Japan 1945: Regime Change and Elite Change

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1. Introduction: Regime Change Exogenous or Indigenous?

On August 15, 1945, Japan surrendered unconditionally to the Allied Powers by accepting the Potsdam Declaration. It postulated that Japan would be occupied by the Allied Forces until a peaceful and responsible government was to be established by the will of the Japanese people freely expressed. The United States sent General Douglas MacArthur to Japan as the Supreme Commander of the General Headquarters of the Allied Forcecs(GHQ), to whom all ruling powers of the Japanese Government must be subjugated during occupation. It was often suggested that GHQ had revealed its intent to rule Japan directly with its military forces. On September 6, however, General MacArthur received a directive from the Unites States to rule Japan indirectly through the Japanese Government as far as it would be cooperative in consummating the purposes of the Potsdam Declaration.① As pointed out by Mark Gayn, a former correspondent, the truth might have been that the Allied Forces had not been well prepared for a direct military rule becasue the surrender of Japan came earlier than expected.② Anyhow, Japan could retain an organ through which she might express the will of her own. Unlike Germany, Japan was also happy enough to escape the fate of being divided, for she was put under the sole jurisdiction of the United States. Other members of the Allied Powers did not excercise the power to participate in GHQ, though they retained the power to oversee and advice through the Far Eastern Commission.

Demobilization of the Japanese armed forces was finished by October 16, and the capture of war criminals went on until around the end of 1945. In accordance with the intent of the Potsdam Declaration to exterminate those who had agitated and misled the Japanese people into the war of conquring the world, a memorandum was issued to purge persons committed to and involved in the cause of war on January 4,1946. Meanwhile, a several reform programs of giving the franchize for women, promoting labor movement, liberalizing education, lifting of censorship and democratizing the economic structure were enforced. A necessity of revising the Imperial Consitution of Japan of 1889 loomed larger and larger, however, if Japan was to be reconstructed on a totally democratic principle. On October 10,

1945, General MacArthur suggested it to Prime Minister K. Shidehara. Until then both the Japanese Government and people had been rather negative toward the constitutional revision in the hope that the old Constitution could be applied democratically. But in the old Imperial Consitution, sovereignty rested in the Emperor who was above any responsibility. What General MacArthur intended to was to shift sovereingty to the people and establish the peaceful and responsible government based on popular consent. The directive he received from the U.S. Governemnt on January 21, 1946 required him to assure that the Emperor must, if he was to be retained at all, act only on adivce by a government which was responsible to a representative legislature. Though there had been the House of Representatives of the Imperial Diet, a prime minister used to be appointed by the Emperor irrespective of the distribution of seats int it.

Around the turn of the year, there appeared opinions to support the consitutitonal revision in favor of popular sovreignty in the editorial articles of major news papers. Newly formed political parties and private groups revealed their own versions of constitutional revision one after another. The Government could not lose time in drafting its own version of a new constitution. The Minister of State Joji Matusmoto without portofolio was put in charge of it. The governmental guidelines of the consitutional revision leaked by one major news paper The Mainichi on Feburary 1, however, were far from satisfactory in terms of popular sovereignty. Then, General MacArthur made up his minds to draft an entirely new constitution by the hands of GHQ and orderd the Government Service Section of it to do the task, giving the so-called MacArthur Notes mandating ⑴ use of the Emperor's powers on the advice of a government, ⑵abdication of war and ⑶ abolishment of feudalistic institutions such as aristocracy. On Feburary 13, a draf of a new constitution of Japan prepared by GHQ in a hurry was shown to the Japanese Government with no room of negotiation allowed as far as the above three points were concerned. The Japanese Government who tried to retain the fundamental principles of the old Imperial Consitution was shocked, but did their best to make up the draft of a new constitution as acceptable as possible to the people during the process of drawing a Japanese version.

On May 13, 1946, the Far Eastern Commission of the Allied Powers made clear the principles of adopting a new constitution: ⑴there must be enough time and chance to discuss and examine the clauses of the final draft of a new Constitution, ⑵there must be a continuity woth the old Imperial Constitution of 1889, and ⑶a new Constitution must be adopted by the freely expressed will of

the Japanese people. Since the Clause 73 of the old Imperial Constitution requied that a proposal of a constitutional revision must be proposed to the Imperial Diet by the Emperor, it was enevitabl that the principles ② and ③ contradicted with each other. The Emperor chose to delegate his power in order to solve the problem. Newly appointed Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida proceeded to put the proposal of the constitutional revision first to the Privy Council and then to the Imperial Diet in accordance with the provision of the old Constitution. The House of Representatives and the House of Lords of the Imperial Diet agreed to adopte the draft of a constitutional revision with minor changes. In this way, the Constitution of Japan was promulgated on November 3, 1946 and came to effect on May 5, 1947. Being deprived of the ruling power, now the Emperor became the symbol of the people and national unity.

Thus the regime of constitutional monarchy in which sovereignty rested in the Emperor and all powers emanated therefrom changed to the regime of popular sovereignty with a representative body and a responsible government. As far as it was mandated by the Allied Powers acting through GHQ, regime change started in 1945 was exogenous. But in the process of recovery from the ruins of war, democracy had given aspirations and hopes to the devastated people and had been an impetus for a reconstruction of society and economy. The Japanse people welcomed the adoption the new Constitution of Japan as a symbol of new national identity and future development. In this way, democracy had been internalized. The people felt more conginiality and affinity in the clauses of the new Constitution than in those of the old one. Once promulgated, it was accepted as natural as it had ever been. Therefore, regime change of 1945 was indigenous as well.

Democracy had not been foreign to the Japanese people even under the old Imperial Constitution of Japan of 1889, in which the ambivalence of the Meiji Reformation of 1868 inhered. It was revolutionary and reactionary at once in that it tried to achieve modernization and development with ancient authority of the Emperor and Imperial Household. In the circumstances of threats from the Western Powers and resistance by feudal landlords, modernization and development could not have been expected without concentrating every powers in the person of the Emperor with whose authority a nation-building had been progressed rapidly. When the old Imperial Constitution was drafted, the reactionary leaders of modernization took a hegemony and modeled it on a Prussian style. As soon as the first memebers of the House of Representatives of the Imperial

Diet were elected, however, it proved itself to be an innegligiable institution, though it did not enjoy a power to nominate a prime minister from among themselves. During 1920s, we had a high tide of democracy, culminating in the adoption of universal suffrage for men in 1925. T.J. Pempel pointed out that the prewar Japanese political system had contained withing itself the potential to become more democratice, and indeed it had done so.③ In addition to popular votes, there were political parties including the socialists, labor unioins and other social movements, and interest groups. At the same time social structure had been already modernized and became achievement-orieted rather than ascriptive- oriented. It was after 1930 that military leaders became rampant and destroyed democracy by usurping the powers of the Emeperor.

2. Structural Change of Elite System and Its Components

Regime change of 1945 inevitably accompanied change of elite system in terms not only of its structure but also of its components. The elite system before 1945 had a double-deck structure consisting of active elites of practice and power and of inactive elites of honor and priviledge. To the first group belonged governmental leaders(a prime minister and ministers of state), military leaders, bureaucrats, elected members of the House of Representatives of the Imperial Diet as well as business leaders. The princes, anciet court nobles and feudal landlords belonged to the second group, composing aristocracy. The two groups were linked by a systm of ennobling distinguished governmental leaders and meritorious military leaders to aristocracy. While active elites participated more or less directly in the decisions that affected the course of developent of society, inactive elites influenced them indirectly as a guardian of the Imperial Household. Sometimes, an inactive elite might be called back to the active service. The highly distinguished governmental leaders were not only honored with the highest rank of aristocracy, but also became the Elders who adviced the Emperor on the choice of a new prime minister. It was not rare that they chose the candidate of a prime minister from among themselves. In this sense, they were a sort of "in-and-outers." Another former governmental leaders and bureaucrats had a chance eitehr to join the the Privy Council or to be an appoined member of the House of Lords, the two strongholds of inactive elites. On the contrary, busienss leaders were not treated so well at least officially in spite of their immense wealth and power. Heads of Zaibatsu Families who owned huge conglomerates were happy enough if they were ennobled to the lowest rank of baronage. A small number of business leaders were coopted into the House of Lords as a higher tax-payer. Business leaders had a close contact with inactive elites as well as with another active elites by marriage and/or monetary sponsorship, though. Elected members of the House of Representatives were still more humbly treated in terms of official honor and priviledge, unless they they joined government.

The two-deck structure of elite system had developed just because of ambivalence and/or antinomy of revolutionary and reactionary characters of the Meiji Reformation of 1868. It was revolutionary as far as it intended to save Japan from feudalistic stalemate and to build a modern nation-state. It was reactionary in so far as it had to have a recourse to ancient authority of the Emperor in order to give a legitimacy to a new government to manage the emerging

modern nation-state, resiting the threats from the Western powers and overcoming oppositions of feudal landlords. The new government set two overarching goals of "Industrialization and Development" and "National Wealth and Power," which could be achievable within a so short period of time only with strong hands of government taking the lead and initiative. Such a government must be composed of young and ambitious national leaders committed to modernization and industrialization irrespective of their social origins. In fact, the reformationary leaders of the Meiji Reformation came mainly from the lower ranks of the samurai-worrier class. Their successsors must be recruited on the basis of achievement rather than of ascription. On the other hand, they could not neglect the existence of anciet court nobles and feudal landlors who had given a support for them during the turmoil of reformation and could be expected to be of some help in stabilizing the new regime. So they were accomodated to a new social structure by being merged into a newly formed aristocracy. Thus came the two-deck structure of elite system.

