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Personal Values or a Democratic Value? Revisiting Public Reactions to the Failure of Civilian Control in Japan

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Personal Values or a Democratic Value? Revisiting Public Reactions to the Failure of Civilian Control in Japan*

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Abstract

Do democratic voters prioritize civilian control over the arbitrary decisions of the military? Shinomoto (2025) examined this question in Japan through a survey experiment and concluded that average voters lose trust in the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) when the JSDF does not follow the orders of the Japanese Prime Minister. This study revisits this finding by conducting a survey experiment that examines Japanese voters' trust in both the JSDF and the Japanese Prime Minister under plausible alternative scenarios of the JSDF's dovish noncompliance with the Prime Minister's hawkish orders. We find that (1) through its noncompliance, the JSDF loses trust from right-wing voters but *gains* trust from left-wing voters; and (2) the JSDF's noncompliance reduces trust in the Prime Minister. The findings imply that Japanese voters' reactions to failures in civilian control are largely based on personal values rather than a democratic value: they evaluate military noncompliance positively if it aligns with their ideology and lose confidence in their democratically-elected leader if his policies are vetoed by the military. These implications from a country with long-standing skepticism toward the military raise additional concerns about the civil-military relationship in democratic politics.

Keywords

civil–military relations, survey experiment, Japan, democracy

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Civilian control of the military is considered one of the fundamental principles to support stable democratic governance (Schmitter and Karl, 1991). However, recent empirical studies in the United States indicate that American voters do not necessarily support this principle (Feaver and Kohn, 2001; Golby, Dropp and Feaver, 2012; Krebs, Ralston and Rapport, 2023). A majority of American voters give civilian leaders "no right to be wrong" regarding decisions to use military force, effectively granting "the military a veto on the use of force" (Krebs, Ralston and Rapport, 2023, 607). Such extreme deference to the armed forces threatens democratic governance by undermining the supremacy of democratically elected civilian leadership.

To examine the generalized implications of these US-based claims, Shinomoto (2025) conducted an online survey experiment in Japan, a country where voters, especially those with left-wing ideologies, have long-standing skepticism toward military expansion (Jou and Endo, 2016*b*). He found causal evidence that Japanese voters lose trust in the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), the de facto military in Japan, when the JSDF commanding officer fails to obey the orders of the Japanese Prime Minister. In his experiment, the magnitude of the noncompliance treatment effects varied by the context of noncompliance, the respondents' ideologies, and their' partisanships; however, but the direction of the effect consistently remained negative. Based on these results, Shinomoto (2025) concluded, "the Japanese participants regarded some kind of deviation from civilian control as taboo" (12–13), implying that Japanese voters, on average, support the fundamental democratic principle of civilian control of the military.

In this research note, we revisit Shinomoto (2025)'s experimental design and argue that (1) its noncompliance scenarios signal more than mere noncompliance with civilian control; (2) its design struggles to capture the gradation in aggressiveness of noncompliance; and (3) trust in the military represents only one aspect of the civil-military relationship. We then introduce an alternative survey experiment with case scenarios that better isolate the JSDF's noncompliance with civilian control. Specifically, we focus on noncompliance in terms of the JSDF discontinuing its overseas mission due to the triggering explosion event, despite the Prime Minister's order to continue the mission. Experimental conditions also involve meaningful variations in the aggressiveness of the civilian order, captured through the presence or absence of human casualties in the explosion event. Furthermore, we measure trust in the Prime Minister as an

additional outcome to assess the military's noncompliance's impact on trust in the civilian side.

Results from our experiment indicate that Japanese voters' reactions to the JSDF noncompliance with the Prime Minister's order are unlikely to be driven by adherence to the democratic principle of civilian control. We find evidence that the JSDF *gains* trust from left-wing respondents through dovish noncompliance with hawkish democratic leadership, while losing trust from right-wing respondents. Furthermore, we find evidence that a Prime Minister who fails to keep the JSDF compliant loses trust, especially among moderate to right-wing respondents. These results provide alternative interpretations of the Shinomoto (2025)'s findings and add insights to the literature on civil-military relationships in democratic politics. Consistent with the claim made in Krebs, Ralston and Rapport (2023), our findings imply that Japanese voters, like American voters, seem to give civilian leadership "no right to be wrong." Their assessments of the JSDF actions are influenced more by their personal ideological values than by adherence to the principle of civilian control. Additionally, they lose confidence in a civilian leader if the leader fails to push through ideologically-preferable policies due to the military's veto.

Existing Research

Civilian control is a critical concept for managing armed forces in democracies. Given its significance, numbers of studies have focused on the normative value of civilian control and public attitudes toward it (Schmitter and Karl, 1991; Feaver and Kohn, 2001; Golby, Dropp and Feaver, 2012). Classic studies of civil–military relations posit that a democratic polity's military must be subordinated to civilian political authority and consider such a condition a prerequisite for the legitimacy and effective functioning of democratic politics (Feaver, 1999; Huntington, 1957). On the other hand, recent empirical studies in the United States show that ordinary voters do not necessarily internalize these democratic ideals. For example, Golby, Dropp and Feaver (2012) conducted a survey experiment during the 2012 presidential campaign, finding that the military's endorsement leads to a small yet significant increase in the probability of voting for Obama. Taking a step forward, Krebs, Ralston and Rapport (2023) made a comprehensive assessment of public perceptions of civil-military relationships, con-

cluding that American voters grant their democratic leaders "no right to be wrong" regarding the use of force. Their report on the original 2019 survey indicates that the public generally allows military officials to override the president's decisions, with partisanship being a driving force that moderates this pattern.

Given that most pre-existing research focused on the US military, Shinomoto (2025) examined the generalizability of their findings in Japan. Citing Japan's stable state of democracy and traditional skepticism toward armed forces, he presented Japan as a likely case for the general public valuing democratic civilian control, claiming that "the impact of noncompliance is likely to be observed more clearly in Japan than elsewhere" (4). Using an online survey experiment, he presented Japanese participants with a randomized hypothetical scenario of the JSDF's noncompliance (or compliance) with an order from the Prime Minister and found evidence supporting a democratic ideal: on average, Japanese participants decreased their trust in the JSDF if it was noncompliant with the order from the Prime Minister. Though he finds heterogeneous treatment effects by ideology and partisanship and expresses concerns regarding the non-uniformity of effects, no condition in his analysis reverses the direction of the treatment effects. With these results, Shinomoto (2025) concluded that "the Japanese participants regarded some kind of deviation from civilian control as taboo" (12-13), while acknowledging the potential interference of political predispositions in this perception.

While Shinomoto (2025) provided an interesting counterexample that partially conflicts with US-based literature, at least three issues in his experimental design limit a deeper understanding of his findings. The first issue is that his depictions of noncompliance in the experiment, *battle* and *suspension*, can be seen as more than just noncompliance with the orders of a civilian leader. *Battle* refers to the situation where the JSDF directly participated in combat based on the commanding officer's arbitrary decision. Here, the JSDF has never been involved in active combat in its history. Therefore, beyond civil-military relationships, this scenario is a clear violation of the "self-defense" principle of the JSDF itself. *Suspension* refers to the condition where the JSDF commander suspends the mission after deployment overseas. In this condition, the timing of noncompliance is confusing and may lead respondents to question the commanding officer's trustworthiness: the scenario indicates that the JSDF commanding

officer complied with the deployment but refused to conduct the immediate mission without a triggering event. While opinions and actions may change over time without specific reasons, inconsistent behavior as a leader can undermine public trust, regardless of its moral value (Fearon, 1994; Kertzer and Brutger, 2016). Therefore, in both *battle* and *suspension* scenarios, the JSDF actions involve more than just noncompliance with civilian control, indicating additional (potentially negative) traits of the JSDF commanding officer.

The second issue is the lack of gradation in the aggressiveness of the military's actions. In both *battle* and *suspension* scenarios, there are no variations in the aggressiveness of JSDF commanding officers' decisions. As a result, it is unclear whether the observed treatment effects in Shinomoto (2025) are driven more by noncompliance itself or by the aggressiveness of the JSDF commanding officer's decisions, independent of noncompliance with the Prime Minister. Shinomoto also acknowledges this issue, stating that his experimental design "failed to establish a clear differentiation between the effects of noncompliance by the military on public confidence and the effects of military aggressiveness" (13).

