

資料解読

以下の[A]～[I]の資料解読問題のうちから、1題をえらび、その設問に答えよ。

問題[A]

以下のフランス語を日本語に全訳せよ。

Et l'on arrive à la grande question : notre vie a-t-elle un sens ? Quel est-il ? Quelle est la place de l'homme sur la terre ? On voit tout de suite pourquoi les objets balzaciens étaient si rassurants : ils appartenaient à un monde dont l'homme était le maître ; ces objets étaient des biens, des propriétés, qu'il ne s'agissait que de posséder, de conserver ou d'acquérir. Il y avait une constante identité entre ces objets et leur propriétaire : un simple gilet, c'était déjà un caractère, et une position sociale en même temps. L'homme était la raison de toute chose, la clef de l'univers, et son maître naturel, de droit divin...

Il ne reste plus grand-chose, aujourd'hui, de tout cela. Pendant que la classe bourgeoise perdait peu à peu ses justifications et ses prérogatives, la pensée abandonnait ses fondements essentialistes, la phénoménologie occupait progressivement tout le champ des recherches philosophiques, les sciences physiques découvraient le règne du discontinu, la psychologie elle-même, subissait de façon parallèle une transformation aussi totale.

Les significations du monde, autour de nous, ne sont plus que partielles, provisoires, contradictoires même, et toujours contestées. Comment l'œuvre d'art pourrait-elle prétendre illustrer une signification connue d'avance, quelle qu'elle soit ? Le roman moderne, comme nous le disions en commençant, est une recherche, mais une recherche qui crée elle-même ses propres significations, au fur et à mesure. La réalité a-t-elle un sens ? L'artiste contemporain ne peut répondre à cette question : il n'en sait rien. Tout ce qu'il peut dire, c'est que cette réalité aura peut-être un sens après son passage, c'est-à-dire l'œuvre une fois menée à son terme.

問題[B]

以下の英文を和訳しなさい。

Working from the definition of humans as speaking beings, Jacques Lacan postulates that we are subject to an all-invading imperative voice that is not broken up by syntax, and that cannot be ascribed to an identifiable source. This is illustrated by the impossibility of closing one's ears, contrary to one's eyes. By contrast, to speak is to create a breach in this voice, allowing subjectivity to manifest itself, albeit by seemingly banal repetition: "I say it as I hear it." Such expression, however, never ceases to engender a "remainder" that is the cause of further saying. What comes to light thus is less a "subject" than a "speaking being" (*parlêtre*) who "ex-sists," in a Heideggerian term put to use by Lacan: an inaccessible part – absolute zero⁴ and ultimate silence – that will never be included within words. Were Beckett's radio plays to accentuate the reproduction of coherent, recognizable reality, they would smother this dimension. But insofar as they do not duplicate the familiar mechanisms of stage plays – they do not simply produce audible drama – they put to work the specific quality of the voice as ultimately belonging to silence. Indeed, listening to radio means being receptive to this dimension that inhabits utterances: to the way they resound against this silence. The breaks arising between phrases cause the auditor to perceive silence as being what drives the speaker to formulate his audible utterances, and the silence that ensues as the only response forthcoming, particularly in a play such as *Embers*, that makes extensive use of monologue. Rather than being able to restore continuity by leaning on the register of meaning, and mobilizing his own personal and internal reading voice, the auditor is surprised by a voice that is foreign to him, and whose rhythm escapes the fluidity afforded by purely intellectual comprehension. Moreover, in their use of technology, these radio plays present a marked contrast with present-day electronic media, which, conveying limitless quantities of information and invading every moment of our lives, propagate invasive and seemingly inescapable voices. Beckett introduces a breach in universal chattering, since his use of technology is at variance with this logic of total connectedness, leading us to examine more closely the nature of this artificial medium.