We can find a more or less similar situation in France of the ancient regime, whem the Kings prefered to give a public office to literate men of humble origins to to court nobles who could be a threat to the throne. In Japan, reformationary leaders and thier close followers formed a new government with court nobles and landlors who were sympathetic with them at first. Since court nobles and landlors lacked either knowledge or ability to manage the modern state, however, they were sifted out one by one from the governmental offices and retired into a rather oblivious aristocracy. The resulting dual structure of elite system made a way for modernization and industrialiaztion easier, but reserved reactionary elements on the both sides of active and inactive elites, which threatened to retard democracy to mature fully. Allied with reactionary elemtnts, military leaders dragged on the Japanese people into the war of devastation.

By demilitarization of 1945, military leaders were expelled from the group of active elites for ever. Ath the same time, regime change destroyed the two-deck streucture of elite system and replaced it with a more or less unitary structure. In the Constitution of Japan, no room was allowed for aristocracy and any other kind of priviledge, and the Privy Council and House of Lords disappeared. What remained were active elites of governmental leaders, bureaucrats, elected memebers of the House of Representatives, and business leaders. Some old governmental leaders struggled to survive but not always

successfully. May of the old elected politicians were purged because of their involvment in war. New politicians had now a chance to replace them. Bureaucrats remained rather unscathed, though some of them were purged. Business leaders who had been relegated to a rather humble status gained power becasue their cooperation was an absolute necessity for the recovery and reconstruction of national economy, though old business leaders were replaced by new ones.

Before 1945, military leaders and bureaucrats were institutional leaders, while governmetal leaders and business leaders were personal leaders. Both military leaders and bureaucrats were educated in some kind of governmetal institutions of education and came to play the role of an active elite in a capacity of being an incumbent of a position in some governmental organizations which stood at the key point of a national policy-making. They could play the role of an active elite because the members of his organization were mobilized behind him. Institutional leaders are organizational men or other-directed persons by definition. On the contrary, governmental leaders, elected politicians and business leaders used to play the role of an active elite because of their own efforts and charisma. That would be a reason why Robert T. Oliver called a governmental leader of the Meiji Era as persuasive leader.④ Politicians must win the electin by his own power of persuation. As party organizations had been streamlined more and more, however, politicians were apt to be increasingly institutionalized as well as professionalized. Businesse leaders used to be also persuasive as far as they showed a model of business success to be followed by the fellow people. But disbandment of the Zaibatsu Groups triggered a sort of mangerial revolution which replaced old business leaders with new ones of an entirely different kind. New business leaders belong to the group of insitutional leaders in that they have been promoted through the line of hierarchy to the elite position. He could play the role of active national elite because he have his organization behind him. Top business leaders were those who represent a federation of business organizations of one kind or another.

The change of elite system from the dual structure to the unitary one was brought about by democratization of society. As a result, there has been no chance left for an active elite to be endowed with honor and priviledge of an inactive elite. If he wants to be an elite at all, he must continiue to be an active elite. Otherwise, he ceases to be an elite any more. Though active elites had been rejuvenated after the World War II, they are now getting older and older as the time has gone. That would be a reason why age has been advanced

among governmental leaders, elected politicians, and business leaders and seniority rule has been firmly ingrained. Though bureaucrats retire rather young, they manage to keep the elite position either by joining different organizations or by running for election. Together with the unitary structure of elite system, growing institutionalization was responsible for a stalemate and faceless leadership of elite groups. The electoral refrom of 1994 was an attempt to destroy stagnation in the political arena. It would be too early to judge the success or unsuccess of the reform, though there is some symptom in favor of breaking stagnation as far as elected politicians are concerned.

In addition to the groups of elites discussed above, there are another kinds of socially prominent persons such as novelists and writers, journalists, news casters and other kinds of opinion-leaders, movie-and television-stars, athletic stars of several kinds as well as descendants of the old established families and sons and daughters of elites or former elites. But they are not elits unless they come to participate in the decisions affecting the fate of his fellow people by themselves. To be true, a fame or prestige of parents and a background of families have some influence upon a chance of being good-educated, which is a crucicial on joining organizations leading to elite positon. But its influence is rather ephemeral than enduring. Ex. Ambassador of Japan to the United Sates Ryohei Murata, who is married with a daughter of a former Governor of Ohsaka Prefecuture and later a member of the Upper House of the Diet, once remarked that it [his marrige] had certainly not been a factor affecting his assisgnments and promotions, though he did not deny some indirect advantages such as informal talks with relatives in an important position.⑤ Any well-connedted person is subjected to the same process of selection as any other persons are to in which he is to be eased off to the side if he does not shows ability and talent competent enough to compete successfully with others. In the selection process observed often is a tendency which purports to reject those who have made a serious mistake in terms of the interests of the organization concerned and those who are allegedly anti-organizational or unbearably asocial. Institutional elites such as bureaucrats have a good chance of being an elcted politician by mobilizing organizational assets and resources. But they must add personal elements if they are to be successful as a politician. Also among elected politicians, there are so many sons or sons-in-law of former politicians who succeeded the constituencies of their fathers. They could not have a bright career prospect as a politician, however, until they have proven

themselves to be reliable and promissing no less than any of his colleagues.

There is always a distance between elites or leaders and their followers. Before 1945, not only inactive elites but also active elites were segregated from the ordinary people by endowing them with priviledged ranks, titles and decorations irrespective of their social origins. Withe growing democratization of society after 1945, the distance has been narrowed more and more. But just becasue of this, elites have been trapped in a situtation in which they must face a loss of deference, respectability, confidence and trust. At the same time growing institutionalization of elites has aroused cinicism among the ordinary people who lose a chance to join an organization leading to an elite position or who swereve from the career ladder inside of it toward them. The faceless institutional elites are easy to be replaced but only by those who are successful in climing up the career ladder in the same way as their predecessors. Therefore it would be getting more and more difficult for them to inspire people with new ideas and visions or to propose a change of course of development. The resulting leadershp- and governability -crisis would be too much to be described away as a cost of democracy.

3. Prime Minister Before 1945: Super-Elite In A Precarious Situation

The cabinet system was introduced in Japan in 1885. At first, the prime minister had looked like a German chancellor endowed with strong powers to ordain a policy guideline to ministers of state and to examine performance of ministries. After the Imperial Constitution of Japan was promulgated, however, a prime minister was deprived of these powers and reduced to being a primus inter pares in accorcance with the provision of the Constitution, which made ecah minister of state advice and be responsible to the Emperor. This change of powers and status did not matter much as far as the immediate followers of the Meiji reformationary leaders occupied the post of a prime minister in turn. Though their successors suffered from the lack of power strong enough to resist a pressure from military leaders and inactive elites acting through their stronghols of the Privy Council and the House of Lords of the Diet as wellas from the courtiers, the main reason was not official powers of a prime minister but the actual configuration of powers among different groups of active and inactive elites. Because the General Staffs of the Army and Navy could advice the Emperor directly over the shoulder of the prime minister, matters concerning military command stood outside the jurisdiction of the cabinet. If Army and Navy did not agree to the appointment of active Generals and Admirals to ministers of Army and Navy, a prime minister could not organize a cabinet, however he was ordered to do so by the Emperor. The Privy Council and the House of Lords were so jealous of a prime minister as to tend to do their utmost to orbstruct the work of a prime minister and his cabinet. Especially, the Elders who used to advice the Emperor on the choice of a new prime minister often tried to replace the incumbent with their own favorite or with themselves.

Still worse was the fact that the members of the House of Representaitves of the Diet was destined to be the arch-enemy of a prime minister and his cabinet, because a prime minister was appointed by and responsible only to the Emperor who was above any responsibility. Under this ambiguous constitutional situation, the House of Representatives felt no hesitation to criticize the policies of a cabinet as severely as possible, though they could not raise a vote of non-confidence against it. Becasue of the lack of popular support expressed through the House of Representatives, a prime minister and his cabinet must stand alone and helpless.

Some scholars insist that a prime minister was not a holder of power but only an agent of power. But that was not true. He was under pressures from many

sources just because he had power and held a hegemony in directing the course of development of society. Mamy people were jealous of him only because they wanted to be a prime minister by themselves some day. That was true enven with the Elders who could be a prime minister again. This would be attested eloquetly by the fact that military leaders, who tried to influence the cabinet from outside at first, came to take over the cabinet at last. Atter 1940s, even the influential members of the House of Representatives were mobilized behind them. In this sense, a prime minister was a super-elite next only to the Emperor. Prominence of a prime minister among several groups of elites would be clealer if we look at the occupational background and fomer position of a prime It was ironical enough that because he stood at the crucial point of managing the nation-state and directing the course of development of society, a prime minister was subjected to a precarious situation before regime change of 1945.

