



# Reliability Challenges for High Performance Electronics in the Internet of Things Era

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# Outline

❑ **Today's electronics, and technological development till now.**

❑ **Reliability Challenges for today's electronics:**

➤ **↑ Vulnerability to transient faults (TFs) → soft errors (SEs)**

➤ **↑ Likelihood of Aging Phenomena (NBTI)**

❑ **Design Approaches for Reliable electronics.**

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❑ **Todays' electronics, and technological development till now.**

❑ **Reliability Challenges for today's electronics:**


➤ **↑ Vulnerability to transient faults (TFs) → soft errors (SEs)**

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
# Today's Electronics

- ❑ Continuous miniaturization of **microelectronic technology**  
→ **massive diffusion/presence of electronic devices**, possibly connected to each other through the **Internet (IoT)**.



# IoT, Big Data and Reliability

- ❑ Huge amount of electronic devices connected **through the Internet (IoT)** → huge amount of data to be stored (*Data Center/Cloud/Fog*), **processed** and **distributed again**.




*R. Mariani, "Making the Autonomous Dream Work", Intel Fellow, University of Bologna presentation, May 2018*

- ❑ Life's **decisions driven by such data** (autonomous drive, factory, transport, home, etc).

*But can we rely on these data? Is the electronic storing/processing them reliable?*

# Today's Electronic Technology



M. Bohr, "Continuing Moore's Law", Technology and Manufacturing Day, 19 September 2017

# Today's Electronic Technology (cont'd)

## □ How much small are 14nm?



Mark  
1.66 m



Fly  
7 mm




Mite  
300  $\mu\text{m}$



Blood Cell  
7  $\mu\text{m}$




Virus  
100 nm



Silicon Atom  
0.24 nm

14 nm  
Process




Very small

*M. Bohr, "14nm Process Technology: Opening New Horizons", Intel Developer Forum, 2014*




# Development of Electronic Technology

- ❑ The Moore law (1965) has driven the evolution of microelectronic technology and is driving its future developments.



*Courtesy of Intel Corporation  
Intel Techn. Journal, 2007*





# How Has It Been Possible to Follow the Moore's Law?

- ❑ **Architectural Changes:** multicore/many-core systems (since 2000)
- ❑ **Material Changes:** high-k gate insulator (since 2007)
- ❑ **Device Changes:** Tri-gate transistors (since 2011)


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❑ **Architectural Changes:** multicore/many-core systems (since 2000)


➤ **June 15, 2010:**

**Experimental microprocessor with 48-cores**

➤ **A trend that will continue**



<http://www.intel.com/pressroom/innovation>, June 15, 2010





*IEEE Computer Society 2022 Report, 2014*

*ISFCT2018, Waseda University, July 24th, 2018*

*Cecilia Metra*

# How Has It Been Possible To Follow the Moore Law? (cnt'd)

- ❑ **Material Changes:** high-k gate insulator (since 2007)
  - Intel 45nm dual-core, **Hafnium-based High-k Metal Gate** process.




*Intel Press Kit, November, 2007*



# How Has It Been Possible To Follow the Moore Law? (cnt'd)

## □ Hafnium-based High-k Metal Gate process advantages:



	High-k vs. SiO <sub>2</sub>	Benefit
Capacitance	60% greater	<i>Much faster transistors</i>
Gate dielectric leakage	> 100x reduction	<i>Far cooler</i>

*Intel's High-k/Metal Gate k/Metal Gate Announcement November 4th, 2003*


# How Has It Been Possible To Follow the Moore Law?(cnt'd)

❑ **Device Changes: Tri-gate transistors (since 2011):**

➤ **Tri-Gate Transistors → higher speed & lower  $I_{OFF}$  (→ low power consumption) [2002].**

✓ **Tri-Gate Transistors used in 22nm SRAM demonstrated in 2009**

✓ **Tri-Gate Transistors used in 22nm microprocessor demonstrated in April 2009**