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問題[C]

以下の英文の下線部を日本語に訳しなさい。

We can distinguish between three major uses of images employed by the disciplines of visual studies and art history: images as mnemonics; examples; and illustrations. Images can be used to remind readers of images they may not be able to recall with sufficient detail, or that they may have seen but forgotten. In art history, one of the principal purposes of illustrations is to remind readers of artworks that they have, ideally, encountered in the original. For that purpose, it doesn't matter if the reproductions aren't the best quality, particularly in scholarly works published in academic journals or monographs. The assumption is that there can be no substitute for encountering the visual objects in the original, although it would also be acknowledged that meanings derived from those encounters are seldom useful for art history, or mentioned in art historical texts.

Art history, visual studies, and associated fields also use images as examples of concepts developed in the accompanying texts. This is especially true in texts where argument plays a large role: in art theory, for example, or in philosophy of art. In *The Order of Things* (1970), Michel Foucault analyzes Velazquez's *Las Meninas*, describing relationships between the elements inside and outside the picture, and geometric figures connecting the people in the painting with plausible beholders. This analysis is instrumental to the tracing of the coordinates of what Foucault calls "classical representation and the definition of the space it opens up to us." The example supports Foucault's wider argument about the ways to define orders in spaces of representation and knowledge and to describe the fundamental codes that "rule languages, schemes of perception, exchange, techniques, values and the hierarchy of practices" in different cultures.

Images of artworks are also sometimes used as examples in fiction and other forms of writing. For instance, in W. G. Sebald's novel *Die Ringe des Saturn* (1995, English translation *Rings of Saturn*, 1998), a Rembrandt painting is shown across a double spread, and then on the next page we're shown a detail, just as in an art history text.

In Sebald's narrative, the image serves as an example of the narrator's theory regarding truth, which is measured against the painter's skepticism of "Cartesian rigidity." Sebald is writing here in a didactic mode, so it is appropriate that he reproduces a detail on the following page to remind his readers of his argument. Elsewhere in *Rings of Saturn*, images are not repeated and the narrative seldom asks a reader to turn back, in the fashion of an academic treatise, and re-examine a detail. These pages, it seems, mimic scholarly writing to make a philosophic point.

There is distinction between *examples* and *illustrations* in this context: an example provides evidence or veracity to an argument; an illustration is an addition, an ornament, a conventional accompaniment. Images are often used as illustrations in more highly produced texts, such as "coffee table" books and large exhibition catalogues. In academic texts, images are more likely to be examples. When an image in an essay or a book is not required, either as an aid to the reader's memory or as a concrete instance of something argued in the text, then its purpose may be illustrative in this sense. Illustrations are not meant to jog reader's memories (as in mnemonic images), or be consulted during reading (as examples are), and they may only be cursorily cited in the text. An example of a text that uses images as illustrations is the art historian Simon Schama's (b. 1945) *The Embarrassment of Riches: An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age* (1987), which has over 300 reproductions, many intended to evoke a visual setting for the author's arguments.

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Visual Worlds: Looking, Images, Visual Disciplines, James Elkins;
Erna Fiorentini, Oxford University Press, 2020
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問題[D]

以下の英文資料を和訳せよ。

Each artist was invited to create his own contribution to this book, a situation which meant that the material presented would be either directly related to the actual work in the show, or independent of it. Therefore, this book is essentially an anthology and considered a necessary adjunct to the exhibition. Contrary to the McLuhan thesis, books are still a major communication system, and perhaps becoming even more important, given "the global village" that the world has become. After all *Time* magazine is available almost everywhere on Wednesday mornings.

The material presented by the artists is considerably varied, and also spirited, if not rebellious - which is not very surprising, considering the general social, political, and economic crises that are almost universal phenomena of 1970. If you are an artist in Brazil, you know of at least one friend who is being tortured; if you are one in Argentina, you probably have had a neighbor who has been in jail for having long hair, or for not being "dressed" properly; and if you are living in the United States, you may fear that you will be shot at, either in the universities, in your bed, or more formally in Indochina. It may seem too inappropriate, if not absurd, to get up in the morning, walk into a room, and apply dabs of paint from a little tube to a square of canvas. What can you as a young artist do that seems relevant and meaningful?

