

# 早稲田大學政治經濟學會論文コンクール 優秀作論文集 第24回（2023年度）

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# 巻頭の辞

早稲田大学政治経済学会 会長  
齋藤純一

早稲田大学政治経済学術院は、学生の皆さんが在学中に修得すべき最も大切な力のひとつは学術的な研究能力であると考え、皆さんが執筆する学術論文（演習論文、修士論文、博士論文等）をその成果として重視しています。本学会が主催する論文コンクールは、この学術院の教育理念を具体化する制度のひとつとして設けられました。論文コンクールに毎年度多数の論文が寄せられていることは、学生の皆さんが自らこの理念にコミットしていることの証であり、教職員もそのことを誇らしく思っています。

政治経済学部は、基礎演習に始まり、アカデミック・リテラシー演習、政治学・経済学・国際政治経済学それぞれの専門演習（プレ専門演習を含む）、ジャーナリズム・メディア演習や学際領域演習を経て、演習論文の指導へと至る対話型の教育の充実をはかっています。本論文コンクールもその一環であり、学生、教員が知的に刺激し合い、互いから学び合うことを通じて研究テーマに関する理解を深めるとともに、しっかりとした根拠や理由にもとづいて自らの見解を示す力を涵養することを目的としています。大学院政治学研究科・経済学研究科も同様です。

第24回となる本年度は、大学院修士課程2年生から2本、学部3年生から8本、4年生以上から20本、合計で30本の応募がありました。応募論文には共同論文が10本含まれており、応募者の総数は61名にのぼります。また応募論文30本のなかには英語で執筆された論文も9本含まれています。これら応募論文のなかから、厳正な審査を経て、学部学生部門のうち「数理・統計計量部門」で最優秀賞1本、優秀賞3本が、「歴史・思想・その他部門」で優秀賞1本が、また、大学院生部門のうち「数理・統計計量部門」で優秀賞1本が学会賞に値する論文として選ばれました（今回より、優秀賞を最優秀賞、佳作を優秀賞に改めています）。

優れた論文として高く評価され、学会賞を見事に受賞された方々、本当におめでとうございます。心よりお祝いいたします。また、今回残念ながら選にもれた応募者の方々にも、研究の成果を論文としてまとめ、積極的に募集に応じたことに対して敬意を表します。

本年度のコンクールにおいても、論文審査に当たっては、審査委員長の上條良夫教授をはじめ審査委員の皆さま、また、審査に携わった教員、研究員、博士後期課程学生の皆さまにご尽力いただきました。心より御礼を申し上げます。

# 講 評

早稲田大學政治經濟學會 総務委員長

上 條 良 夫

2023年度本學會論文コンクールには、大学院生から2作品、学部学生から28作品、計30作品の応募がありました。その内、数理・統計計量部門への応募が25作品、歴史・思想・その他部門への応募が5作品となります。多数のご応募、誠にありがとうございます。厳正なる審査の結果、次の6作品を顕彰いたします。以下の通り紹介し、それぞれの業績を讃えます。おめでとうございます。

## 数理・統計計量部門（大学院生）

### 優秀賞

[Qimo Zhu]

Navigating Foreign Pressure: How Media Control Moderates the Effect of Human Rights Shaming on Political Liberalization

この論文において著者は、国際的な人権非難、メディアの自由、そして独裁政権における民主化の関係について検討している。国際的な非難が民主化の促進に与える影響を調べるため、1976年から2000年までの100カ国のパネルデータに対してマルチレベル分析を行ない、メディアの自由度がより高い政権では、非難が民主化を促進するのにより効果的である一方で、メディアが厳しく統制されている政権では、非難による民主化への抵抗が存在することが確認された。論文は良く書けており、データ分析も丁寧である点を評価できる。その一方で、学術雑誌への掲載を目指す上では、先行研究との差別化および理論構築がやや不十分であり、さらなる改善が必要である。

## 数理・統計計量部門（学部学生）

### 最優秀賞

[Sota Araki]

Do Elections Divide the Public? — Affective Polarization and the Outcome of Elections —

選挙は人々を分断するのか (Do Elections Divide the Public?)。タイトルにもなっているこの一文から論文は始まり、その後、選挙の結果がどのように感情的極性化に影響するのか、というリサーチクエスションへと展開される。アメリカの大統領選挙前後に実施されたアンケート調査 (American

National Election Studies) と大統領選の結果を組み合わせたデータを用いてこの点が検証される。分析結果は、感情的極性化は選挙の敗者（の支持者）よりも勝者（の支持者）においてより顕著であることを示唆しており、政治学の選挙研究において一定の価値を有する結果といえるだろう。加えて、論文は極めて良く書けており、その点からも評価に値する。まさに最優秀賞にふさわしい論文である。

## 優秀賞

[田中 萌映子]

### 国際協力の波及効果の幻影 ―環境問題と国家元首交代への着目―

ある分野での国際協力は他分野への協力へと波及していくのだろうか。本論文で著者はサーベイ実験からこの点を明らかにすることを試みている。サーベイ実験回答者は、環境問題に対する協力状況に関する情報を刺激として提示され、その後、他分野における協力意思について回答した。先行研究のリプリケーションを目的として、実験デザインは丁寧に検討されており、その点を高く評価できる。その一方で、当該先行研究自体の分野における重要性の記述が弱く、その結果、本論文自体の魅力も損なわれている可能性が否めない。

## 優秀賞

[菊地 圭汰]

### 新型コロナウイルス感染症と日本の国政選挙：政権与党得票率への影響の実証分析

本論文において著者は、都道府県毎に微妙な差異が存在している感染症対策が第49回衆議院総選挙（2021年10月31日投票）における与党得票率に与える影響を実証的に明らかにすることを試みた。既存の業績評価モデルやシャークアタックモデルから示唆される通り、不十分な感染症対策と与党得票率との間に負の相関関係が見出された点が興味深い。その一方で、結果に影響を与える変数の統制への若干の懸念が存在し、その点を補足することができれば、より良い論文となるだろう。

## 優秀賞

[石野 有真・國政 啓太・菅原 舞里奈・那須 清崇]

### 日本の自動車関連企業におけるリコールの株価下落効果

企業の業績に関するバッドニュースが株価に悪影響を与えることは想像に難くないが、その効果を推定することは容易ではない。本論文において著者たちは、自動車業界におけるリコール報道が当該企業の株価に与える影響について、日本経済新聞の記事データおよび株価データを利用して明らかにすることを試みた。Generalized Synthetic Control Method (GSCM) という新しい手法を利用した推定結果より、リコール情報が株価にマイナスの影響を与えるものの、その効果は平均するとさほど大きなものではないことを確認した。リコール以外のバッドニュースにも分析を広げることで、論文の価値をさらに高めることができるだろう。

## 歴史・思想・その他部門（学部学生）

### 優秀賞

[Leon Raphael Schweizer]

#### Reexamining National Identity: Europe's Integration Crisis

ヨーロッパにおいて増加する移民は、しばしば現地住民からの反発を招き、極右ポピュリストの台頭の原因となりうる。著者は、このような問題に対処する上で、ヨーロッパにおける国家アイデンティティの再構成の必要性を強調し、歴史的な経緯、自己認識、グローバリゼーションといった、国家アイデンティティに影響を与える多様な要素について検討を行なっている。全体として、さまざまな知見を取り込んだ包括的な議論を展開しており、その点を評価できる。その一方で、方法論的な厳密さにやや欠けており、その点から議論を見直すことで、より質の高い学術論文となることが期待される。

以上

最優秀賞、優秀賞に選出された上記6作品以外にも、内容的に優れた論文が多数提出されました。来年度も、同様の部門を設定して審査する予定です。大学院生・学部学生の皆さんには、奮ってご応募下さるよう、お願い致します。

〈大学院生部門 (Graduate student category)〉

【数理・統計計量部門 (Category of Theoretical Analysis and Statistical/Quantitative Analysis)】

優秀賞 (Outstanding essay award)

# Navigating Foreign Pressure: How Media Control Moderates the Effect of Human Rights Shaming on Political Liberalization

Second-year in the Graduate School of Political Science

Qimo Zhu

## Summary

This article explores the complex relationship between international human rights shaming, media freedom, and democratization in authoritarian regimes. The central argument is that the impact of international human rights shaming on democratization varies significantly across different autocratic regimes, largely depending on the level of media freedom within these regimes. To substantiate this argument, the study employs a multilevel linear modeling approach, analyzing data from 151 autocratic regime cases in 100 countries, spanning the years 1976 to 2000.

Through the incorporation of the interaction term of the shaming and media freedom variables, the study also reveals a significant interaction effect, where the effectiveness of shaming in promoting democratization is contingent on the level of media freedom. In environments where media freedom is less restricted, shaming is more effective in advancing democratic changes. Conversely, in regimes with stringent state control over the media, there is a notable resistance to democratization efforts in response to shaming.

Several other key findings are also presented in this research. First, there are substantial within-group effects of both human rights shaming and media freedom in fostering democratization. This indicates that within specific regimes, these factors play a significant role in promoting democratic processes. Additionally, the study highlights a pronounced between-group effect of media freedom. This finding underscores the importance of the average media environment in an autocratic regime, suggesting that regimes with a more liberal media landscape are more likely to transition towards democracy. Moreover, the research identifies significant contextual effects for both media freedom and human rights

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shaming. It suggests that these factors have diminishing marginal effects on democratization as the overall media environment becomes more liberalized and as the average amount of shaming in dictatorial regimes increases. This points to a more complex and nuanced influence of these variables on the democratization process.

In conclusion, this research provides vital empirical evidence highlighting the roles of foreign human rights shaming and domestic media freedom in shaping the paths of autocratic regimes toward democratization. It underscores the critical importance of media freedom in the efficacy of international shaming efforts. The findings of this study are particularly relevant for policymakers and stakeholders interested in democracy and human rights promotion. They also offer insights for future research in the field of comparative democratization, particularly in understanding the conditions under which external pressures like international shaming can be effective in promoting democratic reforms in authoritarian settings.

## **Introduction**

The practice of international human rights shaming, serving as a form of normative pressure on regimes criticized for their human rights records, has garnered considerable scholarly attention. Notable researchers such as Wachman (2001), Hafner-Burton (2008), Murdie & Davis (2012), Terman (2016) and others have scrutinized the correlation between such shaming and improvements in human rights practices. However, the influence of this shaming on the democratization process in authoritarian countries remains an underexplored area of study. Although direct links between these phenomena are elusive, the advocacy for human rights, often associated with liberal democratic values, implicitly promotes democratic principles. Empirical evidence from various geopolitical contexts illustrates the diverse responses of authoritarian regimes to international shaming, leading to varying political outcomes, including both democratization and autocratization. This thesis seeks to understand the heterogeneity in these outcomes, particularly focusing on the psychological impact of shaming on the populace of the shamed regime and the role of media freedom as a significant mediator in shaping the effects of shaming on democratic changes.

The study employs a multilevel linear modeling approach, tailored for clustered data with random effects. Analyzing longitudinal cross-sectional data of 151 regime cases across 100 countries from 1976 to 2000, it seeks to unveil broad patterns in media utilization by autocratic regimes under international scrutiny. The findings suggest that international shaming is most effective in promoting democratization in regimes where media freedom is less restricted. Conversely, in regimes with stringent state control over media, a pronounced resistance to democratization efforts in response

to shaming is observed, resulting in no progress or even backlash. Therefore, this research contributes nuanced insights into the effectiveness of shaming strategies in promoting democratic norms within autocratic regimes, affirming that its impact is indeed contingent upon domestic media freedom levels. Moreover, the analysis of between-group effects underscores that the overall media environment in a regime holds considerable predictive power for future democratization progress. The significant contextual effects of both variables indicate that identical levels of shaming and media freedom yield divergent effects in autocratic regimes with varying average criticisms and media landscapes.

By illuminating this facet of autocratic resilience through statistical analysis, the research serves as a meaningful cobblestone in the academic community. It not only provides generalizable empirical evidence of the roles that foreign human rights shaming and domestic media freedom play in shaping autocrats' democratization path, but also contributes to a more profound comprehension of the interplay between media control and foreign criticism, discovering an omnipresent pattern of dictators' resistance to democratizing pressures. The insights this paper offers bear significant policy implications for entities engaged in human rights advocacy and democratic promotion, underscoring the pivotal role of media freedom in the efficacy of international shaming. New questions have also emerged as previous ones have been resolved, thus laying the foundation for continued research in this field.

Structurally, the paper begins by untangling the terminological difficulties regarding democracy, autocracy and democratization. After that, it investigates the theoretical frameworks of media freedom and human rights shaming in the context of democratization. It then proceeds to analyze the interaction effect between these two primary predictors in statistical regression models with various modifications to verify the robustness. The analysis concludes with an exploration of the wider implications of these findings, both for policymaking and the fields of political science and comparative democratization.

## **Conceptual and Operational Definitions**

### **The Terminological Challenge in Democratization Studies**

As this paper delves into the nuances of autocratic regimes and their processes of democratization, it becomes essential to clearly define these terms, setting a foundation for the ensuing analysis and discussion. This clarity is crucial, not only for conceptual accuracy but also to align with the specific investigative focus of this study on the dynamics of foreign shaming and media freedom in authoritarian contexts.



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Scholars studying democracies are well aware of the challenges in defining “democracy”, given the diverse interpretations presented by various academics. Joseph Schumpeter, in “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy” (1942), introduced a classical minimalist conception of democracy, focusing on the competitive process of leader selection as the crux of a democratic system. Subsequent scholars expanded upon this minimalist notion of electoral democracy, adding layers to its definition and proposing detailed classifications. Karl and Schmitter (1991), for instance, while acknowledging Schumpeter’s procedural aspects, argue for a broader understanding of democracy that encompasses institutional frameworks and practices, such as rulers’ accountability, political participation, and civil liberties. The complexity of democracy research is further augmented by political pundits continually coining new terms to describe subtypes of democracy. O’Donnell (1994), for example, conceptualized “delegative democracy”, a regime type with fundamental democratic features like regular elections, but lacking the substantive qualities of representative democracy. This expansion in terminology enriches our comprehension of institutional diversity within democracies but also risks diluting the definition, complicating its application to real-world cases. Collier and Levitsky (1997) encapsulate this dilemma, highlighting the tension between the need for “analytic differentiation” and “conceptual validity” (p. 430).

Defining “autocracy” presents similar challenges. Although non-democratic regimes are interchangeably labeled as “autocratic,” “authoritarian,” or “dictatorial” in this paper and broader scholarly discourse, these terms, while nuanced, “can be broken down into subtypes” (Karl & Schmitter, 1991, p. 76). The proliferation of concepts makes the demarcation between democracies and non-democracies notoriously ambiguous, exemplified by hybrid regimes that exhibit both democratic and authoritarian traits (Diamond, 2002). Huntington (1996) also highlights the existence of a “democratic-nondemocratic continuum,” acknowledging numerous examples of countries that straddle the divide between democracy and autocracy. Hence, it is crucial to recognize the continuous spectrum from autocracy to democracy, as a dichotomous view fails to accurately capture the diversity of regime properties. Collier and Adcock (1999) support this, arguing that some “arguments that initially appeared to favor a dichotomy could [...] require, the use of gradations” (p. 561). They also highlight the value of combining the continuous and categorical methods in research.

As for democratization, this term, too, is equivocal, encapsulating varying interpretations. On one hand, it can be seen as a single event or a series of events that transform an autocratic regime into a democracy, either overnight or within a short period. This includes scenarios like peaceful transfers of power, decisions of radical reform, or the violent removal of a dictator, as discussed in numerous research works that examine pivotal political events as catalysts for democratic transitions (Dankwart, 1970; Karl, 1990; Przeworski, 1991). It is important to distinguish these events from those that merely end an autocratic regime, as the latter does not necessarily lead to democratiza-

tion and can result in another form of autocracy (Escribà-Folch & Wright, 2015, p. 43). On the other hand, a widely accepted perspective posits democratization as not merely a definitive event but a protracted, gradual process of political opening. For example, Huntington (1991) famously theorized democratization as waves, with each wave can last decades or even a century. He described the first wave from 1820s to 1926 as a long process of “widening of the suffrage” (p. 12), implying that democratization can entail gradual political liberalization. Similarly, Carothers (2002) critiques the notion of a traditional view of democratic transition as a straightforward path from authoritarianism to democracy, suggesting that there are many stationary countries in a “gray zone” that are experiencing a much slower process of political change.

### **Defining Key Terms through the Research Question**

Considering these scholarly debates, what definitions of democracy, autocracy, and democratization should political scientists adopt? This largely depends on the research question and objectives. This paper, focusing on how autocratic rulers counteract foreign shaming that threatens their grip on power, centers on the motivation and primary concern of dictators: their survival. While survival can sometimes literally mean life or death, as seen in Nicolae Ceaușescu’s case, it predominantly pertains to the continuity or cessation of the autocratic regime itself, hinging on the dictator’s ability to monopolize power. Thus, this paper defines an autocratic regime as one where the leader has a monopoly over political power. The Geddes Wright and Frantz Autocratic Regimes dataset, known as the GWF dataset, (Geddes, Wright, Frantz, 2014) aligns well with this research need by focusing on “who has de facto power” (Wright & Bak, 2016) to identify autocratic regimes. Their approach centers on the nature of the ruling elite and the mechanism of leader selection in non-democratic regimes, recognizing the end of a regime when the ruling person or coalition loses their hold on power through events such as losing to the opposition in a competitive election and being toppled in revolution.

In contrast to autocracy, democracy is defined as states where access to political power is open and subject to an effective system of checks and balances that prevents any monopoly of power. Democratization is then conceptualized as the transformative process that moves a regime from autocracy to democracy. This transition involves changes in both informal and formal rules governing leader selection, shifting from an unchallenged power structure to one where power is both contested and supervised. The role of foreign shaming and media freedom in this process is multifaceted. They can act as catalysts for sudden democratic revolutions or contribute to a more gradual erosion of dictatorial power. Consequently, democratization is understood to encompass both immediate, transformative events and a longer, more gradual process of liberalization and political opening.

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To quantitatively assess democratization, this paper employs the Polity2 score from the Polity V dataset. This score, derived by subtracting the Autocracy index from the Democracy index, provides a continuous annual measure reflecting fluctuations in institutional openness. The Democracy index is a composite measure based on variables that capture three key dimensions: the ability of citizens to influence policies and select leaders, the presence of limits on executive power, and the assurance of civil liberties. Conversely, the Autocracy index is coded through similar dimensions but reflects restricted political competitiveness and participation, a regularized leader selection process, and limited checks on power. Therefore, the Polity score, derived by subtracting the Autocracy score from the Democracy score, encapsulates the degree of political competitiveness, the robustness of checks and balances, and the extent of political participation within a specific regime and year. The shifts in the Polity score effectively represent the democratization process, signifying changes in institutional openness.

In conclusion, these definitions of key concepts are pivotal for analyzing the impact of foreign shaming and media freedom on autocratic regimes. As autocratic rulers attempt to mitigate the effects of foreign human rights shaming to maintain their grip on power, democracy and autocracy are defined in terms of power concentration and the presence of institutional checks. Democratization is thus seen as a shift from a monopoly of power to its contestation, from unbridled authority to constrained governance, and from limited political participation to expanded civil rights. The binary categorization of regimes based on leader selection rules in the GWF dataset is instrumental in identifying autocratic cases. By integrating this with the Polity V dataset, which serves as a proxy for democratization through its measure of institutional openness, this study effectively examines democratization in autocratic regimes subjected to human rights shaming.

## **Theoretical Framework**

### **The Contentious Effect of Human Rights Shaming**

While democracy and human rights are distinct concepts (Evans, 2001), the latter often finds itself under threat in autocratic regimes. The global attention garnered by human rights violations varies considerably, influenced by factors such as the incident's severity, the perpetrator's identity, the number of active organizations within the country (Meernik et al., 2012), and the country's strategic relationships (Terman & Voeten, 2018). International actors, including democracies, international organizations like the UN, and NGOs such as Amnesty International, often engage in shaming with the purpose of exerting normative pressure on the perpetrator and improving human rights by exposing state-perpetrated atrocities and raising general awareness of the on-going human rights

infringement on the international stage. The effectiveness of this shaming tactic in enhancing human rights conditions is a subject of scholarly debate.

Several studies have identified conditions under which shaming can be effective. Murdie and Davis (2012) contend that shaming can improve state behavior if there is a strong presence of international non-governmental human rights organizations in the targeted country, or additional pressure from external actors. Krain (2012) found that naming and shaming can mitigate the severity of extreme state atrocities. Jacqueline (2012) noted that foreign scrutiny can deter state-sanctioned killings. Terman and Voeten (2018) offer a nuanced view, suggesting that shaming is politicized and criticisms from strategic allies are more likely to influence human rights practices in the criticized states. More recently, Zhou, Kiyani, and Crabtree (2023) provided evidence that shaming by the US State Department correlates with improved human rights performance in targeted countries.

Nevertheless, the success of naming and shaming is not universal. Hafner-Burton (2008) argues that shamed authoritarian regimes may escalate certain human rights violations while reducing others. This argument is backed by DeMeritt and Conrad (2019), who observed that while shamed states may decrease specific criticized violations, they often increase others. This indicates a strategic response of authoritarian regimes to international shaming, superficially modifying behaviors while continuing violations in less scrutinized areas. DiBlasi (2020) identifies another strategy where authoritarian leaders perpetuate repression indirectly through pro-government militias to avoid direct responsibility and international criticism. Specific cases, such as China, demonstrate potential backlash effects of shaming. Wachman (2001) found that shaming Chinese leaders did not improve human rights but instead provoked nationalistic defenses. Gallagher (2021) also highlights the counterproductive aspects of shaming, advocating for a more strategic approach during China's status-sensitive periods. Terman (2016) explores the conditions under which shaming can backfire, such as when the targeted regime has weak social ties with the critic, perceives the criticism as biased, or views the shaming as an attack on the regime rather than on specific behaviors. Greenhill and Reiter (2022) show how governments can counteract human rights shaming with effective counter-narratives. Snyder (2020) summarizes the psychological impact of shaming, noting that it can provoke defensiveness and reinforce existing norms and practices.

In summary, the literature on human rights shaming presents diverse perspectives. These varied viewpoints, rather than being contradictory, offer a comprehensive understanding of the complex dynamics in international human rights advocacy. They underscore the importance of considering domestic contexts and the actors involved in assessing the effectiveness of international shaming strategies.

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## The Effect of Shaming on the Populace

Contemporary academic discourse predominantly focuses on the direct impacts of human rights shaming on practices within human rights realms. However, its potential role in facilitating democratization processes within autocratic regimes has not been thoroughly explored. Considering that adherence to human rights is a cornerstone of liberal democratic values, it is plausible to postulate that these values would be reinforced following a transition from authoritarianism to democracy. In this theoretical framework, human rights shaming could in turn act as a catalyst for democratization. Shaming's democratizing effects can be dissected into two groups: the effect on the shamed authoritarian rulers and the effect on the domestic audience in the shamed regime.

Regardless of the depth of authoritarian entrenchment, human rights shaming and international criticism are likely to impact rulers. Shaming tactics can weaken dictators by diminishing their support base and alienating them from international and domestic allies (Krain, 2012; Gallagher, 2021). Escribà-Folch and Wright (2009; 2015) argue that human rights shaming can increase the probability of irregular leader exits by disrupting international aid and trade flows, thus undermining the leaders' ability to maintain support through patronage systems. Lebovic and Voeten (2009) further illustrate this point by showing that condemnation via UNCHR resolutions correlates with reduced commitments from the World Bank and other multilateral lenders, suggesting that shaming can impose material costs on autocratic leaders. Moreover, as suggested by Escribà-Folch and Wright, the effectiveness of shaming varies across different types of regimes. In personalist regimes, shaming can lead to violent turnovers of dictators, but it is more likely to be associated with regular transitions of power in party-based regimes or military juntas where leadership rotation is institutionalized. Therefore, the specific institutional framework of a regime and the resources at its leaders' disposal are critical in determining the path of transition in the aftermath of foreign criticism.

While the effect of shaming on autocratic rulers is an intriguing topic worth further study, this article primarily focuses on the question of how shaming can fruitfully pressure autocracies and promote democratization through influencing the domestic audience in the shamed regime. When shaming effectively reaches the domestic populace of an autocracy, it has the potential to kindle an aspiration for democratic values in the regime, thereby destabilizing the authoritarian rule and fostering the demand on democracy. This democratizing effect could manifest through heightened domestic dissent towards the authoritarianism and the strengthening of opposition forces demanding for democratic transition, which can possibly precipitate revolutionary movements or prompt reformative measures.

However, if a country's populace is unaware of the human rights abuses and foreign condemna-

tion, discontent may remain limited to the directly affected victim groups, resulting in minimal pressure on the regime. Moreover, foreign censure may not always foster democratization; it can provoke backlash instead. Terman (2016) notes that foreign human rights shaming reports, when perceived as stigmatizing, can potentially trigger a backlash. Snyder (2020) elucidates how shaming by “cultural outsiders” can lead to public outrage, allowing the state to employ counter-narratives to rally the populace’s support in opposition to foreign criticisms. Wachman’s (2001) analysis on China also illustrates this, where the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) effectively used foreign pressure to stir patriotic responses and nationalistic sentiment, thereby mitigating the destabilizing effects of external criticism.

Therefore, by impacting the perceptions of citizens, international shaming has the capacity to foster anti-authoritarian and pro-democratic sentiments, while also signaling international solidarity with opposition groups. This approach, however, may not always yield the intended results. Its effectiveness is significantly reduced if only a limited segment of the citizenry has access to the information about shaming. Moreover, the potential for counterproductivity arises when the shaming is perceived not as a legitimate critique, but rather as an act of contempt or malevolence. This perception can be especially prevalent if there exists a dominant counter narrative within the regime that frames the shaming as an unjust attack, thereby potentially leading to a “rally ‘round the flag” effect and undermining the intended democratic impetus of such international actions.

It can thus be hypothesized that the success of shaming as a strategy largely depends on its ability to reach and resonate with the domestic audience within the targeted autocratic regime, as well as the manner in which this audience interprets the shaming. Autocratic leaders, cognizant of the potential threat that shaming poses to their authority, often employ various strategies to mitigate its impact. A prevalent approach involves either intercepting external criticisms before they reach the domestic audience or shaping the internal narrative about these criticisms. Such tactics highlight the pivotal role of media control in autocratic regimes, which is exercised not solely for the propagation of domestic propaganda but also serves as a defensive mechanism against international condemnation related to human rights violations.

### **The Mediating Role of Media**

The role of a free press in democracies is fundamental, as it ensures the proper functioning of democratic institutions. The importance of press freedom in democracy is so pronounced that it is often considered an integral component of liberal democratic values. The common dichotomy posits democracy in association with media freedom and autocracy with media control. However, this view is somewhat simplistic. While democracies generally exhibit higher levels of media freedom (Stier, 2015), Woods (2017) contends that democracy does not automatically equate to media plural-

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ism. In contrast, recent evidence from Brazil shows that media concentration and manipulation can also occur within democratic systems, influencing election outcomes (Cavgias et al., 2023). Likewise, authoritarianism is also not tantamount to the concentration of media ownership, as some autocracies exhibit a certain degree of media freedom (Egorove et al., 2009; Whitten-Woodring, 2009; Stier, 2015), leading to the question of how varying levels of media liberalization in autocracies might influence democratization processes. A substantial body of research has identified a positive correlation between media freedom and the democratization process (O’Neill, 1998; Randal, 1993; Randall, 1998; Gunther et al., 2000; Norris, 2008; Voltmer, 2013; Aredentz, 2023). Specifically, Voltmer and Rawnsley (2019) have noted that the media acts as a forum for political debate and a watchdog over government behavior. Additionally, with the development and popularization of social media in the modern society, many scholars have recognized the role of social media in exposing governmental malpractices and coordinating mass protests in autocratic regimes (Danju et al., 2013; Cattle, 2011). Dissecting the mechanism of media’s democratizing effect through an empirical analysis, Gleditsch et al. (2023) demonstrate that partially free media within autocracies can destabilize regimes by promoting mass nonviolent dissent and empowering opposition movements, as media can both disseminate alternative information and mobilize dissidents.

In summary, free media plays a pivotal role in bolstering democratization efforts within authoritarian regimes through two primary avenues. First, an unencumbered press is instrumental in spreading information that may undermine dictatorial authority. This includes exposing state-perpetrated atrocities and corruption, which can foster public disenchantment with the regime and promote democratic ideals. Additionally, when international society censures a regime’s human rights violations, a free domestic media can magnify this criticism, disseminating it widely among the citizenry. Second, media independence provides a vital platform for the coordination of opposition movements. It serves as an essential tool for mobilization by facilitating the dissemination of information and ideas. When international condemnation of the regime emboldens these groups, the media can play a crucial role in transforming this newfound courage into tangible actions, such as protests or uprisings. By functioning as both an information conduit and a means of coordination, free media emerges as a central force in the democratization process within authoritarian contexts. Consequently, autocratic leaders are often incentivized to suppress press freedom and manipulate media narratives for propaganda. Cho et al. (2017) have shown that individuals with greater media exposure tend to oppose authoritarian incumbents, but this trend is absent when the state exerts dominant control over the media. In China, for instance, the media serves as a staunch defender of the regime (Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011), actively suppressing news that could threaten its stability, such as reports on human rights violations, which have the potential to incite revolutionary sentiment among regime critics (Tai, 2014). Another research combining survey data and media

freedom data by Yeung (2023) has shown autocratic ruler's media control strategy can effectively increase the citizens' perceived democratic level, and thus improve their survivability.

Understanding the conditions under which shaming succeeds or fails in promoting democratization, and the role of media in this process, is critical. The democratizing effect of shaming is largely contingent on media freedom within the targeted state, as shaming needs to reach the populace without being discredited. Consequently, controlling the media and manipulating public opinion are strategies that dictators may use to deflect foreign criticism. This research aims to elucidate the effectiveness of media control by autocratic regimes in mitigating the impact of foreign pressure. It examines how international human rights shaming influences democratization in regimes with varying levels of media freedom. In environments where media maintains some independence, robust international human rights advocacy should be able to exert significant pressure on governments, potentially fostering political liberalization. In contrast, in regimes with tight media control, international "naming and shaming" may have minimal impact or even hinder democratic reforms. Hence, the hypotheses are as followed:

*Hypothesis 1: in autocratic regimes with relatively free media, international human rights shaming can have a democratizing effect.*

*Hypothesis 2: in autocratic regimes where the media is heavily controlled, international human rights shaming may be ineffective or even counterproductive in terms of democratization.*

## **A Quantitative Approach**

### **Data and variables, operationalization**

In the preceding sections, the complexities in defining democracy and autocracy were explored, highlighting the importance of aligning these definitions with the specific objectives of a research project. This study, which examines the media strategies employed by autocratic regimes to counteract foreign shaming, necessitates a precise identification of autocratic regimes. For this purpose, I have selected the Geddes Wright and Frantz Autocratic Regimes dataset (GWF dataset). This dataset is known for its nuanced approach in differentiating autocratic from democratic regimes, making it highly suitable for my research.

The GWF dataset, meticulously developed by Geddes et al. (2014), adeptly delineates autocratic regimes by scrutinizing both their formal and informal governance structures. A key strength of this dataset lies in its analysis of the rules defining the group eligible for leadership and the mechanisms influencing leadership selection and policy decisions. This aspect is critical for my research, as it directly pertains to the core concern of autocratic leaders: the maintenance and consolidation



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of their power.

