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\n*English follows Japanese.<\/p>\n
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\u65e5\u6642\uff1a9\u670828\u65e5\uff08\u571f\uff09\u3000 15:00\uff5e17:15<\/p>\n
*\u4eca\u56de\u306f\u9662\u751f\uff12\u540d\u306b\u3088\u308b\u5831\u544a\u306b\u3088\u308a\u3001\u901a\u5e38\u3088\u308a30\u5206\u65e9\u304f\u7d42\u4e86\u3044\u305f\u3057\u307e\u3059\u3002
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\n\u958b\u50ac\u5834\u6240\uff1a\u65e9\u7a32\u7530\u5927\u5b66\u30003\u53f7\u9928\u3000306\u6559\u5ba4
\n*3\u53f7\u9928\u30a8\u30ec\u30d9\u30fc\u30bf\u306f\uff13\u968e\u306b\u306f\u6b62\u307e\u308a\u307e\u305b\u3093\u306e\u3067\u3001\u30a8\u30b9\u30ab\u30ec\u30fc\u30bf\u306b\u3066\u304a\u8d8a\u3057\u304f\u3060\u3055\u3044\u3002<\/p>\n
\u30ef\u30fc\u30af\u30b7\u30e7\u30c3\u30d7\u7d42\u4e86\u5f8c\u306f\u61c7\u89aa\u4f1a\u3092\u4e88\u5b9a\u3057\u3066\u304a\u308a\u307e\u3059\u3002 \u30aa\u30f3\u30e9\u30a4\u30f3\u53c2\u52a0URL: \u4ee5\u4e0b\u3088\u308a\u767b\u9332\u304a\u9858\u3044\u3057\u307e\u3059\u3002 \u7b2c\uff11\u30bb\u30c3\u30b7\u30e7\u30f3\uff1a\u300015:00\uff5e16:00 \u7b2c\uff12\u30bb\u30c3\u30b7\u30e7\u30f3\uff1a16:15\uff5e17:15 Non-compete agreements (NCAs) are crucial for startups as they prevent employees from joining competing firms, thus reducing the risk of the hiring firm misappropriating the startup’s intellectual property. I propose an additional significant role of NCAs in startups: acting as a defense against acquihiring. By granting a startup monopsony power over its employee, an NCA increases the startup’s outside payoff in acquisition bargaining, making it more challenging for an acquirer to finalize the deal. The NCA can improve worker allocation by either preventing inefficient acquihiring or facilitating efficient acquihiring. Moreover, by preventing acquihirng, the NCA promotes labor market competition and improves worker welfare as long as it does not entirely restrict labor mobility. Finally, I will discuss the optimal regulation of NCAs in industries with high acquisition potential.<\/p>\n \u4eba\u4e8b\u7d4c\u6e08\u5b66\u30ef\u30fc\u30af\u30b7\u30e7\u30c3\u30d7\u3067\u306f\u4ee5\u4e0b\u306e\u901a\u308a\u30a6\u30a7\u30d6\u30b5\u30a4\u30c8\u3092\u904b\u7528\u3057\u3066\u304a\u308a\u307e\u3059\u3002 \u554f\u5408\u305b\uff1a\u65e9\u7a32\u7530\u5927\u5b66\u3000\u5927\u6e7e\u7814\u7a76\u5ba4\u3000eoe-office@list.waseda.jp<\/a> Dear all,<\/p>\n We are happy to have the Personnel Economics Workshop on Sep 28th as follows.<\/p>\n Date: 28th Sep (Sat.) 15:00-17:15<\/p>\n *The workshop will end earlier than usual since the workshop has two 1-hour presentations. *The elevator in Building 3 does not stop at the 3th floor, so please use the escalator. We are planning to have a dinner after the workshop. Please register the following Zoom link for participants online. 1st Session: 15:00-16:00 2nd Session: 16:15-17:15 Non-compete agreements (NCAs) are crucial for startups as they prevent employees from joining competing firms, thus reducing the risk of the hiring firm misappropriating the startup’s intellectual property. I propose an additional significant role of NCAs in startups: acting as a defense against acquihiring. By granting a startup monopsony power over its employee, an NCA increases the startup’s outside payoff in acquisition bargaining, making it more challenging for an acquirer to finalize the deal. The NCA can improve worker allocation by either preventing inefficient acquihiring or facilitating efficient acquihiring. Moreover, by preventing acquihirng, the NCA promotes labor market competition and improves worker welfare as long as it does not entirely restrict labor mobility. Finally, I will discuss the optimal regulation of NCAs in industries with high acquisition potential.<\/p>\n Please check the website of the Personnel Economics Workshop below for the upcoming workshops.
