

2025 年度      早稲田大学大学院文学研究科      入学試験問題  
【博士後期課程】      専門科目      哲学      コース      ※解答は別紙（横・縦 書）

以下の七問（1～7）のなかから自分の専攻する分野の問題を一問選び、下線部を和訳したうえで（下線部が複数ある場合はそのすべてを和訳したうえで）、その課題文全体の論旨をふまえて自由に論じなさい。

（解答用紙にある「専攻する分野」および「研究のために主として参照する一次文献の言語」の欄は、該当するものをひとつ選び丸で囲むこと。また、選択した問題の番号を明記すること。）

1 古代哲学

※この部分は、著作権の関係により掲載できません。

Manifestum est autem ex praedictis quod considerationem circa creaturas habet doctrina fidei Christianae inquantum in eis resultat quaedam Dei similitudo, et inquantum error in ipsis inducit in divinorum errorem. Et sic alia ratione subiiciuntur praedictae doctrinae, et philosophiae humanae. Nam philosophia humana eas considerat secundum quod huiusmodi sunt: unde et secundum diversa rerum genera diversae partes philosophiae inveniuntur. Fides autem Christiana eas considerat, non inquantum huiusmodi, utpote ignem inquantum ignis est, sed inquantum divinam altitudinem repraesentat, et in ipsum Deum quoquo modo ordinatur.

Et propter hoc etiam alia circa creaturas et Philosophus et Fidelis considerat. (a)Philosophus namque considerat illa quae eis secundum naturam propriam conveniunt: sicut igni ferri sursum. (b)Fidelis autem ea solum considerat circa creaturas quae eis conveniunt secundum quod sunt ad Deum relata: utpote, quod sunt a Deo creata, quod sunt Deo subiecta, et huiusmodi.

Unde non est ad imperfectionem doctrinae fidei imputandum si multas rerum proprietates praetermittat: ut caeli figuram, et motus qualitatem. Sic enim nec Naturalis circa lineam illas passiones considerat quas Geometra: sed solum ea quae accidunt sibi inquantum est terminus corporis naturalis.

※この部分は、著作権の関係により掲載できません。

Es giebt zwei Arten von Leugnern der Sittlichkeit. – „Die Sittlichkeit leugnen“ – das kann einmal heissen: leugnen, dass die sittlichen Motive, welche die Menschen angeben, wirklich sie zu ihren Handlungen getrieben haben, – es ist also die Behauptung, dass die Sittlichkeit in Worten bestehe und zur groben und feinen Betrügerei (namentlich Selbstbetrügerei) der Menschen gehöre, und vielleicht gerade bei den durch Tugend Berühmtesten am meisten. So dann kann es heissen: leugnen, dass die sittlichen Urtheile auf Wahrheiten beruhen. Hier wird zugegeben, dass sie Motive des Handelns wirklich sind, dass aber auf diese Weise Irrthümer, als Grund alles sittlichen Urtheilens, die Menschen zu ihren moralischen Handlungen treiben. Diess ist mein Gesichtspunct: doch möchte ich am wenigsten verkennen, dass in sehr vielen Fällen ein feines Misstrauen nach Art des ersten Gesichtspunctes, also im Geiste des La Rochefoucauld, auch im Rechte und jedenfalls vom höchsten allgemeinen Nutzen ist. – Ich leugne also die Sittlichkeit wie ich die Alchymie leugne, das heisst, ich leugne ihre Voraussetzungen: nicht aber, dass es Alchymisten gegeben hat, welche an diese Voraussetzungen glaubten und auf sie hin handelten. – Ich leugne auch die Unsittlichkeit: nicht, dass zahllose Menschen sich unsittlich fühlen, sondern dass es einen Grund in der Wahrheit giebt, sich so zu fühlen. Ich leugne nicht, wie sich von selber versteht – vorausgesetzt, dass ich kein Narr bin –, dass viele Handlungen, welche unsittlich heissen, zu vermeiden und zu bekämpfen sind; ebenfalls, dass viele, die sittlich heissen, zu thun und zu fördern sind, – aber ich meine: das Eine wie das Andere aus anderen Gründen, als bisher. Wir haben umzulernen, – um endlich, vielleicht sehr spät, noch mehr zu erreichen: um zu fühlen.