Moreover, the GWF dataset is not only a longitudinal cross-sectional dataset, but it also effectively identifies autocratic regime cases nested within countries, thus providing a hierarchical structure essential for my analysis. This arrangement enables two crucial aspects of my research: first, it allows for mimicking experimental conditions using panel data for better causal inference, and second, it facilitates the investigation of the random effects of regime cases and countries. The hierarchical nature of the dataset is particularly conducive to a multilevel modeling approach, which is instrumental in capturing the complexities and nuances inherent in the study of autocracies. In conclusion, the GWF dataset is chosen for its hierarchical structure and longitudinal cross-sectional design facilitate multilevel modeling and in-depth causal inference, making it an ideal resource for examining the effects of shaming and media freedom on authoritarian regimes' democratization process.

### ***Dependent Variable***

As discussed above, in this study, the Polity2 score from the Polity V dataset is employed not merely as an indicator of a state's current level of democracy and autocracy, but more critically, as a proxy for democratization processes. This approach is based on the premise that the dynamics of democratization are best captured through changes in institutional openness over time. By leading the Polity2 score by one year, the research design mitigates the risk of reverse causality, using the main predictors in the current year to project the Polity2 score for the following year. This methodology, identical to lagging the independent variables, allows for a focused examination of how contemporary media environment and international human rights shaming influence the future evolution of democratization.

The Polity2 score's range from -10 to +10 provides a detailed measure of governance, spanning the full spectrum from autocracy to democracy. This granularity is essential for this research, as it enables the detection of subtle yet significant shifts in governance indicative of democratization processes. The score's comprehensive assessment of various governance dimensions, such as the competitiveness of political participation and the constraints on executive power, renders it an apt instrument for evaluating democratization. Furthermore, the Polity2 score is instrumental in reflecting qualitative changes in regimes. It categorizes states into three groups: autocracies (scores from -10 to -6), anocracies (scores from -5 to 5), and democracies (scores from 6 to 10). This categorization is crucial for the study as it allows for the identification of not just incremental shifts in autocracy or democracy levels, but also significant regime transitions. Such qualitative changes, often marked by pivotal historical events like revolutions or leadership concessions, are critical indicators of democratization and are effectively captured by the Polity2 score.

There are some discrepancies in regime classification between the Polity2 and GWF datasets, attributable to their different definitions of democracy. While Polity2 offers a more holistic view, GWF focuses on the contested nature of power. This is exemplified by regime cases such as Gambia (1965-1994), considered democratic by Polity2 but autocratic in GWF due to unchallenged rule. I align with GWF's definition of autocracy while acknowledging that including regimes with limited democratization potential might dilute the predictive power for shaming and media freedom in my model. To address this, I will test a model that excludes regimes with a Polity2 score of 6 or higher for robustness check, ensuring the integrity of my analysis.

### ***Independent Variables - Main Predictors***

In selecting the data that best represent the two primary predictors in this study, I have carefully considered both relevance and reliability. For the shaming variable, the choice was the combined number of press releases and background reports released by Amnesty International, as coded by Ron et al. (2005). Amnesty International stands as one of the leading and most influential non-governmental human rights organizations globally. Its reports are not only comprehensive but also widely respected for their accuracy and depth. The press releases and background reports by Amnesty International targeting specific regimes in a given year serve as an effective proxy for international shaming. These reports are indicative of global attention on a regime's human rights abuses and reflect the intensity of international scrutiny. In this context, the number of reports can be seen as a measure of the extent to which a regime is being "shamed" internationally for its human rights record.

As for the media freedom variable, I have chosen the Media System Freedom (MSF) data published by Solis and Waggoner (2021). This dataset is a result of a sophisticated item response theory model applied to ten extant indicators, producing a scale ranging from 0 (most restricted media) to 1 (freest media). The choice of this dataset is based on two considerations. First, the MSF dataset's methodology, which consolidates multiple indicators into a single measure, offers a comprehensive view of media freedom. This approach reduces the risk of bias that might arise from relying on a single source or indicator. Second, the continuous scale from 0 to 1 provided by the MSF data allows for nuanced differentiation between countries in terms of media freedom. This level of granularity is crucial for accurately capturing the variations in media control among different autocratic regimes.

In conclusion, the choice of Amnesty International's reports as a proxy for shaming and the MSF dataset for media freedom is grounded in their respective authoritative positions in human rights reporting and media analysis. Furthermore, considering that the dataset for shaming is heavily right-skewed, I have employed the natural logarithm transformation of its values to normalize

the distributions and facilitate a more robust statistical analysis.

### ***Control Variables***

In examining Polity2 scores and their relationship to democratization, this study integrates several control variables into its model to account for potential influencing factors.

First, the model includes GDP per capita, logged to address skewness and sourced from the Maddison Project Database, recognizing the established connection between economic development and democratization. This relationship has been explored extensively in political science, with various studies indicating that economic development can influence democratization through multiple channels, such as improved education, increased income, and shifts in social class structure. These aspects explored by many scholars (e.g. Lipset, 1959; Huber et al., 1993; Burkhart & Lewis-Beck, 1994; Lu, 2005; Kennedy, 2010; Miller, 2012; Treisman, 2020), underscore the complex ways in which economic achievement can foster democratic environments.

Additionally, population size, also derived and log-transformed from the Maddison Project Database, is considered due to its potential impact on democratic processes. Studies, including Ott (2000), have explored how larger populations might affect democracy through varied social interactions and political engagement.

Regime duration, sourced from the GWF dataset, is another critical control variable. It provides insights into the stability and institutionalization of political systems, with longer durations indicating either a facilitation or resistance to democratization, depending on the nature of entrenched political practices.

The model further incorporates time-fixed effects, categorizing the data into 5-year intervals. This segmentation is crucial for capturing the dynamic nature of democratization trends, which are

TABLE 1. Summary Statistics of Continuous Variables

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Median	Max
Lead Polity2 Score	1,725	-4.640	4.663	-10	-7	10
AI Shaming Centered Within Regime Case Clusters (ln)	1,725	-0.013	0.670	-2.567	-0.050	2.546
Media System Freedom Centered Within Regime Case Clusters	1,725	-0.015	0.083	-0.327	-0.005	0.565
AI Shaming Group Mean Aggregated at the Regime Level	1,725	1.132	0.756	0.000	0.973	2.908
Media System Freedom Group Mean Aggregated at the Regime Level	1,725	0.278	0.174	0.003	0.262	0.734
Regime Duration	1,725	23.365	31.663	1	17	259
GDP per capita Centered at the Grand Mean (ln)	1,725	-0.080	0.918	-2.084	-0.108	2.685
Population Centered at the Grand Mean (ln)	1,725	-0.076	1.384	-2.885	-0.127	4.875

often influenced by global political shifts and regional upheavals.

Regime type is also a vital control variable, acknowledging the different media landscapes and Polity2 scores across regime types, as highlighted in the works of Stier (2015) and Geddes et al. (2014). This inclusion is necessary to disentangle the complex relationships between media freedom, democratization, and Polity2 scores.

Lastly, the geographical location is introduced as a control variable, grounded in the significant disparities observed in democratization processes across different global regions. Scholarly literature has extensively documented these spatial variations and the phenomenon of democratic diffusion (Bunce, 1998; O’Loughlin et al., 1998; Brinks & Coppedge, 2001; Gleditsch & Ward, 2006; Elkins, 2011; Stokes, 2007). Therefore, a dummy variable representing each country’s geographical location, based on the United Nations Statistics Division classification, is incorporated to account for these regional differences.

TABLE 2. Frequency Table of Categorical Variables

Time Period	Frequency	Region	Frequency	Regime Type	Frequency
1976-1980	393	Africa	905	Military	254
1981-1985	382	Americas	202	Monarch	189
1986-1990	354	Asia	534	Party	836
1991-1995	299	Europe	84	Personal	446
1996-2000	297	Oceania	0		

The continuous variables in the model, such as GDP per capita and population size, are detailed in Table 1, while the frequency of categorical variables like regime type and geographical location is presented in Table 2. These controls ensure a comprehensive and robust analysis of the factors influencing democratization and Polity2 scores.

## Method

### *Multilevel Modeling*

This study employs multilevel modeling to analyze the impact of Amnesty International’s human rights shaming and Media System Freedom scores on Polity2 ratings. The dataset consists of longitudinal data nested within regime cases and countries, making multilevel modeling ideal for addressing this complexity and capturing variations at both regime and country levels.

This approach is effective in managing unobserved heterogeneity inherent in democratization

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processes, such as varying ideologies, cultural factors, and historical institutions. These aspects, often intangible, are treated as random effects in the model, acknowledging their influence on democratization.

Crucially, this approach can also address the heterogeneity in the within effect associated with foreign human rights shaming by incorporating a random slope for the variable. Failing to address this heterogeneity and incorrectly assuming homogeneity in mixed effect models will yield biased estimates and thus is undesirable (Bell et al. 2019). Furthermore, model fit indicators, such as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), demonstrate that adding a random slope for shaming at the regime level enhances model accuracy. Conversely, incorporating this element at the country level proves to be less beneficial.

### ***Centering Variables & Aggregated Cluster Mean***

This study utilizes two main centering methods in its multilevel modeling: Grand-mean Centering (CGM) and Group-mean Centering (CWC), as per statistical recommended practices for multilevel analysis (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). The primary level 1 predictors, Amnesty International (AI) shaming and Media System Freedom (MSF) scores, are centered using CWC. This method is chosen due to its effectiveness in isolating level-specific effects and ensuring unbiased estimates for level 1 variables (Ryu, 2015; Brincks et al., 2017).

Theoretical considerations, especially the “frog-pond effect” relevant in sociological studies, also guide this choice (Keft et al., 1995). For instance, the impact of AI shaming on democratization can vary depending on each regime’s history with such criticism, a phenomenon effectively captured through CWC. Similarly, changes in media freedom influence democratization differently based on each regime’s historical media constraints. Incremental shifts in media freedom can have varying impacts depending on each regime’s prior state of press freedom, making it crucial to assess these changes within specific regimes.

The study also accounts for significant between-group effects. While CWC highlights within-group variances, reintroducing group means for AI shaming and MSF at the regime level captures between-group effects and contextual nuances. This approach, integrating CWC with the reintroduction of group means, is endorsed for its accuracy in differentiating within and between-group effects (Cronbach & Webb, 1975; Raudenbush, 1989).

For control variables like GDP per capita and population size, CGM is used. These variables, representing broader national-level characteristics, are better understood in a national context, and centering them with the CGM method aids in interpreting the main predictors’ coefficients (Enders & Tofighi, 2007).

In summary, the methodological choices for variable centering in this multilevel model are

intricately linked to its theoretical framework. Applying CGM and CWC, along with the strategic reintroduction of group means, allows for a nuanced analysis that precisely disentangles within and between-group effects. This approach aligns with political science theories on democratization, media freedom, and international relations, enhancing the study's interpretative depth and credibility.

### ***Lagged Dependent Variable Approach***

The Polity2 score, reflecting the democratic or autocratic nature of regimes, demonstrates inherent temporal stability, with regimes generally maintaining their character barring significant events like democratic transitions or authoritarian consolidation. Such transformative events are rare and do not occur annually. Additionally, democratization, once initiated, tends to perpetuate in autocratic regimes. To account for this autocorrelation, I included the current year's Polity2 score as a control variable. This approach, supported by Keele & Kelly (2006) and Wooldridge (2012), effectively captures the inertial effects and mitigates the influence of latent time-varying confounders on our predictors.

Statistical tests, including the Autocorrelation Function (ACF) and the Durbin-Watson Test, confirm the presence of strong autocorrelation. The ACF analysis shows significant autocorrelation in the Polity2 score and the residuals of models lacking the lagged Polity2 control. The Durbin-Watson Test further supports this, indicating substantial improvement in autocorrelation with the inclusion of the lagged variable. Thus, incorporating the lagged Polity2 score serves to statistically address autocorrelation and theoretically acknowledge the historical continuity in political regimes.

## **Presenting Results**

### **Fixed Effects**

Table 3 delineates the outcomes of the random effects models, incorporating random intercepts at both the regime and country levels. The initial three models presented do not consider autocorrelation. Model 1, the baseline model, includes the centered main predictors and their respective group means. Model 2 extends Model 1 by integrating the interaction term. Model 3 expands further by incorporating control variables, and Model 4 adjusts for the Polity2 score. Model 5, the most complex iteration, introduces random slopes for AI shaming at the regime level. Across various model specifications, the coefficients for AI shaming and MSF exhibit a consistent and robust positive correlation with the subsequent year's Polity2 score, signaling a solid association.

Notably, the MSF coefficient diminishes substantially when the Polity2 score is included, aligning with expectations given the correlation between media freedom and the Polity2 score. This

adjustment allows for a more precise estimation of the media's effect by controlling for other latent time-varying variables. The interaction term's coefficient and standard error remain stable across the models, lending support to the hypothesis that media freedom positively moderates the shaming effect on democratization.

### *Within Effect*

In Model 5, the most complex random slope model, AI Shaming positively and significantly predicts

TABLE 3. Fixed Effects: AI Shaming  $\times$  Media Freedom and Polity2 Score

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	(1) Model 1 Only main predictors	(2) Model 2 + the interac- tion term	Polity2 Score (t+1)		
			(3) Model 3 + control variables	(4) Model 4 + Polity2 as control	(5) Model 5 + random slope
AI Shaming CWC (ln)	0.21*** (0.08)	0.26*** (0.08)	0.17** (0.08)	0.20*** (0.07)	0.43** (0.18)
Media System Freedom CWC	21.21*** (0.63)	20.99*** (0.63)	20.11*** (0.78)	6.19*** (0.72)	5.10*** (0.70)
AI Shaming Group Mean	0.70** (0.29)	0.71** (0.29)	0.71** (0.34)	0.02 (0.12)	-0.05 (0.10)
Media System Freedom Group Mean	14.78*** (1.32)	14.86*** (1.31)	15.98*** (1.31)	3.51*** (0.50)	2.64*** (0.41)
Regime Duration			0.02** (0.01)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.002)
GDP per capita CGM (ln)			-0.36 (0.22)	-0.11 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.08)
Population CGM (ln)			-0.52*** (0.20)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.05)
Regime Type: Monarch			-4.12*** (1.21)	-1.39*** (0.35)	-1.10*** (0.28)
Regime Type: Party			-0.09 (0.64)	-0.71*** (0.20)	-0.59*** (0.17)
Regime Type: Personal			-1.17* (0.63)	-0.86*** (0.21)	-0.70*** (0.17)
Time-Period: 1981-1985			0.09 (0.17)	0.04 (0.14)	-0.02 (0.13)
Time-Period: 1986-1990			0.43** (0.20)	0.49*** (0.15)	0.44*** (0.14)
Time-Period: 1991-1995			0.26 (0.26)	0.10 (0.18)	0.11 (0.17)
Time-Period: 1996-2000			0.43 (0.30)	0.07 (0.19)	0.10 (0.18)
Region: Americas			1.86** (0.73)	0.89*** (0.25)	0.74*** (0.20)
Region: Asia			1.20** (0.60)	0.24 (0.18)	0.19 (0.15)
Region: Europe			2.21** (1.06)	0.80** (0.33)	0.68** (0.26)
Polity2 Score				0.81*** (0.02)	0.86*** (0.02)
AI Shaming CWC (ln) $\times$ Media System Freedom CWC		3.82*** (0.89)	4.08*** (0.91)	3.29*** (0.78)	3.13*** (0.83)
Constant	-9.10*** (0.55)	-9.16*** (0.55)	-10.32*** (0.82)	-1.19*** (0.35)	-0.67** (0.30)
Observations	1,725	1,725	1,725	1,725	1,725
Akaike Inf. Crit.	7,782.50	7,766.24	7,749.20	7,059.09	7,036.31
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	7,826.12	7,815.32	7,869.16	7,184.51	7,172.63

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

the Polity2 score at  $t+1$ , with a coefficient of 0.43 ( $p < 0.05$ ). This finding suggests that a 100% increase (as the variable is log-transformed) in the AI Shaming within an average regime is associated with an increase of approximately 0.43 in the Polity2 score the following year, all else being equal. This enduring significance, after accounting for the lagged dependent variable and random slope of shaming, suggests a durable influence of international normative pressure on democratization processes.

Media freedom's impact in Model 5 also remains significant (Coefficient = 5.10,  $p < 0.01$ ), reinforcing the notion that domestic informational ecosystems are crucial for democratic progression, independent of past political states. The coefficient of media freedom, though shrunk after controlling for Polity2, still is incredibly large. This is because the scope of this variable ranges from 0 to 1, so one unit increase would mean a change from the minimum value to the maximum. To interpret the coefficient more properly, we can say that a 0.1 increase in MSF score within a regime predicts a 0.51 increase in Polity2 score in the next year, holding other variables constant.

More importantly, the statistically significant interaction term in Model 5 continues to highlight the interactive reinforcement between external advocacy and internal liberties in shaping the democratic transition course. The positive coefficient of 3.13 ( $p < 0.01$ ) dictates that when MSF increases by 0.1 in an average regime, we can observe a 0.31 increase in the effect of AI shaming on the dependent variable, assuming other factors, including the current democracy level, are held constant. This suggests that the effectiveness of shaming as a mechanism for influencing democratization is enhanced in contexts where media freedom is greater. Such an effect highlights the importance of considering how the impact of international pressures can be contingent upon domestic attributes, in this case, the level of media freedom.

### ***Between Effect & Contextual Effect***

The significant coefficient for the group-mean of Media System Freedom (MSF) demonstrates a notable between-group effect. The MSF group-mean—reflecting the average media freedom within regimes over time—suggests that regimes with more liberal media environments are associated with greater democratization progress. Specifically, an increase of 0.1 in a regime's average MSF is correlated with a 0.264 increase in its subsequent Polity2 score, indicating the broader impact of media freedom on democratization across the dataset.

Further analysis using the `glht` (Generalized Linear Hypotheses Test) function in R reveals a distinct contrast between the MSF group-mean and the centered MSF variable, significant at  $p < 0.01$ , confirming a substantial contextual effect with a coefficient of -2.46. This negative contextual effect implies that as regimes attain higher levels of media freedom, the incremental effect of further increases in media freedom on democratization diminishes. In other words, this suggests a



scenario of diminishing returns where advancing media freedom yields progressively smaller democratic gains.

Conversely, AI shaming exhibits no significant between effect, as indicated by the large standard error associated with the AI shaming group-mean variable. Nonetheless, the *glht* function indicates a significant contextual effect for shaming, significant at  $p < 0.05$ , with a coefficient of  $-0.48$ . This negative coefficient aligns with the theoretical proposition that, akin to media freedom, the impact of shaming on democratization also lessens as autocratic regimes experience increased shaming on average.

## Visualization

The simple effects of the interaction term of AI shaming and MSF are better illustrated in Figure 1. The x-axis delineates different values of AI shaming that is centered at its group mean, y designates the predicted value of Polity2 score in the subsequent year, and the color group represents varying levels of media freedom.




Figure 1

Examining the trajectory of these lines, it becomes evident that the predicted Polity2 score's responsiveness to AI shaming is modulated by the level of media freedom. Specifically, when media freedom is one standard deviation (SD) above the mean, an increase in AI shaming is associated with a steeper ascent in the predicted Polity2 score, suggesting a more pronounced effect on political liberalization. Conversely, with media freedom at the group mean, the increase in the Polity2 score is less steep, indicating a tempered response. Most notably, when media freedom falls one SD below the mean, indicating a less free press, increased shaming fails to promote and may even hinder political liberalization, as reflected by a stagnating or decreasing Polity2 score. However, this

potential backlash effect is only apparent in Model 4 (left graph), which does not account for the random slope. In contrast, Model 5 (right graph) shows more overlap in confidence intervals, yet the disparity between the groups at one SD above the mean and one SD below the mean remains unmistakable, emphasizing the importance of media freedom in the relationship between international shaming and democratization processes.

Figure 2 provides a clear visualization of the moderating effect of media freedom on the marginal effect of AI shaming on the prospective Polity2 score. It plots the variability of this effect across the spectrum of media freedom scores, offering a lucid representation of the interaction between these two variables. In the graph corresponding to Model 5, we observe a wider 95% confidence interval that spans a broader range of media system freedom (MSF) scores where the effect of shaming is not significantly different from zero. Nevertheless, both graphs in Figure 2 consistently show a shift from a negative to a positive marginal effect of AI shaming on the democratization measure as the centered MSF score increases from lower to higher values. Notably, a statistically significant negative effect at the 95% confidence level is only observed in Model 4.

These visualizations provide compelling statistical validation for the hypothesis: the influence of foreign human rights shaming on the democratization process is conditional upon the level of media freedom within the regime being scrutinized. The graphs indicate that shaming can either positively facilitate democratization or have a negligible impact depending on the emancipation of the press system. While the potential for a counterproductive backlash effect that might hinder future liberalization is suggested in Model 4, such evidence is not substantiated when a random slope is incorporated in Model 5. Therefore, while the data suggests caution, the hypothesis of a backlash effect should be considered tentatively.




Figure 2

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## Random Effects

The random effects structure of Model 5 is shown in Table 4, which revealed several layers of variability in the democratization scores captured by the Polity2 index. At the country level, the random intercept variance was relatively small ( $SD = 0.027$ ), suggesting that while countries exhibit some degree of heterogeneity in their baseline democratization scores, these differences are not pronounced.

More substantial variation was observed at the regime level, as evidenced by a larger standard deviation for the regime intercepts ( $SD = 0.463$ ). This variation implies that there is a significant diversity in democratization scores across different regimes within the same country, underscoring the importance of regime-specific factors and policies in shaping the democratic trajectory. The latent factors could include the regime's mainstream ideology, the specific nature of political institutions, or the individual leadership style, all of which can markedly influence the democratization process.

TABLE 4. Random Effects in Model 5

	Standard Deviation	Correlation
Country Level Intercept	0.02734954	
Regime Level Intercept	0.4632234	(Intr)
AI shaming CWC	1.7791192	0.8
Residual	1.698253	

The slope for AI Shaming within regimes exhibited even greater variability ( $SD = 1.779$ ), with a high correlation (Correlation = 0.8) with the regime intercepts. The positive correlation indicates that regimes which start with a higher level of democratization are likely to experience greater increments in democratization in response to AI Shaming, compared to those with lower initial scores. This could be interpreted as regimes with preliminary democratic structures or democratizing momentums being more susceptible to international normative pressure, reflecting perhaps a commitment to reforming or a genuine responsiveness to international democratic norms.

Finally, the residual variance ( $SD = 1.698$ ) reflects the within-regime, year-to-year variability in democratization scores that cannot be accounted for by the fixed effects or the random effects at the regime and country levels. This includes unobserved idiosyncratic factors unique to each regime-year observation, measurement error, and other forms of noise. The relatively large magnitude of this residual variance component signals that there are considerable influences on democratization that are not captured by our current model and are specific to individual regime-years. This highlights the complex, multifaceted nature of the democratization process and suggests

the presence of dynamic factors at play within regimes that warrant further investigation.

### **Robustness Check**

In the pursuit of verifying the robustness of the initial findings, the study explored a series of models, each introducing specific modifications to the base Model 5, with outcomes detailed in Appendix Tables 5 and 6. The initial 5 models, presented in Table 5, delved into variations in random effects configurations. Model RC1 tested the impact of omitting country-level random effects, while Model RC2 introduced random slopes for Amnesty International shaming at the country level, replacing those at the regime level. Further, Model RC3 incorporated random slopes of AI shaming at both levels, and Model RC4 expanded this by including random slopes for both shaming and media freedom at the regime level. Model RC5 integrated random slopes of their interaction term. Additionally, Model RC6 investigated the effect of substituting the year dummy variable with fixed effects to verify year group coding accuracy. Notably, Model RC4 deviates significantly from the hypothesized results, with the coefficient of the interaction term diminishing to the point of losing statistical significance. However, caution must be exercised in interpreting this outcome due to the high correlation observed between the random effects of shaming and media freedom, indicative of multicollinearity and consequent inflation of standard errors. Furthermore, the incorporation of a random slope for media freedom lacks theoretical justification.

Further extending the robustness checks, Table 6 introduces additional models. Model RC7, for instance, incorporates controls for aid, conceptualized as the Official Development Assistance (ODA) a country receives annually in relation to its Gross National Income (GNI). This inclusion is based on the hypothesis that shaming, apart from influencing the shamed country's populace, may also impact dictators' patron-purchasing power by affecting the aid they receive (Escribà-Folch & Wright, 2009, 2015; Lebovic & Voeten, 2009). The results from this model reinforced the notion that shaming, media freedom, and their interaction have significant effects on the subsequent year's Polity score, independent of aid.

Another significant aspect of the robustness analysis involved Model RC8, which replicated the regression of Model 5 but on a dataset excluding regime-year observations preceding regime transitions. This approach was undertaken to avoid the potential confounding effect of regime transitions on the recorded Polity score. The altered results in this model, particularly the loss of statistical significance for AI shaming and a reduced coefficient for the interaction term, align with the expectations set forth by the model's design.

Further models, namely RC9, RC10, and RC11, employed datasets trimmed based on different regime categories as classified by the Polity dataset. This categorization diverges from the GWF dataset used in the main analysis, which aligns more closely with the theoretical framework of the

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study. These models aimed to examine the effects of shaming and media freedom across various institutional settings of autocratic regimes. The results from these models showcased the nuanced impact of the primary predictors, with more pronounced effects observed in regimes classified as autocracies by the Polity dataset.

Lastly, Model RC12 employed an alternative dependent variable: a machine learning-derived measure of democracy, encompassing ten regime characteristics including political participation and freedom of opinion (Gründler & Krieger, 2021). The consistency of results with the primary analysis under this alternative measure further substantiates the robustness of the findings.

In summary, these various robustness checks, while presenting some variations, largely support the conclusions drawn from the primary analysis. They underscore the multifaceted impact of shaming, media freedom, and their interplay, demonstrating their influence across different political contexts and measurement methodologies.

## **Conclusion & Discussion**

This paper critically examines the interplay between media freedom and foreign human rights shaming in advancing democratization, focusing particularly on the moderating influence of media freedom on the democratizing effects of shaming. This is explored through an analysis of their interaction term within a three-level hierarchical model. The model, employing the centering within cluster method and re-integrating group means at the regime level, has demonstrated robustness across various specifications, including the correction for autocorrelation through adding the lagged dependent variable for control.

The results reveal that both shaming and media freedom exert substantial within-group effects that foster democratization. Moreover, media freedom displays a pronounced between-group effect, highlighting the significance of an autocratic regime's average media environment in facilitating democratic transition. By contrasting the within and between effects, the study discerns significant contextual impacts for both variables, suggesting that media freedom and human rights shaming exhibit diminishing marginal effects on democratization as the overall media environment becomes more liberalized, and the average amount of shaming increases in dictatorial regimes.

A key finding is the significant interaction term, confirming the hypothesis that media freedom within authoritarian regimes enhances the efficacy of shaming in promoting democratization. In environments where media is not free, increased human rights censure correlates with a downward trend in the Polity2 score, although this effect is not statistically significant at the 95% confidence level when incorporating the random slope of shaming in the model.

Theoretically, the moderating role of media in the shaming effect is anchored in the mecha-

nisms through which human rights shaming and media influence the populace of authoritarian regimes. Shaming can trigger public discontent against authoritarian rulers by exposing governmental malpractices, thus eroding regime legitimacy. Additionally, it can empower opposition groups and catalyze democratizing movements by signaling international support, potentially leading to reformative openings or the overthrow of dictators. However, the efficacy of these mechanisms is contingent upon two conditions: Firstly, shaming must reach the domestic audience within the autocratic regime. Secondly, the audience must perceive the shaming as credible, without harboring negative sentiments towards the shamer. The degree of media freedom predominantly determines these conditions. In environments where media is stringently controlled, all forms of foreign critique, including human rights shaming, may be suppressed without being disseminated. Moreover, as shaming impacts dictators primarily through its credibility and trustworthiness among the recipients, it operates by altering public opinion and belief. To counteract this, authoritarian rulers might manipulate public discourse by propagating defensive narratives, thereby potentially fostering domestic support by portraying a foreign entity as attempting to undermine national integrity, akin to the “rally around the flag” effect. This approach could cultivate a nationalistic populace more adherent to autocratic norms. Though not consistently supported by empirical evidence in this analysis, this backlash effect has been notably observed in resilient autocracies like China (Wachman, 2001). Conversely, in a media landscape with relative freedom, the press can independently investigate human rights abuses and amplify international criticism, thereby intensifying domestic pressure. A free media also provides a platform for anti-regime movements and a channel for democratic discourse. Consequently, the shaming effect can be either amplified in a free media environment or diminished in a restricted press system.

In conclusion, the findings of this paper significantly enhance our understanding of the intricate and vital roles of shaming and media in democratization processes and their complex interactions. These insights are crucial for informing democratic promotion policymaking. Since international criticism is not uniformly effective, policymakers should consider the penetrability of their criticism in autocratic regimes to ensure their messages reach the populace. Additionally, they should be cognizant of their perceived image in the criticized regime and the potential for emotional backlash, which could inadvertently bolster dictatorial rule.

While this study has made significant strides in elucidating the dynamic interplay between media freedom, foreign human rights shaming, and democratization, it also unveils several avenues for further investigation. Firstly, the precise mechanisms through which shaming translates into democratization warrant deeper exploration. This includes examining whether shaming predominantly leads to violent regime changes or peaceful transitions, and how media freedom, alongside other factors, may influence these outcomes. Secondly, the conditions under which the backlash

effect of shaming becomes pronounced, beyond the realm of media control, require detailed examination. This could involve comprehensive case studies or the integration of additional mediating variables. Thirdly, the role of media in strengthening opposition movements is a compelling subject for future research. Understanding the extent and manner in which media emboldens protesters is crucial. Additionally, in the context of rapidly evolving digital landscapes, distinguishing the roles of social media from traditional media forms emerges as a vital area of inquiry. These proposed directions not only extend the scope of this research but also contribute profoundly to the broader discourse on media, foreign pressure, and political transformation.