\n\u53c2\u52a0\u3092\u5e0c\u671b\u3055\u308c\u308b\u65b9\u306f9\/20(\u91d1)<\/u><\/strong>\u307e\u3067\u306b\u4e0b\u8a18URL\u306e\u30d5\u30a9\u30fc\u30e0\u306b\u3054\u5165\u529b\u304f\u3060\u3055\u3044\u3002
\nhttps:\/\/forms.gle\/7LxpvfLzM1Ea9z6X6<\/a><\/p>\n
\nhttps:\/\/list-waseda-jp.zoom.us\/meeting\/register\/tJcoceihrzIiGNfWsk8_tMc_ScCcW5mn3RU_<\/a><\/p>\n
\n\u5831\u544a\u8005\uff1a \u65e9\u7a32\u7530\u5927\u5b66\u7d4c\u6e08\u5b66\u7814\u7a76\u79d1\u3000\u91d1\u5c71\u96bc\u4eba\u69d8
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\n\u5831\u544a\u30bf\u30a4\u30c8\u30eb\uff1aMinimum Wage Hikes and the Heterogeneity of Labor Supply
\n\u8981\u65e8\uff1a
\nThis study investigates the heterogeneous effects of minimum wage hikes on the labor supply of married women in Japan, particularly those eligible for the spousal deduction. The Japanese income tax exemption system for spouses has a nonlinear eligibility threshold, which incentivizes low-wage married female workers to limit their annual earnings to 1.05 million yen. When the minimum wage is raised, those workers near the threshold are expected to decrease their labor supply to adjust their annual earnings, while other workers may increase their labor supply or do not respond due to the substitution effect. We utilize an individual-year-month panel data and employ a novel staggered adoption to estimate the effect of binding minimum wages.\u00a0 We find that minimum wage binding has positive impact on income for workers who have no incentive to limit their earnings but not-clear impact for workers who are incentivized. Furthermore, the income effect seems to dominate over the substitution effect for workers with high earnings. We also document a significant labor supply response at the extensive margin while such adjustments at the intensive margin are less pronounced. These findings are strong evidence that the minimum wage impact on income is highly heterogeneous largely due to the dynamics of labor market entry and exit rather than adjusting hours worked.<\/p>\n
\n\u5831\u544a\u8005\uff1a\u4e00\u6a4b\u5927\u5b66\u3000\u7d4c\u6e08\u5b66\u7814\u7a76\u79d1\u3000\u535a\u58eb\u8ab2\u7a0b\u3000\u792b\u77f3\u606d\u543e\u69d8
\n\u767a\u8868\u8a00\u8a9e\uff1a\u65e5\u672c\u8a9e
\n\u5831\u544a\u30bf\u30a4\u30c8\u30eb\uff1a The New Role of Non-compete Agreements in Startups: Their Relationship to Acquihiring
\n\u8981\u65e8\uff1a<\/p>\n
\n\u4eca\u5f8c\u306e\u4e88\u5b9a\u306b\u3064\u3044\u3066\u306f\u4e0b\u8a18URL\u3082\u4f75\u305b\u3066\u3054\u78ba\u8a8d\u304f\u3060\u3055\u3044\u3002
\nhttps:\/\/sites.google.com\/view\/peworkshop\/home<\/a><\/p>\n
\n\u5927\u6e7e\u79c0\u96c4\u30fb\u68ee\u7530\u516c\u4e4b\u30fb\u4f50\u85e4\u9999\u7e54\u30fb\u9ad8\u6a4b\u5b5d\u5e73\u30fb\u5ddd\u592a\u60a0\u53f2<\/p>\n
\nVenue Room: 306 in Building 3, Waseda Campus, Waseda University<\/p>\n
\nFormat: Hybrid<\/p>\n
\nPlease fill in the following form by\u00a020th Sep. (Fri.)<\/u><\/strong>\u00a0if you would like to participate.
\nhttps:\/\/forms.gle\/7LxpvfLzM1Ea9z6X6<\/a><\/p>\n
\nhttps:\/\/list-waseda-jp.zoom.us\/meeting\/register\/tJcoceihrzIiGNfWsk8_tMc_ScCcW5mn3RU_<\/a><\/p>\n
\nSpeaker:\u00a0\u00a0Hayato Kanayama, Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University
\nLanguage: Japanese
\nTitle: \u00a0Minimum Wage Hikes and the Heterogeneity of Labor Supply
\nAbstract:
\nThis study investigates the heterogeneous effects of minimum wage hikes on the labor supply of married women in Japan, particularly those eligible for the spousal deduction. The Japanese income tax exemption system for spouses has a nonlinear eligibility threshold, which incentivizes low-wage married female workers to limit their annual earnings to 1.05 million yen. When the minimum wage is raised, those workers near the threshold are expected to decrease their labor supply to adjust their annual earnings, while other workers may increase their labor supply or do not respond due to the substitution effect. We utilize an individual-year-month panel data and employ a novel staggered adoption to estimate the effect of binding minimum wages.\u00a0 We find that minimum wage binding has positive impact on income for workers who have no incentive to limit their earnings but not-clear impact for workers who are incentivized. Furthermore, the income effect seems to dominate over the substitution effect for workers with high earnings. We also document a significant labor supply response at the extensive margin while such adjustments at the intensive margin are less pronounced. These findings are strong evidence that the minimum wage impact on income is highly heterogeneous largely due to the dynamics of labor market entry and exit rather than adjusting hours worked.<\/p>\n
\nSpeaker: Kyogo Tsubuteishi, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
\nLanguage: Japanese
\nTitle: \u00a0The New Role of Non-compete Agreements in Startups: Their Relationship to Acquihiring
\nAbstract:<\/p>\n
\nhttps:\/\/sites.google.com\/view\/peworkshop\/home<\/a><\/p>\n