

以下の七問（１～７）のなかから自分の専攻する分野の問題を一問選び、下線部を和訳したうえで（下線部が複数ある場合はそのすべてを和訳したうえで）、その課題文全体の論旨をふまえて自由に論じなさい。

（解答用紙にある「専攻する分野」および「研究のために主として参照する一次文献の言語」の欄は、該当するものをひとつ選び丸で囲むこと。また、選択した問題の番号を明記すること）。

## 1 古代

And since it is activities that control life, as we said, no blessed person could ever become miserable, since he will never do hateful and base actions. For a truly good and prudent person, we suppose, will bear strokes of fortune suitably, and from his resources at any time will do the finest actions, just as a good general will make the best use of his forces in war, and a good shoemaker will make the finest shoe from the hides given to him, and similarly for all other craftsmen.

If this is so, the happy person could never become miserable, but neither will he be blessed if he falls into misfortunes as bad as Priam's. Nor, however, will he be inconstant and prone to fluctuate, since he will neither be easily shaken from his happiness nor shaken by just any misfortunes. He will be shaken from it, though, by many serious misfortunes, and from these a return to happiness will take no short time. At best, it will take a long and complete length of time that includes great and fine successes.

τί οὖν κωλύει λέγειν εὐδαίμονα τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένον<sup>※</sup> μὴ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον ἀλλὰ τέλειον βίον; Or should we add that he will also go on living this way and will come to an appropriate end, since the future is not apparent to us, and we take happiness to be the end, and altogether complete in every way? Given these facts [about the future and about happiness], we shall say that a living person who has, and will keep, the goods we mentioned is blessed, but blessed as a human being is.

※ χορηγέω, *furnish abundantly with* a thing, Pass., *to be well supplied*

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex, cum sit regula et mensura, dupliciter potest esse in aliquo: uno modo, sicut in regulante et mesurante; alio modo, sicut in regulato et mesurato, quia inquantum participat aliquid de regula vel mensura, sic regulatur vel mesuratur. Unde cum omnia quae divinae providentiae subduntur, a lege aeterna reguntur et mesurentur, ut ex dictis patet; manifestum est quod omnia participant aliquantulum legem aeternam, inquantum scilicet ex impressione eius habent inclinationes in proprios actus et fines. Inter cetera autem rationalis creatura excellentiori quodam modo divinae providentiae subiacet, inquantum et ipsa fit providentiae particeps, sibi ipsi et aliis providens. Unde et in ipsa participatur ratio aeterna, per quam habet naturalem inclinationem ad debitum actum et finem. Et talis participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura lex naturalis dicitur.

Many modern commentators have taken Berkeley to be chiefly concerned with ‘the problem of universals’. There are a great many problems that philosophers have, from time to time, called ‘problems about universals’. One of the favourites nowadays is the question of how it is possible for general terms to have meaning. For example, it is tempting to suppose that a general word (like ‘rain’) gets its meaning from, or actually means, what all rain has in common. Against this view Wittgenstein, it is said, postulated that some terms get their meaning from ‘family resemblances’. There is nothing in common to all games, but there is a chain of resemblances, a cluster of properties, or some such, that connects patience and rugby football, chess and the pentathlon, war games by the NATO fleet and ring-around-a-rosy. Such questions about general terms are indeed of interest. Perhaps they are central to some of Plato’s thought. But we may usefully recall Kant’s rude remarks about how the seventeenth-century notion of *idea* is altogether different from the Platonic one from which, etymologically, it derives. Berkeley saw clearly that there is nothing in the seventeenth-century doctrine of ideas that implies anything about the meaning of general terms – nothing, that is, except the theory of geometrical proof as mental vision which requires an object. So I believe that much modern commentary misdirects us. This is certainly confirmed by Berkeley’s own Introduction. It is worried about the way general terms occur in proofs. He tries to explain how we can reason geometrically without having an abstract idea to contemplate. In a proof, he claims, we can arrive at a general conclusion even though, at certain stages in the reasoning, we have only an idea of a particular triangle to reason about.

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Daß unseren äußeren Wahrnehmungen etwas Wirkliches außer uns, nicht bloß korrespondiere, sondern auch korrespondieren müsse, kann gleichfalls niemals als Verknüpfung der Dinge an sich selbst, wohl aber zum Behuf der Erfahrung bewiesen werden. Dieses will so viel sagen: daß etwas auf empirische Art, mithin als Erscheinung im Raume außer uns sei, kann man gar wohl beweisen; denn mit andern Gegenständen, als denen, die zu einer möglichen Erfahrung gehören, haben wir es nicht zu tun, eben darum, weil sie uns in keiner Erfahrung gegeben werden können, und also vor uns nichts sein. Empirisch außer mir ist das, was im Raume angeschaut wird, und | da dieser samt allen Erscheinungen, die er enthält, zu den Vorstellungen gehört, deren Verknüpfung nach Erfahrungsgesetzen eben sowohl ihre objektive Wahrheit beweiset, als die Verknüpfung der Erscheinungen des innern Sinnes die Wirklichkeit meiner Seele (als eines Gegenstandes des innern Sinnes), so bin ich mir vermittelst der äußern Erfahrung eben sowohl der Wirklichkeit der Körper, als äußerer Erscheinungen im Raume, wie vermittelst der innern Erfahrung des Daseins meiner Seele in der Zeit, bewußt, die ich auch nur, als einen Gegenstand des innern Sinnes, durch Erscheinungen, die einen innern Zustand ausmachen, erkennen, und wovon mir das Wesen an sich selbst, das diesen Erscheinungen zum Grunde liegt, unbekannt ist. Der Cartesianische Idealismus unterscheidet also nur äußere Erfahrung vom Traume, und die Gesetzmäßigkeit, als ein Kriterium der Wahrheit der erstern, von der Regellosigkeit und dem falschen Schein der letztern. Er setzt in beiden Raum und Zeit als Bedingungen des Daseins der Gegenstände voraus, und fragt nur, ob die Gegenstände äußerer Sinne wirklich im Raum anzutreffen sein, die wir darin im Wachen setzen, so wie der Gegenstand des innern Sinnes, die Seele, wirklich in der Zeit ist, d. i. ob Erfahrung sichere Kriterien der Unterscheidung von Einbildung bei sich führe.

