2022年度　早稲田大学大学院文学研究科　入学試験問題
【博士後期課程】　専門科目　哲学　コース　※解答は別紙（横　書）

以下の六問（１～７）の中から自分の専攻する分野の問題を一問選び、下線部を和訳したうえで（下線部が複数ある場合はそのすべてを和訳したうえで）、その課題文全体の論旨を踏まえて自由に論じなさい。
（解答用紙にある「専攻する分野」および「研究のために主として参照する一次文献の言語」の欄は、該当するものを一つ選び丸で囲むこと。また、選択した問題の番号を明記すること。）

１　古代

Well, you have delivered yourself of a very important doctrine about knowledge; it is indeed the opinion of Protagoras, τρόπον δέ τινα ἄλλον εἴρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα, φησὶ γάρ που "πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον" ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, "τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν":—You have read him?

O yes, again and again.

Does he not say that things are to you such as they appear to you, and to me such as they appear to me, and that you and I are men?

Yes, he says so.

A wise man is not likely to talk nonsense. Let us try to understand him: the same wind is blowing, and yet one of us may be cold and the other not, or one may be slightly and the other very cold?

Quite true.

Now is the wind, regarded not in relation to us but absolutely, cold or not; or are we to say, with Protagoras, that the wind is cold to him who is cold, and not to him who is not?

I suppose the last.

Then it must appear so to each of them?

Yes.

And "appears to him" means the same as "he perceives."

True.

Then appearing and perceiving coincide in the case of hot and cold, and in similar instances; for things appear, or may be supposed to be, to each one such as he perceives them?

Yes.

Then perception is always of existence, and being the same as knowledge is unerring?

Clearly.

In the name of the Graces, what an almighty wise man Protagoras must have been! He spoke these things in a parable to the common herd, like you and me, but told the truth, his Truth, in secret to his own disciples.

What do you mean, Socrates?

I am about to speak of a high argument, in which all things are said to be relative; you cannot rightly call anything by any name, such as great or small, heavy or light, for the great will be small and the heavy light—there is no single thing or quality, but out of motion and change and admixture all things are becoming relatively to one another, which "becoming" is by us incorrectly called being, but is really becoming, for nothing ever is, but all things are becoming.

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e., that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another.

Si ergo id a quo movetur, moveatur, oportet et ipsum ab alio moveri et illud ab alio. Hic autem non est procedere in infinitum, quia sic non esset aliquod primum movens, et per consequens nec aliquod aliud movens, quia moventia secunda non movent nisi per hoc quod sunt mota a primo movente, sicut baculus non movet nisi per hoc quod est motus a manu.

Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

... it is the very fact that the classic texts are concerned with their own quite alien problems, and not the presumption that they are somehow concerned with our own problems as well, which seems to me to give not the lie but the key to the indispensable value of studying the history of ideas. The classic texts, especially in social, ethical, and political thought, help to reveal – if we let them – not the essential sameness, but rather the essential variety of viable moral assumptions and political commitments. It is in this, moreover, that their essential philosophical, even moral, value can be seen to lie. There is a tendency (sometimes explicitly urged, as by Hegel, as a mode of proceeding) to suppose that the best, not merely the inescapable, point of vantage from which to survey the ideas of the past must be that of our present situation, because it is by definition the most highly evolved. Such a claim cannot survive a recognition of the fact that historical differences over fundamental issues may reflect differences of intention and convention rather than anything like a competition over a community of values, let alone anything like an evolving perception of the Absolute. To recognize, moreover, that our own society is no different from any other in having its own local beliefs and arrangements of social and political life is already to have reached a quite different and, I should wish to argue, a very much more salutary point of vantage. A knowledge of the history of such ideas can then serve to show the extent to which those features of our own arrangements which we may be disposed to accept as traditional or even "timeless" truths may in fact be the merest contingencies of our peculiar history and social structure. To discover from the history of thought that there are in fact no such timeless concepts, but only the various different concepts which have gone with various different societies, is to discover a general truth not merely about the past but about ourselves as well. Furthermore, it is a commonplace – we are all Marxists to this extent – that our own society places unrecognized constraints upon our imaginations. It deserves, then, to become a commonplace that the historical study of the ideas of other societies should be undertaken as the indispensable and the irreplacable means of placing limits on those constraints. The allegation that the history of ideas consists of nothing more than "outworn metaphysical notions," which is frequently advanced at the moment, with terrifying parochialism, as a reason for ignoring such a history, would then come to be seen as the very reason for regarding such histories as indispensably "relevant," not because crude "lessons" can be picked out of them, but because the history itself provides a lesson in self-knowledge. To demand from the history of thought a solution to our own immediate problems is thus to commit not merely a methodological fallacy, but something like a moral error. But to learn from the past – and we cannot otherwise learn it at all – the distinction between what is necessary and what is the product merely of our own contingent arrangements, is to learn the key to self-awareness itself.