## Appendix

TABLE 5. Robustness Check I

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Polity2 Score (t+1)					
	(1) ModelRC1	(2) ModelRC2	(3) ModelRC3	(4) ModelRC4	(5) ModelRC5	(6) ModelRC6
AI Shaming CWC (ln)	0.41** (0.18)	0.34*** (0.12)	0.41** (0.18)	-0.005 (0.06)	0.08 (0.08)	0.38** (0.19)
Media System Freedom CWC	6.08*** (0.80)	7.71*** (0.85)	6.08*** (0.80)	18.35*** (6.42)	17.90*** (6.17)	5.69*** (0.79)
AI Shaming Group Mean	0.003 (0.12)	0.09 (0.14)	0.003 (0.12)	0.14 (0.20)	0.18 (0.20)	-0.001 (0.11)
Media System Freedom Group Mean	3.25*** (0.47)	4.43*** (0.58)	3.25*** (0.47)	6.23*** (0.85)	6.13*** (0.83)	3.19*** (0.46)
Regime Duration	0.003 (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.003 (0.003)
GDP per capita CGM (ln)	-0.13 (0.09)	-0.15 (0.11)	-0.13 (0.09)	-0.001 (0.15)	-0.003 (0.15)	-0.11 (0.09)
Population CGM (ln)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.12)	-0.06 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.06)
Regime Type - Monarch	-1.28*** (0.32)	-1.63*** (0.42)	-1.28*** (0.32)	-2.43*** (0.69)	-2.40*** (0.66)	-1.25*** (0.31)
Regime Type - Party	-0.61*** (0.19)	-0.70*** (0.24)	-0.61*** (0.19)	-1.07*** (0.37)	-0.95** (0.36)	-0.60*** (0.19)
Regime Type - Personal	-0.78*** (0.20)	-0.96*** (0.24)	-0.78*** (0.20)	-1.17*** (0.36)	-1.14*** (0.36)	-0.74*** (0.20)
Time-Period 1981-1985	0.02 (0.15)	0.04 (0.15)	0.02 (0.15)	-0.13 (0.12)	-0.10 (0.12)	
Time-Period 1986-1990	0.43*** (0.16)	0.45*** (0.17)	0.43*** (0.16)	0.08 (0.14)	0.10 (0.14)	
Time-Period 1991-1995	0.09 (0.19)	0.09 (0.20)	0.09 (0.19)	0.04 (0.18)	0.11 (0.18)	
Time-Period 1996-2000	0.12 (0.20)	0.12 (0.22)	0.12 (0.20)	0.20 (0.21)	0.26 (0.20)	
Year Categories (e.g. year1990)						1.32*** (0.31)
Region: Americas	0.81*** (0.23)	1.00*** (0.29)	0.81*** (0.23)	1.13*** (0.42)	1.00** (0.41)	0.79*** (0.23)
Region: Asia	0.21 (0.17)	0.29 (0.22)	0.21 (0.17)	0.43 (0.35)	0.35 (0.34)	0.21 (0.17)
Region: Europe	0.76** (0.31)	0.90** (0.39)	0.76** (0.31)	1.41** (0.62)	1.10* (0.60)	0.78** (0.30)
Polity Score	0.82*** (0.02)	0.75*** (0.02)	0.82*** (0.02)	0.62*** (0.03)	0.63*** (0.03)	0.82*** (0.02)
AI Shaming CWC (ln) × Media System Freedom CWC	2.70*** (0.87)	2.81*** (0.86)	2.70*** (0.87)	0.49 (0.70)	4.72* (2.63)	2.62*** (0.86)
Constant	-1.08*** (0.34)	-1.82*** (0.41)	-1.08*** (0.34)	-2.39*** (0.56)	-2.48*** (0.54)	-1.35*** (0.38)
Observations	1,725	1,725	1,725	1,725	1,725	1,725
Akaike Inf. Crit.	7,021.54	7,043.36	7,027.54	6,777.77	6,757.42	7,018.03
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	7,157.86	7,185.14	7,180.22	6,930.45	6,931.91	7,268.87

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

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TABLE 6. Robustness Check II

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Polity2 Score (t+1)					MLDI (t+1)
	(1) ModelRC7	(2) ModelRC8	(3) ModelRC9	(4) ModelRC10	(5) ModelRC11	(6) ModelRC12
AI Shaming CWC (ln)	0.46** (0.22)	0.06 (0.05)	0.42*** (0.14)	0.57** (0.24)	0.62** (0.30)	0.02*** (0.01)
Media System Freedom CWC	4.99*** (0.78)	2.36*** (0.49)	5.59*** (0.77)	3.13* (1.87)	7.49*** (1.00)	0.52*** (0.05)
AI Shaming Group Mean	-0.07 (0.11)	-0.12 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.11)	-0.21 (0.25)	-0.26* (0.15)	0.003 (0.01)
Media System Freedom Group Mean	2.75*** (0.42)	1.82*** (0.31)	2.67*** (0.45)	2.41* (1.24)	2.26*** (0.51)	0.26*** (0.03)
Regime Duration	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)	0.01 (0.01)	0.0003 (0.003)	0.0000 (0.0002)
GDP per capita CGM (ln)	-0.14* (0.08)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.14* (0.09)	-0.25 (0.26)	-0.17* (0.10)	0.01 (0.01)
Population CGM (ln)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.06)	0.26 (0.17)	0.03 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.004)
Regime Type - Monarch	-1.07*** (0.28)	-0.42* (0.21)	-1.06*** (0.30)	-0.95 (1.12)	-0.75** (0.32)	-0.07*** (0.02)
Regime Type - Party	-0.59*** (0.17)	-0.11 (0.12)	-0.60*** (0.18)	-0.53 (0.53)	-0.39* (0.21)	-0.02* (0.01)
Regime Type - Personal	-0.67*** (0.18)	-0.25* (0.13)	-0.65*** (0.19)	-1.16** (0.53)	-0.24 (0.21)	-0.02 (0.01)
Time-Period 1981-1985	-0.01 (0.15)	-0.07 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.15)	-0.10 (0.38)	0.05 (0.14)	0.01 (0.01)
Time-Period 1986-1990	0.29* (0.16)	0.25** (0.10)	0.42*** (0.16)	0.09 (0.41)	0.50*** (0.16)	0.01 (0.01)
Time-Period 1991-1995	0.11 (0.19)	0.15 (0.12)	0.12 (0.19)	-0.04 (0.41)	0.58*** (0.22)	0.03*** (0.01)
Time-Period 1996-2000	0.19 (0.20)	0.07 (0.12)	0.11 (0.20)	0.05 (0.44)	0.21 (0.24)	-0.01 (0.01)
Region: Americas	0.86*** (0.21)	0.38** (0.15)	0.79*** (0.22)	-0.02 (0.52)	1.03*** (0.27)	0.04** (0.02)
Region: Asia	0.27* (0.15)	0.10 (0.11)	0.22 (0.16)	0.15 (0.47)	0.05 (0.18)	0.03** (0.01)
Region: Europe	3.41*** (1.28)	0.36* (0.20)	0.65** (0.29)	0.24 (1.18)	0.81*** (0.29)	0.05** (0.02)
Polity Score	0.84*** (0.02)	0.91*** (0.01)	0.84*** (0.02)	0.82*** (0.05)	0.80*** (0.07)	
Aid per GNI CWC (ln)	0.11 (0.08)					
MLDI score						0.72*** (0.02)
AI Shaming CWC (ln) × Media System Freedom CWC	2.35*** (0.89)	1.60*** (0.57)	3.13*** (0.86)	2.03 (1.99)	7.54*** (1.50)	0.24*** (0.05)
Constant	-0.78** (0.31)	-0.63*** (0.22)	-0.75** (0.33)	0.13 (0.85)	-1.06* (0.62)	-0.004 (0.02)
Observations	1,595	1,634	1,647	494	952	1,725
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,503.31	5,185.67	6,665.69	2,167.93	3,453.91	-2,793.06
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	6,648.43	5,326.04	6,806.26	2,277.20	3,580.23	-2,651.28

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

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〈学部学生部門 (Undergraduate student category)〉

【数理・統計計量部門 (Category of Theoretical Analysis and Statistical/Quantitative Analysis)】

最優秀賞 (Most outstanding essay award)

## Do Elections Divide the Public?

— Affective Polarization and Electoral Outcome —

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### Abstract

Do elections divide the public? In this paper, I examined this research question by investigating the relationship between electoral outcomes and affective polarization. Affective polarization, characterized by increasing hostility towards political opponents based on strong party attachment, has become a prominent concern in contemporary political science, as we have seen serious social divisions as a consequence of this phenomenon. However, the details of why and how it happens still remain unclear. Here, the influence of the crucial event of democracy, elections, has received limited attention in existing literature, and this study contributes to the understanding of the roots of affective polarization by addressing the gap.

Based on previous research, I posit two main hypotheses about the two components of affective polarization (in-group favoritism and out-group hostility): Win/Loss hypothesis, suggesting that electoral winners reinforce in-group favoritism and weaken out-group hostility compared to losers, and Closeness hypothesis, proposing that electoral closeness intensifies affective polarization independently and interactively with win/loss. To test these hypotheses, I employ regression analysis with the repeated cross-section survey data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) conducted before and after every U.S. presidential election from 1980 to 2020, merged with the results of each election including country level and state level.

Results indicate that, only at the country level electoral winners strengthen both in-group favoritism and out-group hostility compared to losers, which indicates that winners get more polarized than losers after the election. This suggests that, unlike traditional theories, not only losers but also winners can harm the public or democracy through different pathways. With theoretical explanation combined, it also implies that electoral losers face a

dilemma about feeling towards out-group, between increasing out-group hostility based on their feelings or preferred policy, or decreasing it by adjusting themselves to the outcome based on cognitive motivation. On the other hand, electoral closeness does not have any significant effect on polarization independently or interactively. I emphasize the need for further research controlling factors such as the timing of surveys which might have affected the empirical results. Additionally, I explore the role of party identification, finding that partisan individuals experience mitigations of in-group favoritism and out-group hostility after the elections. This implies that the relief effect on polarization after elections is bigger for partisan individuals. Results also indicate that their identification reinforces the effect of winning in increasing out-group hostility, which suggests that partisan individuals have higher tendencies to act based on cognitive motivation when they lose, or to react more strongly to the outcome when they win.

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## 1. Introduction

Do elections divide the public? Recently, political scientists have observed increasing hostility against political opponents due to the stronger emotional attachment to political parties, which they call affective polarization[1]. Today, especially in the context of the U.S., we are seeing a serious social division both politically and nonpolitically, ranging from intensified conflict in Congress to the decline in the number of cross-party marriages, as consequences of this phenomenon[1]. There is increasing importance on the question of why and how it happens, and a substantial amount of literature has already tried to figure out the roots of affective polarization and build theories, including the effect of high-choice media environments[2] or increasing number of “sorted partisan”[3]. How-

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ever, its details still remain unclear. In this paper, I addressed the effect of the crucial event for all the political actors in democracies which few of them have examined; election.

I would argue that electoral outcome can impact affective polarization through the scope of two of its components. The first one is win/loss. Regarding this, many studies have examined how people react to electoral win/loss in the context of political legitimacy based on the theory of “Winner-Loser gap”[4]. By connecting those accumulated findings about the mechanism of Winner-Loser gap with the theory of affective polarization, I hypothesized that electoral winner reinforce their in-group favoritism and weaken out-group hostility compared to losers (*Win/Loss hypothesis*). The other one is electoral closeness. Based on previous research[5], [6], [7], I hypothesized that through three consequences of electoral closeness – campaign, engagement, and loyalty – electoral closeness can intensify affective polarization both independently and interactively with the electoral win/loss.

To test these hypotheses, I implemented regression analysis using repeated cross-section data from surveys conducted before and after every U.S. presidential election from 1980 to 2020 through American National Election Studies (ANES), which was merged with state level presidential election results obtained from MIT Election Data and Science Lab[8]. Since survey respondents participated in both pre- and post- election surveys, I could control the effect of pre-election by taking a gap between pre- and post-election surveys in dependent variables, and thus see the valid effect of elections on dependent variables. My results show that at the country level electoral winners reinforce his/her in-group favoritism and strengthen his/her out-group hostility, and thus partly support my hypothesis about electoral win/loss. However, the closeness of the election did not affect in-group favoritism or out-group hostility independently nor interactively with win/loss. Combined with additional analysis, I also found that party identification (identifying themselves as either Republican or Democrat) independently decreases in-group favoritism and out-group hostility, and interactively increases the effect of win strengthening out-group hostility. Interestingly, this means through the election, party identification independently has a mitigating effect on affective polarization, which is based on too strong party identification.

Combined with the theoretical explanations, my findings provide some valuable insights into the relationship between electoral outcomes and affective polarization. First, in the context of affective polarization, citizens react to the country level but not to the state level win/loss, which suggests that policy aspects still play an important role in affective polarization. Second, electoral losers face a dilemma after the elections; They may reinforce out-group hostility based on their policy preference or psychological feelings, or decrease out-group hostility to keep their cognitive consistency, and in this study, the latter is observed to be stronger. Third, partisanship has a mitigating effect on affective polarization independently of the outcome of the elections, which corresponds with the previous research that affective polarization is at its peak during the elec-

tion[9], and implies the peak is higher for partisan voters.

As a structure of the paper, I started with the theory section which mainly argues about the theories of affective polarization and builds hypotheses about how electoral outcome can have an impact on it, followed by the methodology section which explains how I obtained and used the dataset to test my hypotheses empirically. In the result section, I interpret the quantitative result to test my hypotheses and conclude my argument in the summary/discussion section.

## 2. Theory

The phenomenon of affective polarization – increasing hostility towards political opponents - is now one of the most studied subfields in political science. It is simply because we are seeing serious consequences of this phenomenon, intensified social division. It has contributed to more heated political conflict by politicians and support for these behaviors by citizens, as we have seen in the U.S. Congress[1]. It has also affected our decisions in daily life: Who do you hang out with? Who do you marry? How much are you willing to pay for products? The answers to these questions are already found to be affected by partisanship[10][11][12]. Iyengar (2019)[1] argued that these nonpolitical consequences could in turn confound affective polarization itself since it could cause more segregation in society on a party basis.

From the perspective of social psychology, Iyengar et al. (2019)[3] provided a theoretical explanation of this phenomenon. They regarded partisanship as a social group that can be identity for individuals, and conceptualize affective polarization as a well-known psychological phenomenon regarding in-group/out-group distinction that individuals generally have positive feelings towards in-group (=in-group favoritism) and negative feelings towards out-group (=out-group hostility)[13]. Here, affective polarization theoretically has two aspects: favoritism towards his/her own party, and hostility towards his/her opposition party. Empirically, Iyengar (2019)[1] found that while in-group favoritism has been mostly stable over time, out-group hostility has rapidly gotten worse recently and thus mainly caused social division.

Based on these theories, many attempts have been made by political scientists to figure out why and how affective polarization has happened. While they already found some important factors that relate to affective polarization, such as high-choice media environment[2] or increasing congruence between partisanship and other group identities (Race, religion, etc.)(14), additional factors should be examined to more deeply understand the root of this phenomenon. Here, I would argue that while elections are a crucial event for every democracy, its relationship with affective polarization has remained unexamined, except for Hernández et al. (2021). They focused on the salience of elections as the independent variable and found that affective polarization decreases as time passes



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from the election day and that its effect is mediated by ideological polarization and the strength of partisanship. In this paper, I would suggest the alternative model of the relationship between election and affective polarization, by focusing on the outcome of elections.

I would argue that electoral outcome can impact affective polarization through the scope of two of its components. The first one is win/loss. Regarding how citizens react to electoral win/loss, most previous research examined its relationship with their attitudes toward political legitimacy (e.g. Curini et al. (2012)[15]), based on the theory of Winner-Loser gap by Anderson et al. (2005)[4] that there is “the difference in opinions and attitudes between winners and losers at the individual level” ([4], p.10) and that electoral losers have more negative view towards political system than winners. In figuring out the detailed mechanism of this gap, the following research mainly took two different approaches: policy mechanism and psychological mechanism (e.g. Singh et al. 2012[16]; Blais et al., 2007[17]). Policy mechanism argues that since losers predict policies that are distant from their preference will be implemented after the loss, they started to have negative views on the political system or government which contributed to the consequences. On the other hand, psychological mechanism rather stems from the generally negative feeling caused by the loss itself, which is later directed to institutions.

Applying these theories to the context of affect polarization, I would expect electoral winners to reinforce their in-group favoritism, and to weaken out-group hostility compared to losers (*Win/Loss Hypothesis*). Regarding in-group favoritism, winners succeed in making the government proceed to their preferred policy, and have generally positive feelings afterward, both of which can provoke more positive feelings towards their co-partisan, while the opposite is true for losers. Out-group hostility is rather driven specifically by losers, who already have contagious negative feelings of loss after the election, and have incentives to direct them toward the winning party which is about to implement the policy they do not like.

Another way of electoral outcome influencing affective polarization is through electoral closeness. I would argue that higher electoral closeness can intensify affective polarization independently and interactively with the effect of win/loss (*closeness hypotheses*) through three mechanisms. First, a close election can induce more intense electoral campaigns by candidates, since it is rational to put more effort into where the chances of the campaign influencing the result are higher. Researchers already found it empirically true as well, by indicating that politicians spent more money on close districts[5]. Here, I would argue that in close elections, individuals get higher chances of seeing campaign contents that are strongly partisan in general, and thus become more polarized. Second, close elections encourage political engagement of voters. Previous research has already found a consistent relationship between electoral closeness and voter turnout (see e.g. Blais (2000)[7]), and put more effort into collecting information about elections[6]. This leads to their more contact with

political information and their politicization, which again leads to more polarization. Also, because they put more effort into elections, I would argue that the impact of the win/loss in the election is bigger for them. Third, a close election can increase voters' loyalty to the parties. Kam and Utych (2011)[6] claimed that when an election is close, group-based loyalties are triggered and voters become more tempted to root for their parties. I would argue that this cheering not only directly leads to stronger attachment to the parties and more polarization, but also induces more attention to the results of the election, and thus makes the effect of win/loss bigger.

### **3. Methodology**

To test my hypotheses, I ran multiple regression analyses using voter survey data before and after the U.S. presidential elections from 1980 to 2020 and the state level results of those elections.

#### **3.1 Data**

For the data about voters, I used data from American National Election Studies (ANES)[18]. ANES timeseries study is one of the biggest individual level voter surveys around the world in terms of questionnaires and sample size and has been conducted before and after every presidential election since 1948. Since it is a time series study, some questionnaires have been asked to respondents throughout all the surveys, which allowed me to test my hypotheses in multiple timeframes. Also, because the post-election survey in each timeseries study contains voters' vote choices in the election, I could determine the win/loss status of respondents, which is crucial in this analysis. Due to the data availability of the dependent variable, I extracted the data about dependent variables from 1980 to 2020 timeseries studies and merged it with the Time Series Cumulative Data which contains the vote choices in the elections and several variables I used as controlling variables. Note that since almost all the respondents are fresh each year, it is not panel, but repeated cross-section data.

For the data about the outcomes of the presidential elections, I used data from MIT Election Data and Science Lab[8]. It contains state level results of every presidential election from 1976 to 2020 including candidates' names, the parties they belonged to, the number of votes they got, and the total number of votes in the district. I merged this with survey data using respondents' state level addresses and the year of the survey.

#### **3.2 Variables**

As dependent variables, I used feeling thermometers against presidential candidates. Feeling thermometer is an indicator of how much respondents like/dislike about specific individuals/groups,

and is a common measurement of affective polarization in survey responses[3]. I chose presidential candidates as the objects of analysis because ANES data from 1980 to 2020 contains questionnaires about feeling thermometers both pre- and post- election surveys. This allowed me to solve the important methodological challenge that research about outcomes of elections has faced, that most of it had to use post-election data due to data availability and thus could not completely control the effect of pre-election[17]. To create dependent variables for quantitative analysis, first I took the gap between the pre- and post- survey in the values of the emotional thermometer against presidential candidates from Democrats and Republicans to control the effect of pre-election. Then I coded these values as either supporting candidate or opposition candidate based on the vote choices respondents reported<sup>d(1)</sup>. Here, I assumed the emotional thermometer for the supporting candidate (=gap\_sup\_cand) as an indicator of in-group favoritism and the one for the opposition candidate (=gap\_opp\_cand) as an indicator of out-group favoritism.

As independent variables, for winning and losing, I used win/loss status at the state level and country level (=country\_win, state\_win). These variables were created by comparing the self-reported vote choices from surveys with the state/country level results in each presidential election. For the closeness of elections, I used the ratio of margin of defeat at the state level (=state\_closeness). This value was calculated as the number of votes cast for the losing candidate divided by the number of votes cast for the winning candidate. Since votes for presidential elections were tallied at the state level, the analysis which includes the closeness of elections was limited to the state level.

As controlling variables, I included several demographic variables about voters: gender, age, education, race, and income. Regarding gender, I created a dummy variable (=men) which is 1 when a respondent is a man and 0 when s/he is a woman<sup>(2)</sup>. About race, I created a dummy variable that coded white as 1 and the others as 0 (=white). For education, I created a dummy variable that

**Table 1**

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pct(25)	Pct(75)	Max
post_opp_cand	21,954	25.843	24.121	0.000	0.000	47.000	100.000
pre_opp_cand	21,895	24.574	24.208	0.000	0.000	40.000	100.000
post_sup_cand	22,017	79.598	17.682	0.000	70.000	95.000	100.000
pre_sup_cand	21,981	77.508	18.479	0.000	70.000	90.000	100.000
state_closeness	33,911	76.495	15.662	4.498	64.762	89.638	99.982
strongid	33,716	0.365	0.481	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
repvote	22,225	0.445	0.497	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
college	33,533	0.316	0.465	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
state_win	22,223	0.572	0.495	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
country_win	22,223	0.565	0.496	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
gap_sup_cand	21,798	2.108	16.005	-100.000	-1.000	10.000	100.000
gap_opp_cand	21,659	1.238	18.553	-100.000	-5.000	10.000	100.000

coded respondents who have a college or higher degree as 1 and the others as 0 (= college). Also, since it is closely related to the origin of affective polarization, I contained some variables about partisanship, such as a Republican dummy (respondents who voted for Republican, =repvote)<sup>(3)</sup> or party ID dummy (respondents who identify themselves as one of two major parties, partyid). A summary of descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the analyses is shown in Table 1.



### 3.3 Methodology

To test my hypotheses, I ran several models of multiple regression analyses. I separately built a model for each of two dependent variables (`gap_opp_cand`, `gap_sup_cand`) and each of two levels of independent variables (state level and country level). Since closeness cannot be measured at the country level, the closeness of the election (=state\_closeness) is only included in state level models as an independent term and cross-term with state level win. In all the models, random errors were clustered at the level of the year when each survey was conducted to eliminate the effect of time series<sup>(4)</sup>.

## 4. Results


Figure 1 and 2 shows the results of analyses of state level models which exclude (Figure 1) and include (Figure 2) election closeness (See table 1a and 2a in Appendix for detailed results). In these graphs, the ranges of the bars indicate a 95% confidence interval of each coefficient. Therefore, variables whose bars do not touch the dotted line of 0 have a statistically significant effect on dependent variables. Regarding win/loss, being a winner at the state level generally does not have a statistically significant effect on individuals' changes in feeling thermometer towards presidential candidates. This means that state level win/loss does not affect individuals' degree of in-group favoritism or out-group hostility, and thus does not support win/loss hypothesis. However, exceptionally in the model excluding closeness (Figure 1), winning at the state level has a positive effect on the feeling thermometer towards the candidate they voted for, as win/loss hypothesis expected. Regarding closeness, the degree of closeness at the state level does not have a statistically significant effect on in-group favoritism or out-group hostility independently or interactively. Therefore, closeness hypothesis is not supported by empirical results.

Figure 3 shows the results of analyses of country level models (See table 3a in Appendix for detailed results). Regarding the impact of win/loss, winning in the country level is estimated to lower approximately 2.7 points of feeling thermometer towards opposition candidates, and raise 5.0 points towards supporting candidates, both of which are statistically significant at a 5 % level. Considering the average gaps of feeling thermometer between before and after elections falls within 1-2



points (see Table 1), these effects are substantial. This means that country level winners reinforce both in-group favoritism and out-group hostility after the election compared to losers. Therefore empirically, win/loss hypothesis about in-group favoritism is supported, while that about out-group

Figure 3




hostility is rather observed to be the opposite.

Regarding controlling variables, throughout all the models, party identification consistently has a negative effect on feeling the thermometer towards the supporting candidate, and a positive effect on that towards the opposition candidate. Interestingly, this means that having party identification decreases in-group favoritism and out-group hostility, and thus mitigates affective polarization after the election, which is in theory based on too strong party identification. To explanatorily determine if this effect relates to the outcome of the election, I conducted additional analysis with the models that include the cross term between party identification and win/loss status at the country level, which was observed to affect the degree of in-group favoritism and out-group hostility.

Figure 4 shows the results of the additional analysis (See table 4a in Appendix for detailed results). Regarding the independent effects of country level win and party identification, they both have the same effects as consistently seen in previous analyses. Regarding the interactive effect between them, which is the main purpose of this analysis, party identification has a negative influence on the effect of winning lowering the thermometer towards opposition candidates. This means that party identification boosts the effect of winning increasing out-group hostility. On the other hand, regarding the feeling thermometer towards supporting candidates, party identification slightly has a negative influence on the effect of win increasing in-group favoritism, while it is not statistically significant at a 5% level. This means that party identification somewhat canceled out the effect

Figure 4



of win reinforcing favoritism.

## 5. Summary and Discussion

In this paper, I examined if and how elections divide the public, by examining the effect of the outcome of elections on two kinds of affective polarization (in-group favoritism and out-group hostility). I tested two hypotheses (win/loss hypothesis and closeness hypothesis) and conducted additional analysis about the relationship between party identification and win/loss hypothesis. As a result, I found that electoral outcome did have impacts on affective polarization in some ways.

Regarding win/loss hypothesis, my empirical findings mainly indicated two points. First, only country level electoral win/loss have an impact on affective polarization. This suggests that voters care more about country level results than state level results, which corresponds with the fact that the traditional definition of electoral winner in the research of Winner-Loser gap is those who vote for the majority party[4]. I would also argue that this difference stems from the fact that especially in a presidential election, only country level win/loss matters in policy change after the election, and thus suggests that policy aspects still play an important role in the growth of the psychological phenomenon of affective polarization, which has already been pointed out by previous research[3].

Second, and most importantly, while winning strengthens in-group favoritism as expected in the hypothesis, it also reinforces out-group hostility, which is the opposite of the theoretical expecta-

tion. This effect is robust enough to be observed in all the models. I would argue that these contradictory results stemmed from the cognitive phenomenon among losers. In the original theory of Winner-Loser gap, Anderson et al. (2005)[4] pointed out the cognitive aspects of responses towards electoral win/loss, where individuals have the incentives to avoid cognitive dissonance and thus make post hoc adjustments of their attitudes to their behavior. Therefore, in this mechanism, losers, who used to support the losing party and oppose the winning party, are likely to weaken their in-group favoritism and out-group hostility to be consistent with their behavior. With this mechanism and my hypothesis combined, I would argue that there is a dilemma for electoral losers after the election; While they might strengthen their out-group hostility and get more polarized based on their policy or psychological responses, they also may weaken it and get depolarized through cognitive mechanism. And, in the case of the U.S. presidential election, cognitive mechanism was more powerful than the other.

This finding also implies that in the Winner-Loser gap in affective polarization. It is winners, not losers, that polarized more after the election. Considering affective polarization leads to serious social division or further democratic backsliding[19], this is the opposite result of the established argument of Winner-Loser gap in political legitimacy, where it is losers that generally have more dissatisfaction towards political systems and thus could harm the society or democracy. Therefore, my finding proposes the possibility that both winners and losers after elections can harm the democracy or society through different mechanisms, and thus support the argument that the crucial element of democracy (i.e. election) can harm the society or democracy itself.

Regarding closeness hypothesis, I could not find any empirical evidence that either supports or overturns my hypothesis, which means that electoral closeness did not have any significant effect on either aspect of affective polarization independently or interactively. Two factors might have contributed to this result. The first one relates to the timing of the survey. In most of the mechanisms, my hypothesis assumes that individuals and politicians know electoral closeness and act accordingly before elections happen. However, ANES timeseries surveys were mostly conducted from a few months before the election days to the very election days. Because some political events or campaigns regarding the U.S. presidential elections such as conventions or primaries were conducted before the surveys, I would argue that respondents might have already gone through the mechanisms I suggested at the time of pre-election surveys, and thus their responses did not change anymore even after the elections. Second, I only analyzed electoral closeness at the state level, since country level results did not have a clear definition. As is the case with win/loss hypothesis, I would argue that individuals might not have paid enough attention to the state level closeness, and thus its effect was unobservable in the analysis.

Regarding additional analysis, I found that partisanship also plays an important role in the



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change in the degree of affective polarization during the elections. It shows that partisanship has an independent mitigating effect on affective polarization during the election, which means individuals who have partisanship weaken both their in-group favoritism and out-group hostility during the election. I would assert that this is because partisan individuals are more likely to engage in elections both passively and actively, and thus get more polarized as the elections approach than non-partisan, while after the elections all of those enthusiasms are relieved. It is consistent with the fact that affective polarization is at its peak just before election day[9], and the pre-election surveys were mostly conducted within these periods. My finding also shows that partisanship has an interactive effect on affective polarization with win/loss, in that it reinforces the effect of win strengthening out-group hostility. Based on the losers' dilemma I proposed above, this can be explained as partisan individuals having higher tendencies to activate cognitive post hoc modification of their attitudes when they lose, or to react more strongly to the outcome when they win since they are more engaged in the elections.

As future venues of my research, there are at least four points that should be inquired. First, the detailed dynamism of the losers' dilemma after the election – policy or psychological mechanism versus cognitive mechanism – should be examined. Especially, knowing in what context they choose policy or psychological mechanism over cognitive mechanism, or vice versa, can directly contribute to a deeper understanding of how to mitigate or worsen affective polarization, since these two different mechanisms have opposite effects on it. Second, closeness hypothesis should be reexamined with more appropriate data. As stated above, I would argue that it is mostly due to the timing of the response and the lack of attention to the state level result, that I could not observe any significant relationship between electoral closeness and affective polarization. Using a pre-election survey that is conducted before any kind of events related to an election happens, or data from elections that can define country level closeness such as congress elections (the proportion of seats can be defined as country level closeness), may allow us to more precisely examine the effect of electoral closeness on affective polarization. Third, cross-national analysis should be conducted using data from multiple countries. While it is already known that the degree of affective polarization varies from country to country[20], the challenge to explain the variation is still in progress. As is the case with Winner-Loser gap[4], at least I would expect that there are institutional factors that can affect the relationship between electoral outcome and affective polarization because the electoral outcome and its impact are dependent on institutions. Some other country level factors such as culture or campaign style might affect this relationship as well. Therefore, cross-national comparison of electoral outcome and affective polarization might be the key to the general understanding of the phenomenon of affective polarization. Fourth, and most importantly, how long these effects last should be examined. As Hernández et al. (2021)[9] pointed out, the effect of electoral outcome on

affective polarization can only be temporary dynamism, and may not be significant in the long term. Understanding the length of time individuals need to cure from the enthusiasm of elections is crucial to the study of the relationship between elections and affective polarization, since it can answer the most important question of whether elections divide the public overall.

## Acknowledgment

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## Notes

- (1) To simplify the analysis, I omitted people who did not vote or voted for the third-party candidate from the sample. Therefore, all the samples are voters for two major parties (=Democrat or Republican) and coded as either 1 (=win) or 0 (=lose)
- (2) Respondents who answered neither man nor woman are coded NA and removed from the analysis.
- (3) I omitted people who voted for the third-party candidate from the sample. Therefore, respondents who coded as 0 are Democrat voters.
- (4) All the analysis are conducted through Rstudio, using *feols()* function in *fixest* package.