The third issue is the lack of outcome measurements regarding public confidence in democratic leaders. A prominent discussion in US-based literature concerns the military's endorsement or advice's impact on public support for presidential candidates (Golby, Dropp and Feaver, 2012; Krebs, Ralston and Rapport, 2023). Since Shinomoto (2025)'s experiment focused only on trust in the JSDF, the effect of noncompliance on trust in the civilian leader remains unexplored.

Experimental Design

In the current study, we refine and expand the experiment in Shinomoto (2025) based on the issues described in the previous section. In particular, three features that differentiate our experimental design from that of Shinomoto (2025) are worth discussing. First, our hypothetical experimental scenarios focus on the JSDF's noncompliance with the Prime Minister's order to continue the mission after the triggering explosion event. Using this scenario, we intend to isolate the effect of the JSDF's noncompliance without signaling additional characteristics of

JSDF leadership.[1] Our scenarios also largely align with the real case of JSDF deployment in Iraq between 2004 and 2006, during which Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi made decisions to continue the mission despite several reports of mortar bombs landing near the JSDF post (e.g., Al Jazeera, 2005). Second, we manipulate whether there are human casualties from the explosion event. This manipulation will create gradations in the aggressiveness of the Prime Minister's order, as existing literature shows the negative impact of human casualties on public support for war and foreign intervention (Karol and Miguel, 2007; Fetzer et al., 2024). While this manipulation may not directly reflect the military's aggressiveness, it can create variations in the gentleness of the JSDF commanding officers' actions, independent of noncompliance. Third, we use trust in the Prime Minister as an additional outcome measure to assess the effect of the JSDF's noncompliance with civilian orders. If noncompliance undermines trust in the Prime Minister, it has significant implications for understanding how the public perceives civil-military relationships.

With the above design features in mind, we conduct an online survey experiment in Japan, fielded on January 21, 2025. Following Shinomoto (2025), we recruited and compensated respondents through the crowdsourcing platform *Lancers*, with the condition of being 18 years or older.[2] In total, we successfully recruited 901 respondents aged 19 to 78 for the analysis.[3] We designed the questionnaire and collected responses using *Google Forms*.[4]

Treatments. In the experiment, we randomly assigned respondents to one of four passages describing hypothetical situations about the overseas deployment of the JSDF. Specifically, respondents were asked to read the following passage before proceeding to the outcome questions:

> *In recent years, there has been an escalation of international tensions. Please read the following passage, assume temporarily that this situation has occurred, and*

[1] Note that the JSDF's noncompliance in our scenarios is relatively mild compared to Shinomoto (2025). We believe our settings are appropriate for ensuring the external validity of the results; one should be cautioned that noncompliance in our experimental scenarios may represent weak cases of the failure of civilian control.

[2] *Lancers* , one of the largest crowdsourcing platforms in Japan, has been utilized in previously published academic studies, including Shinomoto (2025). The median response time was 3 minutes and 38 seconds. Each respondent was compensated with 60 yen, which approximates the minimum wage in Japan (ranging from 951 to 1163 yen per hour).

[3] We started with 904 respondents, but one who skipped the trust in the JSDF question and two who skipped the political ideology question were excluded from the analysis.

[4] See Online Appendix B for methodological details on randomizing question texts with *Google Forms*.

Table 1: Experimental conditions

		Human casualties	
		No = 0	Yes = 1
Failed civilian control	Maintenance = 0	Group 1 ($n = 217$)	Group 3 ($n = 223$)
	Failure = 1	Group 2 ($n = 217$)	Group 4 ($n = 249$)

answer the subsequent questions.

On the issue of supporting a small to medium-sized country in Africa, the United States entered into armed conflict with the opposing organization. The Prime Minister ordered the JSDF to dispatch for the purpose of providing logistical support (help carrying personnel and materials outside of weapons). Given the order, the JSDF provided the logistical support.

In the middle of the mission, combatants from the opposing organization threw explosive materials into the JSDF post onsite. (A) *due to the explosion. Given the incident, the Prime Minister held a cabinet meeting to discuss whether to continue the JSDF's mission or withdraw. Consequently, the Prime Minister decided to order the JSDF to continue the mission.* (B).

In each experimental condition, we manipulate texts in (A) and (B) to illustrate variations in human casualties and civilian control. First, (A) reflects the absence or presence of human casualties. It is filled by "*There are no human casualties*" for the first and second conditions (Groups 1 and 2), and "*Two members of the JSDF were killed*" for the third and fourth conditions (Groups 3 and 4). Second, (B) reflects the maintenance or failure of civilian control. In the maintained civilian control conditions (Groups 1 and 3), it is filled by "*The JSDF followed the order and continued the mission*"; in the failed civilian control conditions (Groups 2 and 4), it is filled by "*The commanding officer of the JSDF thought that the risk of continuing the mission was too high and made an arbitrary decision to discontinue the mission*". Table 1 summarizes the assignment of experimental conditions. For the analysis, we created two variables: (1) *failed civilian control* , which is 0 if civilian control was maintained and 1 if it failed; and (2) *human casualties*, which is 0 if there are no casualties and 1 if there are casualties.

Outcomes. After reading the manipulated passage, respondents are asked how much trust they have in the JSDF and the Prime Minister. The response options are integers ranging from "don't trust it at all" (1) to "trust it very much" (7). *Trust in the JSDF* has a mean of 4.93 and a standard deviation of 1.42. This distribution is similar to that of Shinomoto (2025), providing

confidence in the external validity of our sample (see Online Appendix A for a more detailed descriptive visualization of critical variables in the analysis). *Trust in the Prime Minister* has a mean of 2.73 and a standard deviation of 1.42, demonstrating that both outcome variables have sufficient variation to be explained.

Moderator. To examine the moderating role of political dispositions, we included the following question from the pre-treatment questionnaire: *Regarding your thoughts about politics, to which of "liberal (left-wing)" or "conservative (right-wing)" do you believe you belong?* The response options are integers ranging from "I feel strongly that I am liberal (left-wing)" as 0 to "I feel strongly that I am conservative (right-wing)" as 10. The resultant *conservative ideology* variable has a mean of 5.24 and a standard deviation of 1.80.

Hypotheses

Based on the alternative experimental design presented in the previous section, we argue that voters' personal values and impressions of the substantive content of the given event may play central roles in explaining public reactions to the JSDF's noncompliance with the order of the Japanese Prime Minister. If the results from the current experiment support the above theoretical expectations, the violation of democratic principles may not be the driving factor explaining the central finding from Shinomoto (2025). In the remaining portion of this section, we propose four hypotheses to be tested in the alternative experiment.[5] To start with, we posit that the presence of human casualties may independently decrease trust in the JSDF, as it potentially signals the JSDF's incapability of managing their own safety. This expectation is not directly related to the impact of the JSDF's noncompliance with civilian control. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to examine whether people perceive the presence of human casualties as an exogenous and uncontrollable event or as a sign of the JSDF's incapability. Therefore, our first hypothesis is formulated as follows:

H1. If there are human casualties, trust in the JSDF is lower than if there are no

[5]To simplify our theoretical expectations, we restructured the hypotheses in the preregistration. H2 in the main text combines preregistered H2a and H3a; H3 combines preregistered H2b and H3b; and H4 combines preregistered H4 and H5.

human casualties.

Second, consider the JSDF's noncompliance when there are no human casualties from the triggering explosion event. In this condition, without serious consequences from the triggering event, we expect that the JSDF has little leverage to persuade people to support their action to discontinue the mission. Finding decreased trust in the JSDF itself, however, cannot determine whether it is caused by the unpopularity of the decision to discontinue the mission or the violation of the principle of civilian control. Therefore, we further expect ideological predisposition to moderate public reactions to the JSDF's decision. In Japan, it is known that self-identified conservative ideology closely aligns with support for the extensive use of military power, such as collective self-defense or the expansion of the JSDF (Jou and Endo, 2016*a*, Table 5.1, 91). Additionally, hawkish voters in democratic countries like Japan tend to demand hawkish actions from their leaders (Incerti et al., 2021). Based on such prior knowledge, we posit that more conservative voters in Japan will give more negative evaluations of the JSDF's action to discontinue the mission.[6] As a result, we formulate our second hypothesis as follows:

> *H2. Suppose there are no human casualties. Trust in the JSDF decreases if the JSDF does not comply with the order of the Prime Minister. This tendency is stronger among more conservative voters.*

Note that the above theoretical expectation is actually the opposite of Shinomoto (2025)'s hypothesis 2, where he noted that "[t]he negative impact on confidence in the JSDF caused by the deviation from the principles of civilian control is less profound among conservatives than liberals" (569). He drew this hypothesis from the literature on social identity and authoritarian values, suggesting that conservatives "consider the military to be an ingroup" (569) and have a high tolerance for authoritarian actions, thus reacting less negatively to the military's noncompliance with democratic principles. This mechanism is valid, but we argue that adherence to democratic principles may not play a central role in how the public reacts to the

[6] Another point of discussion is the connection between political ideology and support for democratic values. Here, right-wing ideologies are discussed as having a moderate positive correlation with authoritarian values, while this connection is not really on the rise in Japan (Gonthier, Jou and Hino, 2022). If anything, this makes our experiment a hard test of H2 and H3, which expect that left-wing voters discount (but right-wing voters emphasize) the (hawkish) adherence to democratic principles.