One necessity is, therefore, at least to move with the cultural stresses and preoccupations (as if you had a choice), particularly with the obvious changes in life style. The art cannot afford to be provincial, or to exist only within its own history, or to continue to be, perhaps, only a commentary on art. An alternative has been to extend the idea of art, to renew the definition, and to think beyond the traditional categories - painting, sculpture, drawing, printmaking, photography, film, theater, music, dance, and poetry. Such distinctions have become increasingly blurred. Many of the highly intellectual and serious young artists represented here have addressed themselves to the question of how to create an art that reaches out to an audience larger than that which has been interested in contemporary art in the last few decades. Their attempt to be poetic and imaginative, without being either aloof or condescending has led them into the communications areas that *INFORMATION* reflects.

Superficially considered, some might seem to be directly involved with dandyism and the "gesture," and while some are, others use these as approaches to more subtle, sophisticated, and profound ends. The activity of these artists is to think of concepts that are broader and more cerebral than the expected "product" of the studio. With the sense of mobility and change that pervades their time, they are interested in ways of rapidly exchanging ideas, rather than embalming the idea in an "object." However, the idea may reside on paper or film. The public is constantly bombarded with strong visual imagery, be it in the newspapers or periodicals, on television or in the cinema. An artist certainly cannot compete with a man on the moon in the living room. This has therefore created an ambiguous and ironic position for the artist, a dilemma as to what he can do with contemporary media that reach many more people than the art gallery.

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<http://www.moma.org>.

問題[E]

設問1 以下の英文資料を和訳せよ。

設問2 現代文化における media ecology の特徴について、各自の研究領域に即して述べよ。

By the 2010s, audiences might watch the ninja character Naruto in the anime series on tv while drinking Naruto soda and browsing the Naruto website or playing the online game on their phones. In the morning they could read the manga on the train and receive tweets generated by a Naruto kyara-bot while chatting with other fans online. Later they might be preparing to present a self-produced Naruto manga at a fan convention on the weekend, possibly in Naruto cosplay. What was once cinema now entered into a less localizable space of media woven into the fabric of everyday life.

To be sure, this is a transformation that affects all highly mediatized societies. On top of a bounded media text for consumption we find constellations of characters and worlds that are accessible via multiple, multidirectional engagements. We are embedded in these arrangements as much as they are entangled with and co-shape our quotidian rhythms. Such a relation is not entirely new—just as film has always entailed connections to other media—but increasingly obvious and consequential. Accordingly, models that assumed the transmission of a media text from an authorial or corporate center to the mass audience that reads the text are increasingly complemented by models that see not a media environment distinct from us but an ecology of media production, circulation, distribution, and redistribution that we are always already part of. Such models frame the relationship between us and media less as one of interactions between cleanly separable individuals and objects or systems than one of what Karen Barad terms intra-actions, actions within interlocked and interpenetrating, barely distinguishable entities or systems.³ A different economy, media epistemology, and ultimately a different mode of politics follow from such a perspective.

問題[F]

記憶の機能がどのようなものかについて論じた次の文章を訳しなさい。

Generally speaking, the study of memory concerns how remembering works; specifically, it concerns the phases of encoding, the storage and the retrieval of information. In fact, there is often the need for maintaining certain information in memory as, for example, a telephone number, a face, or a name. The APA Dictionary of Psychology defines memory as "the ability to retain information or a representation of past experience, based on the mental processes of learning or encoding". This definition of memory fits within the lines of research that have been most elaborated so far in the literature and corresponds to the subjective idea that we all have about memory. That is, it defines memory as the capacity to retain information over time, whether it be event-specific information, such as for episodes in our life, or less accessible but equally numerous and verifiable kinds of information, such as the concept of chair, the ability to recognize a chair, or the meaning of the word "chair" in our mother tongue.