## 5 近現代フランス哲学

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Adorno remarked that for traditional aesthetics “the ugly is that element that opposes the [art]work’s ruling law of form,” adding that “the impression of ugliness stems from the principle of violence and destruction.” Hanslick, coming at the end of a line stretching back to Plato and Aristotle, locates beauty in purposeful order, from which pleasure derives. The deformed, like the unformed, was philosophically, and maybe even socially and culturally, intolerable, though Aristotle duly acknowledged that the ugly could be beautifully represented, a position that held sway for centuries thereafter. In this regard, Lessing, articulating the Greek’s seriousness of purpose in defense of beauty (which presumes formal coherence), noted that “the law of the Thebans commanded idealization in art and threatened digression toward ugliness with punishment.”

During the Renaissance the terms ugly and grotesque were synonymous, and both terms were commonly used as descriptors not

only for deformed objects but also and more importantly for people, those for whom today the term Other is often applied: the poor and downtrodden, ethnic and racial minorities, and the like: in short, the lower social orders, and the colonized. The eighteenth-century English term for those *not* Others was the Quality; accordingly, the Others in essence were the Non-Quality. In the end, the metaphors associated with beauty and ugliness boiled down to the linguistic imagery of economics: *worth*, broadly defined and broadly applied.

All this notwithstanding, the long dominance of form as the foundation for assessing beauty or ugliness was challenged in the course of the eighteenth century and thereafter, in part on the unfolding principle that aesthetic value could not adequately be decided on formal grounds alone.

The importance of beauty, it must be noted, locates its long philosophical history not only in perceived paradigms of Truth and the Ideal but also in the presumed actuality of so much in and about life that was not beautiful and hence ugly. Ugly, we might say, was the default standard; beauty was the exception.

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German Aesthetics : fundamental concepts from Baumgarten to Adorno, Bloomsbury Academic US, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Inc.

One way of linking justice with conceptions of the good holds that principles of justice derive their moral force from values commonly espoused or widely shared in a particular community or tradition. This way of linking justice and the good is communitarian in the sense that the values of the community define what counts as just or unjust. On this view, the case for recognizing a right depends on showing that such a right is implicit in the shared understandings that inform the tradition or community in question. There can be disagreement, of course, about what rights the shared understandings of a particular tradition actually support; social critics and political reformers can interpret traditions in ways that challenge prevailing practices. But these arguments always take the form of recalling a community to itself, of appealing to ideals implicit but unrealized in a common project or tradition.

A second way of linking justice with conceptions of the good holds that principles of justice depend for their justification on the moral worth or intrinsic good of the ends they serve. On this view, the case for recognizing a right depends on showing that it honors or advances some important human good. Whether this good happens to be widely prized or implicit in the traditions of the community would not be decisive. The second way of tying justice to conceptions of the good is therefore not, strictly speaking, communitarian. Since it rests the case for rights on the moral importance of the purposes or ends rights promote, it is better described as teleological, or (in the jargon of contemporary philosophy) perfectionist. Aristotle's political theory is an example: Before we can define people's rights or investigate 'the nature of the ideal constitution', he writes, 'it is necessary for us first to determine the nature of the most desirable way of life. As long as that remains obscure, the nature of the ideal constitution must also remain obscure.'

Of the two ways of linking justice to conceptions of the good, the first is insufficient. The mere fact that certain practices are sanctioned by the traditions of a particular community is not enough to make them just. To make justice the creature of convention is to deprive it of its critical character, even if allowance is made for competing interpretations of what the relevant tradition requires. Arguments about justice and rights have an unavoidably judgmental aspect. Liberals who think the case for rights should be neutral toward substantive moral and religious doctrines and communitarians who think rights should rest on prevailing social values make a similar mistake; both try to avoid passing judgment on the content of the ends that rights promote. But these are not the only alternatives. A third possibility, more plausible in my view, is that rights depend for their justification on the moral importance of the ends they serve.

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哲学

総 点

———ここから記入すること———

専攻する分野： 古代哲学／中世哲学／英米哲学／ドイツ哲学／フランス哲学／美学／現代倫理学・応用倫理学  
研究のために主として参照する一次文献の言語： ギリシア語／ラテン語／英語／ドイツ語／フランス語  
選択した問題の番号(        )

下線部の訳

課題文全体の論旨をふまえて自由に論じる

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