The List 1 shows names of twenty-nine prime ministers during sixty year between 1885 and 1945. The first five prime ministers were immediate followers of reformationary leaders unon whom the tasks of building a modern nation-state were fallen. Two of them had formerly belonged to Choshyu-Han, anoter two to Satusma-Han and one to Saga-Han. Han or clan was a kind of a semi-independent feudal state. Choshyu-Han and Satusma-Han coalesced to destroy the Tokugawa Shogunate and ushered in the Meiji Reformation of 1868, being joined by Tosa-Han and Hizen-Han later. Therefore, their prepondernce in the first stage of the Meiji Era was quite natural, though they had a severe power-struggle among themselves. They were educated in each Han but equipped with new-western knowledge indispensable for managing a modern state. Reformationary leaders picked them up as a sort of transitional burcaucrats. They were quick to overcome divided loyalties and became leading members of the new government. But they felt uneasy with the once-restored ancient system of Dajyokan on the top of which only court nobles and feudal landlords could stand. Taking a hegemony in drafting a constitution on a German model, Hirobumi Ito established the cabinet system and became the first prime minister. He served as prime minister four times. Aritomo Yamagata, Masayoshi Matsukata of Choshyu-Han and Shigenobu Ohkuma of Saga-Han served twice. Kiyotaka Kuroda of Satsuma-Han servied once. They continued to keep the post of a prime minister among themselves until 1901 consecutively and Ohkuma revived as as prime minister even later. Kuroda and Yamagata were civilian and military at once. Yanagata controlled not only the Ministry of Interior and police force, but also the armed forces as Marshal.

List 1. Prime Minister Before August 15, 1945

Prime Minister	Period	Original Occupation	Former Office
1 Hirobumi Ito	1885.12~87.12	Transitional Bureaucrat	Minis.of Court
	1892.08~96.08		President of Privy Council
	1898.01~98.06		
	1900.10~01.05		
2 Kiyotaka Kuroda	1888.01~	Transitional Bureaucrat	Minis.of Commerce
3 Aritomo Yamagata	1889.12~91.04	Transitional Bureaucrat	Minis.of Court
	1898.11~00.10		Minis.of Army
4 Matuskata Masayoshi	1891.05~92.08	Transitional Bureaucrat	Minis.of Finance
	1896.09~97.12		Minis.of Finance
5 Shigenobu Ohkuma	1898.06~98.11	Transitional Bureaucrat	Minis.of F.A.
	1914.04~16.10		
6 Taro Katsura	1903.06~05.12	General	Minis.of Army
	1909.07~11.08		
	1912.12~13.02		
7 Kinmochi Saionji	1906.01~08.07	Court Noble	President of Privy Council
	1911.08~12.12		Chairman of Seiyukai
8 Gonbei Yamamoto	1913.02~14.04	Admiral	Minis.of Navy
	1923.09~23.12		
9 Masaki Terauchi	1916.10~18.09	General	Minis.of Army
10 Takashi Hara*	1918.09~21.11	Party Politician	Chairman of Seiyukai
11 Korekiyo Takahashi*	1921.11~22.06	Party Politician	Minis.of Finance
12 Tomosaburo Kato	1922.06~23.08	Admiral	Minis.of Navy
13 keigo Kiyoura	1924.01~24.06	Buraucrat	President of Privy Council
14 Takaaki Kato*	1924.06~26.01	Party Politician	Chairman of Kenseikai
15 Reijiro Wakatsuki	1926.01~27.04	Bureaucrat	Minis.of Interior
	1931.04~31.12		
16 Giichi Tanaka	1927.04~27.12	General	Chairmen of Consti.Seiyukai
17 Osachi Hamaguchi*	1929.07~30.04	Bureaucrat	Minis.of Finance
18 Tsuyoshi Inukai*	1931.12~32.05	Party Politician	Chairman of Seiyukai
19 Makoto Saito	1932.05~34.07	Admiral	Governer of Korea
20 Keisuke Okada	1934.07~36.03	Admiral	Minis.of Navy
21 Koki Hirota	1936.03~37.01	Bureaucrat	Minis.of F.A.

22 Senjuro Hayashi	1937.02~37.06	General	In Reserve
23 Hidemaro Konoe	1937.16~38.12	Court Noble	President of House of Lords
	1940.07~41.10		President of Privy Council
24 Kiichiro Hiranuma	1939.01~39.08	Burcaucrat	Minis.of Justice
25 Nobuyuki Abe	1939.08~39.12	General	In Reserve
26 Mitsumasa Yonai	1940.01~40.07	Admiral	Mimis.of Navy
27 Hideki Tojyo	1941.10~44.07	General	Minis.of Army
28 Kuniaki Koiso	1944.07~45.04	General	Minis.of Plantation
29 Kantaro Suzuki	1945.04~45.08	Admiral	President of Privy Council

*=those who had a seat in the House of Representatives of the Diet.

Parochialism dominated by Choshyu- and Satsuma-Han was gradualy but steadly overcomed by universalism, as the national integration went on. After them, only three prime ministers were born in former Choshyu-Han and one in Satsuma-Han. Other prime ministers came from all over the country. Thirteen out of twenty-four prime ministers after transitional bureaucrats were military leaders, seven of whom were Generals and six were Admirals. There were five bureaucratic prime ministers and four politician prime ministers. But all of four politician prime ministers had experiencec of governmental service some time in their career. Takashi Hara was a former Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and Takaaki Kato was a bureau chief of the same minisrty. Korekiyo Takahashi was a former President of the Bank of Japan after serving in the Ministry of Finance and of Education in lower capacity. They might well be included among former bureaucrats. But because they led politcal parties, we treat them as politician. All of politician prime ministers had a seat in the House of Representatives together with one former bureaucrat. There were two prime ministers of a court noble of ancient origin.

It would be amazing to find so many military leaders among prime ministers. But not all of them became a prime minister for the same reason. As is clear from the fact that General Taro Katusra and Masaki Terauchi came from former Choshyu-Han and Admiral Gombei Yamoto from former Satsuma-Han, they were an intermediary between a transitional bureaucrat and new type of a bureaucratic or military leader. They were chosen for a prime minister, becasue they had proved themselves to be well qualified to succeed the legacy of the Meiji Reformation. While General Terauchi was ostensibly anti-constitutional,

Katsura and Yamanoto were not so. Admiral Tomosaburo Kato was appointed prime minister after he represented Japan in the Peace Conference in Washington. Giichi Tanaka organized his cabinet with the support of a political paprty in spite of his aggressive policy. Admiral Makoto Saito had been well-known to be a experienced politician by serving five prime ministers as Minister of Navy. Admiral Keisuke Okada worked for the reduction of armed forces negotiated in London. Admiral Mitusmasa Yonai was in favor of alliance with the Unites States and Great Britain rather than with Germany and Italy. Neverthless, we can not overlook militaristic tendency of Japan in having so many military leaders as a prime minister, which culminated in the appointment of General Tojyo in 1941. He took over the cabinet by merging the roles of Ministers of Interior, Army and Ammunition as well as the Chief of General Staff with that of Prime Minister.

Unlike Germany where military offices were preempted by the Junkers, the Japanese military leaders belonged to the group of instututional elites together with bureaucrats. They were recruited nation-wide from any social strata and educated at the miliary institutions just as many bureaucrats were educated at governmental universities. Reformationary leaders of the Meiji Era and their immediate followers established aristocarcy and joined it themselves in the hope that it might supply future national leaders and elites. But the hope faded away. Separating active elites and inactive elites, they hurried in educating institutional elites to nurse their successors. Army and Navy came first in establisheing educational institutions, accompanying other Ministries, and then Governemnt as a whole. That would be a reason why many military leaders appeared among prime ministers earlier than bureaucrats. Keigo Kiyoura was an intermediary between a transitional bureaucrat and a new bureaucrat educated in a governmental institution and recruited on the merit principle. Reijiro Wakatsuki was the first graduate of Imperial University of Tokyo who became a prime minister after having served as a professional bureaucrat, followed by Osachi Hamaguchi, Koki Hirota and Kiichiro Hiranuma. Because the Emperor used to appoint a prime minister on the advice of the Elders irrespective of the party strength in the House of Representatives of the Diet, there were only four party politicians among prime ministers. Being personal elites rather than institutinal, they left deep impression in the pre-war history. Three of them, Takashi Hara, Korekiyo Takahashi and Tsuyoshi Inukai ended their life by assasination, while Takaaki Kato died of ill during his incumbency. One of court

nobles Kinmochi Saionji was an entouragㅣue of Hirobumi Iro and successor of his party. Another court noble Humimaro Konoe enjoyed a mixed reputation.

Another surprise is to he found in the shortness of the term of office of each prime minister. Because we had twenty-nine prime ministers during sixty years of pre-war history, the average years in office were almost two years. The longest record was marked by Taro Katusra, who served 2, 886 days totally, and next by Hirobumi Ito who served 2, 720 dayes. The shortest record was that of Senjuroi Hayashi's 123 days, and the next shortest was taht of Kantaro Suzuki who served only 133 days in order to end the war. During 1885 to 1945, Great Britain had eigteen prime ministers, starting with Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, and ending wiht Winsnton Churchill. The average years in office there were three ycars and four months. The shortness of the term of offices of the Japanese prime minister attested not only severeness of competition over the office but also dispensability of elits, especially of institutional ones. Most of all, however, the existence of the Emperor as the supreme power holder might have made the change of a prime minister easier, assuring continuity of regime and then causing no anxiety among the people.

4. Prime Minister After 1945: Super-Elite Or Naked King ?

After the end of the World War II, Prince Naruhiko Kuninomiya was appointed prime minister. It was first time that a prince became a prime minister, though Prince Taruhito Arisgawa had headed the provisional government just after the Meiji Reformation of 1868. Prince Naruhiko was chosen in the hope that recalicitrant military leaders might not take action against him. In actuality, demoblization had went on rather peacefully. He sent Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu to the Missouri to sign the document of surrender. Shortly, however, he resinged in protest against democratizing policies of GHQ. Next Prime Minister Kijuro Shidehara was a former Minister of Foreign Affaris. He and his cabinet wanted to keep fundamental structure of the old regime as much as possible. Many other old elites olso hoped to do so lest they should lose their power bases. They struggled hard to survive in one way or another. But military leaders were sent to the prisons, and many other persons who had been committed to and involved in the war efforts were purged from any public office by the memorandum issued by GHG on January 4, 1946. Ichiro Hatoyaman, Chairman of Liberal Party, lost the chance of being the third prime minister after the war by being purged. He asked Foreigh Minister Shegeru Yoshida to take care of the party and be a prime minister. The new Constitution of Japan of 1946 was promulgated under the Yoshida's Cabinet.

