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Abstract

This study examines how economic elites respond to the erosion of democratic checks and balances, focusing on the Japanese legislature from 1936 to 1942. Using an original dataset of Diet members' biographies and board memberships, it analyzes the Imperial Japanese Army's consolidation of power and shifts in parliamentary voting patterns amid the suppression of dissent. Employing difference-in-differences and event-study designs, the study evaluates the effects of two key shocks: economic sanctions and wartime procurement. Legislators tied to sanction-hit sectors—such as textiles and petrochemicals, the weakest performers in the stock market—shifted toward authoritarian alignment. Biographical and legislative records suggest this shift was facilitated by regime-backed campaign finance. In contrast, legislators from procurement-dependent sectors, such as automobiles, maintained stable voting behavior. The findings complicate the conventional view that sanctions prompt elites to advocate international policy change. Instead, they show that sanctions can drive vulnerable actors to submit domestically, thereby accelerating authoritarian consolidation.

Elite alignment is widely understood to play a pivotal role in the consolidation of authoritarian rule (Haggard and Kaufman 2021; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; Grillo et al. 2024). In both political and business domains, prevailing accounts suggest that elites support authoritarian regimes when they are rewarded—through material benefits, policy influence, or institutional power. Sanctions, in turn, are thought to push elites in the opposite direction, by raising the costs of loyalty. Yet these perspectives may overstate the autonomy of elites and understate the conditions under which alignment stems not from advantage, but from constraints. Politicians facing declining influence, and firms weakened by sanctions, may find resistance untenable and align with regimes out of dependence rather than strategic choice. This study brings together insights from research on elite defection and economic coercion to examine how material vulnerability and institutional ties bind elites to authoritarian governance.

Japan's prewar political trajectory provides a valuable context for examining elite behavior under institutional strain. While not a full democracy, the country had implemented universal male suffrage by 1925, and the legislature retained meaningful veto power—often successfully challenging military or aristocratic authority. A substantial share of legislators—around 70 percent—also held business leadership roles, placing them at the intersection of political and economic power. By the late 1930s, as military influence expanded, formal institutions persisted but lost substance: accountability eroded, dissent was curtailed, and legislative checks on the executive steadily weakened. In this shifting environment, elite responses—whether resistant, accommodating, or passive—became increasingly consequential.

This study examines how material interests shaped elite responses to rising military influence in prewar Japan, focusing on legislators with corporate board ties to key economic sectors. It analyzes ten pivotal legislative episodes in which legislators' attitudes toward the Imperial Japanese Army's suppression of dissent were revealed—such as the motion to expel legislators critical of the military—highlighting how elites navigated the tension between defending institutional autonomy and accommodating authoritarian encroachment.

The analysis draws on two major economic shocks that disproportionately affected specific sectors. The first was the U.S. sanctions (1940-41), which hit trade-dependent industries such

as petrochemicals, textiles, and silk. The second was the expansion of military procurement, formalized in 1939 and broadened in 1942, which selectively benefited firms supplying the army and navy. Legislators tied to these sectors faced diverging economic incentives: some experienced acute disruption, while others stood to gain from state contracts. Tokyo Stock Exchange data show that these shocks were largely unanticipated, producing sudden and erratic price movements.

To assess how these shocks influenced elite behavior, the study employs difference-in-differences and event-study designs, using sectoral exposure as treatment and legislative behavior as the outcome. All models include legislator and event fixed effects.

The findings reveal a clear contrast: legislators from sanctioned sectors were significantly more likely to support military-backed policies after the shock, with robust results across specifications and no evidence of pre-trends. By contrast, legislators from procurement-linked sectors showed no comparable shift—and, if anything, became more distant from military actors over time—challenging the assumption that economic beneficiaries of war automatically back authoritarian rule.

A parallel case from the 1940 occupation of French Indochina further underscores this divergence. While rubber producers—beneficiaries of annexation—showed little political alignment, rice producers facing import competition exhibited clear authoritarian convergence. Nationally, legislators from sanctioned sectors were more likely to join the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA), a mass political organization closely aligned with the military, and to win seats in the 1942 election—even after losing financial support from traditional funders. At the individual level, the case of Kunitaro Koyama—a legislator from the sanctioned silk industry—shows how economic strain pushed him to realign politically and seek campaign funding from executive actors, abandoning earlier constitutional commitments. His trajectory exemplifies how diminished bargaining power, rather than ideological conviction, drove elite collaboration in the final years of competitive politics.

Alternative explanations—such as nationalist sentiment in response to external threats, fears of nationalization, or strategic delegation to a competent executive—are assessed using both quantitative and qualitative evidence. Yet none account for the timing or behavior of sanctioned

legislators as convincingly as the bargaining power framework advanced here.

Legislators from sanctioned sectors consistently aligned with the military, while those from procurement-dependent sectors—whose firms benefited from military spending—showed no such tendency. This divergence runs counter to expectations based on ideology or rally-around-the-flag effects. It highlights how economic vulnerability, rather than conviction, drove elite collaboration: those with fewer alternatives sided with the regime out of necessity.

These findings refine how we understand elite collaboration during authoritarian consolidation. They show that power asymmetries between elites and executives determine whether elites support or resist authoritarian initiatives. Regimes need not co-opt or repress all elites; securing a critical mass of vulnerable, easily co-opted elites can stabilize rule without broad repression. Weakened elites—especially those under economic strain—often engage in passive collaboration, using authoritarian legislatures to negotiate rents and concessions (Reuter and Robertson 2013). By contrast, stronger elites may resist encroachment, leveraging their bargaining power to demand institutional checks that regimes cannot—or need not—grant.

The study advances understanding of authoritarian transitions by showing how legislators and business leaders shape regime trajectories (Arriola, DeVaro, and Meng 2021; Pospieszna and Vetulani-Cęgiel 2021; Waldner and Lust 2018; Grillo et al. 2024). Unlike voters, elites exercise shifting political and institutional leverage, making their alignment crucial during periods of military ascendancy and political uncertainty (Lorch 2021; Beliakova 2021). The analysis also extends research on business–state relations and economic sanctions by linking sectoral exposure to elite behavior. Evidence from Japan shows that sanctions, meant to discipline regimes, can instead weaken internationally connected actors and shift the balance toward authoritarian consolidation (Szakonyi 2021; Afesorgbor and Mahadevan 2016).

Legislative Elites, Horizontal Accountability, and Authoritarian Shift

Legislative elites are widely regarded as key guardians of horizontal accountability, expected to check executive power and defend institutional balance (Waldner and Lust 2018). Yet their frequent failure to prevent the erosion of legislative authority presents a persistent puzzle (Miller 2021). Unlike ordinary voters, they hold both a vested interest in preserving democratic institutions

and the strategic capacity to resist backsliding (Grillo et al. 2024).

Nevertheless, elite passivity is a central driver of democratic erosion, as political and economic actors often choose inaction when confronted with violations of democratic norms. While polarization and inequality are widely recognized as catalysts of authoritarian electoral shifts (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018), elites frequently facilitate authoritarian consolidation through tacit support aimed at safeguarding their interests (Haggard and Kaufman 2021; Winters 2011). Rather than initiating takeovers, they often allow backsliding to unfold unchallenged, thereby weakening the very institutions they are expected to uphold (Svolik 2013). This dynamic reflects Ermakoff's (2008) "paradox of abdication," in which elected elites relinquish authority despite having a rational interest in preserving it. Business-aligned legislators, for instance, could plausibly safeguard their material and political interests by defending institutional constraints, yet their choice to dismantle them in alliance with opaque authoritarian forces remains a central puzzle. These dynamics extend beyond electoral democracies to hybrid regimes and civil-military relations (Lorch 2021).

Executive aggrandizement—where the executive gradually expands authority at the expense of other branches—often proceeds without elite resistance, accelerating the erosion of checks and balances and weakening judicial independence and legislative oversight (Levitsky and Way 2010; Bermeo 2016). Historical cases such as Nazi Germany show how political and economic elites, whether through passive acquiescence or active support, enabled authoritarian consolidation to protect their status and assets (Wieviorka 2009; Ferguson and Voth 2008).

To explain the breakdown of horizontal accountability, recent scholarship highlights how crises create strategic dilemmas for institutional "restrainers" (Miller 2021; Howell, Shepsle, and Wolton 2023; Gratton and Lee 2024). Howell, Shepsle, and Wolton (2023) show that emergencies can align the short-term goals of restraining institutions with those of the executive, prompting temporary transfers of authority that prove difficult to reverse. Gratton and Lee (2024) similarly demonstrate how liberty-security trade-offs during crises compel restrainers to concede power, entrenching executive dominance. These dynamics echo historical cases such as wartime Britain, where Parliament delegated sweeping powers to the executive under the guise of crisis management.

Interwar Japan presents a compelling yet puzzling case. As a hybrid regime with a legislature capable of exercising veto power, it experienced the erosion of democratic checks and balances with the consent of many lawmakers. Yet this process was uneven—some resisted until the end, while others capitulated. This divergence, coupled with the military’s limited competence in managing the home front, challenges explanations that view delegation as a response to executive capability.

This study adopts a coalitional perspective on democratic breakdown (Waldner and Lust 2018), emphasizing power asymmetries and elite heterogeneity. Unlike voters, elites wield context-dependent political capital; for economic elites in particular, their shifting influence within democratic institutions shapes incentives to either defend or accommodate authoritarian expansion.

Table 1: Elite Responses to Political Capital Shocks: Theoretical Frameworks

	Elites better-off in crises	Elites worse-off in crises
Conventional	Pro-regime	Anti-regime
Delegation model	Pro-regime	Pro-regime
Alternative (coalitional)	Independent (Too costly to buy off)	Pro-regime (Bought off)

Politically weak or institutionally marginalized actors are especially prone to co-optation. Arriola, DeVaro, and Meng (2021), in a cross-national study of African regimes, show that weak opposition leaders are more likely to be co-opted through strategic cabinet appointments. Timoneda (2021) argues that unproductive sectors, perceiving structural disadvantage, may align with anti-democratic coalitions, citing cases from the United States and Spain. Lührmann and Lindberg (2019), using global data, find that smaller party factions may support democratic erosion if they see it as a way to expand influence or protect partisan interests.

These studies establish the broader logic of selective incorporation within the repression–co-optation framework (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006): weak elites are low-cost to buy off and often receptive to integration. Because authoritarian regimes need not neutralize all opponents (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), targeting vulnerable elites to secure a critical mass of support becomes a cost-efficient strategy of consolidation.

Yet most empirical work tends to treat elite weakness as a static attribute or trend—focusing

on who is weak at a given moment—rather than a dynamic condition that evolves with changing economic and political circumstances. This focus can inadvertently conflate pre-existing marginalization with vulnerability that emerges within established elites, making it harder to observe how the same actors become more co-optable as their material bases erode.

Building on this insight, the analysis focuses on how shifts in economic capital reshape political capital and, in turn, the cost of co-optation. Legislative elites losing influence during backsliding may risk forfeiting power and privilege, yet authoritarian legislatures often serve as arenas for brokering rents and concessions (Reuter and Robertson 2013). For elites already waning in democratic relevance—such as those lacking strong campaign finance—alignment with authoritarian coalitions can appear politically rational. For many legislators in hybrid regimes, particularly those tied to business interests, democratic institutions function more as instrumental tools than principled commitments, becoming expendable when the perceived costs of exit are low.

In contrast, strong elites are often too costly to buy off and too dangerous to repress, so regimes tend to tolerate their independence while relying on weaker actors for political support. In Japan, for instance, some legislators continued to criticize the government until 1945. Their persistence reflects how variation in elite power—who depends on the regime and who can resist it—shapes the course of authoritarian consolidation even within constrained institutions.

Selective co-optation—often described as a “divide and rule” strategy—fragments elite opposition and stabilizes regimes without full repression. This dynamic, coalitional view links material vulnerability to shifts in elite alignment, showing how targeted incorporation of weakened actors sustains authoritarian rule.

Economic Elites, Sanction, Procurement, and Backsliding

The relationship between business and politics is well established (Bonardi, Hillman, and Keim 2005; Hertel-Fernandez 2016), but less is known about how legislators with business backgrounds behave politically—especially in their voting patterns (Krcmaric, Nelson, and Roberts 2020). Business influence is often strongest when private-sector actors hold key policymaking roles, such as central bank governors (Adolph 2013) or finance ministers (Jochimsen and Thomasius

2014). At the subnational level, Szakonyi (2013) shows that Russian mayors with business ties used procurement to benefit their own firms, highlighting how personal economic interests shape policy behavior.

Few studies, however, examine how business-backed legislators position themselves toward democratic governance. This study addresses that gap through prewar Japan, where most legislators also held business posts, offering a setting to test how economic interests shaped elite responses to authoritarian consolidation.

External economic shocks, however, can profoundly alter these relationships. Economic sanctions are a common tool for pressuring regimes that violate international norms, including democratic principles, yet their domestic effects are often complex and counterintuitive (Baldwin and Pape 1998; Hufbauer et al. 2009). Intended to weaken authoritarian governments by constraining economic elites, sanctions can instead bolster regime stability through “rally around the flag” dynamics (Egger, Syropoulos, and Yotov 2024) or create rent-seeking opportunities for politically connected actors. Sanctions on Venezuela’s oil industry, for instance, allowed regime-linked elites to profit from illicit smuggling networks, reinforcing authoritarian entrenchment (Bull and Rosales 2023).

While most research emphasizes macro-level outcomes, Afesorgbor and Mahadevan (2016) show that export-oriented sectors bear disproportionate costs, whereas non-tradable sectors remain relatively insulated. This sectoral asymmetry produces divergent political incentives: some elites resist regime change to protect their interests, while others align with incumbents to secure protection. Despite the expansion of targeted sanctions designed to disrupt regime networks (Egger, Syropoulos, and Yotov 2024), little is known about how business elites—as strategic actors—respond to such external pressures.

Sanctions on Japan before the Pacific War illustrate how external shocks interacted with parliamentary institutions, exposing fractures within the elite. Unlike modern theories that emphasize the deterrent or signaling functions of sanctions (Drezner 2003, 2022), the Japanese case represents one of the earliest comprehensive efforts to alter state behavior through economic coercion (Mulder 2022). It thus provides a valuable setting to examine how sanctions influenced elite alignment and institutional dynamics within a semi-democratic regime.

Conventional wisdom holds that sanctions generate economic pain that, in turn, produces public discontent and elite pressure for political change. Elites most exposed to sanctions are therefore expected to defend democratic institutions, since sanctions are meant to create incentives for affected groups to mobilize against authoritarian regimes (Marinov 2005).

This study proposes an alternative mechanism: sectors severely hit by sanctions or international isolation may become so weakened, politically and economically, that they cannot resist institutional erosion, making them more susceptible to co-optation.

Table 2: Sectoral Exposure and Expected Political Alignment

	Procurement Exposure	Sanctions Exposure
Conventional	Pro-Militarism, Pro-Backsliding	Anti-Militarism, Anti-Backsliding
Alternative	Independent	Pro-Militarism, Pro-Backsliding

A frequent reference point is apartheid-era South Africa, where sanctions are credited with spurring business opposition to authoritarian rule (Levy 1999). Yet that resistance came mainly from large, resource-rich firms such as Anglo-American, whose financial security made reform advocacy low risk. It is less clear whether weaker firms—without comparable buffers—have played similar roles in democratic transitions.

Procurement represents the opposite dynamic. Unlike sanctions, government procurement programs—such as military contracts—allow regimes to co-opt economic elites by distributing material benefits. Albertus, Fenner, and Slater (2018) term this “coercive distribution,” whereby central authorities consolidate power or suppress dissent through selective resource allocation. Similarly, Rosenfeld (2020) finds that recipients of government benefits are more likely to support incumbents during episodes of backsliding. Procurement thus serves as a direct channel for aligning business interests with autocratic consolidation.

