

以下の六問(1～6)の中から自分の専攻する分野の問題を一問選び、下線部を和訳したうえで、その課題文全体の論旨を踏まえて自由に論じなさい。

(解答用紙にある「専攻する分野」および「研究遂行のために主として使用する言語」の欄は、該当するものを一つ選び丸で囲むこと。また、選択した問題の番号を明記すること。)

1 古代

Such and so many are the notions, then, which we have about Wisdom and the wise. Now of these characteristics that of knowing all things must belong to him who has in the highest degree universal knowledge; for he knows in a sense all the instances that fall under the universal. And these things, the most universal, are on the whole the hardest for men to know; for they are farthest from the senses. And the most exact of the sciences are those which deal most with first principles; for those which involve fewer principles are more exact than those which involve additional principles, e.g. arithmetic than geometry. But the science which investigates causes is also instructive, in a higher degree, for the people who instruct us are those who tell the causes of each thing. τὸ δ' εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι αὐτῶν ἕνεκα μάλιστα ὑπάρχει τῇ τοῦ μάλιστα ἐπιστητοῦ ἐπιστήμῃ (ὁ γὰρ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι δι' αὐτὸ αἰρούμενος τὴν μάλιστα ἐπιστήμην μάλιστα αἰρήσεται, τοιαύτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ μάλιστα ἐπιστητοῦ), μάλιστα δ' ἐπιστητὰ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τὰ αἴτια, for by reason of these, and from these, all other things come to be known, and not these by means of the things subordinate to them. And the science which knows to what end each thing must be done is the most authoritative of the sciences, and more authoritative than any ancillary science; and this end is the good of that thing, and in general the supreme good in the whole of nature. Judged by all the tests we have mentioned, then, the name in question falls to the same science; this must be a science that investigates the first principles and causes; for the good, i.e. the end, is one of the causes.

I answer that, Univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an adequate result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner; as for example the sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms in all inferior things. In the same way, as said in the preceding article, all perfections existing in creatures divided and multiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly. Thus when any term expressing perfection is applied to a creature, it signifies that perfection distinct in idea from other perfections; as, for instance, by the term *wise* applied to man, we signify some perfection distinct from a man's essence, and distinct from his power and existence, and from all similar things; whereas when we apply it to God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence, or power, or existence. Thus also this term *wise* applied to man in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case when it is applied to God; but it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name. Hence it is evident that this term *wise* is not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same rule applies to other terms. Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures. Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense, as some have said. Because if that were so, it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about God at all; for the reasoning would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who proved many things about God, and also against what the Apostle says: *The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made* (Rom 1:20). Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, i.e., according to proportion.

Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things are proportionate to one, thus for example *healthy* predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body, of which the latter is the sign and the former the cause: or according as one thing is proportionate to another, thus *healthy* is said of medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in the animal body.

And in this way some things are said of God and creatures analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures. Et sic, quidquid dicitur de Deo et creaturis, dicitur secundum quod est aliquis ordo creaturae ad Deum, ut ad principium et causam, in qua praeexistunt excellenter omnes rerum perfectiones. Now this mode of community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one thing; thus *healthy* applied to urine signifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine signifies the cause of the same health.

Dieses dem Philosophen angemutete Anschauen seiner selbst im Vollziehen des Aktes, wodurch ihm das Ich entsteht, nenne ich intellektuelle Anschauung. Sie ist das unmittelbare Bewußtsein, daß ich handle, und was ich handle: sie ist das, wodurch ich etwas weiß, weil ich es tue. Daß es ein solches Vermögen der intellektuellen Anschauung gebe, läßt sich nicht durch Begriffe demonstrieren, noch, was es sei, aus Begriffen entwickeln. Jeder muß es unmittelbar in sich selbst finden, oder er wird es nie kennen lernen. Die Forderung, man solle es ihm durch Rasonnement nachweisen, ist noch um vieles wunderbarer, als die Forderung eines Blindgeborenen sein würde, daß man ihm, ohne daß er zu sehen brauche, erklären müsse, was die Farben seien.