The new Constituion required a prime minister be nominated by the Diet from among its members. Before regime change of 1945, only five prime ministers had a seat in the House of Representatives. Now, any prime minister must have a seat either in the House of Representatives or in the House of Senators(the Upper Hosue). At the same time, it was postulated that a prime minister and minisiter of state must be a civilian. Thus, military leaders were excluded from the office of a prime minister for ever. A prime minister and his cabinet must be responsible for the Diet and the House of Representatives of it could raise a vote of non-confidence against it. If it is passed, a prime minister and other members of his cabinet must resign as a whole, or must dissolve the House of Representatives within 10 days. It is a sovereign people who decide the composition of the Diet and thus influence the choice of a prime minister. In his way, power base of a prime minister has been strengthened by popular support. At the same time, the new Constitution restored a prime minister from the olivious position of a primus inter pares to that of a head of the cabinet with a power to represent the cabinet toward the Diet and to the people.

In a differencce with the old Imperial Constitution, the new Constitution of Japan gave executive power exclusively to the cabinet. As the head of it, a prime minister has now unchallengiable power as a super-elite and national leader. None other than a prime minister can take a hegemony in giving a direction to the course of national development at least officially. People watch carefully his deeds and listen attentively to his voice evey day and

List 2. Prime Minsiter After August 17, 1945

Prime Minister	Period	Original Occupation	Former Office
30 Prince Naruhiko	1945.08~45.10	Prince	General
31 Kijuro Shidehara	1945.10~46.05	Bureaucrat	Minis.of F.A.
32 Shegeru Yoshida	1946.05~47.05	Bureaucrat	Minis.of F.A.
	1948.10~54.13		
33 Tetsu Katayama	1947.05~48.03	Party Politician	Chairman of Socialt Party
34 Hitoshi Ashida	1948.03~48.10	Bureaucrat/Politician	Minis.of Welfare
35 Ichiro Hatoyam	1954.12~56.12	Party Politician	Minis.of Education
36 Tanzan Ishibashi	1956.12~57.02	Party Politician	Minis.of Finance
37 Nobusuke Kishi	1957.02~60.07	Bureaucrat	Minis.of F.A.
38 Hayato Ikeda	1960.07~64.11	Bureaucrat	Minister of Finance
39 Eisaky Sato	1964.11~72.07	Bureaucrat	Minis.of In.T.I.
40 Kakuei Tanaka	1972.12~74.12	Party Politician	Secretary General of LDP
41 Takeo Miki	1974.12~76.12	Party Politician	Minis.of F.A.
42 Takeo Fukuda	1976.12~78.12	Bureaucrat	Minis.of Finance
43 Masayoshi Ohira	1978.12~80.07	Bureaucrat	Secretary General of LDP
44 Zenko Suzuki	1980.07~82.11	Party Poliitician	Secretary General of LDP
45 Yasuhiro Nakasone	1982.11~87.11	Bureaucrat	Minis.of State
46 Noboru Takeshita	1987.11~89.06	Party Politician	Minis.of Finance
47 Sosuke Uno	1989.06~89.08	Party Politician	Minis.of F.A.
48 Toshiki Kaifu	1989.08~91.11	Party Politician	Undersecretary of Cabinet
49 Kichi Miyazawa	1991.11~93.08	Bureaucrat	Minis.of Finance
50 Morihiro Hosokawa	1993.08~94.04	Party Politician	Governor of Kumamoto
51 Tsutomu Hada	1994.04~94.06	Party Politician	Minis.of F.A.
52 Tomiichi Murayama	1994.00~ - -	Party Politician	Chairman of Socialist Party

night, becasue their life and business are affected thereby delicately. I call this phenomena as the footlight effect of a prime minister. In spite of this, a prime minister still suffers from the lack of power base and enough competence to excercise leadership. Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone once avowed that he should have been a president-like prime minister. The more he wants to be so, the more he looks like a naked king, because he can not have a power parallel with any president in the world at all.

Irrespective of regime change, power structure looks like to have inheited the DNA of the old regime. Within fifty years betwee 1945 and 1995, we have had twenty three prime ministers. The term in office of a prime minister has changed slightly from 2.06 years to 2.17 years. The new regime has been as unstable as before. During the same period, Great Britain has only eleven prime ministers. Germany has only six chancellors. The longest record of term of office of 2,798 consecutive days was marked by Eisaku Sato. Taro Katusra had markd the record of 2,886 but intermittently. Next was his mentor Shigeru Yoshida who marked 2,616 days of incumbency. The shortest record was that of Tustomu Hada's 64 days and that of Tanzan Ishibashi's 65 days except Prince Naruhiko's 54 days. Still, the composition of cabinet and recruitment source have changed.

Eight prime ministers from the 30th Prince Naruhito till the 37th Nobusuke Kishi were hangovers from the old regime. But only Shidehara, Hatoyama and Kishi had serverd as a minister of state under the old regime. Hatoyama and Kishi were ones of a few resurged from the purge by GHQ. Of 22 prime ministers other than Prince Naruhito, twelve were party politicians and nine were former bureaucrats. Hitoshi Ashida had had a mixed career of a bureaucrat in the Ministry of Foreigh Affairs and a member of the Imperial House of Representatives. Therefore he was ommitted from both sides. Though they were bureaucrats in origin, Takeo Fukuda, Masayoshi Ohira, Yasuhiro Nakasone and Kiichi Miyazawa had a more or less longer career as a professional politican, having waited a chance to be a prime minister. Contrastingly, Hayato Ikeda and Eisaku Sato became a prime minister with lingering bureaucratic temper.

It was the 32nd Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida who was credited with an honor of being the first prime minister under the parliamentary system of government. The fact that not only Yoshda but also Shidehara and Ashida had served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs underlined that they could have kept themselves relatively aloof from war efforts but also they had a dexterity in negotiating with GHQ. In spite of his bureaucratic arrogance and antiquatedness,

Yoshida was resoponible not only for winning independence but also for miraculous economic recovery. As economic development went on, the post of an ecomomic minister including that of Finance became more and more important as a stepping stone leading to the post of a prime minister. Yoshida showed a special interest in educating bureaucrats with statemanship. Iked and Sato were honor-degree disciples of "Yoshida Schooi." Politically, however, Yoshida committed a several mistakes. He set a precedence of reshuffling a cabinet regularly. He fought with established politicians with bureaucrats on his side. Especially he opposed severly the coming back of Ichiro Hatoyam and sticked to power very long. Thus political infighting of the old regime revived and power struggle between prospective candidates for a prime minister has increased bitterness.

In 1955, opposing conservtive parties were merged into Liberal Democratic Party(LDP) in order to check the birth of socialist government in success. But several factions appeared in LDP soon for the sake of taking an advantage of groups in the election of its chairman, who would be a prime minister at once as far as LDP was in power. A faction was s sort of a personal uniton led by a prime minister or a prospective candidate of a prime minister. The followers support a leader of a faction in return for monetary support and especially for a ministerial post. In the election of the party chairman, the faction fought with each other severely. Though a winner formed a cabinet, he must depend upon the leaders of other factions and another influencial persons to manage the party and handle a relation with opposition parties. A prime minister was challenged not from the opposition parties but from inside of his own party as soon as he was inaugurated. Kichi Miyazawa had to give up his power because the Secretary General of LDP was not sympathetic with his plan of political reform. Under the coalision governments after Morihiro Hosokawa, the situation seems to be aggravated becasue a minor party could have a hegemony in making and remaking of a cabinet.

Yoshida was only one post-war prime minister who retuned to the office again. Inbetween, Tetsu Katayama of the Socialist Party and Hitoshi Ashida of Democratic Party served rather shortly. Yoshida was replaced at last by his former freind and rival Ichiro Hatoyama. He signed the Japan-Russian Common Declaration. Tanzan Ishibashi and Nobusuke Kish struggled with each other to be his successor. The winner Ishbashi handed power to the loser Kishi because of illness. Kishi renewed the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Pact against the storm of portests from all over the country. In return for his success, he retired. The

age of hangovers from the old regime ended together with him. The age of new generation started in 1960 with Hayato Ikeda. As a fomer bureaucrat of the Minisry of Finance, Ikeda propagated the income doubling policy, and thus enhanced economic development. Another bureaucrat from the Ministry of Railway succeeded him. He achieved the return of Okinawa and made the Treaty with Korea. He could record the longest consecutive term of office because of his posture of wait-and-see.

Having sticked to power, Sato never wanted to choose a successor from his own faction in the fear of losing power base. Irritatedt Kakuei Tanaka revolted against him and usurped the faction for his own sake of being a prime minister. He was born in 1918 and elected to the House of Representatives first time in 1947. He marked the change of an age by being nominated prime minister in 1972. At the same time a balance between bureaucrats and politicians was tilted in favor of the later, and primacy of politics seemed to occure. After him, there were only four bureaucratic prime ministers, while there were eight politician prime ministers. Proposing a reconstruction of the Japanese archipelago, Tanakahe inspired the people. A relaltion with China was normalized under him. But he was too eager to enlarge his faction to the extent that it migt become as large as a party by itself to be fallen in serious scandals. After retirement, he managed to kee his own faction. At last, however, Moboru Takeshita usurped the Tanaka Faction in turn and followed his expansion policy. His friend Shin Kanemaru did not conceal the intent to enlalrge his faction and divid LDP. An ostensible reason was to establish a two-party system in Japan. In actuality, the fall of LDP in 1993 was triggered by the internal strife among the enlared Takeshita Faction. The fifteenth prime minister of LDP Kichi Miyazwa since 1955 gave up LDP government fitst time.