Yet the earlier discussion of legislative elites suggests a competing logic. While war profiteers might appear natural allies of authoritarian regimes (Fergusson and Voth 2008), their dependence on the state can be reciprocal. Autocrats often avoid full nationalization—lacking capacity to manage firms efficiently—as seen in wartime Japan and Germany (Marshall 1967). Beneficiaries of procurement may instead use their leverage to resist centralization, seeking to preserve autonomy and protect long-term interests (cf. Hirschman 1970). Even when materially advantaged, their

existing influence under democratic institutions can diminish incentives to support authoritarian shifts.

In both sanction and procurement contexts, the adage “democracy costs money” is apt. Sanctions can deprive firms of the resources needed to sustain pro-democracy coalitions, weakening those most inclined to resist the regime. Procurement, by contrast, can empower firms tied to the state to defend their autonomy when continued cooperation depends on maintaining economic leverage.

These dynamics yield two competing expectations. The conventional view holds that firms benefiting from the regime will support it, while those harmed will resist. This study instead argues that weakened sectors often lack the capacity to oppose authoritarianism, whereas stronger sectors—shielded by economic power—can afford to defend institutional autonomy.

Ultimately, elite behavior reflects not only by preferences but also by political capital and capacity to act.

Historical and Institutional Context

After its establishment in 1890, Japan’s House of Representatives (Diet) gradually expanded democratic participation, achieving universal manhood suffrage in 1925. Although the emperor could appoint cabinets, military chiefs, and senior bureaucrats without legislative consent, all laws and budgets required Diet approval, giving it substantial influence over governance (Takenaka 2014).

The military was constitutionally independent but depended on Diet approval for budgets and mobilization (Mimura 2011). Cabinets appointed by the emperor thus had to bargain with legislators for support. Even non-partisan cabinets such as those of Admirals Saitō and Okada (1932–1936) secured parliamentary majorities only through concessions to party factions.

Despite political assassinations and instability in the early 1930s, the Diet continued to convene regularly, debate policy, and scrutinize government actions until 1941. Political repression remained limited and largely targeted communists and anarchists (Shillony 1991).

Electoral institutions further reinforced the Diet’s pluralism. Elections operated under a Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system, with three to five representatives per district.

Because multiple co-partisans competed within the same district, party cohesion was weak, and candidates relied heavily on personal networks and business sponsors rather than party platforms. Many legislators held corporate board positions, allowing business interests to mobilize electoral support and influence policy (Pekkanen 2006).

In this context of fragmented but still competitive politics, the Diet frequently challenged military influence. The Katō and Hamaguchi cabinets, backed by business-friendly parties, reduced army and navy budgets in the 1920s and early 1930s. In 1937, General Hayashi dissolved the Diet after failing to pass a pro-army budget but won only 40 of 466 seats, forcing his resignation. Legislative opposition also contributed to the downfall of the Hirota (1937), Konoe (1939), and Abe (1940) cabinets.

By the early 1940s, however, this balance collapsed. The creation of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA) in 1940 dissolved all political parties to support the war effort, though limited opposition persisted through new parliamentary groups. In the 1942 election, non-endorsed candidates still captured about 35 percent of the vote and 18 percent of seats, and elections remained relatively free from coercion (Shillony 1991, 12). Yet by the war's end, the Diet had become largely ceremonial, passing nearly all government bills with minimal debate as army authorities pre-cleared parliamentary speeches.

During this period, the army lacked cohesive leadership and suffered from internal divisions and command dysfunction—as seen in the occupation of French Indochina and the failed attempt to nationalize key industries (discussed in the following section). Mid-level officers often acted without central approval, yet the army's political mandate nonetheless expanded, strengthening the executive branch.

Rather than abolishing competitive elections, the army and its allies targeted anti-military politicians through selective repression and electoral disadvantage (Furukawa 2001).

Within a decade, Japan's political landscape transformed. In 1936, legislators still competed for power and exercised veto authority; by 1942, political parties had disappeared, and the Diet largely ratified policies that curtailed its own power. This paradox—how legislators, many tied to business interests and invested in their own autonomy, nevertheless yielded to military pressure—lies at the core of this study.

Data Collection and Preliminary Research Design

This research examines how Japanese legislators responded to the army's efforts to undermine democracy, using a difference-in-differences approach. The dependent variables are legislators' actions and voting behavior during key moments of military influence. The independent variables include legislators' affiliations with industries affected by exogenous economic shocks—either negative (due to sanctions) or positive (through military mobilization). To account for individual legislator traits and time-specific shocks, the models use both legislator and event fixed effects, with full details provided in the research design section below.

Voting behavior and parliamentary affiliations were collected from parliamentary minutes and endorsement lists for resolutions, proposals, and questions (*Shūgiin Jimukyoku* 1928–1945). While the minutes are publicly available online, the endorsement lists are housed at Waseda University Library.

Biographical data were compiled from *Jinji Kōshinroku* (*Jinji Kōshinjo* 1937–1943) and the *Shūgiin Yōran* (*Shūgiin Jimukyoku* 1937, 1942), both available in the Japanese Diet Library. These datasets were digitized using OCR software (Google Cloud Vision and ABBYY FineReader) and verified by multiple research assistants for accuracy.

Biographical information includes place and date of birth, education, titles, prior occupations, political career, and military service. The dataset also records whether a legislator belonged to an aristocratic family, political dynasty, or was adopted into one. Political career variables capture prior service as local or prefectural councillor, mayor, cabinet member, committee chair, party executive, or member of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA). Legislators' economic interests are proxied by board memberships in private firms or business associations, as listed in *Jinji Kōshinroku*, which distinguishes between current board memberships and former occupations. These affiliations are coded as binary indicators representing legislators' connections to specific industries.

Economic shock timing and affected sectors were identified using *Kabukai Nijūnen* (*Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha* 1937–1943) and *Kabushiki Nenkan* (*Nomura Tokushichi Shōten* 1937–1944), both archived at Waseda University Library. From *Kabukai Nijūnen*, I extracted sectoral index summaries reporting end-of-month values by industry, which were digitized and standardized

into consistent time series for cross-sectoral comparison. *Kabushiki Nenkan* provided complementary quantitative and qualitative information on firm- and sector-level disruptions, including government interventions, and offered a more detailed industrial classification used to refine sectoral categories in the analysis.

Government procurement data were obtained from the Army's *Shitei Kōjō Sagyōjō Meibo* (Ministry of War 1940, 1942) and the Navy's *Gyōshu Betsu Kaigun Kanri Kōjō Meibo* (Ministry of Navy 1942), both housed at the Ministry of Defense Archive. They contain comprehensive lists of procured factories and ownership information. Sample images of archival sources and digitized materials are provided in Online Appendix I.

Dependent Variables: Anti-Democratic Legislative Actions

The army's repeated violations of Japan's democratic institutions—especially after martial law was imposed in 1936—undermined parliamentary oversight and suppressed dissent. This study defines the dependent variable as legislators' cross-party resistance or acquiescence to army-backed proposals.

After the failed 1936 coup, the military's institutional power expanded. Active-duty officers were again required for army and navy minister posts, and the new Military Affairs Bureau (*Gunmukyoku*) oversaw defense policy beyond military affairs.¹

The coup was framed as a response to political corruption, and the military-led cabinet adopted the slogan “renewing civilian administration.” The new Cabinet Research Bureau and Military Affairs Bureau led anti-party campaigns blaming corruption for the unrest.²

The army's anti-democratic stance became explicit in late 1936. On October 23, the Military Affairs Division proposed administrative restructuring, declaring that “given the rejection of party politics based on majority rule, the system will inevitably assume the form of a one-party state.”³ A week later, the Tokyo Asahi reported plans to restrict suffrage to household heads and veterans and to introduce a “Political Party Law” limiting party activity in the Diet—measures discussed in a five-minister council on parliamentary reform.⁴

¹ *Teikoku Gikaishi*, vol.26, ed. *Shakai Mondai Shiryō Kenkyūkai* (Kyoto: Tōyō Bunka-sha, 1978), 455.

² *Teikoku Gikaishi*, vol.26, 457.

³ *Teikoku Gikaishi*, vol.26, 459.

⁴ *Teikoku Gikaishi*, vol.27, 334.

Army factions and Interior Ministry allies, despite internal rifts, shared hostility toward parties and civil liberties. On April 5, 1937, Interior officials resolved to suppress criticism of military expansion,⁵ foreshadowing the later fusion of military and bureaucracy—embodied by Tōjō’s dual War–Interior posts and Abe’s leadership of the IRAA.

Legislators initially resisted, blocking army-backed bills on military secrecy and electricity nationalization and decisively defeating pro-army candidates in the 1937 election. Yet within five years, the army accomplished what repression alone could not—subduing the very majority that had once defied it. This study investigates how that paradox unfolded.

A key challenge in this research is the limited documentation of legislators’ stances on anti-democratic cabinet proposals. Controversial bills rarely reached open votes, as the Diet typically blocked them in committee. For example, the Hayashi cabinet—widely seen as anti-democratic—introduced 38 bills, only 11 of which passed, while the remaining 27 lapsed without formal rejection.

In contrast, legislator-initiated bills, motions, resolutions, and questions were far more likely to reach open votes. These proposals circulated in advance and included endorsements listing supporting parliamentarians. Such endorsements serve as the primary evidence of who supported or opposed the suppression of legislative authority and democratic norms. Additional insights come from records of pro-army legislators who split from moderate factions in 1937, 1939, and 1940, with affiliations documented for each session.

This study examines six instances where legislator-tabled activities revealed individual political positions and four cases where parliamentary group splits and reorganizations reflected attitudes toward democratic institutions. Brief descriptions and coding appear in Table 3, with detailed accounts in Online Appendix A. Analyses limited to either legislator-tabled activities or parliamentary group splits are presented in Online Appendix B.

All resolutions, motions, questions, and pieces of legislation analyzed in Table 3 share a common thread: they capture cross-party resistance—or collaboration—in suppressing dissent and weakening democracy.⁶ Resolution 70-11/-12, Legislation 73-19/-20, and Legislation 74-

⁵ *Teikoku Gikaishi*, vol.30, 239.

⁶ In Japan’s prewar Diet, “legislation” referred to formal bills, “resolutions” to declarative statements, and “motions” and “questions” to procedural tools.

28/-31 were rare moments of cross-party unity against military and police repression. On these occasions, multiple parliamentary groups submitted identical proposals on the same day, seeking unanimous endorsement—though none fully achieved it. By contrast, symbolic resolutions, such as those praising soldiers or commemorating imperial anniversaries, consistently passed unanimously. Most other initiatives in the early period reflected partisan divides shaped by proposers' affiliations, making these episodes exceptional instances of cross-party cooperation before the 1940 party dissolution.

Unlike resolutions or legislation, motions were seldom used in the 1930s, when party discipline reduced their necessity. Their use surged after 1940 as the army penetrated parliamentary procedures and weakened party influence, turning motions into battlegrounds between the army and the Diet. Motion 75-1 supported the army's push to expel an anti-army member; Motion 76-1/-2 and Questions 76-5/14 challenged unconstitutional subsidies to pro-army legislators; and Motion 77-1 sought to shield Prime Minister Tōjō from critical questioning.

Some legislative initiatives of the period may appear self-serving, but this does not contradict the paper's central claim. Oversight, transparency, and tolerance of dissent were also institutional strategies through which business-aligned legislators advanced their own material interests. The Prosecutors Office Bill (Legislation 73-19/-20), often caricatured as retaliation against prosecutors enforcing election laws, in fact reflected growing concern over prosecutorial overreach—especially after politically charged cases widely regarded as fabricated. The 1937 Teijin Incident, later discredited as a false-flag scandal aimed at discrediting elected politicians,⁷ exemplified these fears. The bill thus represented not mere self-protection but a defense against unchecked judicial power.

Although party discipline in Japan was weak, cross-party collaboration on proposals and questions remained rare until 1939. Yet, the party splits that did occur consistently centered on attitudes toward the army and parliamentary democracy. In April 1937, Prime Minister General Hayashi's attacks on party resistance to the military led to the Diet's dissolution and splintering within all major parties. By 1939, further fragmentation produced openly pro-army factions—such as the Nakajima and Yanai groups—breaking away from moderates.⁸

⁷ Teikoku Gikaishi, vol. 32, p. 163.

⁸ The 1937 and 1939 splits unfolded gradually but did not coincide with the exogenous shocks analyzed in

In 1940, the army-backed Konoe cabinet created the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA) to establish a one-party state, absorbing cooperative members from all factions and dissolving the existing parties. Dissenters formed new opposition groups—*Dōkōkai* (Liberal) and *Kōua Dōmei* (Hawkish but anti-IRAA). The 1942 election marked another turning point: the army, through the IRAA, formally endorsed candidates and financed their campaigns. Yet this alignment was not entirely coercive—legislators strategically sought or rejected IRAA backing, revealing the calculated nature of their collaboration (Furukawa 2001).

To address concerns about event selection bias, placebo tests using other resolutions, proposals, questions, motions, and open votes from the 76th–79th parliamentary sessions (between the party dissolution and the 1942 election) are reported in Online Appendix C. The six cross-party legislations analyzed in the main text represent the full set of identifiable instances in which legislators collectively opposed the army; most other initiatives during this period were partisan in nature.

A related concern is that the selected events may appear idiosyncratic and difficult to compare. Because few bills were ever reintroduced, truly identical cases are unavailable. However, these ten episodes form a coherent set: each captures cross-party positioning toward army encroachment on the legislature, observed at different stages of democratic erosion. The sequence thus traces how resistance and accommodation evolved—from legislative defense of civil oversight to procedural struggles over parliamentary autonomy—as the army consolidated control. While the cases differ in form, together they provide the most systematic and comparable evidence available for examining Japan’s gradual democratic breakdown.

The coding process is detailed in Table 3. Legislators who died, were expelled, suspended, or recalled were excluded, limiting the sample to those who attended parliamentary sessions. No legislators were assassinated or executed during the study period.

The erosion of Japan’s semi-democracy is often attributed to institutional weakness (Berger 1977), yet institutions themselves were endogenous and contested. The events analyzed here show that both the judiciary and legislature were active arenas of struggle, not passive constraints.

this paper (e.g., July 1937 Sino-Japanese War or the 1940/41 sanctions), ensuring they do not confound the difference-in-differences results. Legislators in pro-army factions are coded as 1 in later splits, though some later returned to anti-army groups (coded as 0).

Legislative efforts—such as Legislation 73-19/-20—helped strengthen judicial independence, and the courts repeatedly ruled the IRAA unconstitutional, even ordering a re-election in Kagoshima's 2nd district in 1944. Conversely, the army's veto power over cabinet formation was restored in 1936 amid post-coup turmoil. These dynamics reveal that institutional change reflected ongoing power struggles between the executive and legislature, rather than predetermined weakness, underscoring the value of examining discrete political events.

Summary Statistics: Profile of Legislators

Figures 1–2 summarize data on 1,086 legislators serving between 1936 and 1942, the period in which the Diet gradually ceded its authority. The average legislator was 50.8 years old, and 14% did not survive the war.

As Figure 1 shows, 69% of legislators held executive or board positions in private firms, reflecting the close integration of business and politics.⁹ Roughly one-third also belonged to industrial or employers' associations, though sectoral details are often unclear. About 69% attended university, and professions such as law, teaching, journalism, and the bureaucracy were well represented. Samurai or aristocratic lineage accounted for only 6%.

Figure 2 presents the distribution of business affiliations by sector, following the 1937 *Kabushiki Nenkan* classification. Two additional categories—*Sanctioned* and *Procured* sectors—identify industries most affected by international sanctions and wartime procurement. 17.4% of legislators were tied to sanctioned sectors, while roughly 10% had interests in procured firms; only the electricity sector underwent partial nationalization.

