

2023 年度
【博士後期課程】

早稲田大学大学院文学研究科
専門科目 哲学 コース

入学試験問題
※解答は別紙 (横) 縦 書)

以下の七問（1～7）の中から自分の専攻する分野の問題を一問選び、下線部を和訳したうえで（下線部が複数ある場合はそのすべてを和訳したうえで）、その課題文全体の論旨を踏まえて自由に論じなさい。

（解答用紙にある「専攻する分野」および「研究のために主として参照する一次文献の言語」の欄は、該当するものを一つ選び丸で囲むこと。また、選択した問題の番号を明記すること。）

1 古代

τὰ μὲν ἅλλα παντός μοῖραν μετέχει, νοῦς δέ ἐστιν ἄπειρον καὶ αὐτοκρατὴς καὶ μέμικται οὐδενὶ χρήματι, ἀλλὰ μόνος αὐτός ἐπ' ἑωυτοῦ ἐστιν. εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἦν, ἀλλὰ τεωρὶ ἐμέμικτο ἄλλῳ, μετέιχεν ἂν ἀπάντων χρημάτων, εἰ ἐμέμικτό τεωρὶ. For in everything there is a portion of everything, as has been said by me in what goes before, and the things mixed with it would hinder it, so that it would have power over nothing in the same way that it has now being alone by itself. For it is the thinnest of all things and the purest, and it has all knowledge about everything and the greatest strength; and Nous has power over all things, both greater and smaller, that have life. And Nous had power over the whole revolution, so that it began to revolve in the beginning. And it began to revolve first from a small beginning; but the revolution now extends over a larger space, and will extend over a larger still. And all the things that are mingled together and separated off and distinguished are all known by Nous. And Nous set in order all things that were to be, and all things that were and are not now and that are, and this revolution in which now revolve the stars and the sun and the moon, and the air and the aether that are separated off. And this revolution caused the separating off, and the rare is separated off from the dense, the warm from the cold, the light from the dark, and the dry from the moist. And there are many portions in many things. But no thing is altogether separated off nor distinguished from anything else except Nous. And all Nous is alike, both the greater and the smaller; while nothing else is like anything else, but each single thing is and was most manifestly those things of which it has most in it.

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est cum de virtutibus in communi ageretur, *virtus est quae bonum facit habentem et opus eius bonum reddit*. Bonum autem potest dici dupliciter: uno modo, materialiter, pro eo quod est bonum; alio modo, formaliter, secundum rationem boni. Bonum autem, inquantum huiusmodi, est obiectum appetitivae virtutis. Et ideo si qui habitus sunt qui faciant rectam considerationem rationis non habito respectu ad rectitudinem appetitus, minus habent de ratione virtutis, tanquam ordinantes ad bonum materialiter, idest ad id quod est bonum non sub ratione boni: plus autem habent de ratione virtutis habitus illi qui respiciunt rectitudinem appetitus, quia respiciunt bonum non solum materialiter, sed etiam formaliter, idest id quod est bonum sub ratione boni. Ad prudentiam autem pertinet, sicut dictum est, applicatio rectae rationis ad opus, quod non fit sine appetitu recto. Et ideo prudentia non solum habet rationem virtutis quam habent aliae virtutes intellectuales; sed etiam habet rationem virtutis quam habent virtutes morales, quibus etiam connumeratur.

3 近現代英米哲学

※この部分は、著作権の関係により掲載できません。

Die philosophische Betrachtung der Inhalte des mythischen Bewußtseins und die Versuche einer theoretischen Erfassung und Deutung dieser Inhalte gehen bis in die ersten Anfänge der wissenschaftlichen Philosophie zurück. Früher als den anderen großen Kulturgebieten wendet sich die Philosophie dem Mythos und seinen Gebilden zu. Das ist geschichtlich und systematisch verständlich: denn in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem mythischen Denken erst gelingt es der Philosophie, zu der scharfen Fassung ihres eigenen Begriffs und zum klaren Bewußtsein über ihre eigene Aufgabe vorzudringen. Die Philosophie sieht sich überall, wo sie sich als theoretische Weltbetrachtung und Welterklärung zu konstituieren sucht, nicht sowohl der unmittelbaren Erscheinungswirklichkeit selbst als vielmehr der mythischen Auffassung und Umprägung dieser Wirklichkeit gegenübergestellt. Sie findet die „Natur“ nicht in derjenigen Gestaltung vor, die ihr später – nicht ohne entscheidende Mitwirkung der philosophischen Reflexion selbst – durch das entwickelte und ausgebildete Erfahrungsbewußtsein gegeben wird, sondern alle Gestalten des Daseins erscheinen zunächst wie eingehüllt in die Atmosphäre des mythischen Denkens und der mythischen Phantasie. Erst durch sie erhalten sie ihre Form und Farbe, erhalten sie ihre spezifische Bestimmtheit. Lange bevor die Welt dem Bewußtsein als ein Ganzes empirischer „Dinge“ und als ein Komplex empirischer „Eigenschaften“ gegeben ist, ist sie ihm als ein Ganzes mythischer Kräfte und Wirkungen gegeben. Und von diesem seinem geistigen Urgrund und Mutterboden vermag auch die philosophische Ansicht und die eigentümliche philosophische Blickrichtung den Weltbegriff nicht unmittelbar abzulösen. Die Anfänge des philosophischen Denkens bewahren noch auf lange Zeit hinaus eine mittlere, eine gleichsam unentschiedene Stellung zwischen der mythischen und der eigentlich philosophischen Fassung des Ursprungsproblems.