The coalition government headed first by Morihiro Hosokawa and next by Tsutomu Hada, a defector from the Takeshita Faction, did not last long, however. Then, LDP came back to power, forming another coalition government with former enemy the Socialist Party. It has been not a so long time since LDP and Socialist Party fought with each other ideologically. But no one knows when a two-party system will be realized and political stability will prevail in Japan.

5. Minister of State Before and After 1945: From the Brightest to the Mediocore

The Imperial Constitution of Japan of 1889 did not mention a prime minister nor a cabinet but only a minister of state who was to advice and responsible to the Emperor. But a prime minister had a power to recommend a minister of state to be appointed by the Emperor. The first cabinet organized by Hirobumi Ito consisted of nine ministers of state who had already established themselves as a distinguished politician of Satsuma-and Choshyu-Han, one coopted from Tosa-Han and another from the Shogunate. As time went on, the mumber of thsoe ministers of state who were not from neither Satsuma-Han or from Choshye-Han had been incereased until universalism overcomed parochialism at last. A minister of state not only belonged to a cabinet bur also presided over a ministry. Though the members of a cabinet did not owe a collective responsibility to the Diet, they were expected to act unitedly.

A minister of state had a dual role of political minister and an administrative minister. As a political minister, he discussed the matter of national import in a cabinet and adviced the Emperor. As an administrative minister he was in charge of a ministry. It was to him and not to the cabinet that a task and power were assigned, and it was he who represented the state as far as the juriscidtion of his ministry was concerned. So, a minister of state was a very important elite only next to a prime minister.

Until around the turn of the century, the distinguished immediate followers of reformationary leaders and another transitional bureaucrats coopted from other parts of the country formed the most important recuritmemnt source of the ministers of state. Reformationary leaders and their immediate followers selected other transitional bureaucrats on a basis of patronage. If they had proved themselves to have a statesmanshgip, they had a chance to be promoted to a post of a minister of state. Fundamentally, the criteria of selecting a minister of state were not different from that of sorting out a higher bureaucrat. For the members of a cabinet were appointed by the Emperor transcendentaly without paying any attention to the configuration in the House of Representatives of the Imperail Diet. Neverthless, political factors such as statesmanship and persuasiveness could never be overlooked. As present and past as well as would-be prime ministers formed their own groups of followers, their choice tended to be confined to a norrower circle. Still, the brightest at least in the eyes of a recruiting prime minister was picked up as a minister of state. It was not necessary to pay attention to inactive elites nor to a balance

among different groups of followers.

As the time went on, transitional bureaucrats were replaced by bureaucrats sifted out and educated through governmental institutions. After around the turn of the century, a minister of state began to be chosed from among these professional bureaucrats. Yoshio Sakatami was the first graduate of the Uniiversity of Tokyo appointed Minister of Finance in 1906 through his sucessive career in the ministry. Kikujiro Ishi was chosen as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1915 from among professionoal ambassadors graduated from the same University. Kitokuro Ichiki was the first graduate of the University of Tokyo who became the Minister of Interior in the same year. Though it was still later that bureaucrats were rather constantly chosen as a minister of state, the brightness of a minister of state was assured in this way, because the University of Tokyo educated the brightest young persons irrespective of their social origin and locality. Increase of bureaucratic ministers of state accompanied inevitably institutionalization of elites and political leadership.

Concomitantly, one or two members of the House of Represenrtatives of the Imperial Diet began to appear among the members of a cabinet. This tendency was enhanced during 1920s, as the power of the elected House of Representaves was recongnized to be innegligiable, and even continiued under the war cabinets. But because bureaucratiztion went on at the same time, the number did not amount so much as was expected. The weight of politician ministers was also controlled by the fact that two posts of Ministers of Army and Navy among fourteen or so ministers of state were reserved for military leaders, another kind of institutional elites. The contradictory trends of politicization and bureaucratizatin occured in order to fill a void left by transitional bureaucrats.

Prince Naruhiko organized the first cabinet after the Wold War II with five bureaucrats and seven non-bureaucrats in addition to two military ministers. Non-bureaucrats included not only politicians but also businessmen. Many of them were novices as a minister of state, and all were already well-estabished elites. Three of them were captured as war-criminials and six including Naruhiko were purged later. Meny members of the next Shiderara's cabint were also purged. Next came the first Yoshida Cabinet with five bureaucrats and eleven non-bureaucrats including politicians. businessmen and scholars. Because it was established after the purge, almowst all of them were novices but well-known elites in respective circles. After the new Constitution

of Japan introduced the parliamentary system of governemnt, it was required that more than half of the members of a cabinet must be a member of either House of the Diet. Then, it was quite natural that Testsu Katayama and Hitoshi Ashida organized the cabinets with more party politicians than bureaucrats. Many bureaucrats had already had a mandate in eitehr Hosue.

This tendency continiued unitl the Second Yoshida's Cabinet, though he appointed an ex-bureaucrat Eisaku Sato Secretary General of the Cabinet without a mandate. In his third cabinet, Yoshida assinged Hayato Ikeda, an ex-bureaucrat just elected to the House of Representatives, to the post of Minister of Finance. Thence, he increased the number of ex-buraucrats among the members of his cabinet, setting a tone of government thereafter. Irrespective of regime change of 1945 expressed in the provisions of the new Constitution of Japan of the next year, bureaucratic predominance had revived during 1950s. Only a difference could be found in the fact that a bureaucrat must have had a mandate before he was appointed minister of state. That mihgt be explained by several reasons: ①The purge of GHQ affected mostly politicians of influence and only slightly bureaucrats, and newly elected politican were not matured yet to reach a post of a minister of state. ②The difficult task of recovery and management of unstable economoy needed both knowledge and manuever which bureaucrats had shown to have certainly during the negotiation with GHQ. ③Having been a bureaucrat by himself, Shigeru Yoshida had a more affinity with a bureaucrat than with a politician. He did not even conceal a disdain for a party politician.

In his Memoir of 10 Years, he said that he tried to mix politicians and bureaucrats up to supplement with each other and to train politicians administratively and bureaucrats politically by assigning each of them to an unfamiliar post.⑥ He reshuffled cabinet regularly as if to realize this idea. Even in his notoriously bureaucratic cabinets, however, bureaucratic ministers fell short of a majority. The pattern of a relative bureacratic preponderance was followed by his enemy-and-freind Ichiro Hatoyana who struggled long and bitterly with him over the post of a prime minister after being fred from the purge. The bureaucratic preponderance reached its climax in the age of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato.

Meanwhile a post of a minister of state was seeked ardently both by party politicians and bureaucratic politicians as the highest honor to be credited with in the wake of peerage or any other kind of priviledges. Therefore, a

custom was gradually established to give a certain ministerail posts to the persons on the waiting list of each faction irrespective of their merit but on the criterion of seniority. A distinction between party politician and bureaucratic politician began to be obscured and politicians of any kind must now wait till they were returned to the Diet four or five times before they were to be appointed minister of state. I call this phenomena as professionalization of politics together with a rise of local politicians and other kinds of professional politicians such as former political staffs to the rank of influential politicians and ministers. After the hegemony of LDP had been firmly established, the members of LDP had a chance to train themselves to be well-versed in respective fields of policies as well as of politics. But it was inevitable that a cabinet consisted not of the brightests but included some mediocore perssons.

In 1972, Kakuei Tanaka, a post-war genuine party politician, came to power and gave a coup de grace to bureaucratic preponderance. But it should not be mitaken that he replaced bureaucrats with politicians. He establised a primacy of politics by alluring active bureaurats and ex-bureaucrats as well as party politicians to his side and mobilized them to support him. After his retirement, he kept a control over Prime Minister Ohira, Suzuki and Nakasone in this way. Tanaka was said to advice Nakasone, "Just ride over the horse of bureaucrats. You can choose the alternatives proposed by brueaucrats organized into ministries of a hundred years old. Your role is to set everything right, and not to meddle into the matters by yourself."⑦ Nakasone spent his young days as a bureaucrat but had to work hard as a politician long enuogh to be professionalized until he became a prime minister. The same fate fell upon ex-bureaucrat Takeo Fukuda and Kichi Miyazawa. With a politician being professionalized, his former career became meaningless relatively. What was important was a seniority as a politician. A bureaucratic politician must go through the same crucible of elections and earn the same seniority as a paprty politician in order to be qualifed to be chosen as a minister of state with few exception.

After LDP fell in 1993, seniority rule looked like reversed, for ministers of state tended to be chosed from among fresh politician of lower seniority. With a retrun of LDP to power, the tendency was mitigated but not negated at all. Thus far, professinalization of politics had accampanied an increasing institutionalization of political elites. It is not yet certain that this trend would still continue or stop in a future.

