English follows Japanese.<\/p>\n
\u4ee5\u4e0b\u306e\u901a\u308a3\/12\u4eba\u4e8b\u7d4c\u6e08\u5b66\u30ef\u30fc\u30af\u30b7\u30e7\u30c3\u30d7\u306e\u958b\u50ac\u3092\u304a\u77e5\u3089\u305b\u3057\u307e\u3059\u3002<\/p>\n
\u65e5\u6642\uff1a3\u670812\u65e5\uff08\u706b\uff09\u3000 17:00\uff5e18:30
\n\u958b\u50ac\u5f62\u5f0f\uff1a\u30cf\u30a4\u30d6\u30ea\u30c3\u30c8
\n\u958b\u50ac\u5834\u6240\uff1a\u65e9\u7a32\u7530\u5927\u5b66\u30007\u53f7\u9928\u3000307\u53f7\u5ba4<\/u><\/p>\n
\u30ef\u30fc\u30af\u30b7\u30e7\u30c3\u30d7\u7d42\u4e86\u5f8c\u306f\u61c7\u89aa\u4f1a\u3092\u4e88\u5b9a\u3057\u3066\u304a\u308a\u307e\u3059\u3002 \u30aa\u30f3\u30e9\u30a4\u30f3\u53c2\u52a0URL: \u4ee5\u4e0b\u3088\u308a\u767b\u9332\u304a\u9858\u3044\u3057\u307e\u3059\u3002 \u5831\u544a\u8005\uff1a\u6843\u5c71\u5b66\u9662\u5927\u5b66\u3000\u6ff1\u6751\u7d14\u5e73\u5148\u751f \u4eba\u4e8b\u7d4c\u6e08\u5b66\u30ef\u30fc\u30af\u30b7\u30e7\u30c3\u30d7\u3067\u306f\u4ee5\u4e0b\u306e\u901a\u308a\u30a6\u30a7\u30d6\u30b5\u30a4\u30c8\u3092\u904b\u7528\u3057\u3066\u304a\u308a\u307e\u3059\u3002 \u554f\u5408\u305b\uff1a\u65e9\u7a32\u7530\u5927\u5b66\u3000\u5927\u6e7e\u7814\u7a76\u5ba4\u3000eoe-office@list.waseda.jp<\/a> Dear all,<\/p>\n We are happy to have the Personnel Economics Workshop on March 12th as follows.<\/p>\n Date: 12th March (Tue.) 17:00-18:30 We are planning to have a dinner after the workshop. Please register the following Zoom link for participants online. Speaker: Associate Prof. Jumpei Hamamura, Momoyama Gakuin University Please check the website of the Personnel Economics Workshop below for the upcoming workshops.
\n\u53c2\u52a0\u3092\u5e0c\u671b\u3055\u308c\u308b\u65b9\u306f3\/8(\u91d1)\u307e\u3067\u306b\u4e0b\u8a18URL\u306e\u30d5\u30a9\u30fc\u30e0\u306b\u3054\u5165\u529b\u304f\u3060\u3055\u3044\u3002
\nhttps:\/\/forms.gle\/uR2egLcEJhTxxjZW9<\/a><\/p>\n
\nhttps:\/\/list-waseda-jp.zoom.us\/meeting\/register\/tJcufuihrTIjHterw556A13WVUdNZ-OF-kGI<\/a><\/p>\n
\n\u767a\u8868\u8a00\u8a9e\uff1a\u65e5\u672c\u8a9e<\/u>
\n\u5831\u544a\u30bf\u30a4\u30c8\u30eb\uff1a Effort allocation under the action spillover on the performance indicator in the multi-task environment: Theory and experiment
\n\u8981\u65e8\uff1a
\nIn this study, first, we consider the multi-task by a single agent with a single principal based on the LEN model. The agent decides the level of actions, and these actions improve the level of outputs. This study assumes that actions affect the other output. In other words, actions have a spillover effect. Additionally, we assume that the case in which one action does not have a spillover effect on the other output in our analytical model. Consequently, we demonstrate, in this case, while its action cannot have an impact on the other output, the level of its action increases as the other action’s spillover effect increases from the model analysis. This is because, depending on the economic environment, we can obtain several outcomes and must consider the features of equilibrium outcomes based on comparative statistics. Next, in this report, we investigate the effect of the choice of performance indicators and the correlation among indicators using the laboratory experiment. In the experiment, we assume that we use three performance evaluations (i.e., profit, profit + sales, and sales and cost) and manipulate the correlations among the error terms of cost and sales, and therefore, we employ a 3\u00d72 experiment in this study. Consequently, contrary to the prediction we obtain when participants are evaluated by profit + sales, they allocate less effort on sales than the optimal level. On the other hand, when we employ the indicator as sales + cost, then participants allocate the excessive effort on sales in the experiment than the effort under the profit case. Additionally, the correlation does not play an important role in our experiment. Lastly, we find that the high accounting knowledge accelerates its bias in our experiment.<\/p>\n
\n\u4eca\u5f8c\u306e\u4e88\u5b9a\u306b\u3064\u3044\u3066\u306f\u4e0b\u8a18URL\u3082\u4f75\u305b\u3066\u3054\u78ba\u8a8d\u304f\u3060\u3055\u3044\u3002
\nhttps:\/\/sites.google.com\/view\/peworkshop\/home<\/a><\/p>\n
\n\u5927\u6e7e\u79c0\u96c4\u30fb\u9ad8\u6a4b\u5b5d\u5e73<\/p>\n
\nVenue Room:\u00a0307 in Building 7<\/u>, Waseda Campus, Waseda University
\nFormat: Hybrid<\/p>\n
\nPlease fill in the following form by 8th\u00a0Mar. (Fri.) if you would like to participate.
\nhttps:\/\/forms.gle\/uR2egLcEJhTxxjZW9<\/a><\/p>\n
\nhttps:\/\/list-waseda-jp.zoom.us\/meeting\/register\/tJcufuihrTIjHterw556A13WVUdNZ-OF-kGI<\/a><\/p>\n
\nLanguage:\u00a0Japanese<\/u>
\nTitle: Effort allocation under the action spillover on the performance indicator in the multi-task environment: Theory and experiment
\nAbstract:
\nIn this study, first, we consider the multi-task by a single agent with a single principal based on the LEN model. The agent decides the level of actions, and these actions improve the level of outputs. This study assumes that actions affect the other output. In other words, actions have a spillover effect. Additionally, we assume that the case in which one action does not have a spillover effect on the other output in our analytical model. Consequently, we demonstrate, in this case, while its action cannot have an impact on the other output, the level of its action increases as the other action’s spillover effect increases from the model analysis. This is because, depending on the economic environment, we can obtain several outcomes and must consider the features of equilibrium outcomes based on comparative statistics. Next, in this report, we investigate the effect of the choice of performance indicators and the correlation among indicators using the laboratory experiment. In the experiment, we assume that we use three performance evaluations (i.e., profit, profit + sales, and sales and cost) and manipulate the correlations among the error terms of cost and sales, and therefore, we employ a 3\u00d72 experiment in this study. Consequently, contrary to the prediction we obtain when participants are evaluated by profit + sales, they allocate less effort on sales than the optimal level. On the other hand, when we employ the indicator as sales + cost, then participants allocate the excessive effort on sales in the experiment than the effort under the profit case. Additionally, the correlation does not play an important role in our experiment. Lastly, we find that the high accounting knowledge accelerates its bias in our experiment.<\/p>\n
\nhttps:\/\/sites.google.com\/view\/peworkshop\/home<\/a><\/p>\n