Wohl aber läßt sich jedem in seiner von ihm selbst zugestandenen Erfahrung nachweisen, daß diese intellektuelle Anschauung in jedem Momente seines Bewußtseins vorkomme. Ich kann keinen Schritt tun, weder Hand noch Fuß bewegen, ohne die intellektuelle Anschauung meines Selbstbewußtseins in diesen Handlungen; nur durch diese Anschauung weiß ich, daß ich es tue, nur durch diese unterscheide ich mein Handeln und in demselben mich, von dem vorgefundenen Objekte des Handelns. Jeder, der sich eine Tätigkeit zuschreibt, beruft sich auf diese Anschauung. In ihr ist die Quelle des Lebens, und ohne sie ist der Tod.

Nun aber kommt diese Anschauung nie allein, als ein vollständiger Akt des Bewußtseins, vor; wie denn auch die sinnliche Anschauung nicht allein vorkommt, noch das Bewußtsein vollendet, sondern beide müssen begriffen werden. Nicht aber allein dies, sondern die intellektuelle Anschauung ist auch stets mit einer sinnlichen verknüpft. Ich kann mich nicht handelnd finden, ohne ein Objekt zu finden, auf welches ich handle, in einer sinnlichen Anschauung, welche begriffen wird; ohne ein Bild von dem, was ich hervorbringen will, zu entwerfen, welches gleichfalls begriffen wird. Wie weiß ich denn nun, was ich hervorbringen will, und wie könnte ich dies wissen, außer daß ich mir im Entwerfen des Zweckbegriffes, als einem Handeln, unmittelbar zusehe? — Nur dieser ganze Zustand in Vereinigung des angegebenen Mannigfaltigen vollendet das Bewußtsein. Nur der Begriffe, des vom Objekte, und des vom Zwecke, werde ich mir bewußt, nicht aber der beiden ihnen zum Grunde liegenden Anschauungen.

Buber a distingué la relation avec l'Objet qui serait guidée par la pratique de la relation dialogale qui atteint l'Autre comme Tu, comme partenaire et ami. Il prétend modestement avoir trouvé dans Feuerbach cette idée, centrale dans l'oeuvre de Buber. En réalité elle ne prend toute sa vigueur que dans les analyses où Buber les expose, et c'est là qu'elle apparaît comme une contribution essentielle à la pensée contemporaine. On peut se demander toutefois si le *tutoiement* ne place pas l'Autre dans une relation réciproque et si cette réciprocité est originelle. D'autre part la relation Je-Tu conserve chez Buber un caractère formel : elle peut unir l'homme aux choses autant que l'homme à l'homme. Le formalisme Je-Tu ne détermine aucune structure concrète. Je-Tu est événement (*Geschehen*), choc, compréhension mais ne permet pas de rendre compte (si ce n'est que comme d'une aberration, d'une chute ou d'une maladie) d'une vie autre que l'amitié : l'économie, la recherche du bonheur, la relation représentative avec les choses. Elles demeurent dans une espèce de spiritualisme dédaigneux, inexplorées et inexpliquées. Ce travail n'a pas la ridicule prétention de « corriger » Buber sur ces points. Il se place dans une perspective différente, en partant de l'idée de l'Infini.

La prétention de savoir et d'atteindre l'Autre, s'accomplit dans la relation avec autrui, laquelle se coule dans la relation du langage dont l'essentiel est l'interpellation, le vocatif. L'autre se maintient et se confirme dans son hétérogénéité aussitôt qu'on l'interpelle et fût-ce pour lui dire qu'on ne peut lui parler, pour le classer comme malade, pour lui annoncer sa condamnation à mort; en même temps que saisi, blessé, violenté, il est « respecté ». L'invoqué n'est pas ce que je comprends : *il n'est pas sous catégorie*. Il est celui à qui je parle il n'a qu'une référence à soi, il n'a pas de quiddité. Mais la structure formelle de l'interpellation doit être développée.

L'objet de la connaissance est toujours fait, déjà fait et dépassé. L'interpellé est appelé à la parole, sa parole consiste à « porter secours » à sa parole — à être présent. Ce présent n'est pas fait d'instant mystérieusement immobilisés dans la durée, mais d'une reprise *incessante* des instants qui s'écoulent par une présence qui leur porte secours, qui en répond. Cette incessance produit le présent, est la présentation, la vie du présent.

If one wishes to describe and grasp aesthetic experience, one should begin with Kant. He developed the prevailing determination of aesthetic experience, in part because he discovered its autonomy. Baumgarten's conception of a *cognitio sensitiva* may have lifted out the independent claim of a "beautiful knowledge," but this knowledge remains conditioned by sensibility and is thus a merely narrowed modification of actual knowledge that is conceived as purely conceptual. Kant, on the other hand, carefully delimits the experience of the beautiful from all other possibilities of affective relation, of perception and thinking, and presents it in its uniqueness.