Table 4 shows that traditional indicators of ideology or personal background—such as party affiliation, military service, or bureaucratic experience—did not consistently predict support for the army by 1942. Authoritarian alignment thus cut across partisan and occupational lines.

Figures 3–4 visualize legislative networks based on shared backgrounds. In Figure 3, dark squares denote independents opposing the army and light circles those endorsed by it; links represent shared education, regional origin, or career ties. The network shows no strong clustering by endorsement, suggesting that personal and regional ties had limited influence on democratic

⁹ In prewar Japan, corporate executives typically served on company boards and were directly involved in management.

Table 3: 10 occasions studied in this paper

Date	Event description and coding
1937.3.22	Resolution 70-11/-12 to Exterminate Human Rights Violations
	Criticized suppression of dissent by police/army. Endorsers coded 0, non-endorsers 1
1937.4.30	20th General Election (PM Gen. Hayashi)
	Anti-democratic factions split from major parties. Pro-Hayashi:1, Anti-Hayashi:0.
1938.2.21-3.4	Legislation 73-19/-20 Prosecutor Office Bill; Court Composition Bill
	Promoted judicial independence and criticized interference. Endorse:0, otherwise:1
1939.3.11	Legislation 74-28/-29/-30/-31 Amendments to Code of Criminal Procedure
	Aimed to prevent unwarranted detention of dissent by police. Endorse:0, otherwise:1
1939.5.30	Split of Two Major Political Parties
	Seiyukai fully split into pro-Army and neutral factions, while Minseito gradually followed suit. Nakajima, Yanai, or other pro-Army factions are coded as 1, and all others as 0.
1940.2.3	Motion 75-4 to refer Rep. Takao Saitō to the disciplinary committee.
	Army pressured legislators to expel him after his anti-army speech. Endorse:1, otherwise:0
1940.10.11	Formation of Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA)
	Pro-government legislators consolidated power to suppress dissent and support the war effort. IRAA members: 1, others (eventual Dokokai, Koua-domei, or independent): 0
1941.2.15	Question 76-5 on the Current Situation and Governmental Leadership
1941.2.27	Question 76-14 on the National Polity and IRAA
1941.2.28	Motion 76-1/-2 on the Use of the second reserve budget to support IRAA
	Criticism of government suppressing parties other than IRAA. Endorse any:0, otherwise:1.
1941.11.18	Motion 77-1 to conclude questioning of the State Ministers of Tojo Cabinet
	Attempt to suppress critical questioning against PM Tojo. Opposed:0, Supported:1
1942.4.4	The 20th General Election: Endorsement by IRAA
	Army backed endorsed candidates, obstructed others. Endorsed:1, non-endorsed:0





Figure 1: Background of the Legislators 1936-42 (%)




Figure 2: *Business Board Membership of the Legislators (>30 Legislators; %)*

alignment. This finding challenges the conventional view of Japan's prewar Diet as a personalist institution dominated by factional or friendship-based politics.

Figure 4 maps connections based on shared business or interest-group ties. A weak clustering of independents in the lower-left quadrant suggests that economic affiliations—rather than personal networks—played a more important role in shaping legislators' political alignment.

Table 4: 1942 army endorsement: Background of Incumbents

1942 Election	IRAA (Army) Endorsed	Independent (Anti-Army)
Former Seiyukai party (Conservative)	87	85
Former Minseito party (Liberal)	112	70
Military experience	26	41
Police officer	14	15
Worked at Ministry of Interior	22	18
Born before 1890 (First election)	159	176
Lawyer	49	59
Studied in the US	10	8




Figure 3: 1942 army endorsement –Network Analysis using Career, Background, and Birthplace




Figure 4: 1942 army endorsement –Network Analysis using Business and Interest Group Affiliations (line denotes the same sectors)

Table 5 shows no pre-1936 partisan bias between legislators in sanctioned and procured sectors, confirming adequate pre-treatment balance.

Figures 5 and 6 present t-test results for business categories and pro-army attitudes in the 1937 and 1942 elections, covering legislators who served throughout the 1937–1942 term.

Table 5: Legislators present in 1936: Initial Party Balance Test

Legislator Status	Sanctioned	Procured	Neither
Seiyukai party (Conservative)	38	24	203
Minseito party (Classical Liberal)	33	26	196
Others	7	3	28

Business executives were mildly anti-army in 1937 but shifted toward pro-army positions by 1942. Those linked to procured sectors remained largely stable and anti-army, whereas legislators tied to sanctioned sectors exhibited the sharpest shift—from anti- to strongly pro-army—over the same period.




Figure 5: Business-Related Variables: T-Test Results for 1937 General Hayashi Coalition




Figure 6: Business-Related Variables: T-Test Results for 1942 Army Endorsement

Empirical Analysis 1: Economic sanction

This section examines how economic sanctions and trade disruptions affected legislators from tradable sectors, focusing on whether they supported or opposed the army's consolidation of power before and after the sanctions.

Following Japan's military expansion in China and Southeast Asia, Western powers—particularly the United States—imposed successive trade restrictions, summarized in Table 6. Early measures by the League of Nations, Britain, and the Netherlands had limited impact, but two major U.S. embargoes produced sharp market shocks. In response, the government banned short-selling and directed banks to purchase stock indices to stabilize the Tokyo exchange.

Figure 7 shows the Tokyo Stock Market Index from 1937 to 1942, as reported in *Kabukai Nijūnen (Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha 1924–1944)*. Solid lines indicate U.S. sanctions; dashed lines mark key war events—the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (1937), Germany's invasion of Poland (1939), the fall of Paris (1940), and the attack on Pearl Harbor (1941). Despite interventions, the market fell sharply after the U.S. embargoes, while other wartime events produced smaller reactions and no comparable policy responses (*Kabushiki Nenkan, Nomura Shōten 1937–1944*).

The timing of the first major U.S. sanction is crucial for causal inference. The September 1940 trade embargo followed Japan's occupation of northern Indochina—an operation that was not centrally planned. In early September, during ongoing negotiations to secure transit rights through French Indochina, Army Operations Chief Tominaga Kyōji prematurely ordered troop mobilization without cabinet approval. Although Tokyo had reached an agreement with Vichy France on August 4, Lieutenant General Nakamura Akito unilaterally advanced troops on September 23, sparking a brief two-day clash. The incident provoked outrage within the Navy and Army High Command, leading to the dismissal of Tominaga and other senior officers.¹⁰

Because the operation was unauthorized and widely condemned as a failure of military discipline, the ensuing U.S. embargo was seen as an unforeseen consequence rather than a predictable outcome of policy choice. From the legislators' perspective, this makes the sanctions plausibly exogenous.

Japan's 1941 occupation of southern Indochina, by contrast, was a deliberate diplomatic

¹⁰ *Teikoku Gikaishi*, Vol.40, p.207.

move negotiated with Vichy France and carried out without conflict. Yet the U.S. response—a full asset freeze and oil embargo—again stunned policymakers.¹¹ Contemporary accounts describe disbelief that Washington would act so harshly, given its leniency toward Germany after France's fall. Industry groups likewise assumed trade would continue via neutral intermediaries, as it had with China, according to the 1942 Textile Yearbook (*Nihon Sen'i Kenkyūkai* 1942).

Table 6: Timeline of American and Allied Embargoes on Japan and Government Reactions in Market

Date	Event
1937.7.7	<i>Marco Polo Bridge incident (the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War)</i>
1938.9.30	League of Nations authorized its members to impose economic sanctions on Japan
1939.7.26	Termination of the US-Japan Trade Agreement
1939.8.23	British export restrictions on war materials (petroleum, iron etc)
1939.8.31	<i>Germany's invasion of Poland and Japan's declaration of neutrality</i>
1940.6.14	<i>Fall of Paris; Armistice on June 22</i>
1940.6–8	US announces a series of export restrictions (steel, iron, lead, and gasoline)
1940.9.23	<i>Imperial Japanese Army enters Northern French Indochina</i>
1940.9.26	US imposes a full embargo on iron and petroleum exports to Japan
1940.10.4	Japanese government bans short-selling in financial markets Japanese government increases deposit requirements
1941.2.8	Dutch export restrictions on war materials (petroleum, iron etc)
1941.7.21	<i>Imperial Japanese Army enters Southern French Indochina</i>
1941.7.26	US and UK freeze Japanese assets, ceasing all trade
1941.7.28	Japanese government asks major banks to stabilize the stock market
1941.12.7	<i>Attack on Pearl Harbor</i>

¹¹ *Teikoku Gikaishi*, Vol.42, 19.




Figure 7: Stock Index: Solid vertical lines: US sanctions; Dashed lines: War-related Events

Sectoral Analysis of Economic Sanction

Monthly reports in *Tōyō Keizai* highlight sharp sectoral disparities following the U.S. embargo. Even export-oriented industries such as textiles suffered from bans on oil and iron, compounded by the contraction of yen-dollar trade. While few sectors were spared, tradable and resource-dependent industries bore the brunt—most notably steel, petroleum, and petrochemicals. Although Japan sourced some iron domestically and from its colonies, dependence on imports placed severe strain on steel firms, while petroleum shortages worsened even in occupied regions before 1942.¹²

Tables F1–F2 in Online Appendix F summarize Japan's trade composition before and after the sanctions. In 1938, imports were dominated by raw materials—most notably raw cotton, which accounted for nearly one-quarter of total imports—while exports centered on finished textile goods. Textile products made from cotton, silk, and nylon occupied six of the top export categories. By 1942, total exports had fallen by roughly half: cotton textiles declined to one-tenth of their pre-sanction levels, and raw silk exports nearly ceased. Occupied territories failed to replace lost Western markets, underscoring the severe disruption to Japan's export-oriented industries (*Nihon Sen'i Kenkyūkai*, ed. 1942).

Figure F1 in Online Appendix F plots sectoral stock indices from *Kabukai Nijūnen* (Shōwa 12–

¹² *Nihon Keizai Nenpō*, vol. 44 (Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha, 1940), 205.

18 editions, 1937–1942). Export- and import-oriented sectors consistently underperformed, with sharp declines after the sanctions. Petrochemical stocks suffered the steepest losses, while textile shares also fell markedly, reflecting the combined effects of trade restrictions and supply shortages.

Although most legislators' firms were unlisted, their economic interests likely followed these market patterns. Small and medium-sized firms were closely tied to major sectoral actors and thus faced similar shocks.¹³

Sectoral indices were compiled by *Tōyō Keizai* at an aggregate level. Coverage varied across industries—textiles were fragmented across multiple listings, while steel and trading firms were few and grouped with related sectors—so observed differences reflect both market performance and reporting structure.

Figure F2 in Online Appendix F shows that insurance companies' share prices, despite the asset freeze, were largely unaffected—likely due to their domestic client base. In contrast, stock exchange and brokerage firms suffered steep declines in market valuation, reflecting dependence on foreign capital, while banks experienced only mild losses.

The worst-performing category was the *Miscellaneous* index, which included trading firms heavily engaged in international commerce; its precise composition is unknown.

Drawing on these patterns, I classify the following as sanction-affected sectors: textiles (cotton, silk, synthetic), petroleum and petrochemicals, steel, stockbrokers, and international trade—five of the six weakest indices. Insurance, though underperforming, shows no sanction-specific effect and is therefore excluded. Each sector is analyzed separately in robustness checks.

Empirical Specifications on Economic Sanction

This section uses a difference-in-differences and event-study design to analyze the political behavior of legislators affected by sanction shocks, compared to those unaffected. The individual legislator is the unit of analysis.

To estimate the effects, all models incorporate legislator fixed effects and event (date/legislation)

¹³ Nihon Keizai Nenpō, Vol. 54, 174.

fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the individual legislator level to account for potential correlations within individual records. The primary specifications can be expressed as:

$$y_{k,t} = \gamma_k + \delta_t + \beta (Sanctioned_k \times Post_t) + \epsilon_{k,t}$$

where $y_{k,t}$ is a binary outcome indicating whether legislator k adopted a pro-army position in event t . As noted in the previous section, pro-army attitudes are observed through recorded votes, endorsements, factional alignment, and sponsorship or opposition to motions directly related to the army's attempts to weaken parliamentary authority. γ_k are legislator fixed effects, and δ_t are event fixed effects.

$Sanctioned_k$ equals 1 if legislator k held a corporate board position in a sector defined as sanctioned in the previous section, and 0 otherwise. Legislators without such ties form the comparison group. $Post_t$ takes 1 if the event occurred after the onset of sanctions.

Earlier sanctions imposed by the League of Nations, Britain, and the Netherlands had limited market impact. The initial phase of U.S. sanctions, including the full embargo on iron, unfolded between May and September 1940, a period during which no relevant legislative events were recorded. The nearest events are in February 1940 (Motion 75-1) and October 1940 (the formation of the IRAA and two opposition factions). September 26, 1940 marks the peak of the initial sanction shock, with the sharpest stock market declines observed in sanctioned sectors, and is therefore used as the cutoff. Treatment is applied uniformly from this point onward, rather than staggered, because all sanctioned sectors experienced severe disruption simultaneously. The sectors affected again after the 1941 sanctions were already under strain by late 1940, as shown in Online Appendix F.

A “sanction shock” is thus defined as the sudden exposure of a legislator's affiliated sector to embargoes that produced measurable market disruption. In some specifications, I exclude the two events between the initial embargo (Sep 1940) and the full and final U.S. sanctions of July 1941 to create a cleaner pre/post contrast.

Event-study models apply the same specification, using 1937 as the baseline to capture long-term dynamics and demonstrate the absence of systematic pre-trends.

Potential confounding shocks—such as the Battle of Khalkhin Gol or the proposed nationalization of the electricity sector—are examined in later sections. These posed localized or sector-specific risks but did not cause the same widespread disruption as the U.S. sanctions. Online Appendix B further presents robustness checks restricting either the outcome variables (e.g., legislation only) or the legislator sample (e.g., board members only) to confirm that results are not driven by coincident shocks.

Results on Economic Sanction DiD

Table 7 reports the difference-in-differences results. Legislators tied to sectors affected by economic sanctions became significantly more pro-army and anti-democratic after the sanctions took effect. Given the binary outcome, the coefficients (0.140–0.168) are large in magnitude. Models 2 and 4 exclude mid-sanction events (September 1940–July 1941), while Models 3 and 4 restrict the sample to legislators who participated in all ten events. Results remain robust across specifications.

Figure 8 presents the event-study estimates, tracing pro-army attitudes among legislators linked to sanctioned sectors. The trends closely match the DiD results, showing a sharp post-September 1940 shift toward pro-army positions—with no pre-trends beforehand—consistent with the sanctions being the first major economic shock to affect sectors asymmetrically. The two sanction dates, September 1940 and July 1941, are marked with dotted lines.

Figure 9 disaggregates results by sector. Except for International Trade—where stock data are incomplete—patterns mirror the main findings. Sectors directly hit by sanctions and suffering sharp market losses, notably petrochemicals, show the strongest pro-army shifts. The leading export sector, cotton textiles, shows a mild pre-trend but turns sharply pro-army after 1940, especially relative to the broader textile group. Small-scale oil sellers, excluded from prioritized supply, also display a pronounced shift. Overall, sanctions mark a turning point as legislators from exposed sectors realigned away from anti-army, pro-legislative positions.

Figures 10–11 show placebo tests for unaffected sectors. As expected, insurance—whose stock prices were stable—shows flat results, as do most non-tradable or domestically oriented industries. Newspaper-linked legislators exhibit a slight pro-army shift only after Pearl Harbor

in 1942.