Der Kampf, den ein jeder moralisch wohlgesinnter Mensch, unter der Anführung des guten Prinzips gegen die Anfechtungen des bösen, in diesem Leben bestehen muß, kann ihm, wie sehr er sich auch bemüht, doch keinen größeren Vorteil verschaffen, als die Befreiung von der Herrschaft des letzteren. Daß er frei, daß er »der Knechtschaft unter dem Sündengesetz entschlagen wird, um der Gerechtigkeit zu leben«, das ist der höchste Gewinn, den er erringen kann. Den Angriffen des letzteren bleibt er nichts destoweniger noch immer ausgesetzt; und seine Freiheit, die beständig angefochten wird, zu behaupten, muß er forthin immer zum Kampfe gerüstet bleiben.

In diesem gefahrvollen Zustande ist der Mensch gleichwohl durch seine eigene Schuld, folglich ist er verbunden, so viel er vermag, wenigstens Kraft anzuwenden, um sich aus demselben herauszuarbeiten. Wie aber? das ist die Frage. – Wenn er sich nach den Ursachen und Umständen umsieht, die ihm diese Gefahr zuziehen und darin erhalten, so kann er sich leicht überzeugen, daß sie ihm nicht sowohl von seiner eigenen rohen Natur, sofern er abgesondert da ist, sondern von Menschen kommen, mit denen er in Verhältnis oder Verbindung steht. Nicht durch die Anreize der ersteren werden die eigentlich so zu benennenden Leidenschaften in ihm rege, welche so große Verheerungen in seiner ursprünglich guten Anlage anrichten. Seine Bedürfnisse sind nur klein, und sein Gemütszustand in Besorgung derselben gemäßigt und ruhig. Er ist nur arm (oder hält sich dafür), sofern er besorgt, daß ihn andere Menschen dafür halten und darüber verachten möchten.

5　フランス哲学

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Among the abilities of the mind that form the Kantian faculties (*Vermögen*), the power of judgment (*Urteilskraft*) is a faculty of a very peculiar kind. In the First Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant writes that the power of judgment "is of such a special kind that it produces for itself no knowledge whatsoever, neither theoretical nor practical . . . but merely constitutes the union [*Verband*] of the two other higher cognitive powers, the understanding and the reason." Its "function is simply to join [*nur zum Verknüpfen dient*] the two" higher powers, and thus judgment is "in no wise [an] independent cognitive capacity" but one whose role is merely to "mediate between the two other faculties." From the very start, then, it would seem that, however important its function may be, the power of judgment is marked by a certain self-effacement, a subservience and a lack of independence. Now, insofar as the faculty is one of determining judgment—which holds "the capacity for *subsumption of the particular under the universal*"—no delineation could be more obvious: "it is merely a power of subsuming under concepts given from elsewhere." But what about judgment in its reflective mode? Indeed, it is this latter kind of judgment that the critical investigation of the power of judgment takes up in the Third Critique. Characteristically, Kant qualifies reflective judgment in telling terms as "merely" reflective judgment. Unlike determining judgment, this judgment has seemingly no cognitive contribution to make, and Kant's qualification would appear to deprive it of any autonomy whatsoever.