JSDF's actions. Indeed, Shinomoto (2025) found that the JSDF's noncompliance in the *suspension* treatment decreases trust in the JSDF slightly more among conservative respondents. Although the interaction term between treatment and ideology was not statistically significant, it rendered the *suspension* treatment effects statistically significant only among sufficiently conservative respondents (Figure 3(a), 574).[7] This result aligns more closely with our H2 than with Shinomoto's hypothesis 2, so we plan to replicate such findings in our experiment.

Third, consider the JSDF's noncompliance in instances of human casualties resulting from the explosion. In this scenario, the order of the Prime Minister order appears more aggressive than in cases without human casualties (while we still believe it is sufficiently realistic). Consequently, we argue that the JSDF can more easily convince the public of the validity of their action to discontinue the mission. But again, following our theoretical logic from the previous paragraph, it should be harder to convince individuals as they become more conservative, because they prefer more hawkish military actions. Conversely, more liberal individuals should respond more positively to the JSDF's actions, as they favor the JSDF's activities only under restricted conditions. We summarize these expectations in Hypothesis 3, as follows:

> *H3. Suppose there are human casualties. Trust in the JSDF increases if the JSDF does not comply with the order of the Prime Minister. This tendency is stronger among more liberal voters.*

Fourth, we turn to the discussion on trust in the Prime Minister as an outcome. One primary concern in the extant literature is that voters may not grant democratic leaders their "right to be wrong," suggesting they oppose the civilian leader's policy on the use of force if it is vetoed by the military (Krebs, Ralston and Rapport, 2023) or support it if endorsed by the military (Golby, Dropp and Feaver, 2012). Then, numerous empirical studies on political trust indicate that policy performance is a key factor explaining trust in the government (Miller, 1974; Levi and Stoker, 2000; Wang, 2016; Citrin and Stoker, 2018; Zhang, Li and Yang, 2022). Contextualizing this claim in our experiment, this means that the JSDF's noncompliance should undermine trust in the Prime Minister. We also argue that this effect is greater in situations

[7] Additionally, Figure 3(b) from Shinomoto indicates that the negative treatment effect of *battle* treatment is slightly weaker for conservative respondents (574). This is also consistent with our H2.

involving human casualties, where the JSDF's noncompliance should be seen as less aggressive. Therefore, our final Hypothesis 4 is formulated as follows:

> *H4. Trust in the Prime Minister decreases if the JSDF does not comply with the order of the Prime Minister. This tendency is stronger when there are human casualties compared to when there are no human casualties.*

In addition to the above hypotheses, while there is no explicit hypothesis on how ideology might moderate the effect of noncompliance on trust in the Prime Minister, we explore such a moderating effect in the analysis. The following section outlines our experimental design to test the proposed hypotheses.

Results

To test the proposed hypotheses, we estimate two types of linear regression models using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and HC2 robust standard errors. Since H2 through H4 expect the effect of the JSDF's noncompliance to differ across human casualty conditions, we estimate the models below separately for each subgroup of respondents in the scenario conditions, regardless of whether they involve casualties. We also conducted analyzes that include all samples of respondents by adding $\delta(\text{human casualties})_i$ to the model equations to capture the baseline effect of casualties on trust in the JSDF (with a negative δ coefficient confirming H1). To start, to capture unconditional baseline treatment effects, we estimate the following simple regression model:

$$(\text{Trust})_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{failed civilian control})_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Here, in the models estimated in subsets, a negative β_1 coefficient under *human casualties = 1* supports H2, and a positive β_1 coefficient under *human casualties = 0* supports H3.

Next, to explore the moderating role of political ideology, we estimate the following regres-

Table 2: The effect of the JSDF's noncompliance on trust in the JSDF

	All		Without Casualties		With Casualties	
	Baseline	Interacted	Baseline	Interacted	Baseline	Interacted
(Intercept)	5.066***	3.944***	5.065***	3.954***	5.000***	3.876***
	(0.084)	(0.240)	(0.098)	(0.382)	(0.091)	(0.268)
Failed civilian control	−0.180†	0.739*	−0.177	0.590	−0.182	0.882*
	(0.094)	(0.312)	(0.137)	(0.504)	(0.130)	(0.378)
Conservative ideology		0.214***		0.211**		0.218***
		(0.041)		(0.067)		(0.049)
Failure * Ideology		−0.177**		−0.146†		−0.206**
		(0.055)		(0.088)		(0.068)
Human casualties	−0.067	−0.057				
	(0.095)	(0.093)				
R^2	0.005	0.043	0.004	0.044	0.004	0.041
Adj. R^2	0.002	0.038	0.002	0.037	0.002	0.035
Num. obs.	901	901	431	431	470	470
RMSE	1.418	1.392	1.426	1.400	1.412	1.388

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

sion model with interaction terms:

$$\begin{aligned}(\text{Trust})_i =& \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{failed civilian control})_i + \beta_2(\text{conservative ideology})_i \\ &+ \beta_3(\text{failed civilian control})_i \times (\text{conservative ideology})_i + \varepsilon_i\end{aligned}$$

Here $\beta_1 + \beta_3 \times (\text{conservative ideology})$ is the quantity of interest. This captures the marginal effect of *failed civilian control* on trust outcomes, conditional on personal ideological values. If it is indeed the case that more conservative voters are more likely to evaluate noncompliance negatively (H2), and more liberal voters are more likely to evaluate noncompliance positively (H3), we should see β_3 to be statistically significant in the theoretically consistent direction; or even when β_3 is not statistically significant, the statistical significance of $\beta_1 + \beta_3 \times (\text{conservative ideology})$ changes within the available values of ideology.

Table 2 presents results with trust in the JSDF as an outcome. First, in both baseline and interacted models, the treatment effects of human casualties are negative but not statistically significant. This result fails to support H1, providing no evidence that human casualties undermine trust in the JSDF. Second, looking at the estimated coefficients of baseline models, it can be seen that the failure of civilian control has a null or, at best, weak effect on trust in the JSDF. For each human casualty condition, the coefficient of *failed civilian control* is slightly negative but does not reach any conventional thresholds of statistical significance ($p > .10$). The coefficient estimates indicate that, on average, the treatments decreased trust in the JSDF

by about 0.2 units on a scale of 1 to 7, which is substantively small. When all samples are pooled, the coefficient reaches marginal significance ($p \approx 0.057$), but its magnitude remains small. These results are inconsistent with the baseline expectations of H2 and H3, offering no strong evidence that noncompliance with the Prime Minister significantly undermines trust in the JSDF, with or without human casualties.

Interacted models in Table 2 indicate that political ideology significantly moderates the relationship between civilian control failure and trust in the JSDF. Coefficients for *Failure* * *Ideology*, i.e., β_3, are all negative, indicating that the effect of failed civilian control on trust in the JSDF diminishes or becomes more negative as respondents grow conservative. To further illustrate political ideology's moderating role, Figure 1 plots the marginal effects of *failed civilian control* for available values of ideology. It first shows that JSDF noncompliance causes right-wing respondents to lose substantial trust in the JSDF. For a strong conservative (*ideology*=10), noncompliance leads to a 0.9 to 1.2 unit decrease in trust in the JSDF. In contrast, the marginal effects of noncompliance among left-wing respondents remain consistently positive. It is never statistically significant under the no casualties condition, but under the condition with human casualties in the JSDF, we observe that the JSDF *gains* trust from left-wing respondents through noncompliance with the Prime Minister's order. The effect magnitude is also non-negligible: For a strong liberal (*ideology*=0), noncompliance in the "with casualties" situation leads to a 0.9 unit increase in trust in the JSDF.