Figure 12 examines banks, whose shares declined modestly. Their pattern is weaker but parallels that of sanctioned sectors. To probe further, legislators are divided into two groups: those connected to mutual banks (small, local institutions) and those linked to commercial or industrial banks with international exposure. Only the latter show a significant pro-army shift, underscoring that vulnerability to foreign asset freezes shaped political realignment.

Overall, the evidence shows that exposure to sanction-induced economic distress was a key catalyst in shifting legislators from affected sectors toward pro-army, anti-democratic positions.

Table 7: Summary of Difference-in-Differences Results with Two-Way Fixed Effects: Sanction (1940.9)

Dependent variable:	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	<i>Anti-democratic, Pro-army action</i>			
Post-Sanction × Sanctioned	0.158***	0.168***	0.154**	0.140*
Legislator-clustered SE	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.060)
Two-way clustered SE	(0.055)	(0.063)	(0.053)	(0.052)
Those present at all 10 events			X	X
Dropped events in 1940.9-41.7		X		X
FE: Events	X	X	X	X
FE: Legislators	X	X	X	X
Num.Obs.	4833	3960	3039	2432
R2	0.487	0.477	0.447	0.424
R2 Adj.	0.381	0.340	0.383	0.339
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001			




Figure 8: Difference-in-differences graph for sanctioned sectors: (95%CI)




Figure 9: Pro-army attitude in various sanction-hit sectors




Figure 10: Placebo: Pro-army attitude in various unaffected (non-tradable) sectors




Figure 11: Placebo: Pro-army attitude in various unaffected (not heavily traded) sectors




Figure 12: Sectors that are not categorized as "Sanctioned" but show similar trends

Empirical Analysis 2: Wartime Procurement

This section examines the political behavior of legislators whose businesses were affected by wartime procurement, assessing whether they supported or opposed the army's consolidation of power.

Following the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, Japan faced severe resource shortages that disrupted both the economy and military operations. Although the army sought control over key weapons factories, the preamble of the 1942 Navy Designated Factories and Plants List highlights its limited administrative capacity: even among Class A (army-controlled) factories, one officer was responsible for supervising three sites.

During this period, there was no nationalization or expropriation of private firms, nor did the army or navy place representatives on corporate boards. Instead, firms were compensated for revenue losses caused by restricted civilian production, with compensation calculated from the previous three years of financial records.

To analyze how procurement affected legislators' political alignment, I digitized the 1942 *Navy Designated Factories and Plants List* and the 1940/1942 *Army Procurement Contractors Lists* archived at the Ministry of Defense. Together, they identify 2,428 firms contracted by the military. Legislators were coded as "procured" if they held board positions in firms supplying goods or materials to the army or navy. The 1940 list covers only army suppliers, with 868 additional firms appearing by 1942—indicating that most procurement relationships were established well after the 1937 war began.

Before the procurement system was reorganized in 1939, following the outbreak of World War II in Europe, contracts were mostly negotiated ad hoc without a centralized framework (Miwa 2015). Despite Japan's declared neutrality, procurement expanded substantially after 1939.¹⁴

Certain sectors, such as pharmaceuticals, automobiles, and heavy industry, were disproportionately represented in the procurement lists compared to firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. As these sectors do not entirely overlap with the procured firm dataset, they are analyzed separately.

Because data on early-stage procurement are limited, the precise timing of shocks cannot

¹⁴ *Nihon Keizai Nenpō*, Vol.41, 111.

be identified with certainty. As shown in Figure F3 (Online Appendix F), sectors linked to procurement exhibited little or even negative market reaction to the 1937 mobilization, reflecting the army's limited industrial reach at the time. The informal 1938 list included only 358 firms—about one-seventh of the 1942 total—indicating that military involvement in industry was still minimal. Accordingly, the 1937 shock is excluded from the difference-in-differences analysis.

By contrast, stock prices in related sectors rose sharply after Germany's invasion of Poland in August 1939 and Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, marking the rapid expansion and formalization of procurement programs. Both developments were unanticipated, providing plausibly exogenous shocks for analysis. Consequently, greater emphasis is placed on the event-study specification, which captures these dynamics and allows assessment of pre- and post-trends.

Table 8: Percentage of Different Sectors in the 1942 Procurement List

Weapons, Machinery, Tank, Ship, Munitions	63.3%
Airplane parts and related goods	13.1%
Food	6.6%
Clothing (Leather/Linen/Wool)	4.6%
Sanitation / Medicine	3.1%
Transport Machinery	1.8%
Textile (Cotton/Silk/Synthetic)	1.1%

Empirical Specifications: Wartime Procurement

This section employs a difference-in-differences framework, analogous to the previous analysis, using legislators with interests in mobilized sectors as the treatment group. Treatment is defined by board memberships in firms designated by the Army or Navy for procurement.

$$y_{k,t} = \gamma_k + \delta_t + \beta Procured_k \times Post_t + \epsilon_{k,t}$$

Where $Procured_k$ is a dummy variable that takes one if the legislator k experienced mobilization shock during the period of this study, and $Post_t$ takes 1 if the vote or other relevant event t is after the occurrence of the shock. As in the previous analysis, $y_{k,t}$ is an outcome dummy variable, pro-army attitude shown by legislator k at an occasion t . γ_k are legislator-level fixed effects, δ_t are event fixed effects.

Given the limited precision of early procurement data, the analysis focuses on the unanticipated expansions following Germany's invasion of Poland (1939) and Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor (1941). The event-study specification is emphasized, as it best captures these shocks'timing and pre- versus post-trends.

Empirical Results: Wartime Procurement

Tables 9 and Figure 13 show no systematic pro- or anti-army shift among legislators linked to firms in the 1942 procurement programs, despite the substantial business opportunities these contracts created with the army and navy.

In Table 9, Models 1 and 3 use the German invasion of Poland (Aug. 31, 1939) as the shock, while Models 2 and 4 use Pearl Harbor (Dec. 7, 1941). Columns 3 and 4 restrict the sample to legislators present at all ten events analyzed in this paper. Across specifications, no discernible effects are found for procurement-linked legislators, even though their sectors'stock prices surged after both events. The figures display both shock dates with dotted lines; treatment is not staggered.¹⁵

Figure 15 shows a modest downward trend among legislators tied to industrial procurement sectors, suggesting a mild anti-army drift. Because the parallel-trends assumption is violated, these results are only suggestive and should be interpreted with caution. Figure 14 focuses on industrial firms only, comparing legislators connected to firms on the procurement list with those linked to non-procurement firms. Despite noisy pre-trends, the overall pattern mirrors the sectoral analysis: procurement-linked legislators drifted slightly away from the army, while others moved closer.

Overall, the null findings across models indicate that legislators tied to procurement firms were not significantly more likely to align with the army during the studied period.

¹⁵ The Marco Polo Bridge Incident (July 7, 1937) is also shown in thinner dotted line. Unlike later shocks, it did not positively affect procurement firms'stock performance.

Table 9: Summary of DiD Results with 2-way Fixed Effects: Procurement

Dependent variable:	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	<i>Anti-democratic, Pro-army action</i>			
Wartime × Procured	0.044	−0.036	0.049	−0.067
Legislator-clustered SE	(0.051)	(0.084)	(0.051)	(0.087)
Shock: Aug. 31, 1939 (Poland)	X		X	
Shock: Dec. 7, 1941 (Pearl Harbor)		X		X
Those present at all 10 events			X	X
FE: Events	X	X	X	X
FE: Legislators	X	X	X	X
Num.Obs.	4833	4833	3039	3039
R2	0.484	0.484	0.444	0.444
R2 Adj.	0.378	0.378	0.380	0.380
<i>Note:</i>		*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001		




Figure 13: Event Study Graph for Procured Firms




Figure 14: Event Study Graph for Legislators Tied to Procured Industrial Firms Compared to Industrial Firms without Procurement Contracts




Figure 15: Pro-Army Attitude in Procured Sectors




Figure 16: Pro-Army Attitude in Potentially Procured Sectors




Figure 17: Event Study Graph for Procured, Sanctioned, or Procured and Sanctioned Firms

Empirical Results: Sanction vs Wartime Procurement

Figure 17 presents a combined (“horse-race”) analysis comparing legislators linked to procurement firms, those in sanctioned sectors, and those connected to both. These effects are estimated simultaneously. The results show a pronounced pro-army shift among legislators tied to sanctioned sectors, especially after the first wave of sanctions.

These findings challenge the conventional assumption that beneficiaries of military expansion were the regime’s strongest supporters. Instead, legislators representing sectors damaged by international isolation were more likely to align with the army, whereas those in procurement-linked industries—despite material gains—showed little change in political stance.

Robustness Checks

The main difference-in-differences and event-study models include two-way fixed effects and clustered standard errors, limiting the scope for additional controls. Table B1 in Online Appendix B reports subsample analyses that isolate either parliamentary factions or legislative actions within the pro-army score, avoiding direct comparisons between factional splits and roll calls. Across all specifications, results remain positive and statistically significant. Additional robustness checks in Table B2—such as excluding socialist legislators, Tokyo representatives, former cabinet ministers, or legislators without business board memberships—produce similar results.

Figure 27 tests whether background or ideological traits—such as military or bureaucratic service, veteran or colonial ties, foreign study, or education—explain pro-army alignment. Across all panels, no systematic association appears: elites from every background behaved similarly by 1942. This absence of ideological or institutional effects reinforces that alignment with the army was driven less by personal identity than by economic exposure.

Figure 19 shows no clear geographic clustering of legislators connected to sanctioned or procured sectors, or of pro-army alignment itself. Legislators from procured sectors were somewhat concentrated in industrial prefectures but remained widely dispersed, including in rural regions. A Kolmogorov–Smirnov test (Appendix C) finds no significant age differences across groups.

Online Appendix D examines whether residual party loyalties shaped legislative behavior after party dissolution. Network analysis of co-voting patterns in the 76th–79th parliaments (1940–1942) shows no clustering among former Minseitō or Seiyūkai legislators—the two largest prewar parties—indicating that informal party discipline had effectively collapsed.

Online Appendix E analyzes the 1937 and 1942 elections using lasso regression to assess the relative influence of sanctions and procurement exposure. Related factors strongly predict pro-army alignment in 1942 but not in 1937, underscoring that economic shocks, rather than inherited partisan orientation, drove the realignment.










Figure 18: Pro-army Attitude with (Potentially) Ideological Factors



Sanctioned Legislators



Procured Legislators



Pro-Army Legislators: April 1937



Pro-Army Legislators: April 1942

Figure 19: Share of Sanctioned, Procured, and Pro-Army Legislators across Legislative Districts

Discussion on Mechanism 1: Parallel Analysis with Annexation of French Indochina

The paradoxical findings warrant closer scrutiny. Economically weakened sectors may have aligned with authoritarian forces through several channels—the most intuitive being co-optation: distressed groups were cheaper to buy off, while thriving sectors were costlier to capture. The evidence points in this direction.

Japan's annexation of French Indochina, which precipitated the sanctions, was undertaken primarily for strategic rather than economic reasons—aimed at cutting China's supply routes rather than securing new markets or resources. As a result, its direct economic impact was limited, reducing concerns about confounding shocks but still producing uneven sectoral effects. The rubber industry, for instance, benefited modestly and escaped the shortages that afflicted other strategic sectors.

By contrast, the rice sector suffered. The Abe cabinet's 1939 rice price controls proved hard to enforce amid resistance from agricultural associations.¹⁶ Cheap Indochinese imports further depressed domestic prices, weakening the bargaining position of rice farmers (Ishikawa 1941, 32). The *Teikoku Nōkai Nenpō* (Imperial Agricultural Association Annual Report) expressed alarm that colonial expansion deepened mainland price declines (Sawara 1941, 29–31).

No single interest group in the Diet represented rice farmers alone. The Imperial Agricultural Association (AA) functioned as an umbrella organization encompassing multiple commodity unions—covering livestock, tea, tobacco, forestry, sericulture, and others—each representing their respective producers. Because rice producers lacked a dedicated union, legislators affiliated only with the general AA, or with the Land Cultivation Union (*Kōchi Kyōkai*), are likely to have been primarily engaged in rice farming.

To test whether these disruptions shaped political alignment, I re-estimate the difference-in-differences model, focusing on sectors affected by the Indochina annexation. Figure 20 shows no political shift among rubber manufacturers—mirroring the null results for procurement beneficiaries—but a clear pro-military drift among legislators affiliated with the general Imperial Agricultural Association (AA) or the Land Cultivation Union (*Kōchi Kyōkai*), both of which likely represented rice producers. In contrast, legislators belonging to specialized AA sub-

¹⁶ *Teikoku Gikaishi*, Vol. 38, p. 161.




Figure 20: Pro-Army Attitude of the Sectors Affected by the Occupation of Northern and Southern French Indochina (Dashed Line)

unions (e.g., livestock, tea, or sericulture) show no comparable change.

Although this test is coarse—lacking precise data on Indochinese import volumes, black-market rice prices, or legislators' direct exposure to the rice economy—it closely parallels the main findings. Economic vulnerability, rather than ideology, emerges as the central driver of elite realignment.

Discussion on Mechanism 2: Imperial Rule Assistance Association Funding

Although officially designated a non-political organization, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA) actively supported pro-military candidates in elections. It received generous public funding, and staff salaries reportedly tripled those of ordinary public servants. While such funds were not legally intended for campaigning, strong evidence indicates they were used for that purpose (Furukawa 2001). In addition to its annual budget of 8,300,000 yen, the IRAA obtained an unaccounted 930,000 yen from the Second Reserve Fund in 1941, with no public disclosure of how it was spent.

During the 76th Imperial Diet session (February 1941), Uehara Etsujirō delivered one of the most forceful parliamentary critiques of wartime authoritarianism. He submitted a formal motion to stop the government's allocation of 930,000 yen from the Second Reserve Fund to the IRAA. He argued that reserve funds—intended for unforeseen emergencies such as natural disasters or external shocks—were unjustifiably diverted to a politically motivated organization lacking any legal foundation. Uehara condemned the Association's structure as unconstitutional, warning that by embedding military officers, prosecutors, and bureaucrats within its ranks, it subordinated the legislature to the executive and was evolving into a one-party authoritarian regime resembling Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, or even a *bakufu*-like dictatorship. He ridiculed the government's claim that the IRAA was a mere "public association," noting the absurdity of official comparisons to hygiene cooperatives.

Uehara further cautioned that freedom of speech was disappearing even within the Diet itself, where only IRAA affiliates could speak without fear. "Without criticism and reflection," he warned, "neither constitutional government nor national well-being can be sustained." Accepting this precedent, he argued, would destroy parliamentary sovereignty.

Although his motion was defeated (54–192), the unusually high number of abstentions (196) reflected significant unease within the Diet over the nature of the organization. Online Appendix G1 presents excerpts of his speech.

Legislators linked to sanctioned sectors were significantly more likely to join the IRAA (Figure 21), while procurement-linked sectors showed no such tendency. Candidates from sanctioned sectors also had a higher likelihood of winning in the 1942 general election (Figure

22), despite economic hardship facing their key funders. These patterns strongly suggest that political support was secured through material inducements. The case studies that follow reinforce this interpretation.




Figure 21: T-Test Results for IRAA Membership




Figure 22: T-Test Results for Seat Retention in the 1942 Election

Discussion on Mechanism 3: Case Study of Rep. Kunitaro Koyama

This section draws on documentary evidence showing that Kunitaro Koyama—a legislator previously aligned with party democracy—received IRAA funding to secure his electoral survival, lending further support to the argument that economically or politically vulnerable candidates were effectively “bought off.”

Autobiographies by Japanese legislators are rare, and even those who held ministerial posts left few records of their wartime activities. This silence likely reflects postwar politics: many purged legislators returned to office after 1952, giving them incentives to avoid documenting collaboration. As a result, systematic case selection is impossible; this section instead illustrates potential mechanisms.