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Appendix

Dependent Variables: Model: <i>Variables</i>	gap_opp_cand (1)	gap_sup_cand (2)
state_win	0.4428 (1.780)	2.932 (2.932)
state_closeness	0.0073 (0.0183)	0.0113 (0.0236)
partyid	1.861*** (0.2550)	-1.578*** (0.2953)
repvote	-0.4730 (1.208)	-1.280 (1.947)
college	0.4827 (0.3249)	-0.2050 (0.4117)
men	0.4661 (0.3740)	-1.381*** (0.3039)
white	0.9294** (0.3618)	-0.1458 (0.4104)
age	0.0056 (0.0106)	-0.0610*** (0.0142)
income	0.1932 (0.1471)	-0.3636** (0.1311)
state_win × state_closeness	-0.0126 (0.0188)	-0.0180 (0.0319)
<i>Fixed-effects</i> year	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i> Observations	20,008	20,128
R <sup>2</sup>	0.02020	0.03656
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.00343	0.01413
<i>Clustered (year) standard-errors in parentheses</i>		
<i>Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1</i>		

Table1a

Dependent Variables: Model: <i>Variables</i>	gap_opp_cand (1)	gap_sup_cand (2)
state_win	0.4428 (1.780)	2.932 (2.932)
state_closeness	0.0073 (0.0183)	0.0113 (0.0236)
partyid	1.861*** (0.2550)	-1.578*** (0.2953)
repvote	-0.4730 (1.208)	-1.280 (1.947)
college	0.4827 (0.3249)	-0.2050 (0.4117)
men	0.4661 (0.3740)	-1.381*** (0.3039)
white	0.9294** (0.3618)	-0.1458 (0.4104)
age	0.0056 (0.0106)	-0.0610*** (0.0142)
income	0.1932 (0.1471)	-0.3636** (0.1311)
state_win × state_closeness	-0.0126 (0.0188)	-0.0180 (0.0319)
<i>Fixed-effects</i> year	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i> Observations	20,008	20,128
R <sup>2</sup>	0.02020	0.03656
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.00343	0.01413
<i>Clustered (year) standard-errors in parentheses</i>		
<i>Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1</i>		

Table2a

Dependent Variables: Model: <i>Variables</i>	gap_opp_cand (1)	gap_sup_cand (2)
country_win	-2.661*** (0.5663)	4.952*** (0.8447)
partyid	1.798*** (0.2833)	-1.444*** (0.2174)
repvote	-1.185* (0.5342)	-0.0077 (0.8253)
college	0.4931 (0.3570)	-0.2213 (0.3292)
men	0.4821 (0.3744)	-1.409*** (0.2999)
white	0.8123** (0.3529)	0.1066 (0.2678)
age	0.0043 (0.0109)	-0.0594*** (0.0138)
income	0.1933 (0.1486)	-0.3482** (0.1239)
<i>Fixed-effects</i> year	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i> Observations	20,008	20,128
R <sup>2</sup>	0.02465	0.05576
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.00796	0.03377
<i>Clustered (year) standard-errors in parentheses</i>		
<i>Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1</i>		

Table3a

Dependent Variables: Model: <i>Variables</i>	gap_opp_cand (1)	gap_sup_cand (2)
country_win	-1.606*** (0.4760)	5.594*** (1.001)
partyid	2.656*** (0.3919)	-0.9221*** (0.2823)
repvote	-1.180* (0.5324)	-0.0041 (0.8261)
college	0.4970 (0.3575)	-0.2185 (0.3315)
men	0.4666 (0.3776)	-1.419*** (0.2988)
white	0.7849** (0.3500)	0.0898 (0.2564)
age	0.0046 (0.0110)	-0.0592*** (0.0138)
income	0.1959 (0.1490)	-0.3462** (0.1235)
country_win × partyid	-1.499*** (0.3575)	-0.9104* (0.4368)
<i>Fixed-effects</i> year	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i> Observations	20,008	20,128
R <sup>2</sup>	0.02499	0.05593
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.00831	0.03394
<i>Clustered (year) standard-errors in parentheses</i>		
<i>Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1</i>		

Table4a

〈学部学生部門 (Undergraduate student category)〉

【数理・統計計量部門 (Category of Theoretical Analysis and Statistical/Quantitative Analysis)】

優秀賞 (Outstanding essay award)

## 国際協力の波及効果の幻影

——環境問題と国家元首交代への着目——

早稲田大学政治経済学部政治学科

4年 田中 萌映子

### 要旨

長期にわたり対立関係にある国家間において、国民が相互に不信感を抱いている状況にありながらも、政府は広報外交を通じて対立的な国家との有益な協力を支持する世論を形成する必要がある。Ujiら (2023) が2021年に実施した日本と韓国での調査では、海洋プラスチック汚染対策への協力に関する情報が安全保障や経済分野の協力への支持を変化させる波及効果をもつことが検証された。日本では、韓国側の協力的な情報によっては他分野での協力意思が変わらなかったが、非協力的な情報では意思が著しく低下した。韓国では対照的に前向きな結果が得られた。原因として、日韓の非対称な関係に基づく優劣の認識が協力の判断に影響するという説と、歴史問題の捉え方の違いが相手国への信頼を低下させることでコミットメント問題を生じるとの説が挙げられた。本研究の目的は、先行研究の結果の再現性が強固なものであるかを確かめると同時に、人々の心理的な誘因の解明を試みることにある。1,198人を対象としたオンラインサーベイによる無作為化比較実験では、韓国への信頼と協力の波及効果に影響すると予想して次の3種類の情報刺激を用いた。(1) 海洋プラスチック汚染対策に対する韓国国民の態度、(2) 日本に友好的な新韓国大統領、(3) 同大統領に対する低い支持率である。韓国国民側の態度が協力的であれば日本側も国際協調のレベルを引き上げ、非協力的であれば引き下げ、大統領の情報が韓国への信頼を高め、低い支持率が裏切りの感情を想起させると考えた。結果は、先行研究とは対照的で、環境分野での協力・非協力の情報に波及効果はなく、他分野での協力への意欲を変化させないことが明らかとなった。日本に友好的な大統領の情報や低い支持率の情報を合わせても実験群間で統計的に有意な差は見られなかったため、コミットメント問題に基づく説が否定された。また、先行研究との時間差を利用した比較では歴史や領土問題において顕著に協力レベルが高かったことから、今回の実験では大統領の情報刺激が働かなかったが、大統領の行動が根深い対立の緩和に有効である可能性が示唆された。本研究で新たに加えた社会的支配志向性 (Social Dominance Orientation、SDO) を見ると、国際協力に反対する傾向との関連性は、あからさま

な差別意識に関わる集団支配志向性 (SDO-D) よりも、集団間の平等に反対する反平等主義志向性 (SDO-E) において高いことが分かった。分野横断的に見られる傾向としては、日韓の国際協力への意思を決定づける心理的要因が両国の非対称な関係や反平等主義志向性であることを示す結果が得られた。この研究結果は、共通の環境課題に直面する対立的な国家間において国際協調を進める上で政策的含意をもつ。

キーワード：環境汚染、国際関係、日本、韓国、広報外交、安全保障

## 1. 序論

2015年に国際連合で持続可能な開発目標 (SDGs) が制定されて以来、グローバル・イシューへの関心はますます高まっているが、国際協調は容易ではない。現状では140のターゲットのうち半数の進捗に遅れがあり、30%は制定時点よりも悪化している (United Nations, 2023)。例えば、武力紛争を解決する国際社会の能力の低下は、貧困や衛生環境、食糧不足の悪化を引き起こしている (United Nations, 2020)。米中のような国家間の対立は輸出入制限や軍備拡張といった経済・安全保障面でネガティブな影響を及ぼしている (BBC News, 2020; Statista, 2021)。

国際対立を決定づける特徴は、国民の相手国への不信感である。オーストラリアで2020年に行われた調査によると、貿易摩擦やコロナウイルス発生源の国際調査問題を背景に、国民の中国への信頼度が低下した (Reuters, 2020)。国民の不信感は、国際協調派の指導者にペナルティを与え、非協力的な指導者を選出することになり、結果として国際的な対立関係が維持される (Colaresi, 2004)。こうした対立を緩和するため、広報外交の科学的な実証が注目を浴びている。主な手法には無作為化実験の1つであるサーベイ実験が用いられる。調査対象者が無作為かつ強制的に介入群・実験群に割り当てられるため自己選択バイアスを限りなく低減できる上に、匿名性の高さによって社会的望ましさバイアスを軽減することもできる (松林, 2021)<sup>(1)</sup>。Asabaら (2020) はサーベイ実験を通して、米軍が作成した北朝鮮の脅威に対抗するための日米韓合同軍事演習に関する短時間の映像を見ることで、人々が日韓での協力を支持するようになることを明らかにした。支持は安全保障分野に限らず、経済や環境保護など他分野にも波及効果があった。

Ujiら (2023) は、環境保護分野での協力から安全保障や経済といった他分野への波及効果を検証した。歴史問題から長年に渡って対立してきた日本と韓国でサーベイ実験を行い、海洋プラスチック汚染対策への協力に関する情報によって人々が安全保障や経済などの分野でも協力レベルを引き上げる意思が高まることを示した。しかし、日本と韓国では対照的な結果が得られた。韓国では日本の協力的な情報に対するポジティブな反応が見られた一方、日本では韓国の非協力的な態度へのネガティブな反応が強く表れた。Ujiらは考えられる原因として2つの説を挙げた。1つは、植民地時代や経

(1) ただし、参加者は自発的にオンラインパネルのメンバーになることを了承しており、コンピュータ操作に慣れていると考えられることから、標本は日本全国の有権者の平均的な性質を表しているとは限らず、ここに自己選択バイアスが存在する (松林, 2021)。

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済規模などの日韓の非対称な関係が相手国と協力しなかった際のコストの認識に差を生じさせるとする説（以下「非対称な関係説」）である。もう1つは、特に日本側において、歴史問題を巡る認識の違いから相手国への信頼が欠如しているという説（以下「コミットメント問題説」）である<sup>(2)</sup>。2つの説に関して聞き取り調査は行われたが、実験では証明できていない。

本研究はUjiらの2021年の実験に変更を加えたレプリケーションを日本で実施することで、国際協力の波及効果の再現性を確かめると同時に、非対称な関係説とコミットメント問題説が有力であるか解明しようと試みた。2022年の韓国大統領の交代に伴って日本に友好的な政策に転換したという事実を利用し、韓国への信頼を高めてコミットメント問題を解消するような情報を提供した実験群を作成した<sup>(3)</sup>。また、同大統領に対する支持率の低さに関する情報を追加した実験群も作成することで、裏切りの感情を再燃させて信頼を低下させる工夫をした。

本研究の貢献は、非対称な関係を望む反平等主義的な人々が国際間の非協力を選ぶ傾向があることを実証したことにある。実験結果を分析すると、Ujiらと異なり、海洋プラスチック汚染対策に対する国民の協力・非協力に関する情報は他分野への波及効果がほとんどなかった。韓国大統領や支持率の低さに関する情報による統計的に有意な差も見られず、これはコミットメント問題説への反論となる。一方、Ujiらと本研究の同条件の実験群を時間差で比較すると、歴史や領土など特定の分野において協力レベルが本研究で有意に高かったことから、その間に起きた大統領の交代の効果が示唆された。この矛盾は、本研究内で大統領の情報刺激がうまく機能しなかったために実験群間の差が出なかった可能性を示しており、反論の論拠が弱いとみなされるかもしれない。しかし、裏切りの感情を想起させるような低い支持率の情報を加えても有意差が見られなかったことを説明するにはコミットメント問題説では不十分である。さらに、あからさまな差別ではないものの集団間の平等に反対する社会的支配志向性（SDO-E）が高い人々は非協力的な態度をとる傾向にあることも明らかとなった。これらの分析結果を踏まえて、Ujiらが日本では有力と考えていたコミットメント問題説よりも、非対称な関係説が有力である可能性を示唆した。

## 2. 先行研究

本研究はUjiら（2023）の実験を一部改変したレプリケーションであるため、以下では同実験について詳しく述べる。

2021年2月から3月にかけて日本と韓国で計3,239人にオンラインサーベイ実験を実施した。実験手順は次の通りである。まず、全ての実験参加者に日本海の海洋プラスチック汚染が両国にとって共通の課題となっている旨の情報が与えられる。次に、参加者は汚染対策への国際協力に関する情報の種類によって、刺激1の2群×刺激2の3群＝6群に分けられる。刺激1は両国の専門家が国連の枠

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(2) コミットメント問題：中央政府が存在しない国際社会においては約束を反故にした者が罰せられない。よって、約束が将来守られない可能性があり、相手を信じられない（コミットメントがない）ため、戦争などの問題が生じる（多湖、2020）。

(3) 2022年5月、韓国では尹錫悦氏が大統領に就任した（Reuters、2022）。なお、韓国の国家元首は韓国大統領である。

組みで協力してきたという情報で、半数の参加者に与えられる。その後、全ての参加者に両国政府が使い捨てプラスチック容器への課税を検討していることが伝えられる。刺激2は相手国の国民の支払意思に関するもので、1/3の参加者には積極的、1/3には消極的とする情報が与えられ、残り1/3には何も与えられない。最後に全ての参加者に、経済や安全保障などの他分野において相手国との協力レベルを現状よりも引き下げるか、維持するか、引き上げるかが問われた。

その結果、専門家・国民の両方で協力的・非協力的な情報を与えられた人々には他分野における波及効果が見られたが、日本と韓国では非対称であった。韓国の参加者は、日本の専門家や国民の協力的な情報を受け入れて国際協力のレベルを大きく引き上げ、非協力的な情報には反応を示さなかった。一方、日本の参加者は韓国国民の協力的な情報には無反応で、非協力的な情報には協力レベルを引き下げるネガティブな行動に出た。この原因についてUjiらは2つの説を挙げた。1つは、植民地時代の支配関係や経済規模の日韓の非対称性に基づく「非対称な関係説」である。韓国では日本よりも韓国が劣っていると認識している人が年齢の高い層を中心にいると考えられており、彼らは強国日本との非協力を多大なコストであると捉える。非協力が多大なコストを感じた時、相手への信頼度の高低にかかわらず協力を選択する傾向がある。日本側はその逆で、韓国との非協力を低コストと捉えて協力しない。しかし、日本国民が韓国国民の非協力的な情報に触れた際の強くネガティブな反応に対する説明がつかない。そこで、もう1つの説「コミットメント問題説」は各国内での歴史問題の認識の差に着目する。韓国では、日本が歴史問題に対して一度も誠実に謝罪したことがないと受け止められている。日本の海洋プラスチック汚染対策への協力的な姿勢という小さくもポジティブな刺激は、韓国の人々にとってより大きなものを感じられ、日本の印象を改めることにつながった。一方で、日本では、和解を試みたものの韓国政権の交代で態度を覆されて失敗した背景から、韓国は信頼できないと考えられている。よって、韓国側の協力的な意図への反応は薄く、専門家の協力と国民の非協力という刺激は日本国民に裏切りの感覚を引き起こした可能性がある。2つの説に関して聞き取り調査は行われたが、実験では証明できていないため本研究での課題となっている。

### 3. 仮説

本研究は、環境分野における国際協力の波及効果の再現性を確かめるとともに、日本のネガティブな反応の説明として非対称な関係説とコミットメント問題説のどちらが有力かを検証することを主な目的としている。

はじめに、先行研究から引き継ぎながら改変した仮説を説明する。レプリケーションでは、先行研究の実験群から2つの条件を選定した。1つは、韓国で最もポジティブな結果が出た専門家の協力と国民の協力の組み合わせで、韓国大統領の情報による信頼向上との相乗効果が最も期待できる。もう1つは、日本ではややネガティブな結果が出た専門家の協力と国民の非協力の組み合わせで、裏切りの感情を引き起こしやすいことから低い支持率の情報との相乗効果が期待できる。ここで、国民の協力・非協力に関する情報を一切与えない実験群を設けなかった理由は、両極端な情報刺激を用いて効



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果の振れ幅を最大にすることで統計的に有意な結果を得やすくするためである。選定した2条件の比較から次の仮説を立てる。

仮説1：韓国国民が海洋プラスチック汚染対策に協力的だとする情報を受け取った実験参加者は、非協力的だとする情報を受け取った参加者よりも、他分野での協力において高い支持を示す（実験群1 > 実験群3、実験群2 > 実験群4）<sup>(4)</sup>。

次に、本研究で新たに加えた仮説を述べる。コミットメント問題説を検証するため、先行研究の実験と本研究の実験の実施時期の間に日韓関係が改善してきたことを利用した。Ujiら（2023）の実験の実施時期には文在寅政権下で日韓関係が冷え込んでいた。2018年には、韓国の徴用工訴訟で日本企業に賠償が命じられ、慰安婦問題に関する2015年協定が破棄され、韓国海軍によるレーダー照射事件が発生した（日本経済新聞、2018；東洋経済オンライン、2019）。2019年には日本が韓国に対して半導体素材3品目の輸出規制とホワイト国からの除外を行い、韓国が世界貿易機関に提訴した（朝日新聞デジタル、2023a）。こうした前政権と対照的に、尹錫悦大統領はシャトル外交の再開や徴用工問題の解決策の提示、半導体サプライチェーン強化などの政策を打ち出して問題の解決に取り組んでいる（朝日新聞デジタル、2023a；2023b）。日本に友好的な韓国大統領の下での協力的な日韓関係の情報は、日本国民の韓国に対する信頼を高め、コミットメント問題の解消に役立つと考えた。ここで次の仮説を導くことができる。

仮説2：日本に友好的な韓国大統領の情報を与えられた実験参加者は、この情報が与えられていない参加者よりも、他分野での協力に高い支持を示す（実験群3 > 実験群5）<sup>(5)</sup>。

コミットメント問題仮説の観点からは、この情報を与えられた人々の間では韓国への信頼が高まると考えられる。環境分野の専門家協力・国民協力の組み合わせ（実験群1）ではポジティブな反応が見られることや、専門家協力・国民非協力の組み合わせ（実験群3）においても裏切りの感情が想起されず、ネガティブな反応があまり見られないことが予想される。

日韓関係の改善で対外的には支持されている尹大統領であるが、韓国国内ではあまり支持を得られていない。調査によって差はあるが、2023年5月時点では支持率が42.2%、不支持率は56.5%となった（聯合ニュース、2023a）。別の記事でも同年5月から7月にかけて支持率が30%台後半で推移したと報じられている（聯合ニュース、2023b）。低い支持率は、再び日本国民に裏切りの感情を引き起こし、韓国への信頼を低下させると考えられ、次の仮説が立てられる。

仮説3：日本に友好的な韓国大統領への支持率が低いことを知らされた実験参加者は、大統領の情報のみを与えられた参加者よりも、他分野への協力に低い支持を示す（実験群1 > 実験群2、実験群3 > 実験群4）。

支持率の情報で韓国への信頼が低下する実験群のうち、専門家協力・国民協力の組み合わせ（実験

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(4) 実験群については後述の第4章「実験デザイン」、特に表1を参照されたい。また、不等号は協力への支持が高いと予想される実験群に開き、低い方は閉じるように表記している。

(5) ここで「他分野」とは、実験のセクション2で示す海洋プラスチック汚染対策ではない分野を表す。セクション1では「歴史問題の解決やシャトル外交の促進」という文言があるが、経済・安全保障分野については触れていない。

群 2) ではポジティブな反応はなく、専門家協力・国民非協力の組み合わせ（実験群 4）ではネガティブな反応があると予想される。

仮説 2 と 3 から、日本に友好的な韓国大統領の情報のみが与えられた実験群 1 と 3 では、支持率の低さを加えた実験群 2 と 4 よりも、海洋プラスチック汚染に対する国民の非協力による差が小さくなると考えられる。前者はコミットメント問題が解消され、後者は裏切りの感情が再燃して解消されないためである。検証できれば、さらにコミットメント問題説が裏付けられることになる。

最後に、仮説 2 で利用される韓国大統領の情報によるコミットメント問題の解消及びネガティブな反応の弱化を実証するため、先行研究との時間差を補足的に利用する。2021 年の先行研究と 2023 年の今回の実験を比較することで、その間に起きた大統領の交代や対日政策の変化が及ぼした影響を分析することができる。よって、以下の仮説が導かれる。

仮説 4：先行研究と本研究で専門家協力・国民非協力の情報のみを与えた同じ条件下の実験群を比較すると、本研究の実験群の参加者は先行研究の参加者よりも他分野での協力の高い支持を示す（実験群 5 > 先行研究の Treat4）。

## 4. 実験デザイン

### 4.1 実験概要

仮説を検証するため、複数の情報刺激を伴うオンラインサーベイ実験を 2023 年 9 月 7 日から 9 月 8 日にかけて実施した。サーベイの作成及び回答には、実験データの一元管理も可能なプラットフォームである Qualtrics を用いた。実験参加者は、市場調査などを担うプラットフォームである Pure-Spectrum を通じて集められた 1,198 人で、Qualtrics のウェブサイト に誘導された。回答所要時間は約 10 分、謝礼は 0.75USD（約 110 円）である。

### 4.2 介入実験

本研究では実験参加者を以下の 5 グループにランダムに振り分ける（表 1）。

表 1 各実験群の条件

	実験群 1	実験群 2	実験群 3	実験群 4	実験群 5
韓国大統領	○	○	○	○	—
低い支持率	—	○	—	○	—
専門家協力	○	○	○	○	○
国民協力	協力	協力	非協力	非協力	非協力

(注) 全ての実験群に専門家の協力に関する情報が与えられるが、先行研究では有無のバリエーションがあったので記述する。

各実験群で得られた回答数はそれぞれ、実験群 1 が 249 人、実験群 2 が 254 人、実験群 3 が 241 人、実験群 4 が 233 人、実験群 5 が 221 人であった。参加者は各実験群に応じた情報刺激を与えられた後に、他分野において韓国との協力レベルを引き下げるか、維持するか、引き上げるかを回答し、これが被説明変数（従属変数）となる。

各実験群の情報刺激と実験手順が複雑であるため、図 1 を参照されたい<sup>(6)</sup>。




図 1 実験の流れ

(6) データを参照する限り、先行研究では属性等の質問が情報刺激の提示よりも先に行われていた可能性があるが、図では本研究の手順に則って末尾に示している。

本実験の情報刺激は大きく2つのセクションに分かれており、以下に詳しく述べる。

【セクション1：韓国大統領と支持率】

実験群1～4に対して韓国大統領が日本に友好的であるとする以下の情報を伝える。友好的なイメージをより強く印象付けるために、韓国の尹大統領と日本の岸田首相が握手している画像も加える(読売新聞オンライン、2023)<sup>(7)</sup>。

「2022年3月、韓国では尹錫悦氏が選挙に勝利して大統領に就任しました。尹大統領は日本に友好的で、歴史問題の解決や相互訪問外交の促進を図るなど、日韓関係の改善に努めています。」  
実験群2と4には、大統領の支持率が低いとする以下の情報も加える。

「しかしながら、韓国での世論調査によると大統領への支持率は低く留まっています。」

【セクション2：海洋プラスチックごみ問題】

全実験群に、海洋プラスチックごみ問題が両国の課題であることを伝えた後、両国の専門家が海洋プラスチックごみ問題に協力していることを伝える。

「韓国と日本を囲む日本海（東海）のプラスチック汚染は世界で最も高いレベルの一つです。海流の循環により、韓国と日本のプラスチック廃棄物は相手国の沿岸海域に到達するため、両国にとって共通の課題となっています。」<sup>(8)</sup>

「この問題に取り組むために、両国政府の政策専門家は国連の枠組みの下で積極的に協力してきました。近年は共同解決策の実現に貢献しています。今年の会合で、両国の専門家は相手国の協力に深い感謝の意を表明しました。」

先行研究に則って「今年の会合」としたが、2022年の海洋プラスチック関連の会合で日韓の専門家が相手国に感謝の意を表したとする資料が見つからなかったため、参加者には架空の設定であるとして事後的に説明した。

次に、両国政府がプラスチック税を検討していることを全回答者に伝える。

「海洋プラスチック汚染に対処するため、日韓両国政府は使い捨てプラスチック容器に課税することを検討しています。税金は海洋汚染を軽減するための日韓共同事業に活用されます。政府が検討している500mlペットボトル1本あたりの税金は最大20円（約200ウォン）です。」

そして、実験群1と2には、韓国国民が税金の支払に積極的であること、実験群3～5には消極的であることを伝える。

「韓国で調査を行ったところ、韓国国民は500mlペットボトル1本あたり18円（約180ウォン）

(7) 実験で用いたアンケートの写真の出典が誤っていたため、ここにお詫び申し上げます。なお、実験への影響は最小限と考えられる。

(8) 「日本海（東海）」の表記について、日本側のアンケートへの記載として不適切であったとの指摘があった。実際に国際水路機関は日本海と表記している(海上保安庁、2021)。「日本海（東海）のプラスチック汚染は世界で最も高いレベルの一つ」とした表現については先行研究に則っている。回答者の中には疑問に思われた方もいたため、ここで説明させていただきたい。確かに、地中海や黒海、インド洋、南シナ海の一部で極めて高い汚染レベルが観測されているが、日本海も比較的高い海域となっている(GRID-Arendal, 2019; Eriksen, 2014)。単に「世界で最も高いレベル」ではなく、その「一つ」と表現しており、事実と反するわけではないと事後説明を怠っていたが、検討の余地はあったと考える。不適切な記述だと思われた方にはお詫び申し上げます。

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の税金を支払う意思があることが分かりました。』

「韓国で調査を行ったところ、韓国国民は500mlペットボトル1本あたり2円（約20ウォン）の税金を支払う意思があることが分かりました。』

20円の想定に対して18円なら積極的、2円なら消極的と考えるかは人によって異なる可能性を踏まえて、要点の確認に際しては、「税の支払いに積極的／消極的」であると明確に表現した。なお、この税政と調査は先行研究の著者が考えた完全に架空のシナリオであるため、参加者には事後的に説明した。

全ての情報刺激が与えられた後、以下のように協力レベルの引き下げ・維持・引き上げに関する質問への回答を求め、これを主要な被説明変数とした。

「次の分野において、日本は韓国に対してどのような政策を取るべきでしょうか。次の3つの選択肢から、あなたの意見に最も近いものを1つ選んでください。」

分野は、気候、貿易、安全保障、投資、交流、竹島問題、徴用工問題の7つである。また、選択肢は次の通りである。

- 1 = 韓国との協力レベルを現在よりも引き下げるべきである。
- 2 = 韓国との現在の協力レベルを維持するべきである。
- 3 = 韓国との協力レベルを現在よりも引き上げるべきである。

#### 4.3 その他の質問

全参加者に共通する質問について詳述する。情報刺激を与える前の一般的な質問は次の通りである。先行研究に則った質問を5つ、「非対称な関係説」の検証のために加えた本研究独自の質問を4つ設けた。

##### 【先行研究】

- (1) 政府は国内の環境問題に対処すべきか（5段階）
- (2) 政府は国際的な環境問題に対処すべきか（5段階）
- (3) 韓国政府への好感度（0～100）
- (4) 韓国国民への好感度（0～100）
- (5) 海洋プラスチック汚染の知識（4段階）

##### 【本研究独自】

- (1) 日本は韓国より国力が優れているか（5段階）
- (2) 日本は韓国より経済力が優れているか（5段階）
- (3) 日本国民は韓国国民より優れているか（5段階）
- (4) 日本は韓国より国家のステータスが優れているか（5段階）

情報刺激及び協力レベルの質問の後、全参加者に個人の属性や社会的支配志向性（SDO）、イデオロギーに関する質問をした。SDOは、社会的に構築された集団間の不平等な階層構造や支配関係へ

の価値観を表す個人的な志向を指す (Sidanius et al, 2012)。本研究では「全く同意しない」から「完全に同意する」までの7段階の選択肢が回答者に与えられる SDO7 を用いた。16 問中前半 8 問は集団間の支配関係を志向する SDO-D、後半 8 問は集団間の平等を好ましく思わない SDO-E と呼ばれる変数である。データセットでは SDO-E に関する変数は回答で得た数値を逆転させている。

全ての質問の原文は後述のレプリケーション・データを参照されたい。

## 5. 結果

本実験の群間比較を行った結果、韓国大統領、支持率及び韓国国民の海洋プラスチック汚染問題への協力に関する情報による統計的に有意な差は見られなかった(仮説 1、2、3 の棄却)。一方、先行研究との時間差を利用した分析では、大統領に関する情報が歴史や領土問題などの分野にプラスの影響を与えたことが示唆された(仮説 4 の検証)。

仮説 1、2、3 について、先行研究と同様の統制変数を用いて重回帰分析を行った結果は表 2 の通りである<sup>(9)</sup>。ここで、被説明変数の「総合」は先行研究に則り、貿易・安全保障・投資・交流の 4 分野の主成分分析 (PCA) で作成した主成分スコア (PCS) となっている。説明変数 (独立変数) を見ると、韓国大統領と支持率に関する情報の有無で統計的に有意な差はないことが分かる。さらに、先行研究では日本において有意水準 5% を満たしていた国民の非協力も有意になっていない。PCS ではなく分野別の重回帰分析でも、全ての分野で有意差がないことが示されている。

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(9) 無作為割り当てによって平均的特徴は各グループで近似していると考えられるが、バランスチェックのために複数の統制変数を含めて重回帰分析を行った。統制すべき交絡変数の選択の難しさや統制し切れない変数の存在は批判し得るが、ここでは先行研究のレプリケーションを行っているため、同じ統制変数を用いて回帰分析の推定式を作った (松林、2021)。

表2 各情報刺激の効果（重回帰分析）

	総合	気候	貿易	安全保障	投資	交流	竹島問題	徴用工問題
定数項	-2.67*** (0.38)	1.33*** (0.13)	1.29*** (0.14)	1.22*** (0.15)	1.32*** (0.14)	1.19*** (0.15)	1.44*** (0.17)	1.44*** (0.16)
大統領	0.01 (0.13)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)
大統領+ 低い支持率	0.02 (0.13)	-0.00 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)
国民非協力	0.10 (0.10)	0.02 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
女性	0.06 (0.09)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
年齢	0.00 (0.00)	0.00+ (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00+ (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
教育	0.03 (0.05)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
収入	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
環境問題への 態度（国内）	0.06 (0.06)	0.06* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.04+ (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
環境問題への 態度（国際）	0.35*** (0.07)	0.06* (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)
韓国政府への 感情	0.01* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00+ (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
韓国国民への 感情	0.02*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)
海洋プラスチック 汚染の知識	0.04 (0.06)	0.04+ (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.04+ (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)
イデオロギー	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03+ (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
観測数	1194	1194	1194	1194	1194	1194	1194	1194
決定係数	0.178	0.077	0.125	0.091	0.118	0.187	0.066	0.060
調整済み決定 係数	0.169	0.067	0.115	0.081	0.109	0.178	0.056	0.050
赤池情報量 規準	4387.1	1901.9	2021.7	2130.3	2010.8	2099.3	2515.9	2375.1
バイズ情報量 基準	4463.4	1978.2	2097.9	2206.6	2087.1	2175.6	2592.2	2451.4
対数尤度	-2178.556	-935.948	-995.835	-1050.153	-990.408	-1034.658	-1242.958	-1172.570
二乗平均 平方根誤差	1.50	0.53	0.56	0.58	0.55	0.58	0.69	0.65

(注) + p &lt; 0.1, \* p &lt; 0.05, \*\* p &lt; 0.01, \*\*\* p &lt; 0.001

図2は、総合分野において他の全ての統制変数が平均値に設定された際の平均処置効果（ATE）を表しているが、グループ間で有意差はない。左から4番目の最もネガティブだと予想した組み合わせ（実験群4）ではむしろ上方に振れる傾向がある。多重比較の一種である Tukey-Kramer 法を使用しても、全ての分野においてグループ間で統計的に有意な差は見られなかった（レプリケーション・データを参照）。したがって仮説1、2、3が棄却される。




図2 群間比較（総合）

仮説4について、韓国大統領の情報の効果を再度検証するため先行研究との比較を行う。本研究の実験群5と先行研究の同条件のグループ（Treat4）の総合分野を比較すると、t検定では1%有意、Tukey-Kramer法による群間比較でも5%有意である。特に竹島問題と徴用工問題では顕著な差が見られる（図3）。したがって、仮説4が支持される。







図3 群間比較 (竹島問題・徴用工問題)

ここからは、先行研究から発展して本研究で独自に集めたデータを含めた分析を行う。表3を見ると、国際的な環境問題への態度、韓国政府・韓国国民への感情と同程度に、平等・不平等への価値観 (SDO)、タカ派・ハト派の変数が影響していることが分かる<sup>10)</sup>。特に SDO のうち SDO-E において幅広い項目で統計的に有意であるとの結果が得られた。SDO-E が高いほど協力レベルが低い傾向がある。他方で、日本と韓国の比較の変数は、徴用工問題を除いて他分野での協力に対する波及効果をほとんどたないことも示されている。