Nous dirons en conséquence que l'image est un acte qui vise dans sa corporéité un objet absent ou inexistant, à travers un contenu physique ou psychique qui ne se donne pas en propre, mais à titre de « représentant analogique » de l'objet visé. Les spécifications se feront d'après la matière, puisque l'intention informatrice reste identique. Nous distinguerons donc les images dont la matière est empruntée au monde des choses (images d'illustration, photos, caricatures, imitations d'acteurs, etc.) et celles dont la matière est empruntée au monde mentale (conscience de mouvements, sentiments, etc.). Il existe des types intermédiaires qui nous présentent des synthèses d'éléments extérieurs et d'éléments psychiques, comme lorsqu'on voit un visage dans la flamme, dans les arabesques d'une tapisserie, ou dans le cas des images hypnagogiques (*), que l'on construit, nous le verrons, sur la base de lueurs entoptiques (**).

On ne saurait étudier à part l'image mentale. Il n'y a pas un monde des images et un monde des objets. Mais tout objet, qu'il soit présenté par la perception extérieure ou qu'il apparaisse au sens intime, est susceptible de fonctionner comme réalité présente ou comme image, selon le centre de référence qui a été choisi. Les deux mondes, l'imaginaire et le réel, sont constitués par les mêmes objets ; seuls le groupement et l'interprétation de ces objets varient. Ce qui définit le monde imaginaire comme l'univers réel, c'est une attitude de la conscience.

* hypnagogiques : 入眠時の

** lueurs entoptiques : 眼球の圧迫など光以外の刺激で起こる光感

※WEB掲載に際し、以下のとおり出典を追記しております：
Jean-Paul Sartre, *L'imaginaire : Psychologie phénoménologique de l'imagination*.
Folio Essais. © Éditions Gallimard. www.gallimard.fr

Kant's endeavor rests upon an essential presupposition. He assumes that aesthetic experience is an experience of the beautiful, and is thus one of *taste*. Taste, in turn, is to be understood as a *capacity for judgment*. Taste is a sensible capacity for judgment that rests immediately upon perception, has a valuing character, and entails a demand for validity that reaches beyond momentary inclinations. In taste, then, individual preference unites with knowledge of what is distinguishable in its diversity and, on the basis of this joining, connects with bindingness. Possessing taste thereby becomes a social ideal; the person to whom one accords taste with regard to lifestyle—furnishings, clothing, manners—enjoys recognition and authority. Kant takes up this ensemble of determinations in order to make something entirely different out of it: a determination of the possibility of judgments concerning the beautiful that accounts for their singularity.

In this sense, Kant is the first to emphasize the *disinterestedness* of the aesthetic judgment. Whoever finds something beautiful is not interested in the increase of their own well-being and also does not see it under the guise of utility or general desirability. The beautiful is neither something pleasant nor something good. It deserves neither affinity nor respect, but only favor, which means: The beautiful is viewed *benevolently*; one enjoys it without this enjoyment uniting with the notion of appropriation or the notion that the beautiful object should exist. One grants it its existence.

Since the aesthetic judgment is disinterested, it can also not be founded upon any sensation. It is "independent of stimulus and affect" (B 38, 223); one is neither stimulated nor induced into inner motion by the beautiful as such. That which is likeable about it is that it gives an occasion for *reflection*. The judgment that something is beautiful is cashed out in reflection, and accordingly the taste for the beautiful is a "reflective taste" (B 22, 214). It may be that something stimulates or induces inner motion, and at the same time gives occasion for reflection. If one follows Kant, however, only the latter is a confirmation of the thing's beauty. The other aspects merely go along with the experience of beauty and contribute to making it more opaque.

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The widely used *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* gives three meanings for the word "euthanasia": the first, "a quiet and easy death"; the second, "the means of procuring this"; and the third, "the action of inducing a quiet and easy death." It is a curious fact that no one of the three gives an adequate definition of the word as it is usually understood. For "euthanasia" means much more than a quiet and easy death, or the means of procuring it, or the action of inducing it. The definition specifies only the manner of the death, and if this were all that was implied a murderer, careful to drug his victim, could claim that his act was an act of euthanasia. We find this ridiculous because we take it for granted that in euthanasia it is death itself, not just the manner of death, that must be kind to the one who dies.

To see how important it is that "euthanasia" should not be used as the dictionary definition allows it to be used, merely to signify that a death was quiet and easy, one has only to remember that Hitler's "euthanasia" program traded on this ambiguity. Under this program, planned before the War but brought into full operation by a decree of 1 September 1939, some 275,000 people were gassed in centers which were to be a model for those in which Jews were later exterminated. Anyone in a state institution could be sent to the gas chambers if it was considered that he could not be "rehabilitated" for useful work. As Dr. Leo Alexander reports, relying on the testimony of a neuropathologist who received 500 brains from one of the killing centers,

In Germany the exterminations included the mentally defective, psychotics (particularly schizophrenics), epileptics and patients suffering from infirmities of old age and from various organic neurological disorders such as infantile paralysis, Parkinsonism, multiple sclerosis and brain tumors. . . . In truth, all those unable to work and considered nonrehabilitable were killed.¹

These people were killed because they were "useless" and "a burden on society"; only the manner of their deaths could be thought of as relatively easy and quiet.

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哲学

総 点



——ここから記入すること——

専攻する分野	古代哲学／中世哲学／英米哲学／ドイツ哲学／フランス哲学／美学／現代倫理学・応用倫理学
研究のために主として参照する一次文献の言語	ギリシア語／ラテン語／英語／ドイツ語／フランス語
選択した問題の番号（ ）	

下線部の訳

課題文全体の論旨を踏まえて自由に論じる

[illegible]

(裏へ続く)

———これより先の余白には絶対に記入しないこと———