Of course, Kant's leap beyond Baumgarten also has its irritating aspects. In the *Critique of Judgment*, he essentially takes aesthetic experience to be a process internal to consciousness. Thus one might doubt whether it really deals with experience and knowledge at all. Yet upon closer inspection, the process Kant describes is neither solipsistic nor autosuggestive. There is something toward which this process is directed, and accordingly one cannot rule out the possibility that Kant's conception of the aesthetic connects to experience and knowledge. It merely depends on what experience and knowledge are in this case. Perhaps Kant's inconsistent or maybe only alleged internalism of the aesthetic first offers the possibility of adequately grasping aesthetic experience and knowledge in their essence. Precisely this possibility could remain ruled out if one took one's bearings from a predetermined conception of experience and thus remained caught in a notion of the knowable or known object that is inadequate to aesthetics. As Kant does not exclude object-relations in the context of the aesthetic, one can speak of aesthetic experience—even if only in a sense that remains unclear. It is crucial, then, to understand aesthetic experience in its peculiar relation to objects.

Kant's endeavor rests upon an essential presupposition. He assumes that aesthetic experience is an experience of the beautiful, and is thus one of *taste*. Taste, in turn, is to be understood as a *capacity for judgment*. Taste is a sensible capacity for judgment that rests immediately upon perception, has a valuing character, and entails a demand for validity that reaches beyond momentary inclinations. In taste, then, individual preference unites with knowledge of what is distinguishable in its diversity and, on the basis of this joining, connects with bindingness. Possessing taste thereby becomes a social ideal; the person to whom one accords taste with regard to lifestyle—furnishings, clothing, manners—enjoys recognition and authority. Kant takes up this ensemble of determinations in order to make something entirely different out of it: a determination of the possibility of judgments concerning the beautiful that accounts for their singularity.

In this sense, Kant is the first to emphasize the *disinterestedness* of the aesthetic judgment. Whoever finds something beautiful is not interested in the increase of their own well-being and also does not see it under the guise of utility or general desirability. The beautiful is neither something pleasant nor something good. It deserves neither affinity nor respect, but only favor, which means: The beautiful is viewed benevolently; one enjoys it without this enjoyment uniting with the notion of appropriation or the notion that the beautiful object should exist. One grants it its existence.

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Günter Figal, Erscheinungsdinge - Ästhetik als Phänomenologie

Another venerable attempt to specify the principle of nonmaleficence appears in the rule of double effect (RDE), often called the principle or doctrine of double effect. This rule incorporates a very influential distinction between intended effects and merely foreseen effects.

Functions and conditions of the RDE. The RDE is invoked to justify claims that a single act having two foreseen effects, one good and one harmful (such as death), is not always morally prohibited. As an example of the use of the RDE, consider a patient experiencing terrible pain and suffering who asks a physician for help in ending his life. If the physician injects the patient with a chemical to end the patient's pain and suffering, he or she intentionally causes the patient's death as a means to end pain and suffering. In contrast, suppose the physician could provide medication to relieve the patient's pain and suffering at a substantial risk that the patient would die as a result of the medication. If the physician refuses to administer the medication, the patient will endure continuing pain and suffering; if the physician provides the medication, it may hasten the patient's death. If the physician intended, through the provision of medication, to relieve grave pain and suffering and did not intend to cause death, then the act of indirectly hastening death is not wrong, according to the RDE.

Classical formulations of the RDE identify four conditions or elements that must be satisfied for an act with a double effect to be justified. Each is a necessary condition, and together they form sufficient conditions of morally permissible action.²⁹

1. *The nature of the act.* The act must be good, or at least morally neutral, independent of its consequences.
2. *The agent's intention.* The agent intends only the good effect, not the bad effect. The bad effect can be foreseen, tolerated, and permitted, but it must not be intended.
3. *The distinction between means and effects.* The bad effect must not be a means to the good effect. If the good effect were the causal result of the bad effect, the agent would intend the bad effect in pursuit of the good effect.
4. *Proportionality between the good effect and the bad effect.* The good effect must outweigh the bad effect. That is, the bad effect is permissible only if a proportionate reason compensates for permitting the foreseen bad effect.

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