Kunitarō Koyama (1889–1981) is one of the few business-backed legislators whose legacy is well-documented through two biographies by his local supporters (Inosaka 1979; Publication Committee for *Omoide no Kunitarō Sensei*, ed. 1982.). His political legacy, carried on by his son-in-law, grandson, and great-grandson—who also became legislators—likely motivated efforts to commemorate his contributions.

Born into a landowning family whose father served as mayor, Koyama graduated from a local commercial school, completed military service, and inherited a small silk-weaving firm in Nagano. Through his management, it grew into a prosperous exporter to the United States—an achievement that propelled his rise to local and national politics as mayor, prefectural councilor, and, by 1928, member of the House of Representatives.

He repeatedly advanced bills and petitions promoting silk price stabilization and production expansion, directly reflecting his stake in the industry. In 1934, for example, he submitted *Proposal 65-97 Regarding the Regulation of Imported Used Silk Stockings* to shield domestic producers from foreign competition.

Early in his career, Koyama publicly emphasized legislative independence and electoral integrity. On February 10, 1929, he delivered a speech criticizing government interference in elections and led an impeachment debate against the Minister of Justice. While this episode partly reflected party politics, it also revealed his early concern for parliamentary accountability. Nonetheless, outside these interventions, his primary focus remained on promoting silk industry

interests.

According to his two biographies, Koyama—then at the height of his business success—was a vocal opponent of the army’s interference in the private economy and consistently prioritized the export market. This is corroborated by his February 25, 1937 speech, in which he criticized the government’s *Raw Silk Price Stabilization Facility Act* as harmful to export competitiveness and denounced emerging totalitarian economic policies.

As a member of the Yonai Cabinet in 1940, Koyama advocated conciliation with China and worked toward a ceasefire with Chiang Kai-shek, even traveling to Hainan Island to negotiate despite obstruction from the military. He was also among the few cabinet members to oppose the army’s attempt to expel Representative Takao Saitō (Inosaka 1979, pp. 175–181).

Economic sanctions marked a turning point in Koyama’s priorities. Although he had earlier opposed centralized measures, he joined the Silk Textile Ration Committee in late 1941. Around the same time, despite his 1929 criticisms of government interference in elections, Koyama joined the IRAA and remained silent as the government suppressed dissent. In the dataset, he is coded as as pro-army in four post-sanction events in this research, compared to his anti-army stance in six prior events. His reelection in 1942 with army endorsement further underscores this transition.

In his memoir of Koyama, Inosaka records that Koyama’s secretary, Yūtarō Kutsukake, received 2,000 yen in campaign funds from the IRAA’s secret budget. According to Kutsukake, Koyama refused to accept the money directly, suspecting it originated from military secret funds. Nonetheless, Kutsukake handed the 2,000 yen to Koyama’s chief campaign staff (Inosaka 1979, p. 212). Other candidates reportedly received up to 4,000 yen—enough at the time to purchase a house in Tokyo. Inosaka also recounts a conversation with prefectural councilor Amane Miyashita, one of Koyama’s supporters who had recommended him to the IRAA. Miyashita argued that “budget matters more than pride” for the sake of the silk industry and implied that without IRAA financial support, Koyama would likely lose his seat (Inosaka 1979, p. 209).

After the sanctions, Koyama made several notable speeches beyond his usual silk policy agenda—on the National Rehabilitation Fund Act (1942), the Enterprise Restructuring Finance Provision Act (1943), and in Budget Committee discussions (1944). Each reflected his efforts to

secure government support for struggling textile firms, emphasizing refinancing and restructuring to mitigate sanction impacts. In September 1944, he proposed *Proposal 85-26* to defend silk resources during the war and successfully negotiated the exclusion of his firm and others from the failed centralization of the silk distribution network.

A contrasting case study of Torakichi Nakano—a legislator tied to procurement industries who followed the opposite trajectory—is presented in Online Appendix H.

Koyama's trajectory exemplifies the core argument of this study: economic strength profoundly shaped legislators' stances and their alignment with the army. When his business prospered, Koyama resisted military interference and supported parliamentary autonomy; under economic distress, he aligned with the army, prioritizing political survival and business continuity over democratic oversight.

Discussion on Alternative Mechanisms 1: Nationalism and Rally-Around-the-Flag Effect

An alternative explanation could be the rally-around-the-flag effect or a broader rise in nationalism and patriotism. Sanctions are often associated with this phenomenon (Egger, Syropoulos, and Yotov 2024), which may well have occurred in Japan during the 1940s. The rally-around-the-flag effect—typically defined as a surge in public support for national leaders during periods of external threat—generally presupposes efforts by political elites to emphasize national unity over partisan or sectional interests. Had the government primarily sought to rally support through appeals to national crisis, responses would likely have been uniform across sectors rather than varying with business characteristics. The behavior of procurement-linked sectors—whose alignment may reflect patriotic identification with the war effort—suggests that any rise in nationalism was uneven and possibly limited rather than universal.

The possibility of a selective rise of nationalism among legislators from sanction-hit sectors—that is, whether they identified themselves with the nation in the sense theorized by Shayo (2009)—is more difficult to assess empirically. Because personal memoirs from this period are scarce and often contested, I instead turn to parliamentary records from the Koiso cabinet era (1944–45), when legislative activity briefly revived, providing a systematic window into political shifts. During the 85th Imperial Diet session in September 1944, legislators introduced

28 proposals. While most addressed practical wartime concerns such as food production, logistics, and insurance, two—one in particular—carried a distinctly nationalistic tone.

On September 9, 1944, a motion titled “Proposal Concerning the Establishment of Imperial National Morality” was introduced in the Imperial Diet. It called for a sweeping ideological mobilization of the state and society to support the war effort. Declaring Japan a divine nation (*shinkoku*), the motion urged national unity to achieve a new world order grounded in imperial morality and “proper guidance” from the state to concentrate the people’s energy toward total victory. It concluded by demanding moral sanctions—such as seppuku, exile, or house arrest—to enforce political accountability and strengthen the war footing. Online Appendix G2 presents excerpts.

Figure 23 shows that legislators linked to sanctioned sectors were not especially likely to support the proposal on imperial national morality, suggesting their alignment was not driven by ideological right-wing conviction.

By contrast, Proposal No. 9—introduced in the same session and calling for the armament of all civilians—was less ideologically charged and faced more opposition from procurement-linked sectors, likely due to concerns over labor shortages, while legislators from sanctioned sectors again showed no strong preferences (Figure 24).

It is difficult to make a definitive statement, since milder measures—such as resolutions to thank soldiers or honor the war dead, which might better reflect nationalist sentiment—were almost universally supported across sectors and over time. Nevertheless, legislators from sanctioned sectors do not appear to have been particularly ideological compared with others in 1944, two years after the 1942 election. The evidence thus suggests that their alignment was primarily transactional rather than ideological.

Earlier accounts, such as Marshall (1967), emphasized an ideological fusion of capitalism and nationalism among business elites. By contrast, this study finds that political alignment was driven less by ideology than by sectoral economic vulnerability.




Figure 23: T-Test: “Proposal on the Establishment of Imperial National Morality” 1944.2




Figure 24: T-Test: “Proposal on the Total Armament of the Population” 1944.2

Discussion on Alternative Mechanisms 2: Business Consolidation and National Control

As we discuss wartime Japanese activities, one might assume extensive government-controlled consolidation during the war. However, most sectors remained under private ownership, with wartime government-backed cartels still largely run by private firm owners.¹⁷ The military did not appoint representatives to corporate boards either.

In December 1940, with strong backing from Minister of War Hideki Tōjō, the Planning Agency announced the Outline for Establishing a New Economic System, which aimed to implement a tightly controlled wartime economy.¹⁸ However, strong opposition from the business community led to the removal of key provisions, including the proposed “separation of capital and management” and strict limits on dividends. The subsequent arrests of 17 Planning Agency and IRAA personnel on charges of harboring state-socialist tendencies further weakened the push for economic centralization.¹⁹ Figure 25A shows a minor but negative reaction in the stock market following the announcement. No parliamentary events analyzed in this study occurred during this episode of policy turbulence.

Legislators tied to sectors under relatively strict government control did not exhibit corresponding shifts toward anti-democratic or pro-army behavior. Two sectors subjected to stronger national control were electricity and liquor, yet neither underwent full nationalization. Hydroelectric plants and liquor distilleries were excluded from nationalization, and shareholders of private firms retained stakes in the resulting national monopolies.²⁰ Legislators connected to these sectors showed no consistent political tendencies (Figure 26), indicating that government control alone did not produce uniform shifts in alignment.

From late 1941 to early 1943, 24 control associations were formed under imperial ordinances as state-backed cartels. Administrative overlap and weak authority meant they achieved little, leaving private firms largely autonomous.²¹ These associations postdated the sanction shocks and are unlikely to affect the main results.

¹⁷ *Nihon Keizai Nenpō*, Vol.41, 111

¹⁸ *Teikoku Gikaishi*, vol.41, 24.

¹⁹ *Teikoku Gikaishi*, vol.42, 24.

²⁰ *Teikoku Gikaishi*, Vol.26, 455

²¹ *Nihon Keizai Nenpō*, Vol.50, 57




Figure 25: Stock Market Performance and Partial Nationalization Attempt (dashed line)




Figure 26: Pro-Army Attitude with Partially Nationalized Sectors




Figure 27: Stock Prices and Pro-Army Attitudes of the Sectors Affected by the Battle of Khalkhin Gol (Dashed Line)

Discussion on Alternative Mechanisms 3: Conflict in Manchuria

The Battle of Khalkhin Gol (summer–fall 1939) occurred within the study period, introducing a potential complication. As a border conflict, it did not directly damage major industries but created uncertainty for Manchurian businesses. Figure 27 shows that Manchuria-linked firms experienced moderate stock market declines, reflecting this heightened risk. Their capital and operations, however, were largely unaffected by the fighting. Other theaters in mainland China remained relatively static during the sanction period and did not generate comparable shocks. Legislators tied to Manchurian firms display only a weak pro-army tendency—observable but far less pronounced than among sanction-affected sectors. This pattern supports the broader argument: firms able to withstand or sidestep disruptions faced weaker incentives for political realignment.

Discussion on Alternative Mechanisms 4: Saliency and Delegation

Another alternative mechanism is that some legislators—particularly those from vulnerable sectors—may have deferred to the military not because of coercion or material inducement, but out of a belief that wartime conditions required greater flexibility and centralized authority. From this perspective, the war effort was paramount, and granting the military wider discretion was seen as essential for national success (Gratton and Lee 2024).

Yet pro-army alignment in the Diet did not necessarily translate into passive delegation. Many legislators who shifted positions also assumed new executive roles in ministries, especially in areas of domestic governance. This blurs the line between strategic delegation and institutional alignment. Military command and operational planning were already beyond parliamentary purview; instead, the Diet's main responsibilities lay in budgeting, economic management, and resource mobilization—domains in which pro-military legislators exercised active influence rather than merely relinquishing authority. At least four legislators were dispatched to govern occupied territories in Southeast Asia, further illustrating the military's dependence on civilian politicians.

The competence-based interpretation is also difficult to sustain. As the Saitō case illustrates, the Army's prolonged campaign in China drew increasing parliamentary criticism, weakening its perceived legitimacy. The efforts by the military to nationalize key industries were scaled back in the face of bureaucratic and business opposition, highlighting the military's limited policy know-how and political capital in economic affairs.²² In matters such as supervising military procurement factories, the Army lacked sufficient personnel to manage the home front and frequently delegated responsibilities to civilian legislators.

Procurement-linked legislators—those most embedded in the war economy—did not exhibit a comparable pattern of deference, suggesting that issue saliency alone cannot account for the observed alignment. The outcomes examined in this study primarily capture institutional deference, such as the curtailment of interpellation, rather than support for military strategy itself. While saliency-based explanations cannot be ruled out, the evidence more strongly supports the view that alignment reflected material vulnerability rather than ideology or beliefs

²² Teikoku Gikaishi, vol.42, p. 24.

about competence.

Discussion

While this research does not dispute the influence of weak democratic institutions and culture in Japan's authoritarian transition, the fact that most legislators defended the semi-democratic status quo in 1937 precludes a deterministic interpretation. As discussed, institutions such as the revival of the army's veto power and strengthened judicial independence were endogenous outcomes of political bargaining rather than fixed structural constraints (cf. Negretto 2013 for similar dynamics in Latin America, Opallo 2019 for Africa).

This study adopts a coalition-based approach, emphasizing the balance of power among elites (Waldner and Lust 2018; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). A sufficient number of legislators aligned with pro-army factions, enabling the military to push through anti-democratic policies without formal constitutional amendments. While this case may not be universal, it provides a valuable opportunity to isolate economic and political interests from institutional design.

Violent repression alone cannot explain these outcomes. Between 1937 and 1941, there were no recorded instances of imprisonment or physical attacks on incumbent legislators. The initial events analyzed here occurred after the last wave of political assassinations in 1936. Only after the army consolidated power did repression intensify. For example, anti-government MP Seigo Nakano was forced to commit suicide in 1943, MP Yukio Ozaki was retroactively jailed for anti-army rhetoric during the 1942 election, and three anti-Tōjō legislators were drafted and sent to war zones (Furukawa 2001). Before this power shift, democratic institutions shielded legislators from violence, and threats of repression did not appear to deter dissent. Legislators even played a non-trivial role in ousting Prime Minister Tōjō in 1944, underscoring their residual agency.

The findings strongly suggest that weakened legislators were co-opted. Empirical evidence and case studies indicate that these legislators valued the authoritarian legislature as a platform for negotiating with the executive (Reuter and Robertson 2013), and were subsequently bought

off. Furthermore, the heterogeneity among economic elites casts doubt on ideological shifts such as the “rally-around-the-flag” effect.

The limited change among procured legislators indicates that their alignment was not driven by coercive resource distribution (Albertus, Fenner, and Slater 2018) or by material dependence on the government (Rosenfeld 2020). Instead, authoritarian forces appear to have targeted weaker and less costly elites for co-optation, while avoiding well-resourced groups whose cooperation was more difficult to secure. This pattern—consistent with Arriola, DeVaro, and Meng (2021)’s findings on the co-optation of opposition politicians—highlights how selective collaboration among elites can erode horizontal checks on power (Grillo et al. 2024).

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Research documentation and data that support the findings of this study are openly available at the *American Political Science Review Dataverse*: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/O3VHIX>.

Limitations on data availability are discussed in the manuscript and separate file *Fukumoto_APSR2025_Data_A*.

Archival sources cited in the study are accessible at the Ministry of Defense Archive, the National Diet Library, and the Waseda University Library.

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CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares no ethical issues or conflicts of interest in this research.

ETHICAL STANDARDS

The author affirms this research did not involve human participants.

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Online Appendix

For: “The Cornered Mouse: Sanctioned Elites and Authoritarian Realignment
in the Japanese Legislature, 1936-1942.”

Makoto Fukumoto

Online Appendix A: Detailed Accounts of Events

1937.3.22 Resolution 70-11/-12 to Exterminate Human Rights Violations following 2-26 Coup

After the failed coup by army officers in February 1936, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) faced widespread criticism from legislators. In response, the IJA intensified its anti-democratic rhetoric, framing itself as the protector of national integrity against a purportedly corrupt political system. The newly formed Hirota cabinet, led by diplomat Hirota Kōki, yielded to military pressure. Consequently, the army secured veto power over cabinet formation, enacted new censorship laws, and implemented martial law, granting the army influence over police actions.