6. Political Elites Before and Affer 1945: From Obscurity to Prominence?

In 1874 a petition was made for introducing a system of elected representatives. But it was in 1890, a year after the promulation of the Impeiral Constitution, that the first election was held for the House of Representatives of the Imperial Diet. A right of vote had been ristricted to rather rich male persons above 25 years until a universal male suffrage was introduced in 1925 in a tide of Taishyo democracy. Some kind of a representative system was an absolute necessity in order to form a modern nation-state based upon a popular support. Though only a minority of the wealthy had been represented at first, it did not take a much time for the elected representatives to appear as one of the important groups of persons mediating between the national center and peripheries. Anyway, the most representatives were a wealthy local notable and as such enjoyed a status of local elites. The House of Representatives was an arena for its members to establish themselves as one of active elites by acquiring a fame as the house leaders. It lacked a power to nominate a prime minister and to propose a vote of non-confidence against his cabinet. Except concering a matter of budget, it must share an equal power with the Hosue of Lords. In this sense, elected political elites were relegated into obscurity, however elites they were.

Neverthless, government had found it an absolute necesity to have a consent of the House of Representatives if it wanted to carry its own policies successfuly as soon as it was convened first time. Many govoernments tried to keep its own party or allied parties in majority successfuly or not successfuly. As a threat of war drew on in 1942, the government mobilized the support of the both Houses of the Diet behind itself by prohibiting all kinds of political associations except the one made up of those who alleged their loyalty to governemnt.

The first column of List 3 shows the former occupations of the members of the House of Representatives elected by the elections of 1936 and 1942. Those elected in 1942 served until 1946, when an election was held under the new Constitution of Japan. The persons who survived the war and reappeared in the remodeled House of representatives are excluded, because they are shown in the second column of List 3 separately. Before the end of the World War II, predominant 43.2 % of the memmbers of the House of Representatives came from local electoral offices such as town-and -city chiefs, town and municipal councillors, and prefectural councillors. Next came 12.1% of journalists and

writers and 10.4% of lawyers including judges and attorneys. Businessmen who occupied 9.2% of the seats were also not neglible forces. Secretaries to a ministers, teachers and professors as well as leaders of agrarian and labor movements were represented slightly. The most striking was a rather small number

List 3. The Former Occupations of the Members of the House of Representatives®

Occupations	1936-46	Survived 1946	1947-1955	Elected 1976
Local Politicians	236(43.2)	49(25.1)	268(30.0)	146(20.5)
Local bureaucrats	22(4.2)	2(1.0)	24(2.7)	16(3.2)
Central Bureaucrats	29(5.3)	18(9.2)	120(13.5)	80(16.2)
Lawyers(inc. judges)	57(10.4)	38(19.5)	70(7.8)	21(4.3)
Journalists	66(12.1)	26(13.3)	59(6.6)	23(4.7)
Military	23(4.2)	2(1.0)	2(0.2)	-
Businessmen	50(9.2)	26(13.3)	128(14.3)	18(3.6)
Social/Agro/Labor Movem.	7(1.3)	12(6.2)	64(7.1)	47(9.5)
Secretaries/staffs	19(3.5)	6(3.1)	11(1.2)	49(9.9)
Teachers	13(2.4)	4(2.1)	70(7.8)	20(4.0)
Professors	14(2.6)	11(5.6)	20(2.2)	8(1.6)
Others	9(0.5)	1(0.5)	56(6.3)	67(13.7)
Total Examined	546(100%)	195(100%)	892(100%)	495(100%0

of central burcaucrats represented in the House of representatives(5.3%). This phenomena reflected a strict separation of bureaucrats from politics. The most successful higher bureaucrats were promoted into a rank of a minister. The other higher bureaucrats also could be either a member of the Privy Council or an appointed member of the House of Lords. It was rather frustrated bureaucrats who sought a seat in the House of Representatives. The House of Lords accomodated not only all of Dukes and Marquieses and coopted Counts, Viscounts and Barons, but also the appointed members as well as the representatives of the highest tax-payers. The appointed members were drawn overwhelmingly from higher bureaucrats and judges.

In accordance with the Constitution of Japan of 1946, the House of Lords was replaced by an elective House of Senators or Upper House on a quite

different model. Thus renewed Diet became the highest organs of the state with a power to nominate a prime mister from among its own members. The House of Representatives of it was now equipped with a right to raise a vote of non-confidence against a cabinet. Thus the status of the members of the House of Representatives have been enhanced. It became a real source of power. The members of the both Houses of the Diet are now active elites by its own capacity and have a chance to become a more and more active national leader as their political career is advanced. There were no more any institutions or forces that could challenge effectively the members of the House of Representatives which are assumed to represent sovereign people. They were restored from obscurity to prominence. Accordingly the recruitment sources of them have changed a lot.

The pre-war members of the House of Representatives who reappeared in the post-war House of Representatives were shown in the second column of List 3. The local politicians accounted for 25.1% of those survived, and lawyers for 19.5%, journalists and businessmen for 13.3% respectively and bureaucrats for 9.2%. But the rate of survival of local politicians was only 17%. while that of lawyers was 40%, of bureaucrats 39.2%. of businesmen 34.2%, and of journalist 28%. GHQ purged a number of members of the House of Representatives sympathetic with and helpful to military government from the public offices together with military leaders, cabinet ministers and high-ranking bureaucrats. That would be at least one reason why the pre-war members of local origin found it difficult to be reelected after the World War II. The most of purged cabinet-ministers and bureaucrats used to be non-parliamentarians. Those politicians who survived regime change of 1945 were rather of less importance except of leaders of labor and social movements and a few others.

By the first post-war electeion in 1946 and succeeding ones in 47, 49, 52, 53 and 55, newly elected former local politicians kept 30% of the seats, forming the most numerous group in the remodeled House of Representatives as before. The former bureaucrats showed an extraordinary ascendancey from 5.3% to 13.5%. Now bureaucrats exposed themselves to a ordeal of elections in order to fulfill their aspirations for a post of a minister and for that of a prime minister if possible. Many established bureaucrats went into politics after they were freed from purge. They found no other way left for them in order to continue to be an active elite. Businessmen rose from 9.2% to 14.3%, and lawyers kept 7.8%, and journalists had 6.6%. Leaders of agro-labor movements

including advocates of human-right and women's cause occupieid 7.1% of the seats and teachers 8.9%. The others included religious, medical and talended persons. Those who were reelected still twenty years after were not counted in the third column of List 3, but included in the forth column.

Twenty years after the establishement of predominant party system with the Liberal Democratic Party in power in 1955, the composition of the House of representatives had undergone a change. The fourth column of List 3 showed the former occupations of the members of the House of Represenratives elected in 1976. Though former local politicians lost a little bit, that loss was compensated by the growth of a group of former staffs to a minister or a member of the Diet. The others in the fourth column included many who started their career directly as a politician at national level. The former bureaucrats were still growing at that time. We should not overlook the fact that lawyers, journalists and businessmen were no more of much importance as recruitment sources of the members of the House of Representatives. That symbolied an increasing professionalization of politics.⑨ Those persons engaged in another occupations found it more and more difficult to continue political activities unless they were fully occupied as politicians. As the seniority rule in terms of the number of the elections won had been set firmly, other than those professional politicans who devoted themselves totally to political activities found a less chance to became a minister, and a much less chance to be a prime minister. For lawyers, journalists and businessmen a risk and toil of elections superseded a political reward. The same fate might well affect the bureaucrats. If a bureaucrat wants to establishe himself as a national leader either as a minister or a prime minister, he must prunge himself into politics quite early in his career, because he can not expect to be treated preferentially any more. A bureaucrat who has reached a post of a vice-administrative minister would prefer a job in a semi-governmental organization or in the private sector to a risk of being a politician after his retirement.

After the World War II, bureaucrats remain to be one of the most active elites qua a bureaucrat, participating in the decision of the course of Japan as far as their jurisdictions are concerned. Some of them might dare challenge to be elected to the House of Representatives to be a professional politican well-qualified to be a minister and a prime minister who could have a more general and far-reaching influence upon the course of Japan. As far as this point is concerned, the bureaucratic dominance as a source of the most influential

source of active elites has been kept. What has changed is the channel through which they reach a post of a natioal leader. Their competiters are not military leaders any more but professional politicians of another kinds; mostly former politicians and former secretaries or staffs including many sons and sons-in law of the former parliamentarians. In order to compete with them, bureaucrats must become professional politicians themselves. The House of Senators which replaced the House of Lords is also an elective body, consisting of more or less active elites. At least two ministers and so are picked up form the members of the Hosue of Senators. But the members of the House of Senators can not expect very much of themselves.

List 4. Educational Backgrounds of the Members of the House of Representatives

	National Univ.	Private/Public Univ.	Others	Total
1936~1945	156(28.6%)	211(38.6%)	179(32.7%)	546(100%)
Survived 1946	55(28.2%)	100(51.2%)	40(19.4%)	195(100%)
1947~1955	243(27.2%)	300(33.6%)	349(39.1%)	892(100%)
Elected 1976	145(29.2%)	219(44.2%)	131(26.4%)	495(100%)

The members of the House of Representatives used to be mainly local notables not formerly educated. though highly literate. Between 1936 and 1945, more than sixty percent of the members of the House of representatives attnded universities, but theirty three percent were not so educated. After the war, the rate of non-university graduates fell to twenty six percent. the loss was covered mainly by graduates of pirvate and public universities. The graduates of the University of Tokyo and other national universities kept a level of twenty-eight percent constantly. Among those who survived regime change of 1945, there were many graduates of private and public universities. Though the rate fell a little, they occupied the majority.