A glance at how Kant distinguishes the two kinds of judgment would seem only to confirm reflective judgment's secondary status. In the First Introduction to the Third Critique, we read: "The judgment can be regarded either as a mere capacity for *reflecting* on a given representation according to a certain principle, to produce a possible concept, or as a capacity for *making determinate* a basic concept by means of a given empirical representation. In the first case it is the *reflective*, in the second the *determining* judgment." [· · · · · ·]

Compared to determining (or determinant) judgment, which receives its law from the concepts that are given to it elsewhere and which accordingly subsumes the particular, the power of judgment called *merely* reflective has nothing definite to offer to the cognitive faculties, and thus appears to be an even less autonomous judgment. It is nothing more than a reflecting power, and seems to be doubly deprived of autonomy, in that it is not an independent cognitive capacity and even lacks the power of determining judgments to yield knowledge under the guidance of the understanding. Such "merely reflective" judgments, which include aesthetic and teleological judgments, would thus border on the insignificant. In consequence of such a reading, teleological judgment has more often than not received short shrift or been regarded as complete nonsense, and aesthetic judgment has been viewed by many of Kant's commentators as a contemplative, self-sufficient, or aestheticist approach to a domain characterized as disinterested, disengaged, nonserious, inconsequential, and merely playful—that is, the domain of art.

Those who have shown unreserved enthusiasm for the use of advance directives have perhaps made the following assumption: if, as the courts and most bioethicists now agree, the competent individual has a virtually unlimited right to refuse treatment, even life-sustaining treatment, then the same choice ought to be respected when a competent individual makes it concerning a future decision situation through the use of an advance directive.

I have argued elsewhere that this assumption is dubious because it overlooks several morally significant asymmetries between the contemporaneous choice of a competent individual and the issuance of an advance directive to cover future decisions.[2] For example, even if at the time an advance directive was issued an individual was well informed about the options available should she develop a particular disease or be in a certain condition, therapeutic options and hence prognosis may change between the time the directive was issued and the time at which it is to be implemented. A second morally relevant difference is that the assumption that a competent person is the best judge of her own interests is weakened in the case of a choice about future contingencies under conditions in which those interests have changed in radical and unforeseen ways.

A third and equally significant asymmetry is that important informal safeguards that tend to restrain imprudent or unreasonable contemporaneous choices are not likely to be present, or if present, to be as effective, in the case of an advance directive. If a competent patient refuses life-sustaining treatment, those responsible for her care can and often do urge the patient to reconsider her choice, and in some cases this can prevent a precipitous and disastrous decision. This safeguard, if it occurs at all, is unlikely to come into play as forcefully during the process of drawing up an advance directive. For when the decision to forgo life-sustaining treatment is a remote and abstract possibility it is less likely to elicit the same protective responses that are provoked in family members and health care professionals when they are actually confronted with a human being who they believe can lead a meaningful life but who chooses to die.

Once these three asymmetries are appreciated, it should be clear that even if the competent patient has a virtually unlimited right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, it does not immediately follow that a refusal of life-support ought always to be respected if it is expressed in an advance directive. After more complex argumentation, however, we might well conclude that in spite of these asymmetries the law ought to regard valid advance directives as having the same force as a competent patient's contemporaneous choice. For we might be persuaded that attempts to limit the authority of advance directives would in practice lead to their being ignored by paternalistic physicians or families, thus robbing them of their value. The well-documented persistence of unjustified paternalistic behavior by physicians indicates that this is a significant danger.[3]

受験番号	
氏名	カナ
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漢字氏名がない場合は、ひらがなで記入すること。

哲　学

総　　点

――――ここから記入すること――――

専攻する分野　　古代哲学／中世哲学／英米哲学／ドイツ哲学／フランス哲学／美学／現代倫理学・応用倫理学 研究のために主として参照する一次文献の言語　　ギリシア語／ラテン語／英語／ドイツ語／フランス語
選択した問題の番号（　　）

下線部の訳

課題文全体の論旨を踏まえて自由に論じる

（裏へ続く）

———これより先の余白には絶対に記入しないこと———