In October 1936, a leaked army reform plan proposed restricting suffrage, abolishing impeachment mechanisms, and weakening parliamentary oversight, directly threatening democracy. Legislators countered by blocking key military-backed bills, including those on military secrecy and electricity nationalization, while independently passing several of their own.²³

Resolutions 70-11 and 70-12, both addressing human rights violations, were submitted by two separate parliamentary groups and later merged into a single resolution during the legislative process, receiving overwhelming support. Resolution 70-11 condemned the use of violence by police and prosecutors and criticized the army's implementation of martial law. Resolution 70-12 explicitly warned that political freedom was under threat, with a particular focus on the suppression of social groups and government interference in freedom of thought.

1937 Resolutions	Endorsed either (0)	Not endorsed (1)
Attended	443	36

By the time the resolutions were passed, the Hirota Cabinet had already fallen, but the succeeding Hayashi Cabinet continued to implement Hirota's policies.

1937.4.30. The 1937 General Election and Anti-Army Majority

The fall of the Hirota Cabinet in February 1937 was driven by escalating tensions between the army and the Diet. Despite parliamentary demands for a moderate figure, General Ugaki, to

²³ Teikoku Gikaishi, vol.26, 457.

form a cabinet, the army blocked his appointment by refusing to provide an army minister, as required by the stipulation that the position must be held by an active-duty officer. By leveraging this veto power, revived under Hirota, the army ensured that no officer could serve in a cabinet without its approval.²⁴

In response, the Army General Staff selected General Senjuro Hayashi as Prime Minister and proposed sweeping reforms to centralize state power and diminish parliamentary authority. The cabinet completely excluded parliamentarians and was supported by army staff, including Colonel Kanji Ishiwara. These reforms included the creation of the Ministry of General Affairs and the National Planning Agency, granting the army significant control over the economy and social policy while severely limiting parliamentary oversight.²⁵

Major political parties opposed these reforms, refusing to bring the proposal to the parliamentary floor. While pro-army factions within the major parties and smaller fascist groups supported the reforms, they were in the minority. In retaliation, General Hayashi dissolved the Diet, citing the need to punish obstructionist members. The prewar Diet frequently preferred legislative sabotage over direct confrontation when faced with anti-democratic initiatives from the government. Pro-Hayashi legislators from major parties split off to join far-right parties or ran as independents.

The 1937 general election proved disastrous for Hayashi's allies, who secured only 40 out of 466 seats. In contrast, anti-Hayashi politicians dominated the parliament, winning 354 seats. Consequently, General Hayashi resigned just 123 days after taking office.

1937 Election	Pro-Army (1)	Anti-Army (0)
Elected	40	426
Incumbent Lost	33	82

1938.2.21-3.4. Legislation 73-19/-20 Prosecutor Office Bill; Court Composition

Bill

Prince Fumimaro Konoe assumed office following General Hayashi and established a new cabinet, appointing ministers from the Diet. At this stage, the political parties exhibited limited

²⁴ Teikoku Gikaishi, vol.26, 460.

²⁵ Teikoku Gikaishi, vol.27, 335.

discipline, but Konoe effectively gained the support of the Diet by accommodating influential parliamentarians through cabinet appointments.

On July 7, 1937, the Japanese army in China initiated a unilateral military campaign against the Republic of China without prior approval from Tokyo. While initially hesitant, Prime Minister Konoe retroactively endorsed the army's actions after their initial success.

In this 73rd parliament, Konoe advocated for the "one nation, one party" principle. While the failure of this fascist initiative led to his resignation in early 1938, it also heightened concerns among many legislators about military overreach, comparable to executive aggrandizement.²⁶

Legislation 73-19, the Prosecutor Office Bill, and Legislation 73-20, the Court Composition Bill, were introduced by legislators not aligned with Konoe during the same month that the General Mobilization Bill was being debated.

Legislation 73-19 sought to limit the influence of the Ministry of Justice over the Prosecutors' Office and to curtail the power of the Prosecutors' Office over regional courts. Legislation 73-20 strengthened the Supreme Court's authority to oversee regional courts, thereby reinforcing judicial independence against executive interference. Both pieces of legislation reflected a strong condemnation of the executive's encroachment on the judiciary and the erosion of checks and balances. Both passed the house with a comfortable majority with bipartisan support.

1938 Legislations	Endorsed either (0)	Not endorsed (1)
Attended	291	171

1939.3.11. Legislation 74-28/-29/-30/-31 Amendments to Code of Criminal Procedure

After Prince Konoe's resignation following his failed attempt to unify all political parties, former Prosecutor General Kiichiro Hiranuma became prime minister. Concerns about the suppression of dissent expressed in Resolution 70-11/-12 in 1937 resurfaced, as Hiranuma, though opposed to war with the United States, was known for his hawkish stance against criticism of the government, socialism, or liberalism (Masumi 1985).

²⁶ Teikoku Gikaishi, vol.32, 167.

Legislation 74-28, 74-29, 74-30, and 74-31 were introduced to prohibit unwarranted detention of citizens by police and prosecutors. These bills were unprecedented and notable, as four separate groups of legislators submitted identical amendments, each with the same preamble, demonstrating a united front against executive overreach.

The preamble of these bills emphasized the importance of upholding Article 23 of the Imperial Japanese Constitution and referenced widespread public anger against arbitrary detention. As detentions were frequently used against anti-government social groups and critical intellectuals, these amendments represented a clear pro-democratic stance. While the army was not explicitly mentioned, its growing influence over the police and prosecution following the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War increasingly jeopardized the rule of law.

1939 Legislations	Endorsed either (0)	Not endorsed (1)
Attended	293	166

1939.5.30. Split of Major Parties in 1939

Following disagreements over the General Mobilization Bill and Konoe's proposal to unify all political parties, the major parties fractured into pro-army and anti-army factions, ceasing to function as unified entities. Compared to the more nuanced positions on general mobilization, attitudes toward the army were more clearly divided.

Both the Nakajima faction within Seiyukai and the Yanai faction within Minseito allied with the army, adopting a stance critical of party politics and parliamentary democracy. Additionally, a small national socialist wing of the Socialist People's Party shifted toward a pro-army stance after the passage of the General Mobilization Bill (cf. Tsurumi 2010). While the formation of these groups was relatively gradual following earlier events in 1938 and personal connections played a significant role, the growing factionalism within parties began to take on clear pro- or anti-democratic connotations as party discipline broke down. This period also witnessed significant political realignment.

The coding is based on May 30, 1939, and cross-referenced with the Ministry of Interior's grading of incumbent legislators.

1939 Parliamentary Factions	Pro-Army (1)	Anti-Army or Neutral (0)
Membership	191	260

1940.2.3: Motion 75-1 to refer Rep. Takao Saitō to the disciplinary committee.

Anti-communist Hiranuma resigned after the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact undermined the Anti-Comintern Pact, and Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai succeeded him as Prime Minister. Yonai adopted a pro-parliament stance, reinstating parliamentary undersecretaries to increase the Diet's representation in the Cabinet. He opposed war with the United States and the United Kingdom, but his cabinet significantly increased taxes to fund the ongoing war in China, which had become a quagmire by this point (Berger 1977).

In March 1940, Takao Saito, a seasoned parliamentarian who had previously voiced his opposition to the General Mobilization Bill in 1938, delivered a vehement parliamentary speech that sharply criticized the rationale behind the war in China. The army strongly condemned his speech and demanded Saito's expulsion from the Diet. Despite Saito's refusal to voluntarily resign, a vote was held to decide his expulsion from the Diet, with pro-army politicians taking the lead as Prime Minister Admiral Yonai refrained from intervening.²⁷

The expulsion motion garnered a majority of votes in favor, with only seven votes against Saito's expulsion. Notably, however, a significant minority of parliamentarians abstained from the vote, expressing their opposition to the very idea of expulsion. Saito would later make a return to the Diet after winning a seat in the 1942 election.

The exact list of those who voted for the motion or abstained is unknown, but the motion to refer Saito to the disciplinary committee already had a substantial number of endorsements that signals the passage of the motion, and the list of the endorsers is used for coding.

Motion to Expel Takao Saito	Endorsed (1)	Not Endorsed (0)
Attended	183	264

²⁷ Teikoku Gikaishi, vol.38, 176.

1940.10.11: Formation of Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA) and Dokokai / Koua Domei

The Yonai Cabinet was toppled by the army, which refused to appoint a Minister of Army, leading to its replacement by the second and third Konoe Cabinets. Konoe's government subsequently signed the Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Konoe renewed his push for a unified government under the justification of a national emergency.

In 1940, the third Konoe Cabinet dissolved all political parties in Japan, deeming them obstacles to effective wartime governance. Supported by both the army and the Ministry of Interior, this move marked a decisive shift toward centralized political control. There was little resistance, as every parliamentary group included members who aligned with Konoe's vision.²⁸

To replace the disbanded parties, the government established the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA), effectively creating a single-party system aimed at fostering national unity and strengthening cooperation between the government, army, and society. The IRAA absorbed or disbanded all existing political parties, taking over their roles within this new framework. It was managed by a council of government-appointed advisors and operated through a network of regional and local branches across Japan (Ōyama 1999).

In response to the army's growing influence, a faction called *Dōkōkai* emerged, directly opposing the army. Another group, the *Kōa Dōmei* (Pan Asia Parliamentary Group), criticized the conduct of the war and government overreach without opposing the war itself. With political parties banned, these parliamentary groups functioned as informal coalitions of like-minded individuals. While some were formed in 1941, most of their members had not participated in the formation of the IRAA in 1940. Despite restrictions, both groups continued to challenge government policies in the months that followed.

The coding is based on October 11, 1940, and cross-referenced with the Ministry of Interior's grading of incumbent legislators.

Parliamentary Group after 1941	Pro-IRAA (1)	Anti-IRAA (0)
Membership	322	112

²⁸ Teikoku Gikaishi, vol.41, 35.

1941.2.15-2.28. Questions 76-5/-14, Motions 76-1/-2 about IRAA

The formation of the IRAA created a situation where the executive branch supported specific political parties, a practice deemed unconstitutional by the judiciary. During the third Konoe Cabinet, the IRAA underwent several reorganizations and subtle renaming efforts.

In the 76th Diet, the 1941 supplementary budget became a highly contentious issue. A sum of 8 million yen, accounting for approximately 1 percent of the wartime supplementary budget, was allocated to support the activities of the IRAA. Non-IRAA legislators delivered lengthy speeches criticizing this allocation as blatant electoral interference by the army and the Ministry of Interior, with several motions and questions tabled in protest.

Ultimately, while the IRAA secured funding, it was prohibited from fielding candidates in the election due to constitutional concerns. In response, the army devised another organizational shell for the IRAA, allowing it to issue endorsements in the 1942 election.

It is important to note that not all 112 non-IRAA legislators endorsed the questions and motions opposing these measures, even though they addressed critical components of democratic practices.

Questions and Motions February 1941	Endorsed either (0)	Not endorsed (1)
Attended	74	366

1941.11.18 Motion 77-1 to conclude questioning of the State Ministers of Tojo Cabinet

The Konoe Cabinet fell amid failed negotiations with the United States, leading to the appointment of the hawkish General Hideki Tojo as Prime Minister. Tojo continued diplomatic negotiations until November while simultaneously preparing for war. Tense negotiations with the United States were a major concern for legislators, and there was widespread interest in the newly formed Tojo Cabinet's stance on war and peace.

The debate was initiated by a mild question from Goutarou Ogawa, a senior IRAA member and former Minister of Railroads under the previous Konoe Cabinet. However, pro-army legislator Yuki Takechi promptly tabled a motion to end the debate after just one question. This

action reflects the army's aversion to parliamentary discussion and debate, which it viewed as indecisive and counterproductive.

With very little information disclosed to legislators, some voiced their disapproval. Despite this, the motion passed with an overwhelming majority, effectively ending the debate. This motion is among the last roll calls recorded in the Imperial Japanese Diet's minutes. While only 77 legislators opposed the motion, the opposition notably included some IRAA members.

Three weeks after the motion was introduced, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and Malaya, marking the beginning of the Pacific War.

Motions in November 1941	Support (1)	Oppose (0)
Attended	356	77

The 1942 General Election and Pro-Army Majority

Following the attack on Pearl Harbor and the initial military successes in Southeast Asia, Prime Minister General Tojo orchestrated the 1942 general election.

Under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA) devised a categorization system to evaluate the level of cooperation between incumbent politicians and the army. The top two classifications received the army's endorsement, while new candidates were fielded by the IRAA in constituencies where incumbents did not receive endorsement. A total of 466 endorsed candidates contested the election, ultimately securing 381 seats.²⁹

Among the incumbents, 235 received the army's endorsement, while 131 chose to run without endorsement. Sixty-two incumbents did not contest the election at all, though many of them had initially sought to run and subsequently withdrew.

The electoral process cannot be characterized as entirely free and fair, and the army supported IRAA candidates with funding and manpower (Furukawa 2001); however, it is worth noting that anti-army candidates, including the previously expelled Takao Saito, were able to participate and secure seats. Approximately one-third of the votes and 18% of the seats were won by non-endorsed candidates. Importantly, this group of non-endorsed candidates encompassed some

²⁹ Teikoku Gikaishi, vol.43, 545.

right-wing politicians who opposed army-led resource mobilization, referring to such efforts as communist measures.

After the election, the IRAA majority passed most of the legislation tabled or requested by the army with minimal deliberation. Even after 1942, clashes persisted between the army and some legislators, particularly over issues like freedom of speech and local governance. However, absenteeism rose sharply after the election, making it difficult to identify pro- and anti-army legislators in each instance. This marks the final event analyzed in this study.

1942 Election	Army-Endorsed	Non-Endorsed
Elected	381	85
Running Incumbent	235	131
Retiring Incumbent	0	62

Online Appendix B: Robustness Checks; Subsample Difference-in-Differences Analysis

Table B1 presents subset analyses of the main difference-in-differences specification. The first column uses only parliamentary factions, and the second uses only legislative actions as outcome variables. Models employ different treatment periods. Results remain consistent and statistically significant, with magnitudes comparable to the main specification. Columns 3 and 4 incorporate the Ministry of Interior's Grading of Incumbent Legislators (January 16, 1942) and a record of parliamentary questions criticizing the army's actions in China (March 31, 1937). As these reflect either external evaluations or non-democratic criteria, they are excluded from the main models but included here. Results remain stable.

Table B1: Summary of DiD Results: Sanctions - Changing Dependent Variables

Dependent Variable	Model 1 Factions Only	Model 2 Legislation Only	Model 3 Adding Two Extra Events	Model 4
Treatment Period		post 1940.9		post 1941.7
Post-Sanction × Sanctioned	0.197**	0.111*	0.161***	0.130**
Legislator-clustered SE	(0.060)	(0.050)	(0.045)	(0.040)
Dropped events in 1940.9-41.7				X
FE: Events	X	X	X	X
FE: Legislators	X	X	X	X
Num.Obs.	2113	2720	5739	5092
R2	0.587	0.507	0.479	0.473
R2 Adj.	0.331	0.363	0.391	0.371
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001			

Table B2 reports additional subset analyses. The first two models exclude either socialist or socialist-leaning legislators, or those elected from Tokyo's seven districts. A third model excludes legislators with cabinet experience prior to 1936, while the last model restricts the sample to those holding business board memberships. Across all specifications, results remain positive and statistically significant.