However, the fact that by using memory we can remember information does not necessarily imply that the final purpose of memory is to remember. Surprisingly, this idea has several theoretical problems. The parallelism between mind and computer has often been used to disentangle the relationship between brain and cognition and has yielded remarkable success. The computer is a memory-and-processing machine, and, in the past, its capacity has often been used as an analogy for human memory. Yet a computer passively stores information and maintains it as it is; for a computer, lack of accuracy signals a breakdown and, in fact, almost never happens. In contrast, human memory, under normal conditions, makes a great number of "errors": it does not store information as it was perceived or processed but transforms it in order to maintain reduced, but more useful and updated, information. Human memory can remember with great accuracy, but this happens only under specific and rare circumstances. We will come back to this point

several times, but at this stage it is enough to bear in mind that human memory is a system that does not retrieve information as it was stored. Thus, human memory and computer memory are dramatically different. While the purpose of computer memory is to remember information as it was, the purpose of human memory is something else.

注：APA Dictionary of Psychology：アメリカ心理学会心理学大辞典

(Vecchi, Tomaso; Gatti, Daniele. 2020. "Memory as Prediction", MIT Press, pp.xi-xii.より。一部改変。)

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Vecchi, Tomaso, and Daniele Gatti., Memory as Prediction, p. 6,
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The MIT Press.

問題[G]

設問 以下の英文資料を日本語に訳しなさい。

The indexical argument no longer supplies the only way to approach Bazin's theory. Rather than assuming that the invocation of Peirce's concept of the index solves the question of film's relation to reality, I think we must now raise again the question that Bazin asked so passionately and subtly (even if he never answered definitively): what is cinema? What are cinema's effects and what range of aspects relates to its oft-cited (and just as variously defined) realistic nature? Given the historically specific nature of Bazin's arguments for cinematic realism as an aesthetic value (responding as he did to technical innovations such as deep focus cinematography and to new visual and narrative styles such as Italian Neorealism), it makes sense for a contemporary theory of cinematic realism to push beyond those aspects of cinematic realism highlighted by Bazin. Specifically, we need to ask in a contemporary technical and stylistic context: what are the bounds that cinema forges with the world it portrays? Are these limited to film's relation to photography? Is the photographic process the only aspect of cinema that can be thought of as indexical, especially if we think about the term more broadly than as just a trace or impression? If the claim that digital processing by its nature eliminates the indexical seems rather simplistic, one must nonetheless admit that computer-generated images (CGI) do not correspond directly to Bazin's description of the "luminous mold" that the still photograph supposedly depends on. But can these CGI images still be thought of as in some way indexical? In what way has the impression of reality been attenuated by new technology, and in what ways is it actually still functioning (or even intensified)? But setting aside the somewhat complex case of computer-generated special effects, is it not somewhat strange that photographic theories of the cinema have had such a hold on film theory that much of film theory must immediately add the caveat that they do not apply to animated film? Given that as a technical innovation cinema was first understood as "animated pictures" and that computer-generated animation techniques are now omnipresent in most feature films, shouldn't this lacuna disturb us? Rather than being absorbed in the larger categories of cultural studies or cognitive theory, shouldn't the classical issues of film theory be reopened? I will not attempt to answer all these questions in this essay, but I think they are relevant to the issues I will raise.

問題[H]

設問1 以下の英文資料の下線部1と下線部2を和訳しなさい。

設問2 現時点における immersive theatre の可能性と限界について見解を述べよ。

Immersive theatre is a loose term. It can describe practices that precede the currency of the immersive moniker, just as understandings of immersive theatre will probably — hopefully — continue to evolve as practitioners experiment with audience engagement. For that reason, you will not find a rigid definition of immersive theatre in this book. (1) What you will find are detailed examinations of common features of performances dubbed ‘immersive’ that focus on modes of productivity that are assigned to audiences in immersive settings, and to which audiences are invited to posit themselves as productive participants. You will find a narrative that seeks to identify what produces a sense of immersion, and what might frustrate an audience’s resourcing in the production of an immersive theatre aesthetic.