<sup>10)</sup> タカ派は国家安全保障のために軍事力の行使が必要だという考え、ハト派は軍事力をほぼ行使してはならないという考えを指す。

表3 本研究独自の変数の効果（重回帰分析）

	総合	気候	貿易	安全保障	投資	交流	竹島問題	徴用工問題
定数項	-1.09** (0.36)	2.05*** (0.13)	1.77*** (0.13)	2.00*** (0.14)	1.44*** (0.13)	1.77*** (0.14)	2.05*** (0.16)	1.66*** (0.16)
環境問題への 態度（国際）	0.34*** (0.05)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)
韓国政府への 感情	0.01** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00+ (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
韓国国民への 感情	0.01*** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)
日本と韓国の 比較（PCS）	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)
SDO_D （平均）	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
SDO_E （平均）	-0.13** (0.04)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
タカ・ハト	-0.14+ (0.07)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.03)	-0.10** (0.03)	-0.09** (0.03)
観測数	1198	1198	1198	1198	1198	1198	1198	1198
決定係数	0.188	0.082	0.129	0.099	0.114	0.202	0.079	0.069
調整済み決定 係数	0.183	0.076	0.123	0.094	0.109	0.198	0.073	0.063
赤池情報量 規準	4377.4	1892.4	2012.9	2117.6	2009.5	2070.1	2500.5	2362.6
バイズ情報量 基準	4423.2	1938.2	2058.7	2163.4	2055.3	2115.9	2546.3	2408.4
対数尤度	-2179.698	-937.224	-997.437	-1049.784	-995.733	-1026.035	-1241.272	-1172.284
二乗平均 平方根誤差	1.49	0.53	0.56	0.58	0.56	0.57	0.68	0.64

(注) + p < 0.1, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

## 6. 考察

仮説1、2、3の棄却、すなわち海洋プラスチック汚染対策への国民の協力、日本に友好的な韓国大統領、同大統領の低い支持率という本実験で設定した全ての情報刺激が結果に有意な差をもたらさなかった理由を考察する。

本実験において海洋プラスチック汚染対策への国民の協力がほとんど波及効果を持たずに仮説1が棄却された理由には、先行研究の結果が偶然であった可能性が挙げられる。先行研究は10%水準で有意であることから、ロバストであったとは言えない。目に見える環境問題への対策という明白な効果が期待できる情報刺激ですら有意な結果が得られなかったことから、環境分野での国際協力がもた

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らず波及効果は限定的であると結論付けざるを得ない。

仮説2の棄却について、本研究の韓国大統領の刺激がうまく働かなかったのは、周知の事実を実験に適用したことが原因であると考ええる。周知の事実を実験の情報刺激として使用すると、刺激の有無にかかわらず、全ての実験群の参加者がその事実を思い起こしながら回答してしまう可能性があるためである。実際に、仮説4の時間差を利用した分析によって特定の分野では韓国大統領の情報の効果を確認できたことから、この解釈は妥当であると言える。

仮説3の棄却については、日本に友好的な韓国大統領の情報によってコミットメント問題が解消された結果として、低い支持率というネガティブな情報に対する反応が弱まった可能性がある。あるいは、大統領の行動に対する評価が極めて高かったために、多少の国内からの批判は許容したとも考えられる。特に強い権限がリーダーに付与されている場合は、当該国家に対する国外からの評判は時のリーダーによって決まり、前政権や他のアクターは軽視されるとの研究がある (Renshon et al., 2018)。韓国の大統領は宣戦布告、和平締結、法案の提出・拒否、必要最小限の財政的・経済的行動をとるための緊急権限といった権利を有しており、強いリーダーであると言える (European Parliament Research Service, 2022)。

以上の仮説1、2、3の考察を踏まえて、コミットメント問題説と非対称な関係説を検証する。コミットメント問題説から論じれば、日本に友好的な韓国大統領の情報を含む昨今の状況は韓国への信頼を高め、環境問題への韓国国民の非協力や大統領への低い支持率というネガティブな刺激に対する反応を弱めている。先行研究において韓国で見られた現象に近いことから、日本においてコミットメント問題が解消されたことを裏付けているように見える。しかし、コミットメント問題説を基にした解釈には欠点がある。仮説1の棄却は、先行研究の韓国での実験結果のように協力的な情報に対するポジティブな影響が確認されなかったことも同時に意味し、コミットメント問題が完全には解消されていない可能性も示唆する。また、低い支持率によって国民が裏切りの感情を想起させられているにもかかわらず協力レベルを引き下げなかったと解釈すれば、コミットメント問題説では説明が付かない。さらに、仮説4の分析と本研究独自の変数を組み合わせると、非対称な関係説が有力であると裏付けられる。

仮説4に関して、分野別に見ると、竹島・徴用工問題では0.1%水準、安全保障では1%水準、投資では5%水準で先行研究と本研究の間に有意差が見られたが、気候・貿易・交流については5%水準では有意差がなかった。徴用工問題には大統領の情報刺激や昨今のニュースの効果があり、竹島はその延長線と考えられ、これら2分野だけでは分野横断的な波及効果とは断言できない。全体的な傾向は、先行研究で低い協力レベルを記録した分野ほど今回は高まっており、分野間の差が縮まっている。歴史問題に取り組む大統領の行動は、気候や貿易、交流といった国際協調が進みやすい分野よりも、根深い対立を生みやすい分野に改善をもたらすことが示唆された。先行研究でも高い数値を記録したもののさらに伸びた例外である安全保障には、北朝鮮や中国の軍事的脅威という外的要因が考えられる。したがって、全ての分野への波及効果はなく、国家全体の信頼性を向上させたというよりも、対立してきた特有の分野に効果を発揮したに留まると言える。

また、独自に集めた変数を見ると、韓国と日本の国力や国民、経済、ステータスの優劣を比較する質問項目において、協力の波及効果への影響は徴用工問題を除いて見られなかった。先行研究の考察とは異なって同項目において年齢との相関関係が見られなかった理由には、オンラインサーベイを用いた本実験の回答者のうち65歳以上の高齢者が全体の約0.5%と極めて少なく、日韓の優劣の認識に対する世代間格差を観測できなかったことが考えられる。いずれにせよ日韓の比較の変数による協力レベルの変化が見られなかったことは非対称な関係説への反論となり得る。

しかし、非対称な関係の心理的傾向をさらに詳細に分析すると別の視点が見える。社会的支配志向性のSDO-DとSDO-Eに着目すると、より多くの分野で協力レベルとの相関関係が強いのはSDO-Eである。SDO-Eは国際的な環境問題に対する態度の変数との相関関係が強い。この変数は、他分野での国際協力レベルと最も相関関係が強い統制変数となっていて、政府が国際的な環境問題に対処すべきであると考え人ほど、他分野での日韓の協力レベルを引き上げるべきだと考える傾向がある。最も係数が大きく相関関係が強いのは今回の実験のみならず先行研究でも同様である。一方で、SDO-Dと日韓の比較の変数は国際的な環境問題への態度と5%水準では有意な関連性はない。日韓の比較の変数と強い関連があるのはSDO-Dであり、SDO-Dが高いほど日本は韓国よりも諸側面で優れていると考える傾向がある。Hoら(2012)は、SDO-Dは攻撃的な行為やあからさまな偏見に関連しているとしており、本研究の結果と一致している。したがって、日韓には非対称な関係として括れない心理傾向が存在し、国際協調の文脈では、相手国に対する露骨な差別意識よりも、日本と韓国という2集団が平等になることを拒否するという意識が働いていることが分かる。

SDO-Eは国内であからさまな差別・抑圧がない社会において、政治的態度やイデオロギーに強力に働くことが明らかになっている。SDO-Eが高いほど、集団間の不平等の維持や保守主義を支持したり、再分配政策を批判したりする傾向がある(Ho et al., 2012)。また、環境に優しい行動に消極的になる傾向を本研究と同様にStanleyら(2017)も確認している。人間が自然を支配することを正当化するからであると考えられている(Milfont et al., 2017; Currie & Choma, 2017)<sup>(11)</sup>。SDO-Eは、道徳的な行動を意識しても変わらないが、時間の経過に連れて変化することが知られている(Stanley et al., 2017)。また、移民や民族的マイノリティとのポジティブな接触体験によって低くなる(Meleady et al., 2020)。本研究でも韓国国民への好感度が高い人々はSDO-Eが低い傾向があることから、両国間の国民のポジティブな交流が、環境問題をはじめとする国際協力に広くつながる可能性がある。

対立関係にある国家との協力関係を築くために、政府は広報外交で、国家の信頼向上や環境問題への国民の協力姿勢に関する情報を提供するのではなく、国際的な問題を政府が対処する重要性の強調と、集団間の平等思想の植え付けを行うべきである。また、波及効果は期待しづらいものの、対立を生じやすい特定の政策分野において両国が協力的であるとする情報も有効である。

最後に、本筋からは逸れるが、SDOや日韓の比較の変数と男女差について言及したい。SDOに対して性別を含む属性と回帰分析を行ったところ10%有意に留まった。一方で、日韓の比較の変数で

(11) ただし、社会の平等性が高い場合、SDOの高さと環境に優しい行動の関連性は弱まる(Milfont et al., 2017)。

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は男女差が顕著に表れた。女性は男性と比べて、日本が韓国よりも優れているとは考えない傾向がある。先行研究では年齢差のみが言及されていたが、男女差に着目する必要があると考えられる。

## 7. 結論

本研究ではサーベイ実験を通して、環境分野の日韓の協力に関する情報によって他分野でも協力への意欲が高まるか、またその心理的な誘因が非対称な関係とコミットメント問題のどちらに基づくか検証することを試みた。結果を分析すると、韓国国民が海洋プラスチック汚染対策へ協力的か非協力的かという情報によって実験群間で統計的に有意な差はなかった。また、日本に友好的な韓国大統領や支持率の低さに関する情報の有無による差も見られなかった。これらは、先行研究で日本では有力とされた相手国への信頼性の欠如に由来するコミットメント問題説への反論となる。先行研究との時間差を利用した比較では、日本に友好的な大統領の情報が、歴史や領土などの対立を生じやすい特定の分野で協力レベルを引き上げたことが分かったが、全分野には及ばなかったことからコミットメント問題説への裏付けには不十分であった。実験で用いた情報刺激ではなく統制変数を見ると、国際的な環境問題への態度の変数が、先行研究から一貫して国際協力のレベルと最も強く相関した。SDO-DよりもSDO-Eとの相関が強いことから、露骨な差別意識に関連する集団支配志向性よりも、両国間の平等を否定する反平等主義志向性の強弱が国際協力への意思を決定づける可能性が高い。したがって、日韓の優劣の認識に基づく非対称な関係説が有力であると考えられる。

本研究の結果は、対立関係にある国家との国際協力を促す政府の広報外交の戦略を示唆する。対立する国家との協力を世論が支持するためには、集団間の平等思想及び国家が国際問題に対処する重要性を主張する必要がある。波及効果は期待できないが、特定の政策分野において両国が協力的であるとする情報も有効である。

今回の実験では、刺激として用いた韓国大統領に関する情報が周知の事実であったことから、効果に限界があったことが示された。また、オンラインサーベイを用いたことから回答者の属性に偏りがあり、結果の一般化可能性は低い。今後の研究で、実験デザインや回答の収集方法を改善したうえで、本研究を裏付けるような結果が得られるか検証する必要がある。

## レプリケーション・データ

本論文で実証分析に用いたサーベイ原文、データセット、コードブック、Rコードは以下のリンクよりダウンロード可能である。

<https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1n7likeZbAy-Yen5iSOfxyvPpzjygPFKK?usp=sharing>

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## 付録

重回帰分析の推定式

WTC = 協力する意思 (Willingness to Cooperate)

表 2

$$WTC_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 President_i + \beta_2 Pres\_App_i + \beta_3 Mass\_Uncoop_i + \gamma X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

President = 韓国大統領の情報刺激

Pres\_App = 大統領 + 低い支持率 (Approval Rating) の情報刺激

Mass\_Uncoop = 国民の非協力的態度の情報刺激

Xi = 性別・年齢などの属性やイデオロギー等の思想

表 3

$$WTC_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Attitude\_Intl_i + \beta_2 Feel\_Govt_i + \beta_3 Feel\_People_i + \beta_4 JK\_PCS_i + \beta_5 SDO\_D_i + \beta_6 SDO\_E_i + \beta_7 Hawk\_Dove_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Attitude\_Intl = 国際的な環境問題に対する態度

Feel\_Govt = 韓国政府に対する感情

Feel\_People = 韓国国民に対する感情

JK\_PCS = 日本と韓国を比較する質問に対する主成分スコア

SDO\_D = SDO-D の平均値

SDO\_E = SDO-E の平均値

Hawk\_Dove = タカ派・ハト派



〈学部学生部門 (Undergraduate student category)〉

【数理・統計計量部門 (Category of Theoretical Analysis and Statistical/Quantitative Analysis)】

優秀賞 (Outstanding essay award)

## 新型コロナウイルス感染症と日本の国政選挙： 政権与党得票率への影響の実証分析

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4年 菊地圭汰

### 要旨

日本は、地震や台風などの被害に頻繁に見舞われる、世界でも有数の災害大国である。しかし、2020年から世界的なパンデミックとして広がった新型コロナウイルスは、さまざまな天災を経験してきた日本の国民をも、大混乱に陥れた。未曾有の感染症が流行し、それまで当たり前のように過ごしていた国民の日常は、一変した。そうした中、2021年10月、第49回衆議院選挙が行われた。はたして、有権者は、コロナ禍によって日常を破壊された悲しみや義憤を、政権与党の責任として捉えて、一票を投じたのだろうか。本稿では、この国政選挙での自民党及び公明党の相対得票率を予測する推定モデルに基づき、コロナ感染が及ぼした影響について47都道府県を分析単位として検証した。重回帰分析の結果、新規陽性者数と入院治療を要する者の数には統計的に有意な効果を見出せなかったものの、コロナ累計死者数と重症者数が与党得票率に負の影響を与えたと推定できることが明らかになった。これは、与党得票率に影響を与える他の様々な変数、とくに政府が進めたコロナ対策の柱であるワクチン接種率など医療体制の充実度をコントロールした上での結果である。さらに、コントロール変数の変更、相対ではなく絶対得票率を用いた推定などを行って、分析結果が頑健であることも確認した。また、本稿では、同様の推定モデルを用いて、翌年2022年7月の参議院選挙についての分析も追加的に行った。その結果、重症者数には統計的に有意な効果を見出せなかったが、累計死者数は依然として与党得票率に負の影響を与えたと推定できることが明らかになった。これらの分析結果から、総じて、新型コロナウイルス感染症の被害は国政選挙における政権与党に対する有権者の支持を押し下げる効果をもった、と結論できる。新型コロナウイルスの蔓延は、必ずしも政治家が責任を負うべきでない自然災害とも位置付けられる。しかし、この2回の国政選挙の結果は、政府が推進したワクチン接種や医療体制の充実といった対応措置に対する合理的な業績評価としてだけでなく、有権者が政権与党に対して災害の責任を負わせるかのような感情的で恣意的な行動をとったことの

表れである可能性を示唆している。

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## 序論

2019年12月に中国で初めて観察された新型コロナウイルスは、瞬く間に国境を越え、アジアから世界へと蔓延し、人間社会を未曾有の大混乱へと陥れた。日本でも、通勤、通学、会食、旅行、スポーツやコンサートのイベントの開催など、それまで誰もが自明なことと思っていた日常生活を一変させた。テレビや新聞など大手メディアによる報道はもとより、個人のSNS（ソーシャル・ネットワーク・サービス）での発信を通して、毎日のように新型コロナウイルス情勢についての情報が交換された。当然ながら、コロナ対策を推進する政府や自治体の動向にも、注目が集まった。そうした中、2021年10月31日に、コロナ禍での初めての国政選挙、第49回衆議院選挙が行われた。

有権者は、はたして新型コロナウイルスの動向を考慮に入れて投票所に向かったのであろうか。もし考慮に入れたとすると、それは政治家たち、とりわけ政権を担っている与党への支持に対して、どのような影響を与えたのであろうか。

日本は、従来から、地震や台風など自然災害が多発する国家である。こうした有事において有権者が政治に対して何を求めて投票所に足を運び、一票を投じるのかを解明することは、現代日本の政治過程および政治行動を理解する上で重要である。ただし、新型コロナウイルスについては、それを「自然災害」とみるか、それとも「人為災害」とみるかは、一概には断定することがむずかしい。ウイルスの発生や変異については、誰にも責任を帰すことのできない「自然災害」としての側面が強い。他方、ウイルスの流行経路を制御したり、発症後の重症化に対する措置を講じたりするなど、公衆衛生や医療体制を整えることで一定程度はその被害を操作できるという意味では「人為的」であり、政府の責任と捉えることも当然できるであろう。

もし有権者がコロナによる被害の「人為的」側面を重視する合理的アクターならば、彼らは政権に就いている政治家たちに負うべき責任があると考え、業績評価にもとづく投票を行ったと考えられ

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る。そうであれば、感染拡大に対して政府が行った措置や医療体制の充実度が、彼らの選挙での投票行動に影響を与えたと推測される。これに対して、強力なウイルスの蔓延という、明らかに平時とは異なる状況においては、有権者は合理的な業績評価をすることができず、日常を破壊された悲しみや義憤を、政権与党の責任として捉えて、一票を投じたと考えることも可能であろう。そうだとすると、政治家の操作できない、より自然災害的な側面、すなわち感染の広がりや被害の大きさそのものが、彼らの投票行動に影響を与えたと推測される。

以上のような問題意識に基づき、本稿では、政府が行ったコロナ対策を勘案した上でも、ウイルスの感染や被害の状況が政権与党の得票率に負の影響を与えたかどうかを検証する。具体的には、47都道府県ごとの上記（第49回）衆議院選挙の与党得票率データと、新規感染者数、入院治療を要する者の数、重症者数、累計死者数などの感染・被害状況を表す指標を扱い、その相関性を分析する。

本稿は以下の構成となっている。第1節では、研究の背景と先行研究について説明する。第2節では、研究で明らかにするリサーチクエスチョンと仮説について述べ、第3節では研究手法と具体的な内容について説明する。第4節では、本研究における分析結果を提示し解説する。第5節では、第4節の結果についてより頑健性を確認するロバストネスチェックの結果を提示する。最後に、結論において本稿から得られる知見と意義を整理し、さらなる課題を述べる。

## 第1節 背景と先行研究

本稿は、新型コロナウイルスが日本政治に及した影響を検証する実証的研究として位置付けられる。しかし、理論的には、現代政治学における業績評価モデルをめぐる論争が、本稿の背景にある。

業績評価モデルとは、有権者が合理的な意思決定を行うという前提のもとで、投票行動を説明する理論モデルである。このモデルでは、政府の業績が良いと判断すれば政権与党・現職政治家に投票し、悪いと判断すれば野党・対立候補に投票すると予測する。他方、業績評価モデルを批判する理論としては、C・H・エイケンとL・バーテルズ（2016）が主張したことで知られる、いわゆる「シャークアタック現象」モデルがある。彼らの研究では、1916年のアメリカ大統領選挙において、サメによる被害が現職大統領の得票率に負の影響を与えたことが示されている。すなわち、政治家のコントロールの及ばない自然発生的な事件による災害や被害であっても、有権者は与党・現職政治家に責任を負わせるかもしれない、ということである<sup>(1)</sup>。業績評価モデルで想定される有権者の行動が冷静かつ合理的であるのに対し、後者のような考え方では有権者の行動が情動的で恣意的である可能性が強調される。

日本は、地震や台風といった自然災害の多発する国家であるにもかかわらず、この論争に関わる研究が十分に蓄積されてきたとはいえない。ただ、そうした中で、三つの貴重な研究がある。

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(1) Achen, C. H., and Larry M. Bartels (2016) *Democracy for Realists*. Princeton University Press. 特に、第5章を参照。

一つは、荒井・中條・小林（2016）であり、自然災害が発生すると被災地において政治家に対する信頼が低下することを計量的に実証した研究である。具体的には、この研究は2015年9月に発生した関東東北豪雨により広範囲に浸水被害にあった茨城県常総市において、郵送で聞き取り調査を実施し、市民の政治意識を計測した。その結果は、概ね業績評価モデルと整合的であり、被害が大きかった市民ほど、政府や行政に対して不満を持ち、経済的損失が大きかった市民ほど、市長に対する評価が低い、という傾向が明らかにされている。

二つ目の研究は、河野・國岡・菊池（2020）による2011年東日本大震災の影響に関する研究である。この研究では、震災によって家屋全壊割合が高い市町村ほど、2013年の宮城県知事選における現職知事村井嘉浩氏の得票率が前回に比べて負の影響を与えることが実証されている。この結果は、大きな自然災害に見舞われたとき、有権者が必ずしも合理的ではなく、情動的、恣意的に現職政治家を評価していることを示し、エイケンとバーテルズ（2016）の議論を支持している。

最後は、本稿と同じく新型コロナウイルス感染を題材とした堀川・大野・橋元（2023）である。この研究では、オンライン質問調査により、政府のコロナ禍対策への評価と投票行動との関係が検証されている。その結果としては、対策への評価が高い人ほど与党に投票し、政治に不満がある人ほど野党に投票した、という傾向が確認されており、有権者が政治家のパフォーマンスについて合理的に評価し投票していることを示唆している。

こうした先行研究をふまえて、本稿では、2021年の衆議院選挙における政権与党の得票率とコロナ感染による被害の程度との関連を、計量的に分析する。堀川・大野・橋元（2023）とは異なり、サーベイデータではなく、実際の選挙結果データをもとにした検証を行う。以下、本論へと進む前に、あらためて、新型コロナウイルス感染症とそれに対する日本の政府の対策に関して、基礎的な事実関係を整理しておく。

新型コロナウイルスは、2019年12月に中華人民共和国の湖北省武漢市で、その発症が初めて確認され、瞬く間に世界的パンデミックとして拡散した感染症である。世界保健機関（WHO）による正式名称は、「COVID-19」である。日本では2020年1月16日に初めて感染者が確認された。4月7日に、当時の安倍晋三首相が東京、神奈川、埼玉、千葉、大阪、兵庫、福岡の7都道府県を対象に特別措置法に基づく緊急事態宣言を発令した。さらに2021年1月7日に、当時の菅義偉首相が東京、神奈川、埼玉、千葉を対象に二度目の緊急事態宣言を発令した。

新型コロナウイルスの発症・重症化を予防する策として、多くの国々ではワクチンの接種が押し進められた。日本では、2021年2月17日に480万人の医療従事者向けに接種が開始された。そして、同年4月12日に3600万人の高齢者向けの接種が、また同年6月13日に一般の人向けに職域接種が開始され、以降、全国で接種が加速していった。ワクチン接種は、「予防接種法の臨時接種に関する特例を設け、厚生労働大臣の指示のもと、都道府県の協力により、市町村において予防接種を実施」

(2) 厚生労働省 PDF 「(2023年4月版) 新型コロナウイルス感染症の“いま”に関する11の知識」を参照。  
<https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/000927280.pdf>

(厚生労働省)され、(2023年度まで)全額国費負担で行われた<sup>(2)</sup>。ただ、ワクチンの接種の進捗には、都道府県や自治体の間で著しい差があったことも知られており、そうした進捗(の違い)が政権与党に対する業績評価に一定の影響を与えたとしても不思議ではない。実際、Kikuchi, Ishihara, & Kohno (2023)によると、2021年の9月時点、すなわち衆院選の直前においては、自治体間での接種率のばらつきと、政権与党(自民党と公明党)議員の議席率・プレゼンスとの間には相関があったことが実証されており、現職政治家の側がワクチン推進をコロナ禍での自らの業績誇示として認識していた可能性は高い。

このように、日本でも新型コロナウイルスが蔓延し、防止し対処する策が講じられる中で、第49回衆議院選挙は行われた。正確には、2021年10月19日に公示、31日に投票、というスケジュールで行われた。

## 第2節 リサーチクエスションと仮説

本稿におけるリサーチクエスションは「新型コロナウイルス感染拡大による被害は、国政選挙における与党得票率に影響を与えるのか」である。

一般に、新型コロナウイルス感染状況は、さまざまな指標を用いて測ることが可能である。本稿では、日本のコロナ禍において、一般の有権者がメディア報道などで比較的容易に情報を得ることが可能だったと思われる4つの指標をすべて用いることにする。すなわち、陽性者数、入院治療を要する者の数、重症者数、コロナ死亡者数である。

これら4つの指標は、まったく同じ状況を測定しているわけではない。すでに序論で述べたとおり、地震や台風などの典型的な自然災害と異なり、新型コロナウイルスによって生じる被害については、政治家が制御できない、従って政治家に責任を帰すべきではないとする見方もできれば、政府の対応によって(ある程度は)制御しうる、従って政府への業績評価の対象とされるべきとする見方もできる。この二つの見解をそれぞれ極論とした次元を想定すると、上記の4つの指標は、図表1に表されるような位置関係にあると思われる。たとえば、ウイルスにどれほどの人が罹患したか、すなわち陽性者数という指標は、コロナ感染状況を、どちらかといえば自然災害的に捉えた場合に当てはまる指標であろう。他方、感染による死亡者数は、医療体制の充実など、対策措置によってその数が左右される可能性がより高いため、どちらかという和有権者が政府の業績評価としてコロナ感染状況を捉える上での指標ではないか、と思われる。

図表1



もちろん、有権者が、業績評価モデルが想定するような合理的な投票行動をとるアクターだとするならば、感染状況だけでなく、政府の対策そのものについても直接的な評価を下し、投票行動を決める上で重視すると考えられる。政府の対策は、医療制度の充実度を表す指標などで測ることができる。逆に、有権者が情動的、恣意的なアクターだとすると、政府によるコロナ施策に対する評価は、投票行動を決定する上でそれほど重視されないはずである。むしろ、平穏な日常生活が脅かされたことに対する悲しみや義憤を、政治家の責任に転嫁し、コロナによる被害の程度そのものが、政権への支持・不支持を決定づけると考えられる。

本稿では、図表1で説明した被害指標の性格の違いを考慮して分析を進めていく。そして、医療体制の充実度といった政治家が操作可能な政策についても、コントロール変数としてモデル推定に組み込む。以上の議論を踏まえて、上記のリサーチクエスチョンを解明する上で4つの仮説を設定する。

#### 仮説1

コロナ累計死亡者数が多いほど、政権与党の得票率に負の影響を及ぼす。

#### 仮説2

コロナ重症者数が多いほど、政権与党の得票率に負の影響を及ぼす。

#### 仮説3

コロナによって入院治療を要する者の数が多いほど、与党得票率に負の影響を及ぼす。

#### 仮説4

コロナ新規陽性者数が多いほど、与党得票率に負の影響を及ぼす。

### 第3節 計量分析

本稿における実証分析の枠組みと手法について説明する。分析の単位は都道府県であり、47都道府県全てを分析対象とする。市町村ではなく、都道府県レベルで分析を行うのは、データ制約上の理由からである。とりわけ、以下で説明する独立変数側の感染状況に関するデータは、下位自治体レベルで収集・集計することが難しい。

従属変数は、同選挙比例代表の（47都道府県ごとの）与党得票率である。与党は自民党と公明党を指し、得票率とは得票数を投票者数で除した相対得票率とする。小選挙区ではなく比例代表の得票率を分析する理由は、前者は候補者個人への投票であり、政党への投票は後者で測るのがより適しているからである。また、相対得票率を用いて分析する理由は、コロナ被害の影響は、選挙に実際に参加する人たち、つまり投票する意思が強いと想定される人たちの評価に、より明確に反映されると考えたからである。これに対して、得票数を有権者の総数で除した絶対得票率は、コロナの被害に遭っ

て投票できなかった有権者も分母に含めることになり、そうした測定誤差がモデル推定にどう影響するかは一概に明らかではない。ただし、望ましい分析結果を導くために恣意的に相対得票率を用いたのではないかという批判がありうるので、それに応答するため、ロバストネスチェックの段階では、絶対得票率を従属変数として用いた分析も追加的に行う。

なお、得票率データは、総務省ホームページの「衆議院議員総選挙・最高裁判所裁判官国民審査結果」から入手した。記述統計は、図表2にまとめた通りである。

図表2：従属変数の記述統計

変数（10万人あたり）	平均	標準偏差	最小値	最大値	標本数
与党相対得票率	50.27	5.622498	33.8	64	47
与党絶対得票率	27.54	3.177021	18.64	33.68	47

次に、独立変数であるが、主要な独立変数は感染被害の指標であり、上記4つの仮説に鑑み、47都道府県ごとの累計死者数、重症者数、入院治療を要する者の数、新規陽性者数のデータを用いる。これらは、2021年第49回衆議院選挙の投票日前日にあたる2021年10月30日を基準に集計した。以下、それぞれ詳細に説明する。

第一に、累計死者数については、データ集計開始日の2020年5月9日から2021年10月30日までに、新型コロナウイルスに罹患し死亡した人数の累計値を用いる。この累計値を各都道府県の人口で除し10万を掛けた、10万人あたりの累計死者数として操作化した。

第二の重症者数については、コロナに罹患した重症者数の、10月24日から10月30日までの平均値をとることとした。累計死者数と同様に、10万人あたりの重症者数を算出し扱う。なお、「重症者」の定義は、「①人口呼吸器の使用、②ECMOを使用、③ICU等で治療、のいずれかの条件に当てはまる患者」（厚生労働省）である<sup>(3)</sup>。

第三の入院治療を要する者の数については、コロナに罹患し入院治療を要する者の数の、10月24日から10月30日までの平均値をとることとした。この変数についても、10万人あたりの値として操作化した。なお、「入院治療を要する者の数」とは、「入院中（調整中を含む）、宿泊療養中、自宅療養中等の者として各自治体が公表した数値を積み上げたもの」（厚生労働省）である<sup>(4)</sup>。

第四は、コロナに罹患した新規陽性者数である。これも10万人あたりの値を算出した。ただし、この指標については、期間設定のバリエーションを設けて、細かく差別化した複数の変数を用意した。すなわち、(1)10月30日の新規陽性者数、(2)10月24日から10月30日までの1週間分の新規陽性者数、(3)10月17日から10月30日までの2週間分の新規陽性者数、(4)10月10日から10月

(3) 厚生労働省ホームページ「データからわかる—新型コロナウイルス感染症情報—」を参照。https://covid19.mhlw.go.jp/

(4) 厚生労働省ホームページ「データからわかる—新型コロナウイルス感染症情報—」を参照。https://covid19.mhlw.go.jp/

30日の3週間分の新規陽性者数、そして(5)10月3日から10月30日までの4週間分の新規陽性者数、の5変数である。

これらのデータは、新型コロナウイルス感染者等情報把握・管理システム(HER-SYS)から集計した。以上の独立変数の記述統計を図表3にまとめた。

図表3：独立変数の記述統計

変数(10万人あたり)	平均	標準偏差	最小値	最大値	標本数
累計死者数	86.69	68.46509	7.43	344.48	47
重症者数	0.05524	0.064545	0	0.27151	47
入院治療を要する者の数	2.0719	1.887057	0	10.3478	47
新規陽性者数(10/30)	0.3111	0.440587	0	1.8176	47
新規陽性者数(1週間分)	1.9486	2.889807	0	14.0695	47
新規陽性者数(2週間分)	3.6867	5.562043	0	30.0239	47
新規陽性者数(3週間分)	5.21857	7.62003	0.07373	39.91965	47
新規陽性者数(4週間分)	6.66347	9.703701	0.08758	51.36373	47

さらに、コロナ禍において与党得票率に影響を及ぼしたと考えられる政策・業績の地域差を統制するために、各種のコントロール変数を加える。第一に、自民党と公明党の地盤に相当するもの、すなわちこの二つの政党への支持の分布をコントロールする必要がある。残念ながら、本稿の分析のような一回限りのクロスセクション分析では、各都道府県の固定効果をモデルに含めることができない。そのため、前回の衆議院選挙の得票率を代替的に用いる。前回の衆議院選挙とは、2017年の第48回衆議院選挙である。このデータも総務省ホームページの「衆議院議員総選挙・最高裁判所裁判官国民審査結果」から入手した。