The results in Table 2 and Figure 1 partially support H2 and H3: Left-wing individuals tend to view the (dovish) noncompliance of the JSDF positively, while right-wing individuals tend to see it in a negative light. On the other hand, the presence of human casualties plays only a minor role in explaining the results. Baseline models indicate that the unconditional effect of the noncompliance treatment remains weak, regardless of human casualty conditions. Interacted models suggest that the positive reaction of left-wing voters' is statistically significant only when there are human casualties, while the marginal effect in the absence of casualties is also positive (though not statistically significant). Right-wing voters consistently react negatively to the noncompliance, irrespective of the presence or absence of human casualties.

Turning to the results on trust in the Prime Minister as an outcome, Table 3 summarizes



Figure 1: The JSDF's noncompliance with civilian control makes right-wing individuals lose their trust in the JSDF, but left-wing individuals increase their trust in the JSDF, especially when there are human casualties

Table 3: The effect of the JSDF's noncompliance on trust in the Prime Minister

	All		Without Casualties		With Casualties	
	Baseline	Interacted	Baseline	Interacted	Baseline	Interacted
(Intercept)	3.007***	2.305***	3.009***	2.109***	2.937***	2.434***
	(0.086)	(0.236)	(0.103)	(0.347)	(0.097)	(0.300)
Failed civilian control	−0.472***	−0.059	−0.477***	0.282	−0.468***	−0.387
	(0.094)	(0.309)	(0.139)	(0.477)	(0.127)	(0.403)
Conservative ideology		0.134**		0.171**		0.098†
		(0.044)		(0.064)		(0.059)
Failure * Ideology		−0.080		−0.144†		−0.017
		(0.058)		(0.087)		(0.078)
Human casualties	−0.067	−0.061				
	(0.094)	(0.093)				
R^2	0.028	0.045	0.026	0.050	0.028	0.042
Adj. R^2	0.026	0.041	0.024	0.043	0.026	0.035
Num. obs.	901	901	431	431	470	470
RMSE	1.405	1.395	1.448	1.434	1.367	1.361

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

the main findings. Coefficient estimates from the baseline models suggest that, on average, the JSDF noncompliance with the Prime Minister orders negatively affects trust in the Prime Minister. The observed effects are all statistically significant ($p < .05$), of non-ignorable magnitude (close to a 0.5 unit decline in trust), and remain almost constant across conditions of human casualties. These results partially support H4, indicating that the JSDF's noncompliance undermines trust in the Prime Minister among Japanese voters. However, we do not find strong evidence that this effect is greater when there are human casualties.

Interacted models in Table 3 explore whether the main effect is moderated by political ideology. They show that the coefficients for *failure * ideology* are consistently negative (marginally



Figure 2: The JSDF's noncompliance with civilian control make the Prime Ministers to lose trust, especially among right-wing individuals

significant only under the "without casualties" condition), indicating that the negative effect of the JSDF's noncompliance on trust in the Prime Minister is somewhat stronger among more conservative voters. Figure 2 visualizes the marginal effects of the JSDF's noncompliance on trust in the Prime Minister, conditional on respondents' political ideology. Overall, the JSDF's noncompliance caused moderate and right-wing respondents to lose trust in the Prime Minister, while left-wing respondents remained unaffected. This tendency is evident when there are no casualties from the explosion incident. When there are casualties, political ideology does not seem to moderate the negative effect of the JSDF's noncompliance on trust in the Prime Minister.

Robustness Checks

We conduct three additional analyzes to determine whether the main results are robust to alternative specifications. First, we estimate all of our models by including additional covariates: political interest, political knowledge, gender, age, educational attainment, marital status, whether one has a child, and place of residence. These covariates should not influence the effect of the randomly assigned treatments, but should help reduce uncertainties in estimation. Online Appendix C presents such results, which, as expected, are almost identical to our main findings. Second, we include trust in the JSDF or the Prime Minister, as asked in the pretreat-

ment questionnaire, as a covariate. This analysis allows us to estimate treatment effects more stringently, as pretreatment trust may absorb part of the effects of ideology because ideology is likely a cause of institutional trust. Online Appendix D shows that including pretreatment trust does not change the overall implications of our main results, except that the JSDF's noncompliance increases trust in the JSDF among strongly liberal respondents more in the condition without casualties than with casualties. The difference between the conditions regarding human casualties is not large, but this pattern contradicts our main findings.

Finally, we conduct analyzes that exclude those considered inattentive to experimental stimuli. Specifically, we exclude individuals who (1) failed the pretreatment question detecting satisficers or (2) failed the manipulation check questions in the post-treatment questionnaire. Online Appendix E contains details of those questions and the re-analyzes of our main models, as well as additional models with covariates and pretreatment trust. While we should be cautious that these analyzes select data based on the post-treatment variable (Montgomery, Nyhan and Torres, 2018), excluding inattentive respondents further highlights our main findings. In particular, the positive effect of noncompliance on trust in the JSDF among strong liberals becomes statistically significant ($p < .05$) regardless of the presence or absence of human casualties. Overall, all additional analyzes confirm our main findings, with one caveat: it seems that human casualty treatment plays only a weak and inconsistent role in influencing the moderating effect of ideology on the relationship between JSDF noncompliance and trust in the JSDF.

Conclusion

In this research note, we revisit and extend the survey experiment of Shinomoto (2025) to assess public reactions to the failure of civilian control in Japan. Using the case where a hawkish democratic leadership orders the JSDF. Japan's pseudo military, to continue a risky overseas mission after an explosion, we demonstrate that public reactions to the JSDF's noncompliance are strongly influenced by ideological predispositions: while right-wing voters lose trust in the JSDF, left-wing voters may increase their trust in the JSDF. The JSDF's noncompliance can also undermine trust in the democratic leader; especially among moderate and right-wing voters, it

leads to diminished trust in the Prime Minister. Our results provide alternative interpretations of Shinomoto (2025)'s findings, implying that Japanese voters evaluate the military's noncompliance largely based on their personal ideological values rather than adherence to democratic principles. Overall, our findings are consistent with Krebs, Ralston and Rapport (2023)'s claim that ordinary voters in a democratic country give their civilian leader a "no right to be wrong".

Current evidence has three important implications for the study of democratic governance and civilian control of the military. First, it demonstrates that even in Japan, a country with a stable democracy and long-standing skepticism toward the military, average adults prioritize their ideological values over the democratic principle of civilian control. Second, it highlights the importance of case selection in testing theoretical expectations. Selecting cases of military noncompliance that signal more than mere noncompliance may obscure meaningful variations in public reactions that warrant theoretical attention. Third, considering the consequences for both military and civilian leaders provides a more comprehensive understanding of the issue. Here, our findings indicate that the military's noncompliance not only affects trust in the military but also undermines trust in democratic leadership.

A couple of caveats remain. First, as Shinomoto (2025)'s experiment suffers from cases of noncompliance that can signal more than mere noncompliance, our case scenarios might also face external validity issues. While we believe that our case scenarios better isolate the effect of noncompliance and capture meaningful patterns, further studies should continue to examine the generalizability of our findings both within and outside Japan. Second, human casualty treatment in our experiment has effects that are weak or, if any, inconsistent with our prior theoretical expectations. Left-wing respondents seem to react positively to the JSDF's noncompliance with a civilian leader, regardless of human casualties (especially after excluding inattentive respondents), while right-wing respondents seem more disappointed with their democratic leader when the leader is unable to implement policies that are supposedly less aggressive, i.e., the order to continue the mission when there are no casualties. Future studies should continue exploring the optimal way to capture the degree of aggressiveness in military actions and develop a comprehensive theoretical framework to explain the impact of noncompliance on public perception of civilian leadership.

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Online Supporting Materials

This is the Online Appendix of "Personal Values or a Democratic Value? Revisiting Public Reactions to the Failure of Civilian Control in Japan."