*R. S. Chau, Technology @ Intel Magazine, August 2006*


# How Has It Been Possible To Follow the Moore Law? (cnt'd)

❑ Planar Transistor


❑ Tri-Gate Transistor



➤ 2 fins



➤ 3 fins



*Bohr, Mistry, "22nm Details\_Presentation", May 2011*


*ISFCT2018, Waseda University, July 24th, 2018*

*Cecilia Metra*




# How Has It Been Possible To Follow the Moore Law? (cnt'd)

## □ Higher Speed




## □ Reduced Leakage ( $I_{OFF}$ )



*Bohr, Mistry, "22nm Details\_Presentation", May 2011*

# How Has It Been Possible To Follow the Moore Law? (cnt'd)


- ❑ **Intel® Core™ M Processor**  
(announced on September 5<sup>th</sup>, 2014):
  - 14 nm, 2<sup>nd</sup> generation 3-gate transistor technology
  - 1.3 billion transistors
  - Compared to previous Intel Core processors
    - ❖ ↑ 50% performance
    - ❖ ↑ 40% graphic elaboration speed
    - ❖ ↑ 20% autonomy of charge



*Intel Developer Forum San Francisco 2014  
Cecilia Metra*

# How Has It Been Possible To Follow the Moore Law?(cnt'd)

## 2<sup>nd</sup> generation 3-gate transistors



*Intel Developer Forum San Francisco 2014*

- ❑ Closer fins → ↑ integration density
- ❑ Thinner and higher fins → ↑ performance
- ❑ Lower number of fins → ↑ integration density

*ISFCT2018, Waseda University, July 24th, 2018*


*Cecilia Metra*

# How Is It Possible To Follow the Moore Law?


❑ 10nm process using the 3<sup>rd</sup> generation of 3-gate transistors:

➤ 10 nm fins are approx. **25% taller** and approx. **25% more closely spaced** than 14nm


22nm



14nm




10nm



*M. Bohr, "Technology Leadership", Technology and Manufacturing Day, 19 September 2017*

# How Is It Possible To Follow the Moore Law?(cnt'd)

- ❑ **10 nm process:** compared to 14nm, **higher transistor density (2,7%)**, **higher performance (25%)**, and **lower power (45%)**



<https://newsroom.intel.com/newsroom/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2017/09/10-nm-icf-fact-sheet.pdf>

ISFCT2018, Waseda University, July 24th, 2018

Cecilia Metra

# How Is It Possible To Follow the Moore Law ? (cnt'd)

❑ **Intel Optane** – announced on March 19<sup>th</sup>, 2017, available since April 24<sup>th</sup>, 2017 (16GB, 32GB)

- **Intermediate solution** between DRAM and Flash memories
  - ❖ **DRAM** (faster than Flash, less dense than Flash and **volatile**)
  - ❖ **Flash** – used in current SSD (**non volatile**, denser than DRAM, slower than DRAM)



<https://newsroom.intel.com/news/intel-introduces-worlds-most-responsive-data-center-solid-state-drive/>

**non volatile + denser (10X) than DRAM and faster (1000X) than Flash**




Technology “*ideal for ...devices, applications, services...requiring fast access to large sets of data*”

(<http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/architecture-and-technology/intel-optane-technology.html>)



# How Is It Possible To Follow the Moore Law ? (cnt'd)

## ❑ Intel Optane— 3D Xpoint Technology:



<http://wccftech.com/intel-storage-roadmap-2017-optane-nand/>

- **Vertical stack (3D) of structures** composed by columns (cell, selector) → ↑ **density**
- Each cell can be written/read **changing only the voltage sent to the selector** → ↑ **speed**

# Reliability Challenges in the IoT Era

❑ Following the Moore law enabled to **↑ integration density**, **↑ complexity**, and **↑ performance**, to arrive to today's IoT, but also:


➤ **In the Field:**

❖ **↑ Vulnerability to Transient Faults (TFs) → Soft Errors (SEs)**

❖ **↑ Likelihood of ageing phenomena** (mainly Negative Bias Temperature Instability – **NBTI**)



*Reliability Challenges*



*Courtesy of Dr. Monica Alderighi, INAF (Italy)*

# Outline

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
➤ **↑ Likelihood of Aging Phenomena (NBTI)**

❑ **Design Approaches for Reliable electronics.**

# Reliability Challenges due to TFs and SEs

❑ **TFs and consequent SEs** may compromise **electronics' correct operation** in the field.