7. Bureaucratic Elites Before and After 1945: A Continuity Or Discontinuity?

Though revolutionary leaders and their immeidate followers from Hans of Satusma, Chosyu, Tosa and Hizen formed the Meiji governemnt, they needed bureaucrats to trust the task of managing an emerging modern nation-state with. Especially in order to achieve tow overarching goals of 'Industrialization and Develompent,' and 'National Wealth and Power,' from above with strong hands of government, competent bureaucrats were indispensable. The ToKugawa Shogunate and three hunred Hans or feudal states had educated samurai-worriers to be a manager of their households. These persons were recruited not only from Hans of winning side but also from Hans of losing side including the Shogunate to be transitional bureaucrats of new government on the basis of patronage. Such as Hisoka Maejima and Eiich Shibuswa were among those appointed from the Shogunate. At first they suffered from divided loyalities between new government and old Hans or the Shogunate. Being employed under the name of the Emperor, however, they committed themelves to serve new government with unparalleled devotion before long. Here we can sec a model of development to establish a bureaucratic government first and the representatives body thereafter. An ancient system of grading bureaucrats were revived soon.

Thus recruited bureaucrats were transitional as far as they had been educated under the old regime. Formerly the people were divided into four classes of samurai-worriers, farmers, artizans and merchants. Formal education was given only to the samurai-worrier class, though another classes were more or less literate by one kind of informal education or another. As soon as the Meiji Reformation was achieved, class distinction was abolished, so that the people might form one and undivided nation upon which the state could rest. In 1873, Ministry of Education published a decree to introduce a compulsory system of education all over the country. The country was divided into eight districts of an university, and each district of an university was divided into thirty-two districts of a middle-school, and them each disctrict of a middle-school was divided into two-hundred and ten districts of an elementary school in turn. Thus 53,760 elementary schools were to be established in every nook and corner of the country. In this way, a chance of being a bureaucrat once confined to samurai-worriers was given to everyone irrespective of their social origins and of the regions of birth. Educated people were enamored of such translated books as Smiles' Selp-Help and aspired to be a minister of state or a bureaucrat by their own efforts some days. Achivement-oriented society were rapidly taking the

place of ascriptive-oriented society.

Educational reform started at the elementary leved led to the refom of a middle school and then to the level of an university at last in 1877, when the University of Tokyo was established. It was remodelled into the Imperial University of Tokyo in 1886 charged with a role of imbuing a prospective candidate of a bureaucrat with arts and sciences of key imort for the state. When a system of competitive examinations for higher and lower civil servants was introduced in 1887, the graduate of the Imperial University of Tokyo was given a preferential treatment.

Before that, Ministries of Army and Navy established their own cadets and several schools in order to nurse future officers. Opening the gate wide, students were recruited from every corner of the country irrespective of their social orgins and educated at governmental expenses. Army and Navy took a lead in raising inistitutional elites. Another Ministries followed the example by establisheing their own schools. But they were absorbed into the Imperial Universities of Tokyo and Kyoto and so on. Thus two lines of insitutional elites. one military and another civilian, were entrenched. It was beyond doubt that students of both lines were predominantly of samurai-worrier class in origin at first. Only sons of samurai-worrier class, which was regrouped into a gentry class without any privilege, were properly educated for this purpose. As the effect of educational reform appeared, however, their dominance declined rapidly. In 1912, a majority of higher bureaucrats were commoners of former farmers, artizans or merchants. According to Akira Kubota, 72.4% of higher bureaucrats were commoners.[9]

At the end of the last century, graduates of the Imperial University of Tokyo occured among bureauc-chiefs in Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Foreigh Affairs, and then were propoted to a vice minister respectively around in 1900. Ministry of Education and other ministries were a little behind but followed the example steadly. A revised decree of 1899 concerning appointment of a higher bureaucrat required that a bureauc chief and vice minister must have passed a higher civil servant examinztion. Thus a graduate of the Imperial University of Tokyo was put in an privileged position to come to the top of a ministry. After 1912, when the Era changed form Meiji to Taisho, many ministries began to have its graduates as their own ministers, though not always. As pointed out before, the number of the graduates of the Imperial University of Tokyo increased among ministers of state gradually. The Japanese bureaucracy

looked more and more like autokephalish, to use Max Weber's terminology, in that a ministry was headed by a person homogeneous with bureaucrats.⑪ The number of bureaucrats in a cabinet changed with the tide of days. Neverthless, as far as the post of a vice(administrative) minister was preempted by a graduate of the Imperial University of Tokyo, bureaucracy could not escape but be autokephalish. Thus having their own haven to anchor, bucraucrats formed a priviledged group separated from society, however they came from evey nook and corner of society.

The Constitution of Japan of 1946 adopted the parliamentqary system of government and required that more than a half of the members of a cabinet must be chosed from among the members of either Houses of the Diet. This necessitated the change of autokephalish bureaucracy to heterokephalish one headed by a minister selected from and responsible to the elected body. But that was only ahcieved halfway. For many bureaurats run for the elections to have a requisite mandate to be a minister of state. At the same time the post of a vice administrative minister has remained a sanctuary reserved exclusevely for bureaucrats. Though appointing power of a vice administrative minister and other civil servants belongs to a presiding minister officially, he can rarely use it by himself. Sometimes, a minister dare challenge to use his power to distort the order of waiting list esoterically determined through an inner process. As soon as he leaves the office, the distorted order will return to the original. Irrespective of regime change of 1946, bureaucracy has fallen between autokephlish and heterokephalish. There is a continuity and discontinuity at once between pre-war bureaucracy and post-war bureaucracy.

Together with constitutional revisions, GHQ ordered a radical reform of the civil service system organized under the name of the Emperor to that of serving for the sovereign people. Especially a classification system was mandated in the place of the former career system modelled after Germany. The National Civil Servcie Act of 1947 adopted the classification system. But it was never carried out. Thus a career system linked with the levels of civil service examinations has remained submergedly. Kubota said, "Efforts to reform the bureaucracy were considerably hampered by the necessity of using the existing bureaucracy to administer other programs of the democratization of Japan." ⑫ At the same time, buraucrats were least affected by the purge from the public offices. Purged bureacurats belonged mainly to Minisitry of Interior destined to persish along with Ministries of Army and Navy. But we

should not overlook the fact that bureaucrats manuvered to survive as intact as possible by sabotaging reforms.

Bureaucratic temper nursed under the former regime has remained as strong as ever. As an integral or official part of government committed to manage society from above, they had a firm belief that they, and only they could see and judge correctly the public interests. One ex-bureaucrat recently said that they were not a servant for the people but a servant of the public interests. With a rise of a primacy of politics, they felt a crisis of identity and declining image. The more crisis they feel, the more bureaucratic temper gets rampant. They know how to manage to survice by forming a political-administrative-business comoplex with other groups of elites without interfereing with each other.

8. Economic Leaders Before and After 1945: Are They Really Powerful?

As the two slogans of "Industrizliation and Development," and "National Wealth and Power" propagated by government in the early stage of the Meiji Era suggests, reformationary leaders put an utmost emphasis upon a build-up of economic power based upon industrialization, lest Japna succumbed to pressures form the Western powers. In order to achieve the two goals steadly and speedily, the new government adopted policies of encouraging industries from above. Under the former regime, commercial capital had been accumnulated in the hands of a few merchants, out of whom occured "political merchants" affiliated closely with the new government, supplying money necessary for winning successive civil wars in return for a patronage. But they lacked entrepreneurship and a technical know-how. Therefore the new governemnt not only had to arrange infrastructures but also bulid and manage modern factories by importing Western technologies and inviting Western engineers. As early as in 1880, however, the government adopted a policy of privatizing the government-owned factories and mines to the private hands, encouraging incorporation and disseminating a spirit of entrepreneurship. Such a writer as Ukich Tagudhi propagated a free enterpsirse system. Eiichi Shibusawa left government to be a model businessman. In these ways industries started to grow and there appeared economic leaders, inspiring entreprenurship among a wider circle of people irrespective of their origins. Especially a development of both pulbic and private banks supported and enhanced industrialization before and after the War with China(1894-95)

When the War with Russia(1904-05)was threatening, bankers and other economic leaders had established themselves so much that the governemnt could no but consult unofficially with them on such a matter as an issuance of governmental bonds.[6] Bankers and industrialists were organized into the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce with Eiichi Shibusawa as its Chairman. But we could not neglect the existence of Zaibatsu Groups which had took a hegemony of banking and industrialization thus far, and, ushering in the age of heavy industries, continued to do so until the end of the World War II in 1945.

A Zaibatsu was a group of companies or a conoglomerate founded and financed by a core Zaibatsu Family with a closed ownership. Mitui and Sumitomo had developed from patronized merchants of the Shogunate, through political merchants, to Zaibatsu Families, while Mitubish and Yasuda joined a band of political merchants after the Meiji Reformation and followed a similar course of

development. During the last decade of the Meiji Era and after, another Zaibatsu Groups of a middle and smaller size burgeoned. Mitusi, Mitubishi and Sumitomo were all-inclusive groups covering banking, trading, key industries and mining. Yasuda and Kawasaki were concentrated in banking through which they controlled some of key industries. Many other smaller groups such as Asano, Okura, Furukawa, Katakura Ayukawa, Noguchi, Mori and Nakano were specialized in one or a few of key industries. But all of them shared common characteristics. Ownership had been closed to the members of each Zaibatsu Family completly until 1930's, and then was made public to a certain extent in order to finance a rising demand for money for enlarged and modernized industries.

Zaibatsu Groups competed with each other bitterly. But they controlled Japanese economy as a whold almost completely. In 1930, the banks of big five Zaibatsu Groups(Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda, and Kawasaki)shared almost forty percent of total deposits. Ninty-nine percent of steel, ninety-four percent of cement, eighty-three percent of fertilizer, seventy-four percent of coal, sixty-nime percent of surogate silk, and fourty-three percent of sugar were produced by companies belonging to one Zaibatsu or another.