Contents

A Distribution of Variables



Figure A.1: Descriptive distribution of outcome variables



Figure A.2: Descriptive distribution of moderator variable

B Conducting Experiment through Google Forms

Google Forms does not have a feature to directly randomize question texts to be displayed to respondents. Alternatively, it has the ability to (1) generate customized survey links with prefilled answers to some questions and (2) show a specific questionnaire page conditional on the answer to the last question on the previous page. We utilized these two features of Google Forms to achieve randomization. We first created a generic question as the last question in the pretreatment questionnaire page, with the question text "For response management (don't change the value) [回答管理用（値を変更しないでください）]". We required a response for this question and offered four random gibberish texts (generated by Avast random password generator) as response options, with a randomized order. We used a list type question in Google Forms, so respondents can only see the selected option in the questionnaire. Figure B.1 presents the screenshot of the response management question. Conditional on the chosen option, the subsequent page of the questionnaire is set to one of four experimental conditions.



Figure B.1: Question that was used to randomize the subsequent questionnaire page

As the next step, using JavaScript, we construct a web page that automatically redirects to a survey with a randomly pre-filled response to the response management question. The pre-filled response is chosen from four options. An example of this page is shown below:

```
<!DOCTYPE html><html><body><script>
    window.onload=function(){
        var vva=['GIBBERISH1','GIBBERISH2','GIBBERISH3','GIBBERISH4'];
        var vvar=vva[Math.floor(Math.random()*vva.length>>0)];
        var urls=['https://FORM-URL/viewform?usp=pp_url&entry.12345=' + vvar];
        for(var i=0;i<1;i++){location.href=urls[i];break;}
    }
</script></body></html>
```

In the above example, `GIBBERISH` 1 to 4 indicates the response options to be randomized, `FORM-URL` indicates a link to a specific Google Forms survey, and `entry.12345` indicates the ID of the response management question within the survey.

One caveat to this methodology is that Google Forms cannot prevent respondents from overwriting the pre-filled response (while we specifically instructed them not to do so). On the other hand, since options are just gibberish and their order is randomized across respondents, the risk of manual selection of responses causing systematic bias in the assignment of experimental conditions is considered substantially small.

C Analysis with Additional Set of Covariates

Table C.1: Analysis with covariates, results parallel to Table 2

	All		Without Casualties		With Casualties	
	Baseline	Interacted	Baseline	Interacted	Baseline	Interacted
(Intercept)	4.883***	3.818***	5.432***	4.475***	4.230***	3.127***
	(0.324)	(0.385)	(0.474)	(0.565)	(0.446)	(0.501)
Failed civilian control	−0.170†	0.741*	−0.208	0.540	−0.144	0.894*
	(0.094)	(0.306)	(0.135)	(0.488)	(0.129)	(0.373)
Conservative ideology		0.210***		0.220**		0.200***
		(0.040)		(0.066)		(0.048)
Failure * Ideology		−0.176**		−0.143†		−0.202**
		(0.055)		(0.086)		(0.067)
Human casualties	−0.053	−0.039				
	(0.094)	(0.093)				
Political interest (0-3)	0.172**	0.176**	0.175†	0.172†	0.202*	0.208*
	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.094)	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.090)
Political knowledge (0-3)	0.047	0.054	−0.002	0.001	0.097	0.107
	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.088)	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.084)
Gender (male)	0.205*	0.176†	0.121	0.092	0.287*	0.251†
	(0.100)	(0.098)	(0.143)	(0.141)	(0.139)	(0.137)
Age (by 10 years)	0.007	−0.001	−0.078	−0.096	0.090	0.090
	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.067)	(0.064)
Education (0-2)	−0.144*	−0.128*	−0.229**	−0.215*	−0.082	−0.061
	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.090)	(0.089)
No children	−0.196	−0.193	0.010	−0.088	−0.364†	−0.293
	(0.143)	(0.142)	(0.210)	(0.208)	(0.199)	(0.199)
City size (0-4)	−0.017	−0.020	0.007	0.004	−0.039	−0.044
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.053)
R^2	0.028	0.064	0.038	0.082	0.060	0.090
Adj. R^2	0.017	0.051	0.017	0.058	0.042	0.068
Num. obs.	893	893	428	428	465	465
RMSE	1.404	1.379	1.403	1.373	1.388	1.368

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.



Figure C.1: Analysis with covariates, results parallel to Figure 1

Table C.2: Analysis with covariates, results parallel to Table 3

	All		Without Casualties		With Casualties	
	Baseline	Interacted	Baseline	Interacted	Baseline	Interacted
(Intercept)	1.350***	0.741*	1.151*	0.470	1.507***	0.989†
	(0.308)	(0.374)	(0.458)	(0.522)	(0.414)	(0.526)
Failed civilian control	−0.450***	−0.124	−0.469***	0.300	−0.426***	−0.491
	(0.092)	(0.306)	(0.136)	(0.467)	(0.126)	(0.399)
Conservative ideology		0.119**		0.153*		0.084
		(0.042)		(0.061)		(0.058)
Failure * Ideology		−0.064		−0.146†		0.010
		(0.057)		(0.085)		(0.077)
Human casualties	−0.073	−0.065				
	(0.092)	(0.092)				
Political interest (0-3)	0.074	0.074	0.173†	0.178†	−0.015	−0.014
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.088)	(0.090)
Political knowledge (0-3)	0.025	0.030	−0.034	−0.034	0.087	0.090
	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.077)	(0.077)
Gender (male)	0.334***	0.319***	0.269†	0.247†	0.380**	0.370**
	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.140)	(0.141)	(0.129)	(0.128)
Age (by 10 years)	0.199***	0.195***	0.203**	0.190*	0.185**	0.190**
	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Education (0-2)	0.130*	0.139*	0.159†	0.170*	0.098	0.109
	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.080)	(0.082)
No children	0.144	0.148	0.240	0.177	0.049	0.104
	(0.141)	(0.141)	(0.220)	(0.220)	(0.185)	(0.184)
City size (0-4)	0.017	0.018	0.043	0.038	−0.007	−0.002
	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.052)	(0.052)
R^2	0.081	0.095	0.090	0.108	0.080	0.093
Adj. R^2	0.071	0.082	0.071	0.085	0.062	0.071
Num. obs.	893	893	428	428	465	465
RMSE	1.368	1.360	1.409	1.398	1.336	1.330

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.



Figure C.2: Analysis with covariates, results parallel to Figure 2

D Analysis with Pretreatment Trusts as Covariates

Table D.1: Analysis with pretreatment trust in the JSDF as a covariate, results parallel to Table 2

	All		Without Casualties		With Casualties	
	Baseline	Interacted	Baseline	Interacted	Baseline	Interacted
(Intercept)	1.365***	0.991***	1.233***	0.794**	1.492***	1.174***
	(0.168)	(0.192)	(0.223)	(0.283)	(0.229)	(0.234)
Failed civilian control	−0.165*	0.509*	−0.113	0.663†	−0.210*	0.383
	(0.072)	(0.224)	(0.102)	(0.346)	(0.100)	(0.287)
Conservative ideology		0.082**		0.090†		0.074*
		(0.028)		(0.046)		(0.031)
Failure * Ideology		−0.129**		−0.148*		−0.114*
		(0.040)		(0.060)		(0.053)
Human casualties	0.014	0.016				
	(0.072)	(0.072)				
Trust in the JSDF (pretreatment)	0.758***	0.747***	0.780***	0.772***	0.739***	0.726***
	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.048)
R^2	0.426	0.433	0.450	0.460	0.404	0.410
Adj. R^2	0.424	0.430	0.448	0.455	0.402	0.405
Num. obs.	892	892	427	427	465	465
RMSE	1.076	1.071	1.056	1.050	1.095	1.093

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.



Figure D.1: Analysis with pretreatment trust in the JSDF as a covariate, results parallel to Figure 1

Table D.2: Analysis with pretreatment trust in the Prime Minister as a covariate, results parallel to Table 3

	All		Without Casualties		With Casualties	
	Baseline	Interacted	Baseline	Interacted	Baseline	Interacted
(Intercept)	1.291***	0.623**	1.270***	0.426	1.190***	0.677**
	(0.115)	(0.192)	(0.153)	(0.273)	(0.148)	(0.244)
Failed civilian control	−0.335***	0.206	−0.341**	0.734†	−0.330**	−0.293
	(0.078)	(0.257)	(0.115)	(0.409)	(0.106)	(0.315)
Conservative ideology		0.129***		0.160**		0.100*
		(0.035)		(0.050)		(0.050)
Failure * Ideology		−0.105*		−0.204**		−0.009
		(0.049)		(0.074)		(0.063)
Human casualties	−0.123	−0.116				
	(0.077)	(0.077)				
Trust in the PM (pretreatment)	0.589***	0.586***	0.598***	0.600***	0.581***	0.581***
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.041)
R^2	0.351	0.365	0.346	0.368	0.355	0.369
Adj. R^2	0.349	0.361	0.343	0.362	0.352	0.364
Num. obs.	892	892	427	427	465	465
RMSE	1.151	1.140	1.188	1.172	1.119	1.108

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.