❑ **Example:** Unexpected and violent descent of **Quantas Flight 72** (Airbus A330-303) caused by particles **hitting the flight control computer** (October 2008)



*“In-flight upset, 154 km west of Learmonth, WA, 7 Oct. 2008, VH-QPA Airbus A330-303,” ATSB Transp. Safety Report - Aviation Occurrence Invest., AO-2008-070, pp. 1 – 313, Dec. 2011.*

# Transient Faults and Soft Errors



❑ Undesired voltage fast transition (*spike* or *glitch*) on a circuit node/line.

❑ They are generally by:

➤ **Alpha particles: atoms of He that lost the electrons, possibly generated by the radioactive decay of unstable isotopes (e.g.,  $^{232}\text{Th}$ ) present within the packages of electronic circuits**

➤ **Neutrons and protons originated by the collision of Galactic Cosmic Rays (GCRs) and atmosphere atoms (mainly Nitrogen and Oxygen)**

*R. Baumann, «Boron Compounds as a Dominant Source of Alpha Particles in Semiconductor Devices», in Proc. of IEEE Conf. on Reliability Physics Symposium, 1995.*




*J. F. Ziegler, "Terrestrial Cosmic Ray Intensities," IBM J. Res. Develop., Vol. 42(1), p. 125, Jan. 1998.*



# Transient Faults and Soft Errors (cnt'd)

- ❑ If the TF affects a **combinational circuit** and is propagated till the **input of a sampling element** → **possible output SE** → *Reliability Risks*
- ❑ This happens if the TF:
  - Is **not electrically filtered out** by the gates between **j** and **the FF input**
  - Is **not logically filtered out ( $m=1$ )** by the gates between **j** and **the FF input**




- Arrives to the FF input with a spike satisfying the FF's set-up and hold time conditions wrt the FF sampling instant



# Transient Faults and Soft Errors (cnt'd)

- ❑ If the TF affects a **memory element/cell** → **likely output SE**  
→ *Reliability Risks*
- ❑ For instance, if the TF hits **the internal node B** of a **standard latch** while **CK=0** (TG1 OFF, and TG2 ON) :
  - the **incorrect voltage value induced by the TF** on node B is **confirmed by the latch positive feedback loop** → **logic value of Q changed** → **SE**.



- There is **half of the CK period** during which TFs can give rise to output SEs → **more likely** than for **TFs affecting the latch input**

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➤ **↑ Likelihood of Aging Phenomena (NBTI)**

❑ **Design Approaches for Reliable electronics.**

# Aging Phenomena - NBTI

- ❑ **Negative-Bias Temperature-Instability (NBTI)** is the **most likely aging effect** for current, scaled down Integrated Circuits (ICs)
- ❑ **NBTI** causes an **increase** in the absolute value of the  $V_{th}$  of **pMOS transistors** → **IC's performance degradation** (> 20% in 10 years)



Signals on **time-critical data-paths** may violate **setup/hold times** of output flip-flops → generation of **incorrect outputs** → *Reliability Risks*

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❑ **Design Approaches for Reliable electronics.**

# Design Approaches for Reliable Electronics

- ❑ **Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT)** is successfully adopted to guarantee the **system's correct operation** despite the occurrence of **TFs and SEs** during the **in-field operation**.