The heads of Zaibatsu Families had controlled companies under their umbrella through a headquarters company holding all stocks of them and sending members of Families to their directing boards. Being exposed to a bitter criticism from military and right-wing groups, however, members of Families retired gradually from the directing baords of the affiliated companies since 1934. Even in the headquarters companies, the well-educated and talented managers came to play a leading role in the place of members of Families, as symbolized by the appointment of Nariaki Ikeda to the acting director of Mitusi Unlimited Co., the headquarters company of Mitsui Group in 1933 in a place of the assasinated director, Takuma Dan. Still the structure of a Family control remained fundamentally unchanged till the end of the World War II.

Prosperity of a Zaibatsu Family owed very much to ingenuity and toils of a founding father. But unless he was supported by dilidgnt and laborious senior clerks, it could not have prospered so much. A senior clerk used to be picked up from apprenticed clerks who distinguished himself in business. But Mitubishi and Mitsui started to recruit graducates of Keio and, later of the other universities including the Imperial University of Tokyo in the middle of Meiji Era. Another Zaibatwsu Groups followed the example. These persons modernized Zaibatsu Groups and managed them effectively. In spite of wealth and

fortunes accumulated in the hands of Zaibatsu Families, the heads of them were not offcially credited with high honor and priviledge. Only some of them were ennobled into a baron, the lowest rank of aristocracy. They were satisfied by having their senior clerks elected in the House of Representatives or appointed to the House of Lords. We can not miss a wide discrepancy between influence Zaibatsu Groups acturally excercised upon the fate of Japan and honor they enjoyed at least officially.

GHQ did not overlook enormous influence of Zaibatsu Groups and mentioned a disbandment of them as early as in September 22, 1945. In accordance therewith, eighty-three holding companies which had functioned as the headquarters of Zaibatsu Groups were designated to be liquidated. Fifty-six members of ten Zaibatsu Families were prohibited to be a director of any fomer affiliated companies. At the same time most of senior and other key clerks were purged from former posts. Thus a personal tie between Zaibatus Families and affiliated campanies was cut. The companies that lost top-personnel must fill vacancies with persons promoted from within. According to Hiroshi Higuchi, many of the newly selected presidents of former affiliated companies had been a branch-chief or section-chief or director of a factory at most in 1940.⑨ They were happy enough to be promoted to the top of a company in an age of early forties. Quoting Hideaki Miyajima, the Asahi News Paper reported that only former presidents of four companies among sixty-two companies surveyed came back after the lift of purge in 1950.⑩ The most sweeping managerial revolution involved almost all major companies with a complet separation of ownership and management that had its root in the pre-war stage.⑪ As a matter of course, many new big companies led by challenging founders appeared after the Wold War II. But even they could not escape the fate of a managerial revolution as they grew bigger and bigger.

In the aftermath of the ruin of the war, an utmost priority was put on economic recovery and reconstruction of productive power. While the government prepareted the plan of recovery under the title of "Fundamenntal Problems Concerning Japanese Economic Reconstruction," new economic leaders must be preoccupied with the task of recovering productivity of their own companies at first. But some of them soon proved themselves to be a charismatic leader not of their own companies but also of Japanese economy as a whole. The liquidation policy of GHQ had divided the trading companies of Mitusi and Mitsubishi but left Zaibatus banks intact intentionally or unintentionally. Former affiliated

companies could be now realigned around core banks. As economic recovery and reconstruction progressed in an unexpected speed and degree, economic leaders became a national hero in place of a military leader. Their voice had influence not only in econoomic circles but also nation-wide. Polticial leaders seeked their opinions earnestly and bureaucrats consulted them both formally and informally.

After the managerial revolution, an economic leader must inevitably be an institutionaly leader just as a bureaucrat is. A manager must clime up the ladder of hierarchy to the post of a president or of a chariman of a company of nation-wide import before he is to be recognized as an economic leader. But if he wants to be a realy influentional econoomic leader, he must joint and be active in the economic organizations such as Federation of Economic Organizations, Japan Federated Managers' Associations, Japan Chamber of Commerce, Japan Committee of Economic Development or Kansai Federation of Econoomic Organizations. The chairman of Federation of Economic Organization is metapholically called a prime minister of economic circles. In the wake of aristocracy being destroyed, he enjoys a more prestitious status and honor than any other individuals. Being in lack of a stable power base, the actual prime minister often try to depend upn the halo-effects of the chairman of Federation Economic Organizations. Power of economic leaders has been grown more and more as we experienced economic prosperity. It has shown no sign of decline after a long depression in the Heisei Ear. Presidents and chairmen of nation-wide import could have a no less influential voice as far as they are active as representatives of econoomic circles. But as presidents of companies they must often ask a favor of bureaucrats in charge of industries concerned either directy or through a channel of politicians. They are strong against politicans because they can supply politicl money, but rather weak agianst bureaucrats who excercise power of license and permission of several kinds. At least officially bureaucrats must stand under the control by politicians. In this way, we have so-called an iron triangle, or a collusion of politicians, bureaucrats and economic leaders. After the fall of the predominant party system in 1993, the situationa might have changed, but we are not yet certain that the change is in the direction of being good or bad.

9. A Concluding Remark

The Meiji Reformation of 1868 was revolutionary and reactionary at once, in that new government committed itself to modernize and industrialize society, upon the basis of which a new nation-state was to be built, with strong hands of government legitimized by the acniente authority of the Emperor and Imperial Household. In order to solve the antinomy, a two deck structure of elite system had developed, one deck accomodating active elites as a modernizing agent and another harboring inactive or retired elites of honor and priviledge. Because of this, modernization and industrialization had been achieved even at the expnese of democracy, though it had come to the fore among the people. Modernization accompanied the change of society from the ascriptive-oriented to the achievement-oriented. This change started with education and recuritment of future military leaders and bureaucrats and then spilled over to society in general and to the business world. Military leaders and bureaurats who played the role of elite qua an imcumbent of a crucial position in the respective organizations were inevitably institutional elites in contrast with governmental leaders who were charismatic and personal with power of persuation. Economic leaderw were also charismatic and personal at least in the early days.

Regime change of 1945 aimed to democratize society sweepingly. Though the initiative was taken abruptly by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces General Doglas MacArthur and his staffs, it was rather easy to absorb the change because the society itslef had been already modernized and rationalized. Though military leaders disappeared from the national scene for ever, bureaucrats survived and enhanced their prestige by contributing to the recovery of Japan from the ruins of the war. Now many of them run for elections and formed one of the most numerous recruitment source of a prime minister as a super-elite. But as a professionalization of polics went on under the predominant party control of LDP, politicians gained power more and more. Still bureaucrats has kept their sancturary intact and continue to play the role of mamaging society. At the same time, economic leaders who came to the fore as the result of economic development have joined the rank of institutional leaders.

By definition, institutional elites are an organization-man or other directed person. Being friendly and sociable does not necessarily assure the fittest as a national leader. Once Loyd George lamented the mediorcity of British military leaders. But that was quite natural becasue not the brightest but the most adaptable survives in the organizational context. Japanese

institutional leader are realy one of the brightest. But they did not use their brightness for the sake of the people in general but for the sake of the organization through which they had risen to an elite position. The organizatgion helps them play the role of a nataional leader full-hartedly. Without it, their voice was a lonely cry in the wilderness. Their personal attractivness or power of persuation is of a secondary importance. Even politicians are being contaminated by the same tendency. In return for the support, an institutional elites must take a good care of his organization. They are also interchangeable in varying degrees. A bureaurat qua a bureaurat has shorter life than an economoic leader in general. A politician can survive still longer by his own personal effort.

Bureaucrats have a more affinity with economic leaders than with political leaders in terms of their social and educational backgrounds. But the difference between bureaucrats and economic leaders on the one hand and political leaders on the other is not so big as supposed. Maritn E. Weinstein estimated that roughly eighty-five percent of the Japanese national leaders are children of the educational gentry.(6) But it was only in 1955 that that the rate of university addendance reached a level of ten percent, though it is forty percent at present. We have had much more social moblity since the establichment of meritocracy. Under the new regime, democratization could be easily absorbed because the society had already being rationalized. But a society has threatend to go asunder with a loss of centrifugal leadership resulting from the increasing institutionalization of elites and fading of personal power of persuation.

It would be too naive to suppose that parents' social status has not influence upon a chance to be well-educated. But the influence could not be so strong as either to guarantee a priviledged position to sons or daughters of active elites nor to negate a challenge from children of the less educated. At the same time, parents could motivate their children to choose the same course of a career as their own. In Germany, for examble, childrent of bureaurats are said to be motivated to choose a career of a bureaucrat by themselves ten percent higher than children of non-bureaucrats. In France, that percentage would be higher, while in Japan, that percentage would be safely estimated to be lower, if the other conditions are the same.(7) Politicians have more tendency to be succeeded by their sons and sons-in-law. It would be difficult to estimate the influence of business leaders upon the choice of an occupatioon of their

sons and daughters. However influentil their parents are, it would be their sons and daughters that might determine their own future fate.

The change of the elite structure as well as that of configuration and composition of elite groups in 1945 were brought about by GHQ of the Allied Forces. But many of the change had their rudiments in before the end of the World War II. The reforms ordered by GHQ were carried out by the hands of the Japanese government in a way easily absorbed by society and thus being made indegenous. We can see a lot of continuity as well as disontinuity betwee before and after the World War II.

Notes

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