Figure D.2: Analysis with pretreatment trust in the Prime Minister as a covariate, results parallel to Figure 2

E Analysis without Inattentive Respondents

E.1 Questions for detecting inattentive respondents

Satisficer detection question in the pretreatment questionnaire is worded as follows:

> *In this survey, we will also analyze how respondents read the questions and choose their answers, as this is considered valuable data. For this particular question, please make sure to select the number that results from adding 5 to 15.*

The response options are *1 time, 5 times, 10 times, 15 times,* and *20 times*. Those who didn't choose *20 times* are considered satisficers.

For the manipulation check question in the post-treatment questionnaire, the question is worded as follows:

> *Let us confirm a few things about the fictional scenario you read earlier. If you don't remember it, that's perfectly fine. But if you remember even a little, please choose the option that is closest to your memory.*
>
> - *Were there casualties in the JSDF member? (there were casualties, there were no casualties, I don't remember)*
> - *Did the Prime Minister ordered the JSDF to suspend the mission? (The Prime Minister ordered the suspension of the mission, The Prime Minister didn't order the suspension of the mission, I don't remember)*
> - *As a result, which decision was made by the JSDF? (the JSDF continued the mission, the JSDF suspended the mission, I don't remember)*

Respondents are considered inattentive to the treatments if they incorrectly answered any of the above manipulation check questions. The exclusion of satisficers and those who failed manipulation check reduced the dataset down to 781 respondents.

E.2 Main results without inattentive respondents

Table E.1: Analysis with covariates, results parallel to Table 2

	All		Without Casualties		With Casualties	
	Baseline	Interacted	Baseline	Interacted	Baseline	Interacted
(Intercept)	5.087***	3.915***	5.073***	3.756***	5.024***	3.981***
	(0.088)	(0.255)	(0.103)	(0.422)	(0.094)	(0.278)
Failed civilian control	−0.130	1.076**	−0.101	1.124*	−0.157	1.060*
	(0.099)	(0.333)	(0.142)	(0.532)	(0.138)	(0.420)
Conservative ideology		0.224***		0.251***		0.201***
		(0.044)		(0.075)		(0.051)
Failure * Ideology		−0.231***		−0.233*		−0.234**
		(0.059)		(0.094)		(0.076)
Human casualties	−0.076	−0.069				
	(0.099)	(0.097)				
R^2	0.003	0.045	0.001	0.054	0.003	0.038
Adj. R^2	0.000	0.040	−0.001	0.047	0.001	0.031
Num. obs.	781	781	371	371	410	410
RMSE	1.386	1.358	1.371	1.338	1.401	1.379

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.



Figure E.1: Analysis with covariates, results parallel to Figure 1

Table E.2: Analysis with covariates, results parallel to Table 3

	All		Without Casualties		With Casualties	
	Baseline	Interacted	Baseline	Interacted	Baseline	Interacted
(Intercept)	3.023***	2.183***	3.026***	1.833***	2.971***	2.444***
	(0.092)	(0.246)	(0.109)	(0.342)	(0.103)	(0.324)
Failed civilian control	−0.543***	−0.209	−0.548***	0.375	−0.538***	−0.749†
	(0.100)	(0.333)	(0.149)	(0.502)	(0.135)	(0.433)
Conservative ideology		0.160***		0.227***		0.101
		(0.046)		(0.066)		(0.063)
Failure * Ideology		−0.064		−0.176†		0.041
		(0.064)		(0.094)		(0.085)
Human casualties	−0.050	−0.040				
	(0.101)	(0.100)				
R^2	0.037	0.063	0.035	0.075	0.037	0.059
Adj. R^2	0.034	0.058	0.032	0.067	0.035	0.052
Num. obs.	781	781	371	371	410	410
RMSE	1.404	1.386	1.442	1.416	1.370	1.357

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$; †$p < 0.1$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.



Figure E.2: Analysis with covariates, results parallel to Figure 2

E.3 Results with additional covariates without inattentive respondents

Table E.3: Analysis with covariates, results parallel to Table 2

	All		Without Casualties		With Casualties	
	Baseline	Interacted	Baseline	Interacted	Baseline	Interacted
(Intercept)	4.757***	3.639***	5.258***	4.123***	4.087***	3.066***
	(0.344)	(0.405)	(0.490)	(0.580)	(0.489)	(0.546)
Failed civilian control	−0.122	1.050**	−0.157	1.069*	−0.116	1.080*
	(0.100)	(0.332)	(0.142)	(0.526)	(0.139)	(0.425)
Conservative ideology		0.221***		0.258***		0.187***
		(0.043)		(0.075)		(0.050)
Failure * Ideology		−0.225***		−0.234*		−0.232**
		(0.060)		(0.094)		(0.078)
Human casualties	−0.059	−0.049				
	(0.100)	(0.098)				
Political interest (0-3)	0.139*	0.148*	0.125	0.126	0.192†	0.203*
	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.098)	(0.095)	(0.100)	(0.099)
Political knowledge (0-3)	0.003	0.011	−0.043	−0.039	0.065	0.073
	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.092)	(0.089)	(0.091)	(0.090)
Gender (male)	0.181†	0.154	0.094	0.072	0.275†	0.245†
	(0.104)	(0.102)	(0.150)	(0.147)	(0.145)	(0.143)
Age (by 10 years)	0.043	0.030	−0.049	−0.072	0.141*	0.137*
	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.071)	(0.069)
Education (0-1)	−0.093	−0.072	−0.154†	−0.137	−0.073	−0.047
	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.096)	(0.096)
Married	−0.094	−0.125	−0.161	−0.262	0.026	0.032
	(0.140)	(0.139)	(0.195)	(0.193)	(0.203)	(0.200)
No children	−0.134	−0.124	0.149	0.064	−0.376†	−0.321
	(0.144)	(0.142)	(0.200)	(0.196)	(0.209)	(0.208)
City size (0-4)	0.010	−0.003	0.034	0.011	−0.012	−0.023
	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.056)
R^2	0.019	0.059	0.029	0.084	0.056	0.085
Adj. R^2	0.006	0.044	0.005	0.056	0.034	0.060
Num. obs.	774	774	369	369	405	405
RMSE	1.384	1.357	1.366	1.330	1.382	1.363

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.



Figure E.3: Analysis with covariates, results parallel to Figure 1

Table E.4: Analysis with covariates, results parallel to Table 3

	All		Without Casualties		With Casualties	
	Baseline	Interacted	Baseline	Interacted	Baseline	Interacted
(Intercept)	1.211***	0.427	1.165*	0.260	1.237**	0.602
	(0.330)	(0.391)	(0.490)	(0.526)	(0.452)	(0.574)
Failed civilian control	−0.515***	−0.326	−0.534***	0.272	−0.515***	−0.890*
	(0.098)	(0.333)	(0.144)	(0.508)	(0.132)	(0.419)
Conservative ideology		0.146**		0.205**		0.090
		(0.044)		(0.062)		(0.063)
Failure * Ideology		−0.037		−0.154		0.073
		(0.064)		(0.095)		(0.082)
Human casualties	−0.067	−0.054				
	(0.099)	(0.098)				
Political interest (0-3)	0.062	0.065	0.167†	0.165†	−0.031	−0.024
	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.099)	(0.097)	(0.094)	(0.095)
Political knowledge (0-3)	0.053	0.058	−0.030	−0.027	0.135	0.135†
	(0.061)	(0.059)	(0.092)	(0.089)	(0.083)	(0.082)
Gender (male)	0.419***	0.408***	0.383*	0.367*	0.445**	0.437**
	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.150)	(0.150)	(0.139)	(0.138)
Age (by 10 years)	0.209***	0.208***	0.183*	0.168*	0.224**	0.234**
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.074)	(0.073)
Education (0-1)	0.141*	0.155*	0.176†	0.190*	0.102	0.113
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Married	0.158	0.125	0.243	0.153	0.090	0.102
	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.239)	(0.239)	(0.178)	(0.174)
No children	0.119	0.138	0.250	0.176	−0.006	0.088
	(0.146)	(0.147)	(0.233)	(0.234)	(0.187)	(0.184)
City size (0-4)	0.026	0.026	0.039	0.022	0.013	0.031
	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.057)	(0.057)
R^2	0.101	0.125	0.105	0.137	0.109	0.132
Adj. R^2	0.089	0.112	0.082	0.110	0.089	0.108
Num. obs.	774	774	369	369	405	405
RMSE	1.359	1.342	1.403	1.381	1.325	1.311

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.