## 5 近現代フランス哲学

※この部分は、著作権の関係により掲載できません。

If the history of philosophy has taught us anything, it is that attempts to define terms like 'beauty' are on-going. Hence, something is always hypothetical about any such definition. We ride it like a raft down the river of our desire for as long as it takes us somewhere we want to go without springing too many leaks. We can do our best to select a sea-worthy vessel, but if we insist on an absolute guarantee of such, chances are good we will never set sail at all.

Here lurks an ancient puzzle; we cannot pursue something unless we already grasp that which we are chasing—and yet, if it is already in our grasp, what need is there to seek it further? This puzzle threatens not only to postpone our quest for beauty until we have concluded our pursuit of its definition; it assumes that success in the latter pursuit is the same as success in the former. Seeking a definition of beauty having thus displaced the actual pursuit of beauty, philosophy lets itself off the hook as far as its own practice is concerned. It remains undisturbed if its own procedures become cramped and ugly.

The way to escape this trap is to acknowledge that some realities can only be grasped gradually, over time, in the course of a long pursuit. These realities are often precisely those of greatest existential concern to us. They may also turn out to be those that, when full clarity finally dawns, are most resistant to being captured in words. Beauty, I think, is just such a reality.

Rather than turning the quest of beauty into an effort to capture it in a definition, we would do better to think of it as an effort to respond to a call. There exist many different kinds of calls and many different ways to respond when called. We can accede to calls of duty out of rectitude or fear. We can resist calls to action out of caution or laziness and honour calls to help out of compassion or a desire to be admired. Moreover, we can ignore calls to serve others out of selfishness or a sense of inadequacy. As well, we can support calls to arms out of patriotic zeal and a desire for revenge or parry calls to glory out of modesty or indifference—and so on, in a seemingly endless cacophony of call and response.

Taken together these examples suggest that a call is something more than a mere stimulus and less than an inexorable demand. Hence, our response to a call can be neither automatic nor coerced. This is especially true for calls issued by beautiful things, for in such cases we are free not merely in how we respond to the call, but also in determining that to which it is a call. The notion that beauty leaves us thus doubly free is akin, perhaps, to Immanuel Kant's claim that an aesthetic response involves 'conformity to law without a law.' What exactly Kant had in mind here is a matter of considerable controversy. But his paradoxical formula does seem to imply that we have an obligation of some sort to the beautiful things that call to us, although precisely what counts as meeting this obligation is left indeterminate.

※WEB掲載に際し、以下のとおり出典を追記しております。

Used with permission of Inter-Disciplinary Press, from "On Beauty: A Manifesto" in "Beauty: Exploring Critical Perspectives (Edited by Pierre Wilhelm)" by Patricia A. Sayre, 2016, p.207-208; permission conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc.

The fact that all selves are constituted by or in terms of the social process, and are individual reflections of it—or rather of this organized behavior pattern which it exhibits, and which they prehend in their respective structures—is not in the least incompatible with, or destructive of, the fact that every individual self has its own peculiar individuality, its own unique pattern; because each individual self within that process, while it reflects in its organized structure the behavior pattern of that process as a whole, does so from its own particular and unique standpoint within that process, and thus reflects in its organized structure a different aspect or perspective of this whole social behavior pattern from that which is reflected in the organized structure of any other individual self within that process (just as every monad in the Leibnizian universe mirrors that universe from a different point of view, and thus mirrors a different aspect or perspective of that universe). In other words, the organized structure of every individual self within the human social process of experience and behavior reflects, and is constituted by, the organized relational pattern of that process as a whole; but each individual self-structure reflects, and is constituted by, a different aspect or perspective of this relational pattern, because each reflects this relational pattern from its own unique standpoint; so that the common social origin and constitution of individual selves and their structures does not preclude wide individual differences and variations among them, or contradict the peculiar and more or less distinctive individuality which each of them in fact possesses. Every individual self within a given society or social community reflects in its organized structure the whole relational pattern of organized social behavior which that society or community exhibits or is carrying on, and its organized structure is constituted by this pattern; but since each of these individual selves reflects a uniquely different aspect or perspective of this pattern in its structure, from its own particular and unique place or standpoint within the whole process of organized social behavior which exhibits this pattern—since, that is, each is differently or uniquely related to that whole process, and occupies its own essentially unique focus of relations therein—the structure of each is differently constituted by this pattern from the way in which the structure of any other is so constituted.

※WEB掲載に際し、以下のとおり出典を追記しております。

Used with the permission of The University of Chicago Press from Mind, Self and Society by George Herbert Mead, 24, 2015, p.201-202; permission conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc.





————これより先の余白には絶対に記入しないこと————