2つ目のコントロール変数として、各都道府県の高齢者割合を加える。本稿における高齢者割合とは、総務省統計局が公表する「人口推計(2021年(令和3年)10月1日現在)」における「表4 都道府県、年齢3区分別人口の割合(各年10月1日現在)」の2021年のデータに基づいた、各都道府県の人口に対する65歳以上の割合とする。厚生労働省によれば、新型コロナウイルス感染症と診断された後に重症化しやすいのは、高齢者と基礎疾患のある人、一部の妊娠後期の人である。重症者数や累計死者数のばらつきに関連しうる「人口構成」をコントロールする必要がある。また、政権与党のうち、特に自民党は保守政党であり、一般的に高齢者の多い地域においてその地盤が強いことが知られている。従って、こうした要素を勘案するためにも、コントロール変数として加えることにする。

第三に、有権者が与党を評価する上で、コロナウイルスによる被害以外の重要な判断材料として、経済状況が考えられる。そこで、以下の分析では、賃金変化率をコントロール変数として組み込む。厚生労働省が公表する「賃金構造基本統計調査」のデータに基づき、前回選挙の2017年から(分析対象である第49回選挙時点の)2021年にかけての賃金上昇率を都道府県ごとに算出した。なお、同



省の定義によると、賃金とは「6月分の所定内給与額の平均」を表し、「所定内給与額」とは「労働契約等であらかじめ定められている支給条件、算定方法により6月分として支給された現金給与額（きまって支給する現金給与額）のうち、超過労働給与額（①時間外勤務手当、②深夜勤務手当、③休日出勤手当、④宿日直手当、⑤交替手当として支給される給与をいう。）を差し引いた額で、所得税等を控除する前の額」である<sup>(5)</sup>。

第四に、都道府県ごとの医療体制の充実度の差をコントロールする。本稿の分析では、以下の4つの指標を医療体制の充実度を表すコントロール変数として用いる。

i) 1回目ワクチン接種率：デジタル庁ホームページの「新型コロナワクチンの接種状況」のデータに基づき、各都道府県の2021年10月30日時点での1回目ワクチン接種率を統制する。このホームページでは、ワクチン接種記録システム（VRS）に記録され集計されたデータが入手できる<sup>(6)</sup>。

ii) 2回目ワクチン接種率：出典、手法については、1回目ワクチン接種率と同様である。

iii) 確保病床使用率：医療体制の逼迫度合いを表す指標の一つとして厚生労働省が公表する各都道府県の「確保病床数」からなる「確保病床使用率」をコントロール変数として組み込む。「確保病床数」とは「新型コロナウイルス感染症患者の受入要請があれば患者受入を行うこととして、都道府県と調整済みの最大の病床数」（厚生労働省）を指す<sup>(7)</sup>。使用率が高いほど、医療体制に負荷が掛かっていることを意味する。データは、厚生労働省ホームページ「新型コロナウイルス感染症対策に係る各医療機関内の病床の確保状況・使用率等の報告」より、2021年10月26日時点のデータを用いる。

iv) 医療施設の従事者数：より一般的に都道府県ごとの医療体制の充実度を表す指標として、医療施設の従事者数をコントロール変数として扱う。政府統計ポータルサイト「e-Stat」が提供する「令和2年医師・歯科医師・薬剤師統計」の「人口10万対医師数、主たる従業地による都道府県－指定都市・特別区・中核市（再掲）、主たる業務の種別」より、各都道府県の10万人あたり「医療施設の従事者」数を算出した。ただし、公開されているデータに2021年分は見当たらないので、最新版である2020年分を利用する。

以上のコントロール変数の記述統計を図表4にまとめた。

本稿では、すでに示唆した通り、クロス＝セクショナルな重回帰分析を行う。その際、推定モデルを組み立てる上では、多重共線性を排除する必要がある。そこで、予備的考察として、図表5および図表6に、独立変数とコントロール変数の相関係数をまとめた。表内の数値が相関係数であり、×の付く部分は、 $p$ 値  $< 0.01$  で統計的に有意と示せない部分である。色が濃いほど、相関係数の絶対値の高さを表す。

(5) 厚生労働省ホームページ「賃金構造基本統計調査」を参照。https://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/list/chingin\_kouzou\_b.html


(6) デジタル庁ホームページによれば、1回目および2回目接種に、医療従事者等の記録は含まれていない。また、都道府県によっては10月30日時点の記録がない場合があるが、その場合は、29日と31日の平均値を算出し30日の接種率とした。

(7) 厚生労働省ホームページ「新型コロナウイルス感染症対策に係る各医療機関内の病床の確保状況・使用率等の報告」を参照。https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/seisakunitsuite/bunya/0000121431\_00327.html

図表 4：コントロール変数の記述統計

変数 (10 万人あたり)	平均	標準偏差	最小値	最大値	標本数
前回得票率 (%)	47.8	4.7	37.6	63.2	47
高齢者割合 (%)	31.11	3.2	22.9	38.1	47
賃金変化率 (%)	1.58	0.37	5.405405	74.11311495	47
1 回目ワクチン接種率 (%)	74.3	2.79	63.73	79.31	47
2 回目ワクチン接種率 (%)	70.29	2.46	60.71	74.61	47
確保病床利用率 (%)	2.84	2.07	0	9.4	47
医療施設の従事者数 (10 万人あたり)	261.44	40.95	177.8	338.4	47

図表 5：独立変数の相関係数表



図表 5 を見ると、各種陽性者数間の相関係数は 0.91 以上と、高い値が出ている。そのため 5 種類の陽性者変数は、同時にモデルに組み込まないこととする。

図表 6 を見ると、1 回目ワクチン接種率と 2 回目ワクチン接種率の相関係数が 0.88 と高いため、同時にモデルには組み込まないこととする。

以上の予備的考察の結果も踏まえて、分析は 2 段階に分け、計 13 本の推定モデルを作成した。

1 段階目 (モデル A~E) では、前回得票率以外のコントロール変数を入れず、各独立変数を投入する。ただし、多重共線性を考慮し、陽性者数を表す諸変数については、順次個別に投入する。

2 段階目 (モデル F~I) では、個々の独立変数と従属変数との関係を検証するため、独立変数に

図表 6：コントロール変数の相関係数表

	前回得票率	高齢者割合	賃金変化率	1回目ワクチン接種率	2回目ワクチン接種率	確保病床使用率	医療施設の従事者数
前回得票率	1	0.44	<del>0.3</del>	<del>-0.1</del>	<del>0.24</del>	<del>-0.1</del>	<del>0.3</del>
高齢者割合	0.44	1	0.45	0.41	0.49	<del>-0.29</del>	<del>0.4</del>
賃金変化率	<del>0.3</del>	0.45	1	<del>0.1</del>	<del>0.3</del>	<del>0.2</del>	<del>-0.3</del>
1回目ワクチン接種率	<del>-0.1</del>	0.41	<del>0.1</del>	1	0.88	<del>-0.2</del>	-0.52
2回目ワクチン接種率	<del>0.24</del>	0.49	<del>0.3</del>	0.88	1	<del>-0.26</del>	<del>-0.24</del>
確保病床使用率	<del>-0.1</del>	<del>-0.29</del>	<del>0.2</del>	<del>-0.2</del>	<del>-0.26</del>	1	<del>-0.06</del>
医療施設の従事者数	<del>0.3</del>	<del>0.4</del>	<del>-0.3</del>	-0.52	<del>-0.24</del>	<del>-0.06</del>	1

加えて、コントロール変数も投入する。

モデル F：累計死者数（10 万人あたり）についての分析

モデル G：重症者数（10 万人あたり）についての分析

モデル H：入院治療を要する者の数（10 万人あたり）についての分析

モデル I：新規陽性者数（10 万人あたり、4 週間分）についての分析

\* 新規陽性者数は、1 段階目にて唯一有意を確認した「4 週間分」に限定してモデルを作成した。

これら 4 つのモデルを

- ① 1 回目ワクチン接種率をコントロールするパターン
  - ② 2 回目ワクチン接種率をコントロールするパターン
- にそれぞれ分けて分析する。

## 第 4 節 分析結果

本節では、第 4 節で作成したモデルの分析結果を提示し、その結果の考察を行う。

図表 7 をみると、まず、全てのモデルにおいて F 値が 1% 水準で適切であることが確認される。また、修正済み R<sup>2</sup> の値より、どのモデルから推定された回帰式も、与党相対得票率の分散の約 80% を説明していると言える。

図表7：1段階目の分析結果

	モデル(A)	モデル(B)	モデル(C)	モデル(D)	モデル(E)
従属変数	2021年衆議院選挙比例代表 相対得票率				
説明変数					
前回(2017年)得票率	0.776*** (0.100)	0.786*** (0.097)	0.802*** (0.095)	0.808*** (0.095)	0.810*** (0.094)
累計死者数	-0.031*** (0.010)	-0.031*** (0.010)	-0.033*** (0.010)	-0.034*** (0.010)	-0.035*** (0.010)
重症者数	-16.737*** (8.075)	-15.987* (7.930)	-15.305* (7.826)	-15.665* (7.768)	-15.226* (7.722)
入院治療を要する者の数	0.113 (0.289)	0.061 (0.294)	-0.021 (0.295)	-0.010 (0.285)	-0.017 (0.281)
新規陽性者数(10/30)	0.867 (1.502)				
新規陽性者数(1週間分)		0.196 (0.209)			
新規陽性者数(2週間分)			0.161 (0.110)		
新規陽性者数(3週間分)				0.129 (0.079)	
新規陽性者数(4週間分)					0.111* (0.061)
切片	16.237*** (4.959)	15.786*** (4.852)	15.092*** (4.749)	14.805*** (4.732)	14.726*** (4.667)
N	47	47	47	47	47
修正済みR <sup>2</sup>	0.776	0.779	0.809	0.811	0.814
F値	32.899***	33.436***	34.715***	35.219***	35.845***

○統計的有意水準：\*p < 0.1; \*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\*p < 0.01 ○括弧内は標準誤差

次に、独立変数の推定係数を順に見ていく。累計死者数については、全てのモデルにおいて1%水準で有意を示しており、係数は-0.03付近を推移している。重症者数について、モデルAで1%水準、モデルB～Eで10%水準の有意を示しており、係数は-15.2～-16.7を推移している。どちらも、推定係数は負であり、この方向は一貫している。

一方、入院治療を要する者の数について、全てのモデルにおいて有意を示せなかった。陽性者数についても、4週間分のみが10%水準で有意を示している。しかも係数は0.111と、正の方向である。

さて、引き続いて、以上の分析結果が、コントロール変数を追加して推定し直すと、どのように変わるかを検証する。なお、第一段階の分析結果をふまえて、統計的に有意な効果が確認できなかった陽性者数変数については、4週間分の変数のみを推定に用いることとする。

図表8を見ると、まず、全てのモデルにおいてF値が1%水準で適切である。修正済みR<sup>2</sup>の値より、モデルFとGから推定された回帰式は、与党相対得票率の分散の約79%を説明しており、モデルHとIから推定された回帰式は、与党相対得票率の分散の約69%を説明している。推定モデルのフィッ

図表 8 : 2 段階目の分析結果

	モデル (F-①)	モデル (F-②)	モデル (G-①)	モデル (G-②)	モデル (H-①)	モデル (H-②)	モデル (I-①)	モデル (I-②)
従属変数	2021 年衆議院選挙比例代表 相対得票率							
説明変数								
前回 (2017 年) 得票率	0.804*** (0.096)	0.822*** (0.098)	0.905*** (0.094)	0.911*** (0.094)	0.877*** (0.114)	0.899*** (0.114)	0.891*** (0.119)	0.910*** (0.118)
累計死者数	-0.035*** (0.008)	-0.034*** (0.009)						
重症者数			-28.849*** (6.898)	-28.930*** (6.773)				
入院治療を要する者の数					-0.162 (0.451)	-0.042 (0.428)		
陽性者数 (4 週間分)							0.014 (0.072)	0.023 (0.071)
高齢者割合	-0.052 (0.215)	-0.117 (0.216)	0.060 (0.202)	0.075 (0.191)	0.381* (0.225)	0.340 (0.224)	0.415 (0.251)	0.386 (0.253)
賃金変化率	0.270 (0.175)	0.286 (0.182)	0.268 (0.175)	0.256 (0.178)	0.207 (0.211)	0.209 (0.216)	0.193 (0.211)	0.197 (0.217)
1 回目ワクチン接種率	-0.239 (0.203)		-0.030 (0.206)		-0.244 (0.280)		-0.181 (0.250)	
2 回目ワクチン接種率	-0.110 (0.208)			-0.069 (0.204)		-0.121 (0.269)		-0.100 (0.249)
確保病床利用率	-0.157 (0.205)	-0.150 (0.209)	-0.210 (0.201)	-0.214 (0.200)	-0.320 (0.322)	-0.372 (0.317)	-0.402* (0.236)	-0.398 (0.238)
医療施設の従事者数	-0.029** (0.013)	-0.022* (0.011)	-0.032** (0.013)	-0.033*** (0.011)	-0.038** (0.015)	-0.032** (0.013)	-0.038** (0.015)	-0.033** (0.013)
切片	41.990** (16.254)	31.094** (14.198)	17.633 (15.408)	19.613 (13.351)	25.422 (22.399)	14.491 (18.326)	18.857 (21.110)	11.135 (17.828)
N	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47
修正済み R <sup>2</sup>	0.788	0.782	0.790	0.790	0.696	0.692	0.695	0.693
F 値	25.466***	24.608***	25.647***	25.721***	16.053***	15.752***	16.003***	15.804***

○統計的有意水準：\*p < 0.1; \*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\*p < 0.01 ○括弧内は標準誤差

トという点では、コントロール変数を入れない一段階目とそれほど変わらないと言える。

次に、独立変数について、順に見ていく。累計死者数については、1%水準で有意を示しており、係数は -0.035, -0.034 を示している。すなわち、10 万人あたり累計死者数が 1 人増えると、与党相対得票率が約 0.03% 低下する事を示している。重症者数についても、1%水準で有意を示しており、係数は -28.849, -28.930 である。すなわち、10 万人あたり重症者数が 1 人増えると、与党相対得票率が約 28.9% 低下する事を表している。なお、死者数の影響と重症者数の影響の推定係数が 1 桁違うのは、死者数が累計値であるのに対して、重症者数は一週間の平均値を取っているためである。よって、分かりやすく言い換えれば、重症者については、100 万人あたり 1 人増えると、与党の相対得票率が約

2.89%低下する、ということである。

ここで強調すべきは、コントロール変数を加えた上でも、特に医療体制の充実度をコントロールした上でも、累計死者数と重症者数の推定結果が統計的に有意である、という点であろう。この結果は、有権者が新型コロナウイルスによる死亡と重症化については、政治家に帰すべき責任があると捉えていることを示唆し、合理的というよりは恣意的な投票行動をとっている可能性を浮き彫りにしている。

図表8によると、死や重症化と比べて、入院治療を要する者の数と陽性者数については、与党相対得票率に影響を与えたとは言えないことがわかる。その理由として、おそらく2021年10月までには、有権者が「コロナ慣れ」し、ウイルスに罹患する可能性、さらには感染した場合に入院治療（自宅療養も含まれる）を要することになるという見通しを、当たり前のことと受け止め、そうしたことについては政治家に責任を負わせるまでもないという感覚を持ち合わせたからだとも考えられる。逆に言えば、そうした中でさえ、累計死者数と重症者数の変数が与党得票率に及ぼす負の影響が一貫して認められることは、感染は仕方ないにしても、死や重症に至るまでには政府がなすべきことがあっただろうと、有権者が考えていることを示唆しているように思われる。

また、コントロール変数の医療施設の従事者数について、全てのモデルにおいて有意が示されており、得票率に負の影響を与えたと推定されている。これは、累計死者数や重症者数が同程度であった場合には、医療施設の従事者数が多いことは、医療体制の非効率を示唆している、という意味で、有権者が厳しい、合理的な業績評価を下していると解釈できる。

## 第5節 ロバストネスチェック

本節では、上記で示した結果について、頑健性の確認を行う。具体的には、まず確保病床使用率の代わりに、感染病床を有する病院数・感染病床数とする分析を行う。次に、従属変数を相対得票率ではなく絶対得票率にした場合でも、類似の結果が出るのかを確認する。最後に、分析対象を、さらに一年後に行われた国政選挙である2022年の参議院選挙としても、類似の結果が出るのか、を確認する。なお、ロバストネスチェックの段階において用いる独立変数は、前節までの分析で有意な効果が推定された累計死者数と重症者数に限定する。

まず、確保病床使用率と感染病床を有する病院数・感染病床数について述べる。そもそも、これらの変数を、上記の分析で採用しなかったのは、その測定が一貫していないという疑義が拭えなかったからである。とりわけ、東京都については、2021年2月16日まで、確保病床使用率を国基準ではなく、独自の都基準で算出していたことが知られている。衆議院選挙が行われた2021年10月には、全都道府県が国基準による報告を行っているが、その一貫性については「未解明部分がある」との指摘も残っている<sup>(8)</sup>。

(8) 楊井人文 (2021) 「【検証コロナ禍】東京都の重症病床使用率、大幅な下方修正 気づかず再び誤報のメディアも」を参照。 [https://note.com/h\\_yanai/n/nb997e4eeec569](https://note.com/h_yanai/n/nb997e4eeec569)

そこで、ここではロバストネスチェックの目的で、医療制度の充実度を測る追加的な指標として使用する。それぞれの変数は、政府統計ポータルサイト「e-Stat」が提供する「医療施設調査/令和3年医療施設（動態）調査 都道府県編」から得る。感染病床を有する病院数は、「第11表 人口10万対病院数, 病院-病床の種類・都道府県-指定都市・特別区・中核市（再掲）別」から、感染病床数は「第15表（報告書第28表） 病院の人口10万対病床数, 病院-病院の種類・都道府県-指定都市・特別区・中核市（再掲）別」から入手した。これらは、2021年各都道府県の10万人あたりの数値だ。重回帰分析を行った結果が図表9である。

図表9から明らかなように、依然として、累計死者数、重症者数については、負の（統計的に有意な）効果が推定される。

図表9：医療制度の充実度を変更した場合の重回帰分析

	モデル(J-①)	モデル(J-②)	モデル(K-①)	モデル(K-②)
従属変数	2021年衆議院選挙比例代表 相対得票率			
説明変数				
前回（2017年）得票率	0.805*** (0.098)	0.822*** (0.100)	0.910*** (0.097)	0.914*** (0.098)
累計死者数	-0.037*** (0.009)	-0.036*** (0.009)		
重症者数			-29.998*** (7.103)	-30.076*** (7.030)
高齢者割合	0.003 (0.238)	-0.087 (0.237)	0.091 (0.234)	0.106 (0.220)
賃金変化率	0.253 (0.177)	0.274 (0.184)	0.246 (0.178)	0.237 (0.181)
1回目ワクチン接種率	-0.255 (0.210)		-0.014 (0.212)	
2回目ワクチン接種率		-0.102 (0.212)		-0.046 (0.209)
感染病床を有する病院数	1.334 (3.389)	1.196 (3.444)	1.814 (3.387)	1.786 (3.376)
感染病床数	-0.681 (1.032)	-0.519 (1.038)	-0.553 (1.039)	-0.556 (1.027)
医療施設の従事者数	-0.028** (0.013)	-0.021* (0.011)	-0.031** (0.013)	-0.032** (0.011)
切片	41.636** (16.487)	29.510** (14.312)	14.719 (15.410)	16.368 (13.347)
N	47	47	47	47
修正済みR <sup>2</sup>	0.782	0.775	0.780	0.780
F値	21.647***	20.817***	21.355***	21.385***

○統計的有意水準：\*p < 0.1; \*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\*p < 0.01 ○括弧内は標準誤差

図表 10：絶対得票率を従属変数とした場合の重回帰分析

	モデル(L-①)	モデル(L-②)	モデル(M-①)	モデル(M-②)
従属変数	2021年衆議院選挙比例代表 絶対得票率			
説明変数				
前回(2017年)得票率	0.637*** (0.095)	0.629*** (0.098)	0.719*** (0.092)	0.715*** (0.095)
累計死者数	-0.017*** (0.005)	-0.018*** (0.005)		
重症者数			-12.015*** (4.089)	-11.678*** (4.045)
高齢者割合	0.013 (0.119)	-0.007 (0.119)	0.098 (0.114)	0.118 (0.110)
賃金変化率	0.134 (0.100)	0.146 (0.104)	0.109 (0.103)	0.106 (0.107)
1回目ワクチン接種率	-0.009 (0.114)		0.070 (0.120)	
2回目ワクチン接種率		0.036 (0.118)		0.039 (0.123)
確保病床利用率	0.014 (0.116)	0.019 (0.116)	-0.026 (0.117)	-0.031 (0.118)
医療施設の従事者数	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.009 (0.006)
切片	14.058 (9.045)	11.373 (7.860)	3.157 (8.813)	5.716 (7.849)
N	47	47	47	47
修正済みR <sup>2</sup>	0.790	0.790	0.776	0.774
F値	25.651***	25.721***	23.733***	23.549***

○統計的有意水準：\*p < 0.1; \*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\*p < 0.01 ○括弧内は標準誤差

次に、相対得票率ではなく、絶対得票率を従属変数として用いて、再度重回帰分析を行う。

図表 10 を見ると、従属変数を絶対得票率に設定しても、累計死者数と重症者数は1%水準で有意を示し、得票率に対して負の影響を与えていることが見てとれる。累計死者数と重症者数の頑健性を確認できたと言える。一方で、医療施設の従事者数は、有意な結果を示せなかった。

さて、ここまでの分析は、コロナ禍での最初の国政選挙である第49回衆議院選挙を対象としていた。その翌年、もう一つの国政選挙である参議院選挙(第26回参議院選挙)が、2022年7月10日に行われた。この時点でも、コロナ禍はまだ終息してはいえない。そこで、この参院選のデータを用いて、本稿で展開してきた議論や解釈のさらなる頑健性を確認することにする。周知のように、参議院は3年ごとに半数が改選される。同じ候補者という条件を揃えるため、前回選挙は第25回ではなく2016年の第24回とする。参議院選挙を舞台に行った重回帰分析の結果が図表 11 である。

図表 11 でも、累計死者数が依然として統計的に有意な結果を示しており、得票率に対して負の影



図表 11：参議院選挙の重回帰分析


	モデル(N-①)	モデル(N-②)	モデル(O-①)	モデル(O-②)
従属変数	2022年 参議院選挙比例代表 相対得票率			
説明変数				
前回(2016年)得票率	0.687*** (0.093)	0.687*** (0.093)	0.823*** (0.093)	0.822*** (0.093)
累計死者数	-0.125** (0.051)	-0.125** (0.050)		
重症者数			1.090 (2.576)	0.982 (2.594)
高齢者割合	0.447** (0.183)	0.454** (0.183)	0.487** (0.195)	0.499** (0.196)
賃金変化率	-0.138 (0.183)	-0.143 (0.183)	-0.086 (0.196)	-0.090 (0.196)
1回目ワクチン接種率	-0.192 (0.202)		-0.004 (0.220)	
2回目ワクチン接種率		-0.206 (0.201)		-0.029 (0.223)
確保病床利用率	0.019 (0.053)	0.018 (0.053)	0.006 (0.062)	0.006 (0.062)
医療施設の従事者数	-0.033** (0.013)	-0.034** (0.013)	-0.035** (0.014)	-0.036** (0.014)
切片	25.934 (17.456)	26.881 (17.224)	1.012 (17.999)	2.922 (18.109)
N	47	47	47	47
修正済みR <sup>2</sup>	0.820	0.820	0.793	0.793
F値	30.870***	31.002***	26.129***	26.142***

○統計的有意水準：\*p < 0.1; \*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\*p < 0.01 ○括弧内は標準誤差

響を与えている。一方で、重症者数については、有意な効果が推定されない。この結果は、すでに示唆した通り、時間の経過と共に、有権者の間では「コロナ慣れ」が進んでいったことの表れとも理解できる。すなわち、2022年においては、コロナに感染すれば重症化する見通しさえもが、受け入れられた可能性がある。しかし、これは裏返せば、コロナに対する医療の進歩により、重症化しても死亡には必ずしも至らないという認識が広がったことを意味している。この時点においても、累計死者数は、与党得票率に負の影響を与えており、コロナに感染して死亡することについては、非日常的な事象だと受け止められていることの傍証であろう。

3つのロバストネスチェックを通して、コロナ累計死者数が与党得票率に負の影響を与えていることが、頑健に再確認されたといえよう。参考までに、視覚的にコロナ累計死者数の与党得票率に対する影響を捉えるため、図12で二つの変数間だけの散布図を提示しておく。

図 12：コロナ累計死者数×比例代表与党得票率の散布図グラフ



## 結論

本稿では、「新型コロナウイルス感染拡大による被害は、国政選挙における与党得票率に影響を与えるのか」というリサーチクエスチョンを明らかにするために、47都道府県を単位として、政権与党である自民党と公明党の得票率と新型コロナウイルスの被害状況との関係性について、実証的な計量分析を行った。

主たる分析対象として選んだ第49回衆議院選挙は、日本で新型コロナウイルスが流行してから初めて行われた国政選挙である。その勝敗だけを単純に見れば、現職与党である自民党、公明党が議席の過半数を獲得した選挙であった。しかし、感染や重症化、死亡の被害が発生している中であって、コロナの状況がこの選挙にどのように影響を及ぼしたのか、とりわけ政権与党にとってどれほどダメージとなったのかは、重要な問いである。そして、先にも記したように、日本政治の文脈において、コロナ禍と選挙の関係については、まだほとんど分析が進んでいない。

本稿の計量分析の結果で、一貫して明らかとなったのは、累計死者数と重症者数が与党得票率に負の影響を与えたということである。また、コントロール変数としてではあるが、医療施設に従事する人数についても、与党得票率に負の影響を与えるという、業績評価モデルを示唆する結果を一部得た。一方で、政治家の明らかな業績であるワクチン接種率などは有意な結果が得られていない。

特筆すべきは、累計死者数である。医療制度の充実度によるコントロール、絶対得票率、参議院選挙による3つのロバストネスチェックを通して、依然として累計死者数の効果の有意性が確認された。すなわち、様々な事情を勘案しても、累計死者数は与党得票率に影響を与えることが明らかになった。

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以上から、本稿では、業績評価モデルを支持するような結果も見受けられる一方で、シャークアタック現象モデルの一面も見受けられる、と結論するのが妥当であろう。新規陽性者数ではなく累計死者数について有意な推定結果が得られたということは、累計死者数を自然災害の結果としてではなく、医療体制などの政策の業績の帰結として有権者が捉えていることの表れであるように思われる。その一方、医療体制の充実度でコントロールしてもなお、累計死者数に有意な推定結果が得られた点は、有権者がコロナによる死亡の増大に憤慨し、そのため政権党への支持を押し下げた可能性を示唆している。これは、合理的というよりは、恣意的、情動的な投票行動を浮き彫りにしているといえる。

最後に、本稿には3つの課題点があることを指摘して終わりたい。

1つ目は、本稿で分析に用いたデータが集計データである、という点である。そのような分析では、有権者の全体としての傾向を推し量ることはできても、個人がどのような意思決定をして投票行動をしているのかまでは特定することはできない。本来ならば、有権者個人に対するサーベイ実験を行って、因果メカニズムをより厳密に検証することが必要である。もちろん、そのような実験を、選挙のタイミングに合わせてタイムリーに行うことは、非常に難しい。

2つ目は、分析が都道府県単位で行われた、という点である。集計データだとしても、より有権者個人単位に近づくためには、より下位レベルの市区町村データで分析する方が望ましいであろう。しかし、新型コロナウイルスの感染や被害の状況については、市区町村レベルでのデータを入手することができなかった。

3つ目は、上記とも関連するが、サンプル数が47個に限られているという点である。データの信頼性を増すためには市区町村データなどのより多くのサンプルが必要である。しかし、そのような制約の中でも、累計死者数の効果については、一貫性のある頑健な結果が得られたということは、強調しておきたい。

未曾有のパンデミックを引き起こした新型コロナウイルスが国政選挙の得票率に与える影響について解明した研究は他に見受けられないため、本稿が見出した知見には学術的意義がある。また、業績評価モデルとシャークアタック現象モデルとの間の論争に鑑みても、本稿の分析及び分析結果は現代政治分析へ一定の貢献をなすものと思われる。感染症のみならず自然災害が多発する日本において、本稿が緊急事態に直面した際の投票行動を解明する一助となれば幸いである。

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〈学部学生部門 (Undergraduate student category)〉

【数理・統計計量部門 (Category of Theoretical Analysis and Statistical/Quantitative Analysis)】

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## 日本の自動車関連企業における リコールの株価下落効果

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### 要旨

本研究の目的は、日本の自動車関連会社において発生したリコールと株価の関係を題材に、企業の不祥事が株価に与える影響を明らかにすることにある。近年企業の不祥事が頻発し、企業には一層の不祥事対策が求められる。そのためには、まず不祥事がどのような結果を引き起こすのかというリスクを正しく認識する必要がある。そこで本稿では、リスクを定量的に把握する指標として株価（終値の収益率）を使用し、不祥事から受ける影響を推定した。また、不祥事の種類や産業によって不祥事と株価の関係性が異なる可能性が存在することから、今回は分析対象とする不祥事を自動車関連会社のリコールに限定した。本稿では、日本経済新聞社から提供された新聞記事データを利用することで、決定木の一種であるLightGBMを用いた教師あり学習と人力を組み合わせ、対象期間内のリコールを客観的な指標の下で十分な数を抽出することができた。また、リコールの中でも特に人々に周知され、株価に影響を与えた可能性が高いものに注目することもできた。上述の手法によって抽出されたリコールに関する報道を処置として、本稿ではGeneralized Synthetic Control Method (GSC) の手法を用いてリコールが株価収益率に与える影響について分析を行った。この手法は、対照群と処置がなかった場合の処置群が並行に推移するという状況を仮定したうえで対照群を比較するDifference in Differences (DID) の考え方に基づいた推定手法であるが、GSCは複数の対照群から未知のトレンドの存在を仮定して、それらのトレンドに対して各処置群がどの程度反応するのかを推定し、仮想的な処置群を構築するという点でDIDとは異なる。このようなアプローチによって作成された仮想的な処置群と実際の処置群の比較に

よって処置効果を推定することによって、対照群と処置群が並行トレンドの仮定を満たさない可能性を考慮することができるのが、GSCの利点である。結果として、対象となった全事例を平均すると、リコール報道は株価を10日間で1.8%ポイント減少させると推定された。これは本稿で使用した株価の分布を考慮すると、無視できない大きさの減少があったといえる。企業がリコールのリスクを定量的に把握し、その対策にどの程度のコストをかけるかの意思決定の一助となることが期待される。しかし各企業ごとに推定結果を見た場合、リコール報道とは異なる要因によって過大に処置効果が推定された事例が存在し、平均の処置効果が過大に推定されている可能性が懸念された。以上の懸念を踏まえると、今後はリコール報道前後における各企業に関する報道を調べることで、リコール報道以外の要因や企業の対応、姿勢を確認していく必要があるだろう。

## 1. イントロダクション

近年、企業の不祥事が頻発している。不祥事への社会的な関心は高まる一方で、新たな不祥事の発生は後を絶たない。このような状況下においては、各企業には一層の不祥事対策が求められる。つまり、どれほどのコストを不祥事への対策に割くのかという意思決定を迫られていることになる。そのためにはまず、不祥事によりどの程度の損失がもたらされるかというリスクを正しく把握することが必要となる。単に不祥事を漠然と避けるべきものだと思うにとどまらず、それが引き起こす結果を定量的に把握することが望ましい。

そこで本稿では、日本の自動車関連会社において発生したリコールが株価を下げるかを検証する。日本経済新聞のデータを使用してリコール情報を収集し、Generalized Synthetic Control Method (GSC) という手法を使用してその株価への影響を推定した。その結果、平均としてはリコールは株価をわずかに下げるという結果が得られた。