Figure E.4: Analysis with covariates, results parallel to Figure 2

E.4 Results with pretreatment trusts without inattentive respondents

Table E.5: Analysis with pretreatment trust in the JSDF as a covariate, results parallel to Table 2

	All		Without Casualties		With Casualties	
	Baseline	Interacted	Baseline	Interacted	Baseline	Interacted
(Intercept)	1.242***	0.833***	1.190***	0.685*	1.291***	0.961***
	(0.171)	(0.202)	(0.241)	(0.318)	(0.230)	(0.237)
Failed civilian control	−0.107	0.834***	−0.024	0.945**	−0.182†	0.766*
	(0.074)	(0.234)	(0.105)	(0.361)	(0.105)	(0.315)
Conservative ideology		0.086**		0.108*		0.067*
		(0.029)		(0.052)		(0.030)
Failure * Ideology		−0.181***		−0.184**		−0.184**
		(0.042)		(0.064)		(0.059)
Human casualties	0.010	0.006				
	(0.074)	(0.073)				
Trust in the JSDF (pretreatment)	0.783***	0.776***	0.786***	0.773***	0.783***	0.780***
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.046)
R^2	0.454	0.466	0.466	0.480	0.444	0.456
Adj. R^2	0.452	0.463	0.463	0.474	0.441	0.451
Num. obs.	774	774	368	368	406	406
RMSE	1.027	1.017	1.004	0.993	1.049	1.040

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.



Figure E.5: Analysis with pretreatment trust in the JSDF as a covariate, results parallel to Figure 1

Table E.6: Analysis with pretreatment trust in the Prime Minister as a covariate, results parallel to Table 3

	All		Without Casualties		With Casualties	
	Baseline	Interacted	Baseline	Interacted	Baseline	Interacted
(Intercept)	1.322***	0.553**	1.305***	0.282	1.236***	0.694**
	(0.124)	(0.203)	(0.164)	(0.289)	(0.160)	(0.257)
Failed civilian control	−0.428***	0.177	−0.462***	0.768†	−0.398***	−0.398
	(0.083)	(0.280)	(0.123)	(0.441)	(0.114)	(0.332)
Conservative ideology		0.150***		0.197***		0.108*
		(0.038)		(0.055)		(0.053)
Failure * Ideology		−0.116*		−0.234**		0.000
		(0.054)		(0.082)		(0.067)
Human casualties	−0.104	−0.095				
	(0.083)	(0.082)				
Trust in the PM (pretreatment)	0.581***	0.576***	0.593***	0.589***	0.571***	0.565***
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.044)
R^2	0.352	0.371	0.357	0.387	0.347	0.364
Adj. R^2	0.350	0.367	0.354	0.380	0.344	0.358
Num. obs.	774	774	368	368	406	406
RMSE	1.153	1.138	1.179	1.154	1.132	1.120

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.



Figure E.6: Analysis with pretreatment trust in the Prime Minister as a covariate, results parallel to Figure 2

F Preregistration (English Translation with Original Japanese Texts)

Data collection

No, no data have been collected for this study yet.

Hypothesis

<Hypothesis>

H1. If there were human casualties in the JSDF, trust in the JSDF is lower than if there were no casualties.

H2a. Suppose there were no human casualties in the JSDF. If the JSDF did not obey the order of the Prime Minister, trust in the JSDF is lower than if it obeyed the order.

H2b. Suppose there were human casualties in the JSDF. If the JSDF did not obey the order of the Prime Minister, trust in the JSDF is higher than if it obeyed the order.

H3a. The effect described in H2a is larger among conservative voters than liberal voters.

H3b. The effect described in H2b is larger among liberal voters than among conservative voters.

H4. If the JSDF did not obey the order of the Prime Minister, trust in the Prime Minister is lower than if it obeyed the order.

H5. The effect described in H4 is larger if there were human casualties in the JSDF than if there were no human casualties.

＜仮説＞

H1. 自衛隊に人的被害が発生した場合、発生しなかった場合と比べて自衛隊への信頼度が低下する。

H2a. 自衛隊に人的被害が発生しなかったとする。内閣総理大臣による任務継続命令に自衛隊が従わなかった場合、従った場合に比べて自衛隊の信頼度が低下する。

H2b. 自衛隊に人的被害が発生したとする。内閣総理大臣による任務継続命令に自衛隊が従わなかった場合、従った場合に比べて自衛隊の信頼度が上昇する。

H3a. H2aで説明された効果は、リベラルな有権者よりも、保守的な有権者の間で大きくなる。

H3b. H2bで説明された効果は、保守的な有権者よりも、リベラルな有権者の間で大きくなる。

H4. 内閣総理大臣による任務継続命令に自衛隊が従わなかった場合、従った場合に比べて内閣総理大臣の信頼度が低下する。

H5. H4で説明された効果は、自衛隊に人的被害が発生しなかった場合よりも、発生した場合の方が大きくなる。

<Trust in the JSDF and Prime Minister>

As of now, how much do you trust the following institutions? Suppose 'don't trust it at all' as 1 and 'trust it very much' as 7. Please choose the number that is closest to your feeling.

Target: the Prime Minister, the Diet, police, the Self-Defense Forces

Choice: Don't trust it at all (1), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, trust it very much (7)

＜自衛隊および内閣総理大臣への信頼度＞

質問文：現在、あなたは下記の機関をどの程度信頼していますか。「まったく信頼しない」を 1、「非常に信頼する」を 7とした場合に、あなたのお気持ちに最も近いものを選んでお答えください。

項目：内閣総理大臣、国会、警察、自衛隊

選択肢：まったく信頼しない（1）、2、3、4、5、6、非常に信頼する（7）

Conditions

At the screen just prior to asking the outcome question, randomly show one of four scenarios about the overseas mission of the JSDF (logistical support) to respondents. Create two patterns of with or without human casualty and two patterns of the success and failure of civilian control. Total combinations of 2 x 2 = 4 scenarios are generated.

従属変数設問を聞く 1 つ前の画面で、自衛隊の海外派遣（後方支援）に関する4つのシナリオを、4つのランダムにわけた回答者のグループに対して提示する。人的被害の有無で2パターン、内閣総理大臣の任務継続命令への遵守／拒否で2パターン作り、2×2で4つの異なるシナリオを作る。

<Experiment Texts>

On the issue of supporting a small to medium-sized country in Africa, the United States entered the armed conflict with the opposing organization. The Prime Minister ordered the JSDF to dispatch for the purpose of providing logistical support (help carrying personnel and materials outside of weapons). Given the order, the JSDF provided the logistical support.

In the middle of the mission, combatants of the opposing organization threw explosive materials into the JSDF post onsite. (A) due to the explosion. Given the incident, the Prime Minister held a cabinet meeting to discuss whether to continue the JSDF's mission or to withdraw. As a result, the Prime Minister decided to order the JSDF to continue the mission. (B).

In each experimental group, texts in (A) and (B) are manipulated as follows.

Group 1 (without casualties; successful civilian control):
(A) = There were no human casualties
(B) = The JSDF followed the order and continued the mission

Group 2 (without casualties; failed civilian control):
(A) = There were no human casualties

(B) = The commanding officer of the JSDF thought that the risk of continuing the mission was too high and made an arbitrary decision to discontinue the mission

Group 3 (with casualties; successful civilian control):
(A) = Two members of the JSDF were killed
(B) = The JSDF followed the order and continued the mission

Group 4 (with casualties; failed civilian control):
(A) = Two members of the JSDF were killed
(B) = The commanding officer of the JSDF thought that the risk of continuing the mission was too high and made an arbitrary decision to discontinue the mission.

