Please scroll down for English version<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
12\u67087\u65e5\uff08\u6728\uff09\u306b\u884c\u308f\u308c\u307e\u3059\u3001\u73fe\u653f\u7814\u30bb\u30df\u30ca\u30fc\u306e\u65e5\u7a0b<\/p>\n
\u5834\u6240\u306a\u3069\u306b\u3064\u304d\u307e\u3057\u3066\u3054\u6848\u5185\u7533\u3057\u4e0a\u3052\u307e\u3059\u3002<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\u3010\u65e5\u3000\u6642\u301112\u67087\u65e5\uff08\u6728\uff0910:40~12:10<\/p>\n
\u3010\u5834\u3000\u6240\u3011\u65e9\u7a32\u7530\u5927\u5b66\u3000\u65e9\u7a32\u7530\u30ad\u30e3\u30f3\u30d1\u30b9\uff13\u53f7\u9928\uff11\uff12\u968e \u30c7\u30a3\u30b9\u30ab\u30c3\u30b7\u30e7\u30f3\u30eb\u30fc\u30e0<\/p>\n
\u3010\u5831\u544a\u8005\u3011\u6751\u5c71\u3000\u5149\u592a\uff08\u7c73\u56fd\u30ce\u30fc\u30b9\u30a6\u30a7\u30b9\u30bf\u30f3\u5927\u5b66\u535a\u58eb\u8ab2\u7a0b\uff09<\/p>\n
\u3010\u30bf\u30a4\u30c8\u30eb\u3011Social Value of Information in Networked Economy<\/p>\n
\u3010\u62db\u8058\u6559\u54e1\u3011\u6cb3\u6751\u8015\u5e73<\/p>\n
\u3010\u8981\u7d04\u3011<\/p>\n
This paper extends a beauty contest model to allow asymmetric interactions. As in Morris and Shin (2002), agents want to take actions close to the underlying economic fundamental, but at the same time, benefit from coordinating their actions each other. The benefits from coordination can be heterogeneous and are described by an interaction network whose link represents the intensity of interaction between two agents. There are two main results. First, I revisit Morris and Shin’s question: should a government always increase public disclosure? I show that more public information is always better if and only if the Bonacich centrality vector of the interaction network is sufficiently small. Second, I consider an environment where a government can disseminate information only to a fixed number of agents, and characterize the optimal selection of agents. The government typically should target agents whose interaction sub-network gives the smallest Bonacich centrality vector.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\u73fe\u653f\u7814\u30bb\u30df\u30ca\u30fc\u306f\u5e83\u304f\u307f\u306a\u3055\u307e\u306b\u3072\u3089\u304b\u308c\u305f\u30bb\u30df\u30ca\u30fc\u3067\u3059\u3002<\/p>\n
\u7686\u69d8\u306e\u5fa1\u53c2\u52a0\u3092\u304a\u5f85\u3061\u3057\u3066\u304a\u308a\u307e\u3059\u3002<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\uff1d\uff1d\uff1d\uff1d\uff1d\uff1d\uff1d\uff1d\uff1d\uff1d\uff1d\uff1d\uff1d\uff1d\uff1d\uff1d\uff1d\uff1d\uff1d\uff1d\uff1d\uff1d\uff1d\uff1d\uff1d\uff1d\uff1d\uff1d\uff1d\uff1d\uff1d\uff1d<\/p>\n
*English<\/p>\n
We are sending this email to inform you of the WINPEC<\/p>\n
(Waseda Institute of Political Economy) Seminar on December 7th.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\u3010TIME\u3011Thursday,Dec.7th<\/sup> 10:40~12:10<\/p>\n \u3010Venue\u3011Discussion room, BUILDING 3 – Floor 12.<\/p>\n \u3010Presenter\u3011MURAYAMA Kota(PhD. Northwestern University, USA)<\/p>\n \u3010Title\u3011Social Value of Information in Networked Economy<\/p>\n \u3010Organizer\u3011Prof. KAWAMURA, Kohei<\/p>\n \u3010Abstract\u3011<\/p>\n This paper extends a beauty contest model to allow asymmetric interactions. As in Morris and Shin (2002), agents want to take actions close to the underlying economic fundamental, but at the same time, benefit from coordinating their actions each other. The benefits from coordination can be heterogeneous and are described by an interaction network whose link represents the intensity of interaction between two agents. There are two main results. First, I revisit Morris and Shin’s question: should a government always increase public disclosure? I show that more public information is always better if and only if the Bonacich centrality vector of the interaction network is sufficiently small. Second, I consider an environment where a government can disseminate information only to a fixed number of agents, and characterize the optimal selection of agents. The government typically should target agents whose interaction sub-network gives the smallest Bonacich centrality vector.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n We are looking forward to your participation.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Please scroll down for English version 12\u67087\u65e5\uff08\u6728\uff09\u306b\u884c\u308f\u308c\u307e\u3059\u3001\u73fe\u653f\u7814\u30bb\u30df\u30ca\u30fc\u306e\u65e5\u7a0b \u5834\u6240\u306a\u3069\u306b\u3064\u304d\u307e\u3057\u3066\u3054\u6848\u5185\u7533\u3057\u4e0a\u3052\u307e\u3059\u3002 \u3010\u65e5\u3000 […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[103,104,105,1],"tags":[99,18],"class_list":["post-5781","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news-en","category-other-en","category-other","category-news","tag-events-en","tag-events"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fpse\/winpec\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5781","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fpse\/winpec\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fpse\/winpec\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fpse\/winpec\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fpse\/winpec\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5781"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fpse\/winpec\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5781\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fpse\/winpec\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5781"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fpse\/winpec\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5781"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fpse\/winpec\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5781"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}