- ❑ **Traditional HFT approaches:**




- ❑ Proper **aging monitors** can be connected to the inputs of **FFs at the output of time-critical data-paths** → early monitoring of delay effect due to **NBTI** → possible activation of **in-field compensation strategies** → **system's correct operation**.

# Example of Aging Monitors for NBTI

❑ Aging monitors connected to the inputs of the output FFs of time-critical data-paths ([1, 2]).

❑ Each aging monitor:



➤ Checks the **output** of the data-path  $C_i$  ( $S_i$ ) during a proper time guardband ( $T_M$ )

➤ Is enabled during  $T_M$  only, by a proper control signal ( $TWC$ ), which is = 1 only during  $T_M$

➤ Gives an output **alarm message** in case of late transitions of  $S_i$  during  $T_M$


[1] C. Metra, et al., "Self-Checking Monitor for NBTI Due Degradation", in Proc. of IEEE Int. Mixed-Signals, Sensors and Systems Test Workshop (IMS3TW), 2010

[2] C. Metra, et al., "Low Cost NBTI Degradation Detection & Masking Approaches", IEEE Transactions on Computers




# Example of Aging Monitors for NBTI (cnt'd)

❑ Case of **no late transition** of  $S_i$  while **TWC=1**



❑ Case of **late transitions** of  $S_i$  while **TWC=1**



❑  $(O_1, O_2) = (0,1)/(1,0) \rightarrow$   
**no alarm message**

❑  $(O_1, O_2) = (1,1) \text{ or } (0,0)$   
 **$\rightarrow$  alarm message**

# Example of Aging Monitors for NBTI (cnt'd)

❑ **Costs (area & power) of the monitor in [2] wrt those in [3, 4]:**

	Area (Sq)	$\Delta A$	Power ( $\mu W$ )	$\Delta P$
Our Monitor [2]	<b>60</b>	-	<b>12</b>	-
Monitor in [3]	<b>78</b>	<b>-23%</b>	<b>12.2</b>	<b>-1.6%</b>
Monitor in [4]	<b>62</b>	<b>-3.2%</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>-20%</b>

$$\Delta A(\%) = 100 \cdot \frac{A_{our} - A_{[3,4]}}{A_{[3,4]}} \quad \Delta P(\%) = 100 \cdot \frac{P_{our} - P_{[3,4]}}{P_{[3,4]}}$$


[2] C. Metra, et al., “Low Cost NBTI Degradation Detection & Masking Approaches”, *IEEE Transactions on Computers*

[3] M. Agarwal et al., “Optimized Circuit Failure Prediction for Aging: Practicality and Promise”, in *Proc. of IEEE Int. Test Conf.*, pp. 1-10, 2008.

[4] A. C. Cabe et al., “Small Embeddable NBTI Sensors (SENS) for Tracking On-Chip Performance Decay“, in *Proc. of Symp. on Quality Electronic Design*, pp. 1-6, 2009.

# New Approaches for Reliable Electronics implemented by Emergent Technologies?

- We have analyzed (by means of Spice simulations) the effects of the most likely faults (i.e., *shorts* and *opens* [2]) affecting the selectors of a *ReRAM* (of size 128x128).




- As for **opens**, our analyses showed that **they can alter only the logic value stored in the faulty *ReRAM* cell**

→ *Single error → correction by the conventional ECCs*

# New Approaches for Reliable Electronics implemented by Emergent Technologies?cnt'd

- ❑ As for **shorts**, our analyses showed that **they can alter** (due to the huge current through the faulty cell) the **logic value** stored in:



1. The **faulty *ReRAM* cell**, and
2. **Many other cells sharing the same *word line*** as the faulty *ReRAM*

- ❑ The **# of cells in 2** depends mainly on the **position of the faulty cell** within the crossbar array, and **it can be > 10**.

→ *High number of errors* → *need for alternate solutions to traditional ECCs*



# Reliability Challenges for High Performance Electronics in the Internet of Things Era

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