＜実験文＞

アフリカの中小国に対する支援をめぐり、米国は敵対組織と武力紛争に突入しました。内閣総理大臣は、米軍の後方支援（武器弾薬を除く物資と人員の輸送）を目的として、自衛隊に出動を命じました。これを受け、自衛隊は後方支援を実施しました。

任務の途中に、敵対組織の戦闘員が自衛隊の駐屯している場所に爆発物を投げ込みました。爆発によ【　A　】した。これを受け内閣総理大臣は閣議で自衛隊を撤退させるか任務を継続させるか検討をしました。その結果、内閣総理大臣は自衛隊に対し任務の継続命令を出すことにしました。【　B　】しました。

実験群ごとに、以下のように【　A　】と【　B　】の部分を変更する。

実験群1（人的被害なし、文民統制成功）
【　A　】= る死亡者はいませんで
【　B　】= 自衛隊は命令に従い、任務を継続

実験群2（人的被害なし、文民統制失敗）
【　A　】= る死亡者はいませんで
【　B　】= 現地にいる自衛隊の指揮官は、任務の継続はリスクが高いと考え、独自の判断で活動を中止

実験群3（人的被害あり、文民統制成功）
【　A　】= り自衛隊員が2名死亡しま
【　B　】= 自衛隊は命令に従い、任務を継続

実験群4（人的被害あり、文民統制失敗）
【　A　】= り自衛隊員が2名死亡しま
【　B　】= 現地にいる自衛隊の指揮官は、任務の継続はリスクが高いと考え、独自の判断で活動を中止

<Independent Variables>

Using experimental groups, create the following two variables.

Human casualties: 1 = with human casualties, 0 = without human casualties

Civilian control: 1 = success, 0 = failure

＜独立変数＞

実験条件を用いて、以下の２つの変数を作成する。

人的被害： 1 = 人的被害あり、0 = 人的被害なし 文民統制： 1 = 成功、0 = 失敗

<Moderator>

Using the following pretreatment question, measure ideology:

Question text: About your way of thinking about politics, which of ”liberal (left-wing)” and ”conservative (right-wing)” do you think you belong to? Suppose ”I feel strongly that I am liberal (left-wing)” is 0 and ”I feel strongly that I am conservative (right-wing)” is 10. Please answer with a number between 0 and 10.

Options: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10

＜条件付け変数＞

以下の実験事前質問を用いて、イデオロギーを測定する。

質問文：政治的な考え方について、あなたは、「リベラル（左派）」、「保守（右派）」のどちらに属すると思いますか。「強く自分はリベラル（左派）であると感じる」を0、「強く自分は保守（右派）であると感じる」を10として、0から10の数字でお答えください。

選択肢：0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10

Analyses

<Analysis>

For each hypothesis, estimate a regression model through Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method using following dependent variable (Y), independent variable (X), moderator (M), and other covariates (Z). Don’t include the variables that are not mentioned.

For each analysis, the model equation is expressed as follows.

(Without moderator) $Y_i = b_0 + b_1 * X_i + d * Z_i + e_i$

(With moderator) $Y_i = b_0 + b_1 * X_i + b_2 * M_i + b_3 * X_i * M_i + d * Z_i + e_i$

H1. Y=Trust in the JSDF, X=Human casualties, Z=Civilian control

H2a. Y=Trust in the JSDF, X=Civilian control (Limit the sample to human casualties= 0)

H2b. Y=Trust in the JSDF, X=Civilian control (Limit the sample to human casualties= 1)

H3a. Y=Trust in the JSDF, X=Civilian control M=Ideology (Limit the sample to human casualties= 1)

H3b. Y=Trust in the JSDF, X=Civilian control M=Ideology (Limit the sample to human casualties= 0)

H4. Y=Trust in the Prime Minister, X=Civilian control, Z=Human casualties

H5. Y=Trust in the Prime Minister, X=Civilian control, M=Human casualties.

＜分析＞

仮説ごとに、以下の従属変数（Y）、独立変数（X)、条件付け変数（M）、その他共変量（Z)を用いた回帰モデルを最小二乗法（OLS)で推定する。言及がない変数は含めない。

各分析におけるモデル式は以下の通りである。

（条件付変数なし）$Y_i = b0 + b1 * X_i + d * Z_i + e_i$

（条件付変数あり）$Y_i = b0 + b1 * X_i + b2 * M_i + b3 * X_i * M_i + d * Z_i + e_i$

H1. Y=自衛隊への信頼度、X=人的被害、Z=文民統制

H2a. Y=自衛隊への信頼度、X=文民統制(サンプルを人的被害=0に限定）

H2b. Y=自衛隊への信頼度、X=文民統制(サンプルを人的被害=1に限定）

H3a. Y=自衛隊への信頼度、X=文民統制、M=イデオロギー(サンプルを人的被害=0に限定）

H3b. Y=自衛隊への信頼度、X=文民統制、M=イデオロギー(サンプルを人的被害=1に限定）

H4. Y=内閣総理大臣への信頼度、X=文民統制、Z=人的被害

H5. Y=内閣総理大臣への信頼度、X=文民統制、M=人的被害

<Hypothesis Testing >

For hypothesis testing, use robust standard errors and $p < .05$ and $p < .10$ (two-sided test) as critical values. Hypotheses are supported if following coefficients are statistically significant in specified directions.

H1. b_1 (direction is positive)

H2a. b_1 (direction is positive)

H2b. b_1 (direction is negative)

H3a. b_3 (direction is positive), or even when b_3 is not statistically significant, if the statistical significance of $b_1 + b_3 * M$ changes within the possible values of M.

H3b. b_3 (direction is positive), or even when b_3 is not statistically significant, if the statistical significance of $b_1 + b_3 * M$ changes within the possible values of M.

H4. b_1 (direction is positive)

H5. b_3 (direction is positive), or even when b_3 is not statistically significant, if the statistical significance of $b_1 + b_3 * M$ changes within the possible values of M.

＜仮説検証＞

仮説検証にはロバスト標準誤差を使用し、有意水準としてp¡.05とp¡.10（両側検定）を用いる。以下の係数が指定の向きで統計的有意になった場合に、仮説が支持される。

H1. b1（向きは負）

H2a. b1（向きは正）

H2b. b1（向きは負）

H3a. b3（向きは正） もしくは、b3が統計的有意でなくてもb1+b3*Mの統計的有意性がとりうるMの値の範囲内で変化する場合

H3b. b3（向きは正）、もしくは、b3が統計的有意でなくてもb1+b3*Mの統計的有意性がとりうるMの値の範囲内で変化する場合

H4. b1（向きは正）

H5. b3（向きは正）、もしくは、b3が統計的有意でなくてもb1+b3*Mの統計的有意性がとりうるMの値の範囲内で変化する場合

Outliers and Exclusions

Exclude item no responses from the main analysis. As a robustness check, also conduct the analysis that replacs item non-response with the middle value in response scales.

各質問に無回答である対象者は主要分析から除くが、無回答を選択肢の中央にある値にリコードした分析も頑健性チェックとして行う。

Sample Size

Participants are Japanese voters who are 18 years old or older (n=900). Power analysis of two samples t-test with power=0.8, Cohen's d=0.3, and significance level=0.05 (two-sided) indicated that the required minimum sample size is 175 (per sample) x 4 = 700.

被験者は900人の18歳以上の日本人有権者とする。検出力を0.8、Cohen's dを0.3、有意水準をp<.05の両側検定として、2標本t検定を対象とした検出力分析を行ったところ、必要とされる最低サンプルサイズは1標本あたり175 x 4 = 700人であった。

Other

Following exploratory analyses may be conducted:

(1) Analyses that control for, or are moderated by, political interest, political knowledge, gender, age, educational attainment, marital status, having a child or not, and the place of residence.

(2) Analysis that excludes those who failed manipulation check.

(3) Analysis that excludes those who are identified as satisficer based on satisficer check questions.

以下の様な探索的分析を行う可能性がある。

（１）政治関心、政治知識量、性別、年齢、教育程度、婚姻状態、子どもの有無、居住地域を統制する、もしくはこれらの変数による条件付けを含む分析。

（２）マニピュレーションチェック設問に誤答した回答者を除いた分析。

（３）サティスファイサー検出設問による省力回答者を除いた分析。

Name

Experiment about the effects of human casualties and the failure of civilian control in the JSDF's overseas mission on trust in the JSDF and the Prime Minister

自衛隊の海外派遣における人的被害の発生と文民統制の失敗が自衛隊および内閣総理大臣の信頼度に与える効果に関する実験