Theatre audiences who do not intervene directly in the action of performance are no more docile than pedestrians who are herded or amble between spaces in immersive theatre. To a certain extent, ‘productive participation’ is what audiences do in all theatre performances when they’re not sleeping, daydreaming or procrastinating (although some performances might still build on these activities). In ‘The Emancipated Spectator’ Jacques Rancière influentially critiques Bertolt Brecht’s and Antonin Artaud’s approaches to the engagement of theatre audiences to make a similar point, allowing his caricatured framing of each to stand in for twentieth-century theatre practice more generally. (2) Brecht described the audience’s ‘critical approach’ to theatre as ‘our great productive method’, and he designed and mobilized dramaturgic and aesthetic strategies to awaken this kind of audience productivity. And Artaud proposed ideas for staging proto-immersive theatre, as these ideas might be understood today, so as to ‘cruelly’

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Beyond Immersive Theatre, Adam Alston;
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jolt audiences out of docility; an important aim was to facilitate the audience's realization that fiction is not what they encounter within the ritual of theatre, but in the socio-culturally coded world outside of the theatre. For Rancière what these two paradigmatic conceptions of productivity overlook is the inherent productivity of reception. Audiences watch, listen, decode, cogitate, imagine, feel, hope and desire. These are all productive things to do in the sense that these actions produce meanings among a gathered audience of individual spectators, each 'refashioning' performance in their own way.

*出題にあたり、和訳に不必要と思われる原注は省いてある。

問題[I]

以下の英文の下線部を日本語に訳してください。

There could not have been a more fitting setting for Eric Schmidt to share his opinion on the future of the web than the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. In 2015, during a session at the winter playground for neoliberals—and increasingly surveillance capitalists—Schmidt was asked for his thoughts about the future of the internet. Sitting alongside his former Google colleagues Sheryl Sandberg and Marissa Mayer, he did not hesitate to share his belief that “The internet will disappear. There will be so many IP addresses . . . so many devices, sensors, things that you are wearing, things that you are interacting with, that you won’t even sense it. It will be part of your presence all the time. Imagine you walk into a room and the room is dynamic.”¹ The audience gasped in astonishment, and shortly thereafter, headlines around the world exploded in shock at the former Google CEO’s pronouncement that the end of the internet was at hand.

Schmidt was, in fact, merely paraphrasing computer scientist Mark Weiser’s seminal 1991 article, “The Computer for the 21st Century,” which has framed Silicon Valley’s technology objectives for nearly three decades. Weiser introduced what he called “ubiquitous computing” with two legendary sentences: “The most profound technologies are those that disappear. They weave themselves into the fabric of everyday life until they are indistinguishable from it.” He described a new way of thinking “that allows the computers themselves to vanish into the background. . . . Machines that fit the human environment instead of forcing humans to enter theirs will make using a computer as refreshing as taking a walk in the woods.”

Weiser understood that the virtual world could never be more than a shadow land no matter how much data it absorbs: “Virtual reality is only a map, not a territory. It excludes desks, offices, other people . . . weather, trees, walks, chance encounters and, in general, the infinite richness of the universe.” He wrote that virtual reality “simulates” the world rather than “invisibly enhancing the world that already exists.” In contrast, ubiquitous computing would infuse that real world with a universally networked apparatus of silent, “calm,” and voracious computing. Weiser refers to this apparatus as the new “computing environment” and delights in the possibilities of its limitless knowledge, such as knowing “the suit you looked at for a long time last week because it knows both of your locations, and it can retroactively find the designer’s name even though that information did not interest you at the time.”

Schmidt was not describing the end of the internet but rather its successful unshackling from dedicated devices such as the personal computer and the smartphone. For surveillance capitalists, this transition is not a choice. Surveillance profits awakened intense competition over the revenues that flow from new markets for future behavior. Even the most sophisticated process of converting behavioral surplus into products that accurately forecast the future is only as good as the raw material available for processing. Surveillance capitalists therefore must ask this: what forms of surplus enable the fabrication of prediction products that most reliably foretell the future? This question marks a critical turning point in the trial-and-error elaboration of surveillance capitalism. It crystallizes a second economic imperative—the prediction imperative—and reveals the intense pressure that it exerts on surveillance capitalist revenues.

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——これより先の余白には絶対に記入しないこと——