Table B2: Summary of Subset DiD Results: Sanctions

Subset	Excluding Socialist Legislators	Excluding Tokyo Districts	Excluding Former Cabinet Members before 1936	Business Executive Only
Dependent Variable	Pro-Army, Anti-Democratic Actions			
Post-Sanction × Sanctioned	0.117**	0.131**	0.126**	0.122**
Legislator-clustered SE	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.041)
FE: Events	X	X	X	X
FE: Legislators	X	X	X	X
Num.Obs.	4424	4510	4005	3251
R2	0.525	0.488	0.484	0.516
R2 Adj.	0.424	0.382	0.370	0.412
<i>Note:</i>			*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Online Appendix C: Balance Tests

Figure C1 presents the balance test of 76th to 79th Diet sessions, showing that both the sanctioned and procured groups exhibited statistically significant inclinations to support or oppose legislator-tabled bills in only one out of ten instances when the legislation did not pertain to democracy or the military. Legislators from sanctioned sectors showed a slight inclination to support 12, the Farmland Nationalization Bill tabled on January 24, 1942. Similarly, legislators from procured sectors demonstrated higher support for 15, the Proposal to Enhance Apprentice Training, tabled on November 19, 1941. Given the context of these sectors' circumstances, it is understandable that procurement sectors would support training policies, while sanctioned sectors would favor nationalization.

These findings align with expectations and indicate that neither the sanctioned nor procured groups acted uniformly in the post-sanction era of Japan. This nuanced behavior underscores the lack of unified voting patterns among legislators connected to these sectors.

Figure C2 presents the density plot by age group. Neither the procured nor sanctioned sectors exhibit a skewed distribution of year of birth.




Figure C1: T-test for all the legislator-tabled legislation and proposals in 77th, 78th, and 79th Diet: Procured or Sanctioned





Figure C2: Density Plot: Year of Birth




Figure C3: *Business Board Membership of the Legislators. (10-30 Legislators; %)*

Online Appendix D: Lack of Partisanship in Legislative Activities: 76th to 79th Diet Sessions (1940-42)

Political parties in prewar Japan, as discussed in the main text, were characterized by weak discipline and internal fragmentation. Pro-army attitudes in 1937 and 1942 also did not align with former party affiliations. However, one might hypothesize that the legacy of party socialization could have influenced legislative activities, as former party members might maintain connections even after the parties were dissolved.

Figures D1 and D2 present network analyses of legislators who co-sponsored or co-endorsed the same legislative proposals during the 76th, 77th, 78th, and 79th parliaments (1940–1942). Each node represents a legislator. Following the dissolution of political parties in 1940, the two former major parties appear to have had minimal influence on legislators' relationships in legislative activities.

These results confirm that partisanship did not significantly shape the actions of most legislators regarding their engagement with democratic backsliding.




Figure D1: Former Seiyūkai (Conservative) Legislators: Black




Figure D2: Former Minseitō (Liberal) Legislators: Black

Online Appendix E: Lasso Regression for 1942 Army Endorsements

One of the primary challenges of this research stems from the dataset's characteristics, which include a large number of variables (over 400) relative to the limited number of units per period (fewer than 1,100). This imbalance could increase the risk that some variables may appear statistically significant purely by random chance.

While the use of difference-in-differences with two-way fixed effects as the main specification significantly mitigates concerns about random significance, issues of overfitting and multicollinearity among variables remain. To address these concerns, Lasso regression is an appropriate and effective method. Lasso regression results can be used to assess the relative importance of different variables in predicting outcomes. This section highlights the most significant variables influencing pro-army attitudes in 1937 and 1942, providing a basis for further discussion and analysis about the importance of the main results.

Lasso can perform variable selection by shrinking some coefficients to exactly zero, effectively removing irrelevant features from the model. It enhances prediction accuracy by preventing overfitting, especially in models with a large number of predictors such as this case. It can handle multicollinearity by selecting among correlated variables, retaining the most important ones.

Lasso (Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator) regression is a linear regression technique that introduces a penalty term to the objective function to enforce sparsity in the model. The objective function for Lasso is:

$$\hat{\beta}^{\text{lasso}} = \arg \min_{\beta} \left(\sum_{i=1}^n \left(y_i - \beta_0 - \sum_{j=1}^p \beta_j x_{ij} \right)^2 + \lambda \sum_{j=1}^p |\beta_j| \right)$$

where:

- y_i is the response variable,
- x_{ij} are the predictor variables,
- β_j are the coefficients,
- $\lambda \geq 0$ is the tuning parameter controlling the strength of the penalty.

The L_1 penalty $\lambda \sum_{j=1}^p |\beta_j|$ forces some coefficients to be exactly zero, leading to a sparse model that performs variable selection.

I applied Lasso regression to the dataset concerning the 1942 army endorsements. Out of 549 predictors, Lasso regression preserved 26 key predictors that were associated with more than 1% of legislators. Notably, the "economic sanction" variable as well as some procured or sanctioned sectors were retained through the penalization process. Table E1 suggests that these factors are indeed critical, rather than incidental, in predicting pro- or anti-army stances during this period. Table E2 presents the results of the same analysis applied to the 1937 election, retaining only six variables. As the industrial union served as a catch-all interest group encompassing various businesses, none of the sector-specific variables appear to strongly influence pro-army attitudes in 1937.

predictor	Lasso coefficient
Petrochemical Business	0.209112171
Studied in China	0.189925752
Worked at Ministry of Industry	0.167743668
Chief Reporter	0.156198965
Welfare Institution	0.151067902
Coal Mining	0.139757851
Welfare Interest Group	0.135848906
Construction League (Real estate)	0.134083787
Retail	0.131904018
Sanctioned	0.116420344
Career in Manchuria	0.116367857
Credit Union	0.082674104
Governor	0.075610722
Plank	0.07530458
Steel	0.073098367
Lieutenant	0.06197516
Imperial University Graduate	0.049498457
Agricultural Union	0.045508601
General in Military	0.044056351
Keio University Graduate	0.034124217
Bank	0.024270089
Cadet School Graduate	0.0218861
Secretary to Politicians	0.020530973
Elite Bureaucrat	0.015724306
Non-steel Metal Industry	-0.002570235
Kwansei Gakuin University Graduate	-0.002620796
Nihon University Graduate	-0.009868266
Judge	-0.015733836
Literature Degree	-0.016082949
Pharmaceutical	-0.080212524
Land Cultivation Union	-0.083378639
Doctor	-0.15438007
Automobile	-0.2464697
Public Sector Job	-0.248889943
Prosecutor	-0.249994056
Peasant Union	-0.38985596
Labor Union	-0.772036389

Table E1: 37 out of 549 predictors chosen by Lasso Regression for Army Endorsements in 1942

predictor	Lasso coefficient
Editor	0.07193548
Colonial Business	0.03389578
Kyoto University Graduate	0.02505424
Worked at Tokyo Asahi Newspaper	0.02183653
From Miyazaki Prefecture	0.01539855
Industrial Union	-0.02130418

Table E2: 6 out of 549 predictors chosen by Lasso Regression for Pro-Army Factions in 1937

Online Appendix F: Stock Market Performance of Relevant Sectors around Economic Sanction

The descriptions and related discussions are provided in the main manuscript.

Table F1: Top 10 export and import products of Japan in 1938 (in 1000 yen; from the Japanese Customs: customs.go.jp)

Export		Import	
Cotton textile	121,413	Raw cotton	292,476
Raw silk	84,991	Pulp	28,100
Nylon textile	56,957	Rubber	22,811
Silk textile	24,346	Linen	15,622
Wool textile	21,640	Beans	14,723
Cotton shirt	15,167	Soya	14,046
Liquor	10,637	Leather	9,541
Flour	10,337	Raw wool	8,676
Canned food	9,571	Coal	6,688
Cotton socks	7,109	Sulfate	5,398
Total	774,038	Total	968,220

Table F2: Top 10 export and import products of Japan in 1942 (in 1000 yen; from the Japanese Customs: customs.go.jp)

Export		Import	
Linen sack	17,486	Raw cotton	172,478
Cotton textile	15,062	Rice	45,433
Silk textile	13,506	Rubber	42,102
Nylon textile	12,804	Soybeans	25,539
Wool textile	10,154	Coal	24,557
Locomotive	9,269	Raw wool	21,627
Pottery	5,730	Bean powder	21,530
Electronics	5,681	Leather	16,996
Fiber	5,628	Linen	15,725
Dried fish	5,350	Iron	15,231
Total	362,672	Total	578,185




Figure F1: Stock Market Performance of Sanctions-Affected Sectors (Dashed lines indicate U.S. sanction timing)




Figure F2: Stock Market Performance of Potentially Sanctions-Affected Sectors (Dashed lines indicate U.S. sanction timing)




Figure F3: Stock Market Performance of Procured Sectors

Online Appendix G1: Excerpts from The Speech by Etsujiro Uehara in the Imperial Diet, House of Representatives, 76th Session, Plenary Meeting No. 19, February 27, 1941

The following is an excerpt from a speech by Etsujiro Uemura, who introduced a motion to deny the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA) access to funding from the second reserve fund. In his remarks, Uemura openly criticized the military and defended democratic principles. Although the motion was defeated by a vote of 54 to 192, it led to an unprecedented 196 abstentions on a budget-related motion, remarkable in 1941. The English translation follows the original Japanese text.

私ハ委員長ノ報告ニ對シ昭和十五年度第二豫備金支出中、大政翼賛會補助金九十三萬圓ノ部分ハ承諾スベキモノニアラズトノ動議ヲ提出スル者デアリマス（拍手）御承知ノ通り第一豫備金ハ豫算款項目ヲ有スル費目中、不足ヲ生ジタ場合ニ支出スル規定デアリマス、第二豫備金ハ、天變地異若シクハ不可抗力、其ノ他政府ノ豫期セザリシ事項ガ發生致シマシテ、必要ナル費用ノアツタ場合ニハ之ヲ支出スル規定ニナツテ居ルノデアリマス、然ルニ大政翼賛會ハ何等ノ法律上ノ根據ヲ持ツテ居ルモノデナイノミナラズ、政府ノ豫期セザリシモノデモナイノデアリマス（「ヒヤ■■」）大政翼賛會ガ過去、現在ノ狀態ニ於テハ憲法ニ背反シ、立憲政治ヲ紊ルモノデアリマスルコトニ付テハ、一點ノ疑問ガナイノデアリマス（拍手）

I hereby submit a motion to disapprove the portion of the committee chairman's report concerning the 930,000-yen subsidy to the Imperial Rule Assistance Association from the Second Reserve Fund for fiscal year 1940.

As you are aware, the First Reserve Fund is designated for shortfalls in budgeted items, while the Second Reserve Fund is to be used in the event of natural disasters, acts of God, or other unforeseen circumstances requiring urgent expenditure.

Yet the Imperial Rule Assistance Association not only lacks any legal foundation—it was not even an unforeseen occurrence for the government. (“Hear, hear!”)

There is no doubt whatsoever that the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, in both its past and present forms, violates the Constitution and disrupts constitutional governance. (Applause.)

然ルニ大政翼賛會ナルモノハ近衛公ヲ總裁トシ、各地方長官ノ肝煎ニテ、各町村各部落マデ細胞の組織ニ編成セラレ

ツツアル、實ニ大掛リノ大組織デアリマス、若シ此ノ龐大ナル國民組織ガ完成セラレ、政府主張ノ如ク高度ノ政治性ヲ有シ、所謂上意下達、下情上達ノ機關タルモノトスレバ、私ハ近キ將來我が國ニ於テ實ニ好マシカラザル事態ノ發生ヲ懸念スル者デアリマス

”The so-called Imperial Rule Assistance Association, with Prince Konoe as its president, is being constructed as a vast organization, systematically organized down to every town, village, and hamlet under the initiative of local governors. If this massive national structure is completed and, as the government claims, comes to possess a high degree of political function—serving as a mechanism for top-down command and bottom-up feedback—then I must express my grave concern that such a development may bring about a most undesirable state of affairs in our country in the near future.”

何ト言ウテモ翼賛會組織ハ「ソ」聯ノ「ボリシェヴィーキ」又ハ「ドイツ」ノ「ナチ」ニ酷似シテ居ルモノデアリマス、而モ此ノ組織内ニハ奇矯過激ナル言論ヲ敢テスル者ガ多數存在シテ居リマス

“No matter how one looks at it, the organizational structure of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association closely resembles the Bolshevik model of the Soviet Union or the Nazi model of Germany. Moreover, within this organization, there are a great many individuals who openly espouse bizarre and extremist rhetoric.”

政府ハ大政翼賛會ハ高度ノ政治性ヲ有シ、上意下達、下意上達ノ政治行爲ヲ行フモ、政事結社ニアラズト強辯シ、公事結社ナリト主張シテ居ル、然ラバ公事結社トハ如何ナルモノカ、實例ヲ擧ゲテ之ヲ説明セヨトノ議員ノ要求ニ對シ、治安警察法ノ委員會ニ於テ、司法省刑事局長ハ、公事結社トハ政治以外ノ公共ノ利益ニ關スル結社ヲ謂フ例ヘバ衛生組合ノ如シト答ヘテ居ル、天下何人ト雖モ大政翼賛會ノ實體、性格、其ノ活動狀態ヲ以テ、衛生組合ト同列ニ看做ス者アランヤデアリマス（拍手）政府ノ答辯スノ如クデアル

”The government insists that the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, despite possessing a high degree of political character and engaging in political activity—such as top-down instruction and bottom-up feedback—is not a political association but rather a public association. In response to a Diet member’s request to explain what exactly constitutes a ‘public association,’ citing concrete examples, the Director of the Criminal Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Justice, speaking before the Peace Preservation Law Committee, stated that a public association refers to an organization concerned with public welfare outside the realm of politics—such as a hygiene association.

But who in this country could seriously consider the Imperial Rule Assistance Association equivalent to a hygiene association? (Applause.) That is the nature of the government's explanation.”

尙ホ事實ニ徴シテ大政翼賛會ナルモノノ實體ヲ検討スルニ、翼賛會ハ總理大臣之ヲ統率ストアリ、議會局ハ其ノ下ニアリテ立法院ヲ左右スル態勢ヲ有シテ居ル、翼賛會ノ役員ニハ現役軍人アリ、檢事アリ、多數ノ官吏モアルサウシテ總理大臣ノ命令一下、高度ノ政治性ヲ持ツテ政治的活動ヲ行フコトヲ標榜シテ居ル、是デ立法院ノ權威ガ保持出來ルカ、司法權ノ確立ガ出來ルカ（拍手）大政翼賛會ノ實質ハ、何ト辯解シテモ、獨伊流ノ一國一黨ト揆フーニスルモノデアル、究極スル所幕府ノ存在ヲ意味スルコトハ、多言ヲ費ス必要ハアリマセヌ

”Looking further at the facts to examine the actual nature of the Association, we see that it is commanded by the Prime Minister himself, with the Parliamentary Affairs Bureau subordinate to it, creating a structure capable of dominating the legislature. Its leadership includes active-duty military officers, prosecutors, and numerous bureaucrats. The Association claims to carry out political activities of the highest order under the directives of the Prime Minister.

Under such conditions, how can the authority of the legislature be maintained? How can judicial independence be preserved? (Applause.)

No matter how the government may try to explain it away, the true nature of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is essentially that of a one-party state modeled after Germany and Italy. Ultimately, it signifies a bakufu-like regime—and that, I believe, requires no further elaboration.”

憲法ニ依ツテ保障サレタ議會ノ論壇ニ於テサヘ八方手ヲ盡シテ議員ノ言論ヲ抑壓スル方途ガ、白晝公然構行シテ居ルト言ハレル、今日ノ日本デ言論ノ自由ヲ認メラレテ居ルノハ、翼賛會ノ役員ノミダト言ハレテ居リマス

“It is said that even within the Diet's forum—whose deliberations are guaranteed under the Constitution—every effort is being made to suppress the speech of its members through various means carried out openly in broad daylight. In today's Japan, it is said that the only people who still enjoy freedom of speech are the officials of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.”