不祥事と株価の関係を検証した先行研究としてはKarpoff and Lott (1993) などが挙げられる。Karpoff and Lott (1993) では、法的な処罰よりも株価の下落による市場からの罰則の方が効果が大きいことを論じ、株価の下落の要因の大部分を信用の毀損が占めることを示した。株価の下落は不祥事の結果企業が被る損害のすべてではないが、その指標としては適切であるといえる。

Prince and Rubin (2002) のように、産業種別により不祥事に対する株価の反応が異なることを示唆する先行研究も多数存在する。そこで本稿ではPrince and Rubin (2002) と同様に、データが豊富に存在し、かつ日本経済への影響が大きい自動車関連産業を対象とした。さらに抽出の正確性を高めるため、不祥事の内容をリコールに限定した。

Karpoff and Lott (1993) や Prince and Rubin (2002) では企業の不祥事が株価を下げることが示されている一方で、Garber and Adams (1998) のように企業の不祥事が株価に影響を与えないことを示した先行研究も存在する。Prince and Rubin (2002) では企業の不祥事が報じられた時点をショックとしているのに対して、Garber and Adams (1998) では裁判の評決をショックとしているという

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違いがある。本稿では、日経新聞で報じられたリコールをショックとして利用する。

日本における事例を検証した先行研究としては、小佐野・堀（2006）などが挙げられる。小佐野・堀（2006）では、企業不祥事は株価に有意な影響を与えず長期保有する株主に損害を与える可能性は低いことと、法令順守に違反する不祥事や環境汚染に関する不祥事のような、特定の種類の不祥事に限っては株価が影響を受ける可能性があることが示された。

これらの先行研究を踏まえたうえでの本稿の新規性は二点ある。第一に、日本経済新聞社から提供された新聞記事データを利用したことがある。これにより、十分な標本数を確保しつつ、期間内のリコールを客観的な指標の下で抽出することが可能となった。また、新聞で報道されるほど社会的に影響が大きく、企業イメージに影響があった可能性のある不祥事に着目してデータを集めることができた。

第二に、日本の自動車産業を対象として統計的分析を行った点がある。自動車産業は日本を代表する産業の一つであり、国内外への影響力が大きい産業であるため、その性質を検証する意義は大きい。この自動車産業を対象とした先行研究には、井村（2013）のように個別の不祥事事例に対してケーススタディを行ったものと、不祥事をカテゴリ分けして統計的な効果検証を行ったものがある。ケーススタディを行った先行研究に比して、リコールなどの特定のカテゴリの不祥事に対して統計的な検証を行った先行研究は非常に少ない。本稿では、後述する Generalized Synthetic Control Method (GSC) という手法を用いて、統計的因果推論を行った。

本論文は以下のような構成になっている。まず、使用したデータの取得ならびに抽出の方法を説明し、記述統計を示す。次に、本稿で採用した手法である GSC の推定方法などの理論的枠組みについて説明する。最後に、分析結果とその解釈を提示し、頑健性の確認をして、結論を述べる。

## 2. データ

### 2.1 データの出典

日本の自動車関連会社のリコール事例を数え上げるにあたり、本学の理工学術院とデータ科学センターが共同で今年に開催した「第5回早稲田大学データサイエンスコンペティション」にて、日本経済新聞社から提供された新聞記事データの全てを使用した。データの期間は2010年4月～2011年3月、2016年4月～2017年3月、2022年4月～2023年3月の計3年度分である。

また、株価データは、本学が契約しているデータベースである「日経 NEEDS Financial QUEST」から取得した。アクセス時点で東京証券取引所に上場している全ての企業のデータが利用可能であった。データのダウンロードは2023年10月25日に行った。

### 2.2 リコール記事の抽出

さて、リコール事例は前述の新聞記事データに基づいて抽出した。その方法として、まずは記事本

文に「リコール」という単語を含む記事の抽出を行った。この段階では、例えば「企業 A は先月大規模なリコールがあったが売り上げを徐々に回復している」などの、「リコール発表」とは異なる記事も残っている。そこで次に、「リコール発表」に関する記事を、予測モデルを使用して抽出した。予測は、決定木の一種である LightGBM を用いた教師あり学習によって行い、「リコール発表」記事か否かについての正解ラベルは、無作為抽出された一部のデータに対して人手で付与することによって作成した。そして最後に、「リコール発表」だと分類された記事全てを実際読み、予測が間違っていた記事 4 件を削除した。以上の方法により、11 社の 54 件のリコール発表事例を抽出した。

### 2.3 リコール記事を元にした処置変数の作成

こうして抽出されたリコール記事について、記事の掲載日、あるいはその日からもっとも近い掲載日後はじめての、東京証券取引所の営業日を「処置」の開始日と定義した。

ここで、「リコール発生日と処置開始日には幾許かのずれがある」ことに注意する。これは主に以下の二点による。一つ目に、新聞は企業のリコール発表を、その翌日の朝刊などで報じることがある。二つ目には、リコール発表が土日祝日に行われた場合、東京証券取引所は取引をしていないため、その後初めての営業日を処置開始日としている。

### 2.4 記述統計

次に、処置群と対照群を含む、分析に用いた全企業/期間のデータの記述統計を示す。処置群は、計 54 件のリコールが生じた 11 社の自動車関連会社の該当期間のデータで構成されている。一方、対照群には、景気や為替レートなどの外部条件に自動車関連会社と近い影響を受けるであろうと考えられる「東証 33 業種の区分において“機械産業”に属する企業」41 社を利用した。また、結果変数には以下の式の最右辺で表される「終値の収益率」を使用した。

$$\text{収益率}_t = \frac{\text{終値}_t - \text{終値}_{t-1}}{\text{終値}_{t-1}} \doteq (\log \text{終値}_t) - (\log \text{終値}_{t-1})$$

なお、企業特有のショックによって収益率が外れ値を取った場合、それらは処置群の反実仮想を構築する際にノイズとなり得るため、対照群データのうち、収益率の絶対値が 0.2 を超えた日についてはそれをデータから除外した。

さて、全ての企業/期間についての終値の収益率の要約統計量は以下の表 1 のようであった。表 1 からは、-0.0114~0.0122 という狭い範囲に半分のデータが存在するなど変動が小さい一方で、最小値は -0.25、最大値は 0.28 と突出した値を持つデータが含まれていることも分かる。

表 1 株価収益率の要約統計量

標本数	平均値	標準偏差	最小値	第一四分位数	第三四分位数	最大値
47580	0.0002730	0.02307	-0.253	-0.01139	0.01222	0.2806



また、全ての企業/期間の終値の収益率の分布は以下の図1のようになっていた。

図1 株価収益率のヒストグラム




図1からは、対象データはばらつきが小さく、左右対称に近い分布をしていること、言い換えれば、0を中心とした裾の広い分布に従っていることが読み取れる。なお、歪度は-0.395であったため峰は若干右方に寄っている。また尖度は11.488と大きいことから、終値の収益率のばらつきの小ささは強調される。

### 3. 理論的枠組み

ある企業の株価にリコール報道が与える影響を推定するにあたって、観測不可能な要因を考慮することは重要である。例えば国際情勢の状況に対して各企業の株価はそれぞれ異なる反応を見せる可能性が考えられる。その他にも株価の変動要因は多岐にわたって考えられることから、単なるDifference in Differencesによる分析を適用する場合、対照群の株価収益率が処置群の株価収益率と並行に推移するという仮定を満たさない可能性が懸念される。本稿で採用した手法である、Xu (2017)により開発されたGeneralized Synthetic Control Method (GSC)では、株価変動の要因となるトレンドの存在を一つ、あるいは複数仮定して、そのトレンドに対して各企業がどの程度反応するのかを推定し、仮想的な処置群を構築することでこの可能性を考慮することができる。また、GSCの他の利点としては、処置群に処置がなかった場合の潜在的な結果変数を推定する際に用いられるデータは、処置が一度も行われぬ対照群のデータと、ある処置群の処置前のデータのみであるため、Goodman-Bacon (2021)によって提唱されているような、すでに処置があったグループと新たな処置群との比較が行われてしまうという従来のTwo-way Fixed Difference in Differencesを処置のタイミングが異なる場合へ適用する際に生じる問題点を解消していることも挙げられる。本稿におけるGSCのモデルは以下で表される。

$$Y_{it} = \delta_{it}D_{it} + \lambda_i' f_t + \alpha_i + \xi_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad \dots \textcircled{1}$$

$i$ は企業、 $t$ は日次での時間を表す。 $Y_{it}$ は各企業の各日次における株価の終値を対数差分して求め

られる収益率（以下、単に株価収益率と呼ぶ）、 $D_{it}$  はリコール報道後に常に 1 を取り続けるダミー変数、 $\delta_{it}$  はリコール報道後の各期の各企業における処置効果、 $\alpha_i$  は企業固定効果、 $\xi_t$  は時間固定効果、 $\varepsilon_{it}$  は誤差項である。またここで、 $f_t = [f_{1t}, f_{2t}, \dots, f_{rt}]'$  は  $r \times 1$  ベクトルの、ある時点における個体共通の時間変動する潜在因子を表し、 $\lambda_i = [\lambda_{i1}, \lambda_{i2}, \dots, \lambda_{ir}]'$  は  $r \times 1$  ベクトルの、個体特有の時間不変の因子負荷を表しており、その交差項がモデルに含まれている。なお、ここで  $r$  は因子の数を表す。この二つの変数は、前者は株価変動の要因となるトレンドを表し、後者はそのトレンドに対する各個体の反応の度合いを示していると解釈することができる。この GSC による処置効果の推定は、処置がなかった場合の処置群の潜在的な結果変数を上記のモデルを基にして予測し、実際の処置群の結果変数と比較することで実行される。これを数式にすると以下の通りである。

$$\hat{Y}_{it}(0) = \hat{\lambda}_i' \hat{f}_t + \hat{\alpha}_i + \hat{\xi}_t, i \in \Omega^{treatment}, t > T_0 \quad \dots \textcircled{2}$$

$$\hat{\delta}_{it} = Y_{it}(1) - \hat{Y}_{it}(0), i \in \Omega^{treatment}, t > T_0 \quad \dots \textcircled{3}$$

ここでハットがついている変数は、推定値であることを示している。また、 $\Omega^{treatment}$  は処置群を、 $T_0$  は処置が起きる直前の日を表す。 $\hat{Y}_{it}(0)$  は、実際にはリコール報道があった企業にリコール報道がなかった場合の潜在的な株価収益率を各企業について予測したものであり、 $Y_{it}(1)$  はリコール報道があった企業の株価収益率の実測値である。この実測値と予測値の差分が  $\hat{\delta}_{it}$  であり、これは各企業の処置後の各期の処置効果を推定した値となっている。これを全ての処置後期間、全ての処置群について平均したものが平均処置効果となる。同様に、各期における平均処置効果は、各期において全処置群の処置効果を平均することで求められる。

ここで、 $\hat{\delta}_{it}$  を求めるためには  $\hat{Y}_{it}(0)$  を推定する必要があるが、その推定のためには先に②式の右辺に用いられている変数を求める必要があるが、これらの変数は、第一に全期間における対照群の株価収益率のみを用いて  $f_t, \xi_t$  を推定し、次に処置群に含まれる各企業の処置前の期間の株価収益率と上で推定した  $f_t, \xi_t$  を用いて、処置群の処置前の各企業における  $\lambda_i', \alpha_i$  を推定することで求まる。

平均処置効果の具体的な推定手順を Xu (2017) に沿って以下に述べる。

まず、データ生成過程は

$$Y_{it} = \delta_{it} D_{it} + \lambda_i' f_t + \alpha_i + \xi_t + \varepsilon_{it}.$$

で表されるが、この式を以下のように変形する。

$$Y_{it} = \delta_{it} D_{it} + \lambda_i' f_t + \alpha_i + \xi_t + \mu + \varepsilon_{it}.$$

ここで、 $\mu$  は対照群における結果変数の平均である。

第一工程では、対照群のデータのみを用いて

$$(\hat{\lambda}_i, \hat{f}_t, \hat{\alpha}_i, \hat{\xi}_t, \hat{\mu}) = \underset{\lambda_i, f_t, \alpha_i, \xi_t, \mu}{\operatorname{argmin}} \sum_{t=1}^T \sum_{i \in \Omega^{control}} \tilde{\varepsilon}_{it}' \tilde{\varepsilon}_{it}.$$

を求める。ここで、 $t = 1, 2, \dots, T$  であり、 $\Omega^{control}$  は対照群を表す。また、

$$\tilde{e}_{it} = Y_{it} - \hat{f}_t \hat{\lambda}_i - \hat{\alpha}_i - \hat{\xi}_t - \hat{\mu}$$

であり、これは対照群の実際に観察された結果変数と予測される結果変数との誤差を表している。

第二工程では、各処置群のデータを用いて

$$(\hat{\lambda}_i, \hat{\alpha}_i)' = \underset{(\hat{\lambda}_i, \hat{\alpha}_i)'}{\operatorname{argmin}} \sum_{t=1}^{T_0} \mathbf{e}_{it}' \mathbf{e}_{it}, i \in \Omega^{treatment}.$$

を求める。また、

$$\underline{e}_{it} = Y_{it}^0 - \hat{f}_t \hat{\lambda}_i^0 - \hat{\alpha}_i - \hat{\xi}_t^0 - \hat{\mu}.$$

であり、これは処置前の期間における実際に観察された処置群の結果変数と予測される仮想的な処置群における結果変数の誤差を表している。ここで、上付きの 0 は処置前期間を表す。

最後に、以上で推定された変数を用いて、処置後期間における処置群が処置を受けなかった場合の結果変数の推定値を表すと

$$\hat{Y}_{it}(0) = \hat{\lambda}_i' \hat{f}_t + \hat{\alpha}_i + \hat{\xi}_t + \hat{\mu}, \forall i \in \Omega^{treatment}.$$

となる。このときの処置後の各期間における平均処置効果は

$$\widehat{ATT}_t = \frac{1}{N_{tr}} \sum_{i \in \Omega} [Y_{it}(1) - \hat{Y}_{it}(0)], i \in \Omega^{treatment}, t > T_0.$$

と表すことができる。 $N_{tr}$  は処置群の個体数の合計であり、 $T_0$  は処置される直前の日にちである。以上が推定の流れである。

また、因子数についても適切に定める必要があるが、その数の決定においては交差検証が用いられしており、過学習の可能性を抑制している。

なお本稿の分析では、同一企業に違う日次で複数回リコール報道があることを考慮するために、処置効果が長くとも 10 日間しか続かず、かつリコール報道が複数回起きることによる処置効果の増幅、あるいは減衰が生じないという仮定を置いたうえで、その処置が起きた企業の処置から 11 日後以降のデータを切り落とし、その切り落としたデータを新しい個体 ID としてデータセットに含めるという工程を踏んでいる。この方法は一般的ではないと考えられるが、同様の問題を本稿と同じ方法を用いて対応している文献としては Mader and Rüttenauer (2022) が挙げられる。

また、Xu (2017) では推論のためには処置前期間が 10 期間以上あることを推奨されているため、ある個体 ID において処置前期間が 10 期間以上存在しない場合はその個体 ID は除外されている。

処置効果の推定値の 95% 信頼区間の作成は、1000 回のパラメトリックブートストラップにより行われた。

今回の GSC による分析では、R のパッケージである *gsynth* v.1.2.1 を用いた。

#### 4. 結果

図2は合算したリコール発表企業の収益率の推移を表しており、実線は実測値、破線はGSCにより推定したリコールがなかった場合の推定値、垂線はリコール発表記事が掲載された時点を表している。図2は、リコール発表記事の掲載後、リコール発表企業の株価がリコールのなかった場合の推定の株価よりも減少する傾向があることを示唆している。また、処置前における実測値と推定値は近しく同じトレンドを辿っていることは、並行トレンドの仮定の成立を支持していると言える。

図2 リコール発表企業の合算した株価収益率の実測値と処置がなかった場合の推定値




図2. 縦軸は、リコール報道が株価収益率をどの程度減らしたのかを表す。横軸は処置後経過日数である。

次に、表2および図3はリコール発表記事掲載による平均処置効果を示している。表2によれば、平均処置効果は負であり、リコール発表記事によって株価が下がることが示唆されている。表2の(A)に注目すると、記事掲載後の全期間の平均処置効果は0.18%ポイントの減少であった。p値も約0.040であり、5%水準で有意であった。表2の(B)に注目すると、記事掲載直後の平均処置効果は0.29%ポイントとより大きな減少が見られたが、p値は約0.25であり、有意ではなかった。

最後に、図4はリコール発表記事の平均処置効果の点推定値と95%信頼区間をリコール事例ごとに個別に示したものである。図4は、個別の事例に注目するとリコール発表記事が株価を下げるとは言い切れないが、負の効果をもたらす場合が多いということを示唆している。

95%信頼区間に注目すると、統計的に有意な事例は3件のみである。また、統計的に有意な事例でもリコール発表記事以外のショックを拾っている可能性がある。例えば、左から20番目の2016年4月14日の三菱自動車のケースは、2016年4月20日の三菱自動車の燃費不正報告のショックを拾っている可能性が大きい。ただし個別の効果の推定では統計的精緻さが下がり、標準誤差が大きくなることには留意されたい。点推定値に注目すると、値が正のものがいくつもあり、リコール発表記事により株価が減少しない傾向にある事例が存在することがわかる。しかし点推定値が負である事例の方

表2 リコール発表記事による平均処置効果

(A) 平均処置効果

推定値	標準誤差	95%信頼区間 (下限)	95%信頼区間 (上限)	p 値
-0.001828	0.0008886	-0.00357	-0.00008685	0.03962

(B) 時点別の平均処置効果

処置後何日目か	推定値	標準誤差	95%信頼区間 (下限)	95%信頼区間 (上限)	p 値
1	-0.002887	0.002513	-0.0078114	0.0020379	0.250592
2	0.001745	0.002582	-0.0033152	0.0068044	0.499183
3	-0.001614	0.002546	-0.0066035	0.0033765	0.526241
4	-0.005648	0.002529	-0.0106044	-0.0006921	0.025504
5	-0.004285	0.002535	-0.0092533	0.0006836	0.090974
6	-0.004676	0.002520	-0.0096163	0.0002638	0.063555
7	-0.003221	0.002927	-0.0089574	0.0025164	0.271217
8	-0.003586	0.002530	-0.0085439	0.0013719	0.156304
9	-0.0008109	0.002820	-0.0063379	0.0047161	0.773686
10	0.001498	0.002779	-0.0039484	0.0069450	0.589784

図3 リコール発表記事による平均処置効果の図示




図3. 縦軸は、リコール報道が株価収益率(1=100%)をどの程度減らしたのかを表す。横軸は処置後経過日数であり、1日目からが処置期間である。点線より右側がリコール報道後を表す

が比較的多い。また統計的に有意ではないが平均処置効果が-1%前後とやや負に大きいものもいくつか存在する。

図4 リコール事例ごとの平均処置効果と95%信頼区間




図4. 縦軸は、リコール報道が株価収益率（1=100%）をどの程度減らしたのかを表す。

## 5. 頑健性の確認

上述のような三菱自動車の燃費不正報告のショックを拾ってしまっているという懸念を確認するために、不正があった三菱自動車のリコール（2016/4/14）を除外したサブグループでの各期の平均処置効果のプロットを図5に示す。点線より右側が処置後を表す。処置後全期間の平均処置効果は-0.13%ポイントとやや小さく、標準誤差は0.0936とやや大きくなっており、各期ごとの平均処置効果が統計的に有意となった期は存在せず、三菱自動車のリコール（2016/4/14）によって処置効果が過大に推定されていた可能性が示唆される。

図5 三菱自動車のリコール（2016/4/14）を除外した場合




図5. 縦軸は、リコール報道が株価収益率（1=100%）をどの程度減らしたのかを表す。横軸は処置後経過日数であり、1日目からが処置期間である。

次に、結果の頑健性の確認のために Two-ways Fixed Effects Event Study を実施した。モデルは以下の通りである。

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \xi_t + \sum_{l \neq -1, l \in L} \delta_l \mathbb{1}[t - k_i = l] + \varepsilon_{it}$$

ここで、 $l$  は処置後の経過日数、 $k_i$  は処置が起きた日にちである。 $\mathbb{1}[t - k_i = l]$  は  $t$  と  $k_i$  の差が  $l$  のときにのみ 1 を取る変数、 $\delta_l$  は  $l$  期における処置効果であり  $L$  は分析の対象となる処置からの相対的な期間を表す。

上記の分析を実行した結果が以下の図 6 であり、点線より右側が処置後を表す。5%水準で有意な処置効果は見られなかったほか、処置前期間における変動が有意になっており、並行トレンドの仮定を満たしていない可能性が懸念される。また処置後 10 期間における平均処置効果は約 -0.14%ポイントと推定されたが、標準誤差は 0.0793 とやや大きく、有意ではなかった。

図 6 TWFE Event Study による分析結果




図 6. 縦軸は、リコール報道が株価収益率（1=100%）をどの程度減らしたのかを表す。横軸は処置後経過日数であり、1日目からが処置期間である。

## 6. 結論

本稿では、リコール報道が企業の株価収益率の推移に与える影響について分析した。結果として、全事例かつ処置後 10 日間の推定結果を平均した場合、リコール報道は企業の株価収益率を 0.18%ポイント、つまり 10 日間の累積では 1.8%ポイント減少させると推定された。この結果は、リコール報道が株価を減少させることを示唆しており、リコールという事象に対して、限られた予算を用いてどの程度事前にリスクを抑制すべきかという、企業の運営判断の材料の一つになることが期待される。

しかし各企業ごとに推定結果を見た場合、一部の企業の処置効果が著しく大きく推定されているこ

とがわかり、その処置前後の報道を調べたところ、燃費不正のようなリコール報道とは異なる要因によって過大に処置効果が推定された事例が存在する可能性が懸念された。実際にこの事例を除外したサブグループの処置後10日間における平均処置効果は-0.13%ポイントとやや小さくなり、標準誤差はやや大きくなるため、元の分析では処置効果が過大に推定されていると考えられる。

一方で、推定値は負の符号で一貫しており、10日間の累積で考えると1.3%ポイントの株価収益率の減少が起きるということを考えると、リコール報道が負の効果を持たないとは言いきれない。また、各事例について10日間の平均処置効果を見た場合にはその値が0近傍の場合や正の場合が少なからず見られるが、-1%ポイント程度と負に大きめに推定されるケースも比較的多く存在することもわかる。このような結果のばらつきの要因としては、そもそもの標準誤差が大きいことも考慮しなければならないが、その他には例えば上述の燃費不正のようにリコール報道以外の要因を拾っている可能性や、それに加えて企業のリコールへの事後対応が関係している可能性も考えられる。

以上の懸念を踏まえると、今後はリコール報道前後における各企業に関する報道を調べることで、リコール報道以外の要因や企業の対応、姿勢を確認していく必要があるだろう。

## 7. 謝辞

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〈学部学生部門 (Undergraduate student category)〉

【歴史・思想・その他部門 (Category of History, Philosophy and other)】

優秀賞 (Outstanding essay award)

## Reexamining National Identity: Europe's Integration Crisis

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### Abstract

In this essay, I examine the mechanism between the evolving self-conception of national identities in the European Union and, consequently, the issue of integrating immigrants. A critical factor is the appearance of far right leaders throughout the West, who often positions themselves against increased immigration. My thesis is that the societal upheaval the European Union is dealing with requires a reevaluation of national identity. To that end, states must improve education and reform the media.

The first section offers a historical overview and analyzes the status quo in European politics with respect to nationhood. I move on to enumerate factors that influence national identity in Europe, explaining how founding myths and self-perception lead to complications. Next I discuss the relation to globalization and reactions thereto, which include fears of change and the blending of cultures. Suggesting further factors like replacement anxiety, I explain how shifting demographics spur fears and reactionary sentiments among the votership.

The next section offers two potential paths open to Europe. I present first the case of Singapore as a multiethnic state that ostensibly lacks the social tensions characteristic of contemporary Western society. Since Singapore exists in a fundamentally different context as compared to Europe, I urge that this method must not be elected. The second path open to Europe is that of 'liberal nationalism' as portrayed by Yael Tamir. I explain that her method is ultimately flawed because it contradicts individual identities.

My proposition is that a cross-cultural dialogue between immigrants and local society be established so that inevitable differences in culture do not lead to conflict. Rather than forcing immigrants to assimilate, they should be given the tools to coexist without being

forced to change radically. To that effect, I argue that immigrants should be encouraged to become self-reliant. The first tool I suggest to be used is education. The public system in general must teach citizens how to respectfully and effectively help immigrants to integrate, in addition to targeted education that helps newcomers settle smoothly. The other key tool is the media, which I argue need to be reformed so that debate can steer away from the problematic trajectory it is currently heading. Especially social media represents an opportunity to unify society instead of causing further cleavages. I conclude by admitting that all parts of society must cooperate to achieve this feat, government and citizens alike.

## Section I: Introduction

Nationalist populism is on the rise.<sup>(1)</sup> Support for protectionism has risen drastically, and high levels of immigration have strained social cohesion and order throughout the world.<sup>(2)</sup> National populists on the far right like former US President Donald Trump, former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, or Dutch politician Geert Wilders continue to mobilize the reactionary votership of their respective countries, appealing in many instances to “us-versus-them” and “in-group/out-group” mentalities that only serve to exacerbate already uneasy societal conditions. Marine Le Pen and Eric Zemmour (France), Georgia Meloni (Italy), Viktor Orbán (Hungary), and Robert Fico (Slovakia) indicate a strong pattern. The 2016 Brexit referendum conversely dispels the idea that this movement runs simply on coincidental electoral success of individual strongmen.<sup>(3)</sup> Rather, the examples listed suggest a societal disposition leaning towards certain policies, suggesting the origin lies in how national identity influences self-perception.

Given that the far right clearly positions itself against increased immigration, there is a *prima facie* link between both developments, a connection which has deeper roots, although it appears merely cosmetic. The focus of this essay is the EU, but I also draw upon broader examples from the West, notably the United States. This is due to shared experiences with the far right and many historical congruences that enhance my analysis. Immigration to Europe is expected to increase in

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(1) Abdul Noury and Gerard Roland, “Identity Politics and Populism in Europe.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 23 (2020): 421–439. doi: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-050718-03354212

(2) “Legal Migration and Integration.” *European Commission - Home Affairs*. Accessed November 30, 2023. [https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/legal-migration-and-integration/integration\\_en](https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/legal-migration-and-integration/integration_en); see also: “Migration and Migrant Population Statistics.” *European Commission - Eurostat*. Accessed November 30, 2023. [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migration\\_and\\_migrant\\_population\\_statistics#:~:text=In%202021%2C%202.3%20million%20immigrants,of%20international%20immigration%20in%202021.](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics#:~:text=In%202021%2C%202.3%20million%20immigrants,of%20international%20immigration%20in%202021.)

(3) Agust Arnorsson and Gylfie Zoega, “On the Causes of Brexit.” *European Journal of Political Economy* 55 (2018): 301–323. doi: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.02.001

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the future, continuing tendencies of the past 25 years.<sup>(4)</sup> This conveys Europe’s need to ensure its ability to integrate immigrants successfully so that they are able to lead fulfilling lives, while also ensuring that the autochthonous population does not become alienated, then radicalized, by the rapid change in culture that will follow. Since immigration can be assumed to continue steadily, and exclusionary or anti-immigration politics would be antidemocratic, this paper will presuppose the desirability of integration. I argue that in order to stop the erosion of social harmony throughout Europe – and, by extension, the rise in support for nationalist populism – national identity must be transformed because it hinders the multiculturalism that Europe needs. This should be accomplished via a cross-cultural dialogue between immigrants and locals, aided by targeted education and reformed media.

Before presenting my argument, I will establish some vocabulary that will be essential later on. Next, I will recount the reasons behind this push to the far right. The causes I consider include a troubled national self-perception, which is complicated by globalization, changing demographics, and further hampered by the lack of a framework to allow a multicultural populace to engage positively with its environment. The third section will review the difficulties immigrants face, and discredit nationalism as an approach that bears no fruit of success. Section four will advance my proposed solution and explain how education and media can be adapted to help achieve this goal. I then conclude, looking ahead to future challenges and opportunities.

## Definitions

Before beginning, I would like to quickly establish some relevant terminology in order to eliminate any unclarity. To start, I will use the terms ‘country’ and ‘state’. When referring to states, I will be referring to the administration or government, and when referring to countries, I will highlight the actions of the entire country, including the residents, administration, and any other private actors.

As for ‘nation,’ I consider Benedict Anderson’s portrayal of an “imagined community” helpful in discussing this subject, because it exposes that nationhood is a matter of self-perception. It takes both the members and outside observers of a nation to make it one, a process which the media shape heavily.<sup>(5)</sup>

David Miller further observes three important points about nations. First, they normally have destructive events in their past (he gives the examples of massacres).<sup>(6)</sup> These then gradually fade

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(4) Marie McAuliffe and Anna Triandafyllidou (EDS). *World Migration Report 2022*. International Organization for Migration (IOM), Geneva, 2021, p. 88;

“Statistics on migration to Europe.” *European Commission*. Accessed November 29, 2023. [https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/statistics-migration-europe\\_en1](https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/statistics-migration-europe_en1).

(5) Benedict Anderson. 1983. *Imagined Communities*. Verso.

(6) David Miller. 1995. *On Nationality*. Clarendon Press, 1-27.

out of the collective memory in order to enable a unifying cognitive dissonance throughout the national community, thereby upholding the noble lie.<sup>(7)</sup> Second, in criticizing the “lifeboat metaphor,”<sup>(8)</sup> he also shows that nationality is not so much a choice as arbitrary, as one can jump out of the lifeboat, whereas abandoning a nation is more difficult – it has to do with how others view an individual, meaning they must acknowledge the individual’s identity.<sup>(9)</sup> Third, he comments that communities of ‘compound-,’ or ‘hyphenated’ identities (e.g., Italian–American, Chinese–Canadian, etc.) must feel safe within their country of residence in order to integrate, rather than nourish their own sentiment of nationhood contrary to that of the host society.<sup>(10)</sup> I further adopt Miller’s view that ethnicity and nationality are not mutually exclusive, and can coexist.

This paper discusses integration holistically. Immigrants are people who move to a country other than where they were born or where their family is from – I refer to this new residence as the host country or society – sometimes becoming citizens. Refugees are immigrants who flee their home for reasons of security, not simply to benefit from wealthier societies with more opportunity. I will be referring collectively to immigrants because it includes all types of reasons for leaving one’s country, and I am discussing the issue on a macro, society-wide level.

National communities must then deal with immigrants in some way. For one, they could encourage assimilation. Assimilation means that an individual living in a host country tries their best to transform into a member of the host society; it is a one-way development, where others are made to conform.<sup>(11)</sup> Integration, on the other hand, means that there is a two-way exchange in which both guest and host give and take. Multiculturalism comes about when the two-way exchange takes place between both individuals and groups, predicated on integration.<sup>(12)</sup>

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(7) Ibid.

Manifest destiny, to take the American example, was used to justify the eradication of the indigenous tribes, and legitimized the American nation because of their imagined mission to ‘civilize’ the wild west. Another example is the French Revolution, the ideals of which – Liberty, Equality, Fraternity – allowed the French to forget more easily the violence perpetrated in Haiti before the revolution, or in French Indochina before France’s egress.

(8) Ibid.

The lifeboat metaphor argues that much like survivors of a shipwreck, surviving on a lifeboat, must get along with strangers with whom they have nothing in common, people must get along with other members of the same nation. The analogy rests on shared aspects like a lack of choice regarding the situation and that the others are strangers.

(9) Ibid.

(10) Ibid.

(11) Tariq Modood, “Multiculturalism and Integration: struggling with confusions.” *Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies*. Accessed November 30, 2023. <https://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/mars/source/resources/references/others/38%20-%20Multiculturalisme%20and%20Integration%20-%20Modood%202011.pdf>.

I borrow from Tariq Modood the descriptions of and distinctions between assimilation, integration, multiculturalism. I will steer away from diversity in this essay since it relates more to a value-based discussion. Since I am treating growing diversity axiomatically and argue mainly about how to achieve this effectively, diversity will remain a subject for future discussion.

(12) Ibid.

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## Section II: An Account of the Situation

Before setting up my action plan to transform the status quo, a historical explanation is in order. I first outline how national identity operates, what reinforces it, and what is needed to mend its problems. Next, I invoke the dissatisfaction with globalization that bears much of the blame for the push to the right, and survey the effects of shifting demographics on the mentality of many voters.

### Self-Perception and National Identity

Nations have histories, and every nation tells a slightly different story than others tell about it. If one were to ask the average Greek about what defines Greece and its people, one would likely receive a different answer than if the interviewee were Turkish. The average Russian will view Russia differently than the average Finn, and Iranians view Iran differently than it is viewed by Iraqis. Part of the explanation for this inconsistency is that being from a certain country affords a deeper experience of the culture – who would know more about being Kenyan than Kenyans? – but an important contributing factor is that national narratives carry with them a bias. The degree to which this applies varies, but virtually every nation presents its history more favorably than is justified by the facts.

One such story is the founding myth, the narrative surrounding the origins of a nation. Rather than merely describing where they come from, however, founding myths tend to ascribe virtues and qualities to the people in question, and frequently a sense of heroism. The United States represents an intuitive example, but is all the same a prime example of how a nation sees itself through rose-tinted glasses. George Washington, having crossed the Delaware in messianic fashion, depicted in a painting by Emanuel Leutze, long represented an ideal leader to Americans, a successful general who refused to be corrupted by power, and embodied democratic beliefs.<sup>(13)</sup> The founding fathers wrote the Declaration of Independence, which has since been enshrined as quasi holy scripture, but it also took a long time for the general population to reflect on the troubled duality of the founding fathers as slave-owning white men.

In the same vein, numerous European states were once colonial empires. In the cases of Portugal and Spain, recent memory primarily recalls a negative experience with fascism and dictatorship, with empire a more distant afterthought. Their empires also ended relatively long ago, and neither country enjoys the same level of economic or political influence as the United Kingdom or France.

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<sup>(13)</sup> George Washington is sometimes likened to Cincinnatus, the Roman farmer, who supposedly took the power of dictator to defend Rome before returning power to the senate and continued living life as a farmer. Cincinnati, Ohio, is named in his honor, and shows how willingly Americans tend to overlook the lack of enfranchisement at the founding of the US: only white men had any substantial rights.

Yet, an imperial mentality still persists in France and the United Kingdom. Despite their relative weakness compared to the other permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations, they carry nuclear weapons, house some of the largest collections of foreign artifacts in their museums, and view themselves as highly important players on the international arena.<sup>(14)</sup> Both countries currently struggle much more than their Iberian neighbors to calibrate their identities, although it would be untrue to suggest Spain did not have its own issues.<sup>(15)</sup>

The United Kingdom maintains many overseas territories and participates in the Commonwealth games, all of the other participants being former British colonies. The British still tend to view themselves favorably, as victors of World War II, disposed to whitewashing their colonial abuses.<sup>(16)</sup> Perhaps the passing of Queen Elizabeth II enables a more sober reckoning with the British Empire's past, but its special relationship with the United States and involvement in alliances such as the 5 Eyes suggest that such a discussion will take more time to reach fruition.

Similarly, France maintains overseas territories it has not relinquished, and regularly experiences riots relating to the relationship between ethnic French people and descendants of the colonized. One such instance came in the summer of 2023, when Nahel, a teenager of Maghrebian descent, was killed by police in a suburb of Paris.<sup>(17)</sup> These social tensions originate in part from the fact that France has not managed to fully move on from its imperial mentality; its immigrants are concentrated in communities outside of Paris and spatially separated. Many government buildings like the National Assembly are in lustrous palaces, and museums illustrating the grandeur of France still bespeckle Paris today.<sup>(18)</sup> France's self-image still concentrates on the storming of the Bastille, the ideals of the Revolution as immortalized on the Tricolor flag (liberty, equality, fraternity), and regards with admiration the likes of Napoleon and Charles de Gaulle, just as the British fervently regard Admiral Nelson and Former Prime Minister Winston Churchill.

Perhaps a less straightforward self-image is that of Germany, which has the opposite issue. The founding myth of the Federal Republic as it stands today rests on guilt. The German nation's

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(14) For an insight in how British self-perception affects British decision-making to this day, see Tilford, Simon. "The British and Their Exceptionalism." Centre for European Reform. Centre for European Reform, May 3, 2017. <https://www.cer.eu/insights/british-and-their-exceptionalism>.

(15) See the Catalan separatist movement led by Carles Puigdemont.

(16) Smith, Matthew. 2020. "How Unique Are British Attitudes to Empire? | Yougov." Yougov.co.uk. March 11, 2020. <https://yougov.co.uk/international/articles/28355-how-unique-are-british-attitudes-empire>.

(17) "French officer who fatally shot teenager Nahel, sparking riots, released from custody." France 24. November 15, 2023. Accessed December 22, 2023. <https://www.france24.com/en/france/20231115-france-releases-policeman-behind-killing-of-teenager-nahel-that-sparked-nationwide-riots>.

(18) The Hôtel des Invalides, for instance, is a large palace with an equally vast boulevard leading up to its entrance. It is the site of occasional airshows and houses several collections, as well as the tomb of Napoleon Bonaparte, who remains a figure of great repute. His tomb is housed in the eponymous dome, which is one of the tallest structures within city limits. In the surrounding area, it is difficult to miss this landmark, ample space being given so that onlookers may appreciate its glory.

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credo could be summarized as “we committed unspeakable acts of evil and must never start a war again”, which was on display when Germans were reluctant to offer military aid to Ukraine in the early phases of the 2022 Russian invasion.<sup>(19)</sup> Here, the skewed German mentality interfered with the government’s ability to defend its ally from a foreign invasion. This broad overcorrection of past wrongdoing has opened the possibility for exploitation of the immigration infrastructure as well as domestic politics. Islamist extremists often enter Germany without much threat of being deported, as this could suggest to the public that Germany has returned to a fascist outlook. Per contra, German right-wing extremists use this opportunity to portray the German state as decrepit and sluggish, fueling the divide.

Abdel Samad recognizes such dangers of this overcorrection, and criticizes German society and politics for their shortcomings. In his book *Integration*, he diagnoses the country with insufficient confidence and consequently an inability to defend the values it holds dear.<sup>(20)</sup> He points out that this shadow has led to oversight, enabling the growth of Mosques controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood and the like, where antisemitism and hate speech are spread without federal jurisdiction, and that this tactic, often employed by donors from Gulf States like Saudi Arabia, exploits a neurotic self-perception.<sup>(21)</sup>

To conclude, social harmony requires a truthful confrontation with the past, avoiding the arousal of excessive resentment. Neither the optimistic and amnesiac perspectives of Britain, France, or the United States, nor the overly self-righteous and excessive moralizing of Germany are ideal. Immigrants must not be marginalized by a host society that patronizes outsiders, but as Germany shows, the state in question must also be able to protect the immigrants and give them a community of which to be proud. What is needed is a critical reflection of both good and bad, a golden middle that encompasses the historical facts, and undoes any apotheosis, in order to give a national community the understanding it needs to fix its issues. This cannot be accomplished without a sense of pride that is positive while remaining constructive, and leaves room for change. The key is that the pride in question must foster some sense of community and belonging, but nationality encourages the recognition of ‘otherness,’ rather than common traits.<sup>(22)</sup> Pride and dignity are valued and even prioritized by many cultures, contributing to general psychological well-being.

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(19) David Herszenhorn, Lili Bayer, and Hans Von Der Burchard, “Germany to send Ukraine weapons in historic shift on military aid.” Politico. February 26, 2022. Accessed November 28, 2023. <https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-war-russia-germany-still-blocking-arms-supplies/1>.

Holly Ellyatt, “Ukraine slams Germany for failing to send it weapons.” CNBC. September 16, 2022. Accessed January 9, 2024.

(20) Hamed Abdel Samad. 2019. *Integration: Ein Protokoll des Scheiterns*. Droemer.

(21) Ibid.

(22) For an excellent discussion of the fading sense of community, see Robert Putnam. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000.

Nationality, on the other hand, invites exclusion, and leads to those issues discussed previously, which is why it disrupts integration. More on this later.

### **Globalization and its discontents**

Negative reactions to globalization have enhanced support for far right parties and anti-immigration sentiments. Globalization challenges many aspects of national identity. The fact that Mexican restaurants are found in rural Hungary, and that London's Soho is populated by Hong Kongese dim sum locals reminds people of their own national and cultural identity in short intervals. The internet has homogenized many corners of global culture, and augmented the phenomenon of pop culture. By virtue of America's dominance in most sectors of industry as well as culture, scientific jargon and vernacular everywhere have incorporated English loanwords into their vocabularies.<sup>23</sup> This sudden and arguably intrusive development can be unsettling. Change is a fact and has always accompanied humanity. No language today is what it was 200 years ago, no cuisine remains static. However, the pace of change is more rapid than before the industrialized era. Although the introduction of Indonesian and Indian spices made possible the great variety of continental European Christmas candy, and the tomato, without which Italian cuisine is now unthinkable, came from the Americas, it took a long time for these changes to settle. Nowadays, the velocity of cultural evolution betrays just how artificial many traditions are. Santa Claus, the way he exists today, is the product of a Coca Cola ad campaign; the theme of alcohol and green colors symbolizing Saint Patrick's Day came about in the late 20th century; phones have rapidly altered table manners; traditional dress codes have been dropped in favor of modern, cosmopolitan fashion styles, such as women matching jeans with a hijab.<sup>24</sup> Confrontation with such truths is unpleasant for many people, which helps explain away the indirectly reactionary responses to globalization. Following this line of thought, it could be argued that Donald Trump draws support from his voter base partially from a shared feeling of being left behind by a shifting world. More broadly, changing attitudes and norms like a black American president and the Me Too movement introduce uncertainty to many insecure minds. This insecurity is on full display in Trump's rhetoric, replete with allusions to a "great national effort to rebuild," to "renew [America's] spirit," hinting at the trauma his supporters feel.<sup>25</sup>

Aside from new ideas and goods, the advent of new technology also facilitates the movement

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<sup>23</sup> Especially terms in the realm of computer science and the internet are predominantly English, in line with American pioneering in the field. Alongside the jargon, vernacular such as "cool" or "hi" have been included in many other languages and are almost universally recognized. See "linguistic imperialism" for further reading.

<sup>24</sup> Kathleen Neils Conzen, et al., "The Invention of Ethnicity: A Perspective from the U.S.A." *Journal of American Ethnic History* 12, no. 1 (1992): 3–41. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27501011>.



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of people across borders. Travel is now more affordable, and the internet has created international jobs, inviting people to relocate more readily. The resulting upsurge in minorities further complicates the feeling of jeopardy with which some regard their sense of national belonging. Minorities as a social force are nothing new, even if counting those from less proximate cultures. Descendants of a 17th century Japanese mission to Spain can be found today, and genetic evidence indicates that some Native Americans were taken back to Iceland after Leif Erikson's journey a millennium ago.<sup>26</sup> Not to mention the genetic legacy left by Genghis Khan, whose DNA can be found throughout Eurasia.<sup>27</sup> The presence of these minorities did not challenge the societies they inhabited as we are seeing today. Key differences between these developments and the present are twofold: the duration of the change, and its magnitude. First, today's events make it possible for someone to arrive on another continent in mere hours, which involves an element of surprise. When a group of explorers like that of Erikson leave for unknown lands, people will be relatively prepared for some form of surprise or another. When outsiders were brought back and let into the community, this was a decision made over the course of more time than this process requires today. Refugees especially tend to arrive without prior warning, with a suddenness that can lead to tensions when the population was not prepared to harbor refugees beforehand, adding to the feeling of being overwhelmed by people too plentiful to count. This feeling is reflected in the common choice to dub these 'waves' of refugees.<sup>28</sup>

Second, the amount of people in Spain who claim Japanese ancestry and the approximately 300 individuals purported to be of American descent in Iceland had no choice but to assimilate into a greater community. An enclave that small was unlikely to present a threat to social stability, and would not perturb residents to the same degree that over a million Syrian refugees will upset an established order. Returning to Miller, he makes the argument that people need to see themselves

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<sup>25</sup> Donald Trump, "Remarks by President Trump In Farewell Address to the Nation." Speech, Washington, D.C., 2021. "Trump White House Archives: Briefings-Statements," Trump White House Archives. Accessed January 15, 2024. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-farewell-address-nation/>.

<sup>26</sup> Joaquín Beltrán Antolín, *El nodo español en las diásporas de Asia Oriental*. Las diásporas de Asia Oriental en Europa Occidental. Documentos CIDOB. Vol. 13. (November 2006);

Sigríður Sunna Ebenesardóttir et al, "A new subclade of mtDNA haplogroup C1 found in Icelanders: Evidence of pre-Columbian contact?," *American Journal of Physical Anthropology* 144 no. 1 (November 2010): 92–9. doi:10.1002/ajpa.21419. PMID 21069749.

<sup>27</sup> Hillary Mayell, "Genghis Khan a Prolific Lover, DNA Data Implies." National Geographic. February 13, 2003. Accessed November 27, 2023. <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/article/mongolia-genghis-khan-dna1>.

<sup>28</sup> Edward Lempinen. 2023. "As Refugees Surge, European Voters Show 'Resilient' Support, Study Finds | Research UC Berkeley." *Vcresearch.berkeley.edu*. UC Berkeley. August 9, 2023. <https://vcresearch.berkeley.edu/news/refugees-surge-european-voters-show-resilient-support-study-finds>;

Richard Wike, Bruce Stokes, and Katie Simmons. 2016. "Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs." Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project. Pew Research Center. July 11, 2016. <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/07/11/europeans-fear-wave-of-refugees-will-mean-more-terrorism-fewer-jobs/>.

and be seen by others as a nation in order to qualify as one.<sup>(29)</sup> Absent any mass media to publicize the presence of new groups, and with only such a small number of people, there simply was not much of a choice other than to assimilate. The difference in numbers is evidently impactful, explaining why neither Spain nor Iceland fell into turmoil as a result of these changes. The amount of immigration of the 20th and 21st centuries is more voluminous than in the past, and will thus require a new paradigm to deal with the difficulties this brings to the table.<sup>(30)</sup>

## Demographics

Europe and much of the developed world are aging, which augurs fears of being outnumbered and overtaken by an outside population, against which many resist by voting more conservatively.<sup>(31)</sup> In light of an older citizenry and lower birth rates, there is demand for young, usually unskilled, labor.<sup>(32)</sup> One might think that given this apparent supply and demand alignment, Europe would welcome the millions of young immigrants looking for jobs. This would be a grave miscalculation, as high numbers of foreigners have led to social tensions in every context imaginable. There are parties that have formed with explicitly anti-immigration policy platforms, chiefly among which one can find the likes of Geert Wilders and Marine Le Pen. There are regular protests, and occasional threats of violence, with immigration at the heart of the divide.<sup>(33)</sup> Whether their presence is a direct cause or not, immigrants do not always feel welcome in their host country. This heightens the likelihood that they will form their own sequestered communities sooner than integrating, a driving force behind the wide dispersion of Chinatowns everywhere. This is a worry for many, since enclaves often become slums or ghettos which are treated with derision and viewed as unproductive. Unlike ghettos and slums, Chinatowns are perceived as productive assets, hence it would be foolish to dismantle them now. The Chinatowns in New York and San Francisco, for example, are home to sui generis cultures, and their destruction would be a great loss to society. Simultaneously it is important to recognize that racism was a large reason for their establishment in the first place.

What this increase in immigration also fuels is replacement anxiety. The population of ethnically white people is projected to decline, although the global population will continue to rise.<sup>(34)</sup>

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(29) David Miller. 1995. *On Nationality*. Clarendon Press, 1-27.

(30) McAuliffe, M. and Anna Triandafyllidou (EDS). *World Migration Report 2022*. International Organization for Migration (IOM), Geneva, 2021.

(31) "Ageing Europe - statistics on population developments." Statistics Explained. Accessed November 28, 2023. [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Ageing\\_Europe\\_-\\_statistics\\_on\\_population\\_developments1](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Ageing_Europe_-_statistics_on_population_developments1).

(32) Ibid.

(33) See the November 2023 protests in Dublin, the October 2023 protests in Paris, and the November 2023 protests in Amsterdam. For further reference, see Rafaela Dancygier, *Immigration and Conflict in Europe*. Cambridge University Press, 2010. Accessed November 30, 2023.

(34) The idea of a "great replacement" was originally put forward by Renaud Camus in his book *Vue d'œil: Journal 2012*, and was faced with criticism upon its release.

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Common reactions include people feeling threatened in an almost primordial sense, as if to worry that their genetic material will not be passed on to future generations, a further iteration of the fears against change, particularly national identity. Ethnicity being perhaps the most visible group identifier plays to the imagination; popular support for conspiracy theories like the Great Replacement and Eurabia has grown significantly.

The general sense of suspicion with which black individuals are treated in the American subconscious has its roots in Europe, where immigrants from Muslim countries above all others are often treated with the same mistrust.<sup>35</sup> This mistrust can be understood in part as a historical fear of what happens after colonialism is over.<sup>36</sup> Such a historical fear could be what sways the hearts of European voters in favor of a reactionary response, attracting them to the right.<sup>37</sup> Voters don't necessarily choose these convictions; rather, they tend to have them unwittingly. This backlash is enhanced by an eagerness to denounce the West altogether. Important to appreciate, this issue is closely intertwined with integration, but ultimately a separate topic beyond the scope of this investigation.

### Section III: Struggling to Find the Right Path

Moving on, I will present the reasons for Europe's ineptitude in integrating immigrants, and refer to Singapore as an example of what Europe should avoid. I then present and reject the work of Yael Tamir, asserting that bolstering nationalism and national identity are deficient responses to the problem at hand, since it clashes with the individual at the heart of society.

#### The Difficulty of Integrating to Europe

An important if divisive matter to survey is that of which people are most likely to immigrate to Europe. Although the body of people is a diverse one, they do not all receive exactly the same treatment. People from Muslim majority countries tend to receive the most resistance from host countries when trying to immigrate, and due to their numbers as well as specific cultural differ-

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<sup>35</sup> The society-wide mistrust is the subject of novels like *To Kill a Mockingbird* and high profile murder cases like those of Tiger Woods and O. J. Simpson carry a similar tone.

<sup>36</sup> Reggie Jackson, "Scared White Hysteria: People of Color Due to Paranoid Fear of Retribution", *Milwaukee Independent*, 14 May, 2018, <https://www.milwaukeeindependent.com/featured/scared-white-hysteria-people-color-due-paranoid-fear-retribution/>; see also

Edward Lempinen, "Loss, fear and rage: Are white men rebelling against democracy?", *Berkeley News*, 14 November, 2022, <https://news.berkeley.edu/2022/11/14/loss-fear-and-rage-are-white-men-rebelling-against-democracy>.

<sup>37</sup> On top of replacement anxiety, it could be argued that white guilt is also at play, in that many people may intrinsically feel that the structures perpetuating the social inequality between whites and others is what allows them to profit from a better lifestyle as a result of slavery, colonialism, and racism. This is more the case in the Anglophone West than continental Europe, though nonetheless relevant.

ences they are more readily seen as a threat. This mostly refers to MENA<sup>38)</sup> countries, and less so Muslims from Southeast Asia or other parts of the world. There are parties that are against immigrants per se, but many of them are explicitly against Islam, whereas other groups are mainly left out of the picture.<sup>39)</sup> Aside from the fact that Muslims make up a large part of those who come to Europe, there are more underlying reasons for this clash. Hamed Abdel Samad makes the case that there are mechanisms among host societies but also within the Muslim diaspora that contribute to the conflict. Taking predominantly Turkish and Arabic immigrants to Germany as a case study, he describes how immigrants from Confucianist societies like Vietnam tend to experience far fewer frictions in Germany than their Turkish counterparts.<sup>40)</sup> He attributes this to two decisive factors, namely values and strength of local pressures.<sup>41)</sup> Confucianism generally values education highly, and those Vietnamese who came as part of the boat people<sup>42)</sup> were from the South, rather than the more radical communist North. This is relevant because communism tends to be anti-intellectual and denounce individual achievement, which includes higher education, since it helps form an elite and is an instrument of power. Since this culture values education and its people were unable to return to their country of origin, there was little to be done other than to assimilate. Islam supports a very different approach, however. Certain sects of Islam, if followed verbatim, have far more provisions regarding how people outside the religion are treated.<sup>43)</sup> While Islam primarily rewards knowledge on the Quran and what belongs to the system, Confucianism values knowledge more practically, and has a history of encouraging public service and being in touch with the people.<sup>44)</sup> This argument is broadly supported by a study which found that different ethnic groups tend to have a distinct integration experience. Accordingly, both the rate of integration as well as the relationship that future generations have to the host society vary greatly.<sup>45)</sup>

In addition, there is the shared history between Christianity and Islam: the crusades, the Ottoman empire's wars, etc., a bellicose dynamic absent in the relationship between Confucianism and

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<sup>38)</sup> The Middle East and North Africa is often abbreviated MENA due to a shared Islamic as well as Arabic influence.

<sup>39)</sup> Marine LePen, the AFD, Geert Wilders, and the broad far right in Sweden all target Muslims above other groups. They often conflate Muslims, Turks, and Arabs, depending on the party. The consequences can be seen in the Quran burnings of summer 2023, leading to a diplomatic row with Turkey and a delay in the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO.

<sup>40)</sup> Hamed Abdel Samad. 2019. *Integration: Ein Protokoll des Scheiterns*. Droemer.

<sup>41)</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42)</sup> See Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia "boat people." *Encyclopedia Britannica*, December 18, 2023. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/boat-people-refugees>.

<sup>43)</sup> Abdel Samad discusses this in *Integration*, though he provides a more thorough examination of Islam's tenets and the following conflict with Western values in his 2015 work *Mohamed - Eine Abrechnung*, his 2016 book *Der Koran: Botschaft der Liebe. Botschaft des Hasses*, as well as his 2016 book *Zur Freiheit gehört, den Koran zu kritisieren*, co-authored by Mouhanad Khorchide.

<sup>44)</sup> Hamed Abdel Samad. 2019. *Integration: Ein Protokoll des Scheiterns*. Droemer.

<sup>45)</sup> Anthony Heath and Silke Schneider, "Patriarchy and Populism During the COVID-19 Pandemic." *Frontiers in Sociology*, August 6, 2021. Accessed November 23, 2023. <https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fsoc.2021.722393/full>

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Western Europe. Put into the context of a post-9/11 world in which the West views Muslim countries with more than a degree of caution, if not hostility, it is no surprise that there is more friction between Europeans and Muslim immigrants than Vietnamese immigrants, respectively. Abdel Samad further explains that Germany in particular has difficulty in defending its constitution when pitted against another culture.<sup>(46)</sup> He reasons that Germany's nationalist past and overly negative self-image form an environment in which it is difficult to deport the few 'bad apples' for legitimate reasons, which in turn causes some Europeans to see all immigrants as 'bad apples.'<sup>(47)</sup> Altogether, this complex mixture of factors reveals that relationships between host societies and immigrants are not all the same, and that it is not necessarily best to operate with one strategy for all cases. It is therefore crucial that every state examine their case individually, and understand the causal mechanisms shaping the problems barring successful integration.

### **The Inappropriate Solutions of Singapore**

Given these difficulties, should Europe reject immigration? I will now show why two approaches are hazardous, and why they should not be employed. First, Europe could follow the Singaporean model. Critically, the city-state did not exist as either nation or state a century ago. The modern identity of Singapore was the creation of Lee Kuan Yew, forcing the predominant ethnicities, i.e., Chinese, Malay, and Indian, to coexist peacefully within the same area. Nominally, all forms of discrimination are prosecuted with utmost prejudice and the government does not tolerate any degree of racial tensions. There exists nonetheless a certain Chinese hegemony, as almost 76% of the population, including almost all of the leadership, is ethnically Chinese, which lends itself to Chinese chauvinism, muddling the waters.<sup>(48)</sup> Overall, the creation of this identity was, in *numerical* terms, an effective way of creating social stability and cohesion.

Notwithstanding its success, I maintain that Europe should not follow Singapore's model because the same method of using carrots and sticks through the legal system and moderate repression are unlikely to work in a European context. First among several reasons is Singapore's age as a political phenomenon. Whereas Europeans have conceptualized themselves as belonging to one nation or another for centuries – a process facilitated by constant warfare and opposition – Singapore existed within the Japanese and British empires, but never had any idea of nationhood itself. Consequently, far less national history needed to be altered; or rather, the perception of history needed to undergo less of a transformation. In other words, the people of Singapore were essentially a blank slate which the leaders of Singapore could dictate views as they saw fit, and establish

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(46) Hamed Abdel Samad. 2019. *Integration: Ein Protokoll des Scheiterns*. Droemer.

(47) Ibid.

(48) Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs. *Population in Brief 2019*. Singapore: Department of Statistics, 2019.

values and norms without too much backlash as long as they produced results.

Another factor was that Singapore was shut off from Malaysia, and its situation closer to the lifeboat metaphor than those of the European states, contributing to a sense of necessity and urgency drawing people together due to a shared plight. Europe has few natural borders and always had plenty of trade, but Singapore was isolated and its people could not leave easily. This necessity was a common denominator, a motivation to work together and ignore cultural differences.

There is a last factor, namely the prevalence of individualism among people in Europe. While individualism is not monopolized by Western countries, Singapore does have the mark of Confucianism incorporated into its value system, and for the reasons listed above conformity and collective harmony are encouraged by the government.<sup>49</sup> This made the establishment of a common identity far easier for Singaporean leaders. On the other hand, Singapore does not rank high on the Freedom House Index, scoring only 47 out of 100 liberties, a low number compared to European developed economies.<sup>50</sup> Authoritarian measures and a lack of liberty appear to have been the trade-off for the integration of once disconnected people.

### **Yael Tamir and the Faults of Nationalism**

Yael Tamir's "liberal nationalism" is another approach Europe could adopt. I again argue that this model is unfit for Europe, this time because it will obstruct the desired cross-cultural dialogue and in fact counteract attempts at integration. In *Why Nationalism*, Tamir lays out her claim that nationalism must be reclaimed in order to move past the complex reactions to globalism. In the process, she makes some remarks that could be useful in understanding the stated problem. For instance, she points out that the public school is one of the most critical institutions a country relies on, since it turns subjects into citizens.<sup>51</sup> However, she mostly uses this stance to further her claim that the nation must be strengthened, and somewhat liberal interpretations of her text suggest that she is arguing in favor of actively utilizing schools to force propaganda onto citizens at a young age to maintain national unity.<sup>52</sup> She touches upon a significant tool when bringing up education, which I revisit later.

Aside from her attempts to advertise propaganda, Tamir argues that nationalism should enjoy a quotidian relevance, and that it should be ubiquitous in order to buttress fraternity.<sup>53</sup> A misstep,

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<sup>49</sup> Chew Lay Kuan, "Economic Development of Singapore and Confucianism", (Ba. diss., NUS, 2000).

<sup>50</sup> Freedom House. "Singapore: Freedom in the World 2023 Country Report." Freedom House. 2023. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/singapore/freedom-world/2023>.

<sup>51</sup> Yael Tamir. 2020. *Why Nationalism*. Princeton, NJ: online edn, Princeton Scholarship Online, 23 Sept. 2021. Chapter 11. <https://doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691210780.001.0001>, accessed 22 Nov. 2023.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

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this would only serve to heighten the tensions and intensify the divisions already present and would therefore be nothing but a damaging maneuver. Intentionally increasing the frequency with which we are reminded of our national belonging could theoretically strengthen a closed, isolated community, so Tamir posits. It is difficult to see why this would end any differently than the fascist experiment undertaken by Europe in the 1930s; her argument holds little water due to her lack of distinguishability vis-à-vis said tragedy.

More importantly, the European communities in question are not closed off; in fact, they are welcoming immigrants and will continue to do so, as the number of immigration will skyrocket due to climate change. This development minimizes the degree to which the population's wishes influence whether immigration will occur, as it is largely out of their control.<sup>54</sup> Reinforcing divisions between "us" and "them" in a diverse environment as Tamir would have us do would not allow people to celebrate difference. It would call attention to difference, and ultimately only amplify the ways in which some do not – and could not – belong to the group. Congruously, had Singapore employed this strategy instead of emphasizing everyone's shared plight, it is highly improbable that racial tensions would have remained peaceful.

Along similar lines, she recommends that narrative and the noble lie should be upheld to foster brotherhood between unlikely allies.<sup>55</sup> Recalling the previous section detailing self-perception, it has been established that perpetuating a narrative known to be factually untrue is not a good idea. Immigrants harboring concerns about how safe they are in the host society may feel justified in avoiding interactions with locals as a result, deepening the divide.

In order to truly open a dialogue and create the cultural give and take required for genuine integration, false historical narratives must be altogether dismantled. In lieu of a sense of nationality, community must be centered around another point. It must be more inclusive than nationality, as this idea is restrictive and thus limited in its ability to include outsiders. Nationality is prone to pitfalls and will not mitigate the ailments of modern Europe, which is why nationalism must not be introduced as an answer to the problem.

Now, a brief expounding on the defect of Tamir's philosophical basis. One of the principal inborne flaws that prevented nationalism and similarly dogmatic ideologies from success is the fact that no person is the exact same as another. No matter how deeply similarities connect us, even in the case of siblings (who generally share the same nationality and group identity), there will be different views and approaches to complex political topics. The explanation for this heterogeneity is

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid, chapter 10.

<sup>54</sup> "Migration, displacement and human mobility." UNFCCC. Accessed November 25, 2023. <https://unfccc.int/wim-excom/areas-of-work/migration-displacement-and-human-mobility1>.

<sup>55</sup> Yael Tamir. 2020. *Why Nationalism*. Princeton, NJ; online edn, Princeton Scholarship Online, 23 Sept. 2021. Chapter 8. <https://doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691210780.001.0001>, accessed 22 Nov. 2023.

that in all contexts, nationality or group identity will not explain all behavior. Although there are clear correlations between sex, age, ethnicity, nationality, socio-economic background, etc., and political behavior, listing out all of these individual parts will not predict how somebody acts, feels, or makes decisions. The core subjects of immigration, as with all socio-political matters, are groups of individuals who are not reducible to their nationality.

This is the fundamental philosophical reason why I do not believe that the propositions of Yael Tamir contain high chances for success. National identity must not be reinforced because it will impede integration and a multicultural society's chance for peace. There is some truth to what Tamir observes, but it is tangential to her main argument. When analyzing a group of people from Sweden, for example, they will look different. Many of them will probably be blonde and white, but some will have an immigrant background. Some may be Muslim, some may eat different foods and wear different clothes. There will be deviation in those attributes. Nonetheless, there is a speck of "Swedish-ness," a claim often made by nationalists, but it is not inherent to someone's genetic *mélange*, but comes about in an altogether different way.

#### **Section IV: Constructing a Positive Identity**

At this juncture I depart from scrutinizing the past and look towards the future, putting forth my own suggestion. Communication between cultures is key to maintaining social cohesion, which I support through targeted education. Society must also become more accepting and aware of immigrants' troubles integrating, to which end the media must be mobilized.

##### **Communication as a Value**

Rather than heