « Moi ». Comprendre l'homme par la compréhension de son « origine », c'est donc comprendre l'origine du Moi révélé par la parole.

Or, l'analyse de la « pensée », de la « raison », de l'« entendement », etc. – d'une manière générale : du comportement cognitif, contemplatif, passif d'un être ou d'un « sujet connaissant », ne découvre jamais le pourquoi ou le comment de la naissance du mot « Moi », et – par suite – de la conscience de soi, c'est-à-dire de la réalité humaine. L'homme qui contemple est « absorbé » par ce qu'il contemple; le « sujet connaissant » se « perd » dans l'objet connu. La contemplation révèle l'objet, et non le sujet. C'est l'objet, et non le sujet qui se montre à lui-même dans et par – ou, mieux encore, en tant que – acte de connaître. L'homme « absorbé » par l'objet qu'il contemple ne peut être « rappelé à lui » que par un Désir : par le désir de manger, par exemple. C'est le Désir (conscient) d'un être qui constitue cet être en tant que Moi et le révèle en tant que tel en le poussant à dire : « Je ... ». C'est le Désir qui transforme l'Être révélé à lui-même par lui-même dans la connaissance (vraie), en un « objet » révélé à un « sujet » par un sujet différent de l'objet et « opposé » à lui. C'est dans et par, ou mieux encore, en tant que « son » Désir que l'homme se constitue et se révèle – à soi-même et aux autres – comme un Moi, comme le Moi essentiellement différent du, et radicalement opposé au, non-Moi. Le Moi (humain) est le Moi d'un – ou du – Désir.

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Kojève, Alexandre. Introduction à la lecture de Hegel: leçons sur la Phénoménologie de l'esprit professées de 1933 à 1939 à l'École des hautes études. Edited by Raymond Queneau, pp. 13-14. © Éditions Gallimard

If the history of philosophy has taught us anything, it is that attempts to define terms like 'beauty' are on-going. Hence, something is always hypothetical about any such definition. We ride it like a raft down the river of our desire for as long as it takes us somewhere we want to go without springing too many leaks. We can do our best to select a sea-worthy vessel, but if we insist on an absolute guarantee of such, chances are good we will never set sail at all.

Here lurks an ancient puzzle; we cannot pursue something unless we already grasp that which we are chasing—and yet, if it is already in our grasp, what need is there to seek it further? This puzzle threatens not only to postpone our quest for beauty until we have concluded our pursuit of its definition; it assumes that success in the latter pursuit is the same as success in the former. Seeking a definition of beauty having thus displaced the actual pursuit of beauty, philosophy lets itself off the hook as far as its own practice is concerned. It remains undisturbed if its own procedures become cramped and ugly.

The way to escape this trap is to acknowledge that some realities can only be grasped gradually, over time, in the course of a long pursuit. These realities are often precisely those of greatest existential concern to us. They may also turn out to be those that, when full clarity finally dawns, are most resistant to being captured in words. Beauty, I think, is just such a reality.

Rather than turning the quest of beauty into an effort to capture it in a definition, we would do better to think of it as an effort to respond to a call. There exist many different kinds of calls and many different ways to respond when called. We can accede to calls of duty out of rectitude or fear. We can resist calls to action out of caution or laziness and honour calls to help out of compassion or a desire to be admired. Moreover, we can ignore calls to serve others out of selfishness or a sense of inadequacy. As well, we can support calls to arms out of patriotic zeal and a desire for revenge or parry calls to glory out of modesty or indifference—and so on, in a seemingly endless cacophony of call and response.

Taken together these examples suggest that a call is something more than a mere stimulus and less than an inexorable demand. Hence, our response to a call can be neither automatic nor coerced. This is especially true for calls issued by beautiful things, for in such cases we are free not merely in how we respond to the call, but also in determining that to which it is a call. The notion that beauty leaves us thus doubly free is akin, perhaps, to Immanuel Kant's claim that an aesthetic response involves 'conformity to law without a law.' What exactly Kant had in mind here is a matter of considerable controversy. But his paradoxical formula does seem to imply that we have an obligation of some sort to the beautiful things that call to us, although precisely what counts as meeting this obligation is left indeterminate.

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The fact that all selves are constituted by or in terms of the social process, and are individual reflections of it—or rather of this organized behavior pattern which it exhibits, and which they prehend in their respective structures—is not in the least incompatible with, or destructive of, the fact that every individual self has its own peculiar individuality, its own unique pattern; because each individual self within that process, while it reflects in its organized structure the behavior pattern of that process as a whole, does so from its own particular and unique standpoint within that process, and thus reflects in its organized structure a different aspect or perspective of this whole social behavior pattern from that which is reflected in the organized structure of any other individual self within that process (just as every monad in the Leibnizian universe mirrors that universe from a different point of view, and thus mirrors a different aspect or perspective of that universe). In other words, the organized structure of every individual self within the human social process of experience and behavior reflects, and is constituted by, the organized relational pattern of that process as a whole; but each individual self-structure reflects, and is constituted by, a different aspect or perspective of this relational pattern, because each reflects this relational pattern from its own unique standpoint; so that the common social origin and constitution of individual selves and their structures does not preclude wide individual differences and variations among them, or contradict the peculiar and more or less distinctive individuality which each of them in fact possesses. Every individual self within a given society or social community reflects in its organized structure the whole relational pattern of organized social behavior which that society or community exhibits or is carrying on, and its organized structure is constituted by this pattern; but since each of these individual selves reflects a uniquely different aspect or perspective of this pattern in its structure, from its own particular and unique place or standpoint within the whole process of organized social behavior which exhibits this pattern—since, that is, each is differently or uniquely related to that whole process, and occupies its own essentially unique focus of relations therein—the structure of each is differently constituted by this pattern from the way in which the structure of any other is so constituted.

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