批判ナキ所ニ公明ナル政治ハアリマセヌ、批判ト反省ナキ所ニ國民ノ健全ナル發達ヲ望ムコトハ出來ナイノデアリマス（拍手）立憲政治ノ圓滑ナル運用ハ健全ナル政黨ニ依ル外途ハゴザイマセヌ、政府モ愈、翼賛會ノ行き過ギト其ノ缺陷ヲ了解シ、其ノ政治的行爲ヲ抑制シ、人事ノ一新、機構ノ改造ヲ斷行スルコトヲ公約シ、其ノ結果追加豫算ヲモ改訂シテ實行豫算ヲ編成スルコトヲ聲明サレテ居リマス、是ニ出ツテ之ヲ觀テモ過去及ビ現在ニ於ケル翼賛會ノ組織ハ勿論、其ノ行動ニ付テモ正當ナラザルコトハ明カデアリマス（拍手）而シテ之ニ向ツテ政府ガ此ノ畦局柄ヲモ顧ミズ、九十三万圓ノ

豫備金支出ヲ敢テセルコトハ何ト言ウテテ不常デアルト斷言シナケレバナラナイノデアリマス (拍手)

”There can be no transparent politics without criticism. Without criticism and reflection, it is impossible to hope for the healthy development of the nation. (Applause.) The proper functioning of constitutional government is only possible through the existence of healthy political parties. The government has finally acknowledged the excesses and shortcomings of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, promising to restrain its political activities, to reform its personnel and structure, and to revise the supplementary budget accordingly in order to implement a new operating budget.

From this alone, it is already clear that the organization and actions of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, both past and present, have not been legitimate. (Applause.) That the government nonetheless disregarded this critical juncture and allocated 930,000 yen from the second reserve fund is, in my view, plainly inappropriate and indefensible. (Applause.)”

政府ハ此ノ九十三万圓ノ使途ニ付テモ一々明細ニ議會ニ其ノ動字ヲ示スコトヲ避ケテ居ラレマス (拍手) 斯様な事實ニ徴シマシテ、私共ハ何トシテモ此ノ九十三万圓ノ第二豫備金支出ニ對シテ承認ヲ與ヘルコトハ出來ナイノデアリマス、若シ之ヲナスヤウナコトガアレバ、翼賛會ノ過去及ビ現在ニ於ケル行動ヲ是認シタコトニモナルノデアリマス、又之ヲ承認スレバ此處ニ於テ委員長ハ色々ノ實例ヲ擧ゲラレマシタ、例ヘバ輸出入獎勵金ダトカ、或ハ食糧ノ増産計畫ニ支出シタモノハ第二豫備金ノ支出ニ依ルトカ、實例ヲ擧ゲテ申サレマシタガ、ソレト是トハ全く根本的ニ其ノ性質ヲ異ニスルモノガアリマス (拍手) 私共ハ斯様テ惡例ガ議會政治ノ上ニ殘ルコトヲ斷ジテ許サヌ者デアリマス (拍手) 是ガ議會ニ對スル吾々ノ聯權ヲ全ウスル所以ナリト確信シテ疑ハザル者デアリマス

”The government has also avoided presenting the specific uses of this 930,000 yen in detail to the Diet. (Applause.) In light of these facts, we cannot, under any circumstances, approve the use of the second reserve fund for this purpose. To do so would be to retroactively endorse the Association’s past and present conduct.

The committee chair has cited various precedents, such as subsidies for export promotion or food production planning, which were funded through the second reserve. But this case is fundamentally different in nature. (Applause.) We cannot allow such a harmful precedent to remain in parliamentary politics. (Applause.)

In rejecting this, we affirm our constitutional responsibility as representatives of the people, and we do so with unwavering conviction. (Applause.)”

Online Appendix G2: Excerpts from The Proposals on the Establishment of Imperial National Morality (皇國道義確立ニ關スル建議) in the Imperial Diet, House of Representatives, 85th Session, Proposal No. 6, September 9, 1944

The following are excerpts from The Proposals on the Establishment of Imperial National Morality, used to assess the ideological orientation of sanctioned legislators in the discussion of alternative mechanisms.

皇國道義確立ニ關スル建議一、神國斷ジテ守ルベシ道ノ國大日本ハ侵スベカラズ大東亞ヲ解放シ全人類ヲシテ霸道邪想ヨリ永遠救ハザルベカラズ此ノ道義ニ基ク世界新秩序ノ建設戰ヲ完遂スル爲ニハ先ヅ國內ニ於ケル政治上、行政上、生産上指導者責任ヲ明確ニシリテ皇國傳統/道義ヲ昂揚シテこそ初メテ全國民ノ總力ヲ遺憾ナク必勝ノ一點ニ凝集スルコトヲ得ベシ一、而シテ戰局/現狀一億/民ヲシテ憤然滅敵/忠誠心ヲ燃ヘ上ラシムル秋其ノ總力ヲ十百倍化シテ一死殉忠忱ヲ遂ゲシムルノ途萬遺漏ナキ企畫ト適正強力ナル指導ニ俟ツノ外ナキナリ

(Omitted middle part)

政府此關シ速ニ切腹遠島閉門謹慎等ノ日本の道義の制裁立法其他信賞必罰ノ上緊急適切具體的措置出デ國ヲ舉ゲテ大イニ皇國道義ノ昂揚ヲ圖リ、必勝態勢ヲ強化セラレムコトヲ望ム

1. Japan is a divine nation (shinkoku), the land of the Way (michi no kuni), which must by no means be violated. It must resolutely defend this Way and liberate Greater East Asia, and it must save all humanity once and for all from hegemonic violence and wicked ideologies. In order to complete the war for the construction of a new world order based on this morality, it is necessary, first and foremost, to clearly define the responsibilities of leaders in politics, administration, and production within the country, and to elevate the imperial nation's traditions and moral spirit. Only by doing so can the total power of the entire people be gathered together, without reservation, and concentrated fully toward certain victory.

2. At this point in the war situation and current conditions, it is the time to inflame in the one hundred million people righteous indignation to destroy the enemy and devotion to the emperor. The path to multiplying this national strength ten- or hundredfold, and to enabling everyone to die a loyal death and fulfill their sincere duty, depends entirely on meticulous planning and

strong, proper leadership.

(Omitted passages)

The government must, with regard to this matter, swiftly enact specifically Japanese-style moral sanctions such as seppuku (ritual suicide), exile to remote islands, house confinement, or voluntary self-restraint. It must also implement a system of clear rewards and punishments (shinshō hibatsu), and urgently take appropriate and concrete measures to promote imperial morality across the entire nation and strengthen the posture for certain victory.

Online Appendix H: Case Study of Rep. Torakichi Nakano

No biography of Torakichi Nakano (1879-1962) survives today, but two local encyclopedias provide relatively detailed accounts of his life^{30 31}. Hailing from the Aizu region, known for its strong local identity, this regional pride likely contributes to the relatively detailed accounts of his life preserved in local sources.

Nakano, born into the Kobayashi family in modest circumstances in Aizu, worked his way through Tokyo Professional School (now Waseda University) while employed. He began his career as a clerical secretary at *Otaru Daily Newspaper* in Hokkaido before becoming a police officer. His police service spanned the Hokkaido Prefectural Government, the Governorates General of Taiwan and Korea, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department, and the former German colonies in the Pacific during World War I.

At 35, Nakano was adopted by business tycoon and Tokyo prefectural legislator Torajiro Nakano, taking the name Torakichi Nakano. After his adoptive father served one legislative term in 1917, Torakichi ran for office in Aizu in 1920, serving intermittently until 1949. Despite campaign finance scandals in 1936 and 1948, he was in office during the critical period of 1936–1942, which this study examines. He served as the chair of the Petition Committee but did not hold any cabinet positions.

Nakano also managed businesses while in office, serving as executive director of Tokyo Electric Ceramics and director of Toyo Paint. Notably, Toyo Paint appears in both the 1940 and 1942 *Army Designated Factories and Plants List*. Tokyo Electric Ceramics, though absent from the list, likely supplied parts to the airplane industry.

He was one of the few allies of General Hayashi to survive the 1937 election and took far-right positions on numerous occasions. During the Provisional Committee on the Bill for Restrictions on the Movement of Horses in September 1937, he controversially advocated for sending Koreans and prisoners to support the Second Sino-Japanese War effort. He also called for penal measures to address juvenile delinquency.

³⁰ Aizuwaka Dictionary Compilation Committee, ed. *Aizu Daijiten* [Aizu Encyclopedia]. Tokyo: Kokushokankokai, distributed by Buneido Shoten, December 1985.

³¹ Fukushima Prefecture, ed. *Fukushima Kenshi*, Vol. 22: 8 (Jinbutsu) [Fukushima Prefectural History, Vol. 22: -8 (Biographies)]. Fukushima: Fukushima Prefecture, February 1972.

As a proponent of the aircraft industry, he introduced the Bill on the Issuance of Patriotic Aviation Bonds to the floor in March 1938. Earlier, in 1934, he had been a vocal advocate for the ultimately unsuccessful attempt to record nonstop cross-Pacific flights.

In 1938, however, during debates on the Electricity Nationalization Bill, he delivered a starkly anti-government speech, criticizing the timing, inadequacy of compensation, and coercive nature of the planned nationalization. His criticism of government economic policies persisted. During the Committee on the Issuance of Public Bonds to Cover General Account Expenditures for Fiscal Year 1941, he lambasted the bloated budget and even demanded salary cuts for army officers and generals.

Interestingly, his shift toward economic liberalism coincided with a pro-democratic turn. By 1939, he had left his far-right faction to join the centrist Kanemitsu faction. In 1940, he refused to join the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA) and strongly criticized the National Eugenics Bill in a speech. In 1941, he endorsed criticism of government suppression of anti-army candidates in March and demanded that the Tojo government address critical questions in November. Running without the army's endorsement, he lost his seat in the April 1942 election but later returned to Diet under American occupation in 1946. In this study's dataset, he is coded as (1) until May 1939 and (0) thereafter.

Nakano's business undoubtedly prospered under army contracts, yet he consistently opposed the army's political agenda. His motivations remain unclear but appear to align with this paper's central finding that economic independence enabled anti-army political stances.

Online Appendix I: Photocopy of Archival Materials (Sample)

[illegible]

Figure I2: *Details of Jinji Koshinroku 14th Edition (1943).*

株 價 指 數											153
月 末 現 在 (昭和12年4月=100)											
電燈 電力	鐵道	海運	製紙	食料品 工業	製糖	繊維	煉 油	礦 山	銀行 信託	保險	
91.3	96.2	74.2	87.3	87.4	80.9	109.6	85.5	90.6	97.3	90.3	昭和13年平均
95.9	102.9	71.2	85.7	87.9	81.1	121.8	85.2	85.0	95.1	84.6	昭和14年1月
98.4	105.8	76.7	87.0	88.2	81.1	114.3	88.2	85.8	95.5	83.2	2
98.4	107.1	76.1	84.4	87.7	78.2	121.7	87.0	85.0	95.1	84.9	3
97.0	110.2	82.7	84.9	89.3	73.9	105.4	89.1	86.3	95.1	82.3	4
100.6	110.7	80.6	85.2	89.3	81.7	111.0	94.1	70.1	95.2	82.5	5
106.0	113.4	82.4	85.4	89.0	84.7	114.7	99.9	83.1	97.9	82.7	6
106.6	116.9	84.5	90.8	91.3	87.3	120.3	95.6	91.5	95.4	84.6	7
108.3	116.1	86.6	89.1	92.0	85.0	118.4	104.1	86.4	98.3	85.1	8
110.8	115.9	81.3	94.3	96.3	91.0	124.2	117.2	100.3	99.5	85.6	9
112.5	122.6	117.0	91.8	96.4	94.4	122.6	122.6	101.0	100.2	85.0	10
117.4	124.2	117.0	93.4	94.6	93.3	126.2	116.2	99.4	101.2	87.0	11
116.8	127.2	120.3	94.1	93.2	91.1	123.9	119.7	98.1	105.5	88.1	12
106.6	114.4	92.6	88.7	90.9	85.7	117.5	101.3	88.4	92.7	84.9	昭和15年1月

Figure I3: A page from *Kabushiki Nenkan* (1942)

調	督	調	調	督	督	調	調
調	調	調	調	調	調	調	調
ラサ工務株式會社大坂工場	森印バルブ製造株式會社	浪速船艇株式會社	合名會社漁業鑛務工作所	ナシヨナル電球株式會社	内外木材工藝株式會社	株式會社中山製鋼所	第一鐵鋼株式會社高橋工場 棉本チエソ製作所 土屋澤美商店河内敷家工場 中島機械株式會社大阪工場 中島製作所放出工場 株式會社中島製作所九條工場 中島造船株式會社 株式會社中山製鋼所
同	同	同	同	同	同	同	同
西淀川區佃町二一九	住吉區加賀屋町二一一	港區繁榮町一ノ三二	東淀川區豐崎富通四ノ一	千鳥町六	大阪市大正區船町三	中河內郡龍華町太子堂二八	旭區放出町六二〇 港區九條南通一ノ一二六 同
兵	兵	兵	兵	兵	兵	兵	兵

Figure I4: *A page from Army Designated Factories and Plants List (1942).*

昭和十二年二月二十五日

右成規ニ據リ提出候也

世界資源再分割ト新國策樹立ニ關スル質問主意書

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Figure I5: A page from Endorsement List of Parliamentary Motions, Proposals, and Questions (1937)




Figure I1: A page from Jinji Koshinroku 14th Edition (1943).




Figure I6: A page from Parliamentary Minutes: Roll Call (1938).

Online Appendix J: 10 occasions studied in this paper: Original in Japanese

Date	Event description and coding
1937.3.22	Resolution 70-11/-12 to Exterminate Human Rights Violations 第70回帝国議会決議第11号「人権蹂躪根絶ニ關スル決議案」又は第12号「人権蹂躪ニ關スル決議案」賛成：0
1937.4.30	20th General Election (PM Gen. Hayashi) 第20回衆議院議員総選挙（林内閣）： 昭和会・国民同盟・国家社会主義派無所属：1
1938.2.21-3.4	Legislation 73-19/-20 Prosecutor Office Bill; Court Composition Bill 第73回帝国議会議員提出法案19号・20号「検察廳法案」 賛成：0
1939.3.11	Legislation 74-28/-29/-30/-31 Amendments to Code of Criminal Procedure 第74回帝国議会議員提出法案28号・29号・30号・31号「刑事訴訟法中改正法律案」 賛成：0
1939.5.30	Split of Two Major Political Parties 立憲政友会中島派（革新派）・立憲民政党柳井派（分党派）・社会大衆党国家社会主義派*：1
1940.2.3	Motion 75-4 to refer Rep. Takao Saitō to the disciplinary committee. 第75回帝国議会動議4号「議員齋藤隆夫君ヲ懲罰委員ニ付スルノ動議」 賛成：1
1940.10.11	Formation of Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA) 大政翼賛会 発足時所属：1
1941.2.15	Question 76-5 on the Current Situation and Governmental Leadership 第76回帝国議会質問主意書第5号「時局の變遷と政府の指導に關する質問」（尾崎行雄） 賛成：0 又は
1941.2.27	Question 76-14 on the National Polity and IRAA 第76回帝国議会質問主意書第14号「國體擁護ト大政翼賛會ニ關スル質問」（小山谷蔵） 賛成：0 又は
1941.2.28	Motion 76-1/-2 on the Use of the second reserve budget to support IRAA 第76回帝国議会本会議動議第1号・第2号「昭和十五年度歳入最出總豫算追加案ニ對スル修正動議」 賛成：0
1941.11.18	Motion 77-1 to conclude questioning of the State Ministers of Tojo Cabinet 第77回帝国議会本会議動議第1号「國務大臣ノ演説ニ對スル質疑終局ノ動議」（武知勇記） 賛成：1
1942.4.4	The 20th General Election: Endorsement by IRAA 第21回衆議院議員総選挙（東條内閣） 翼賛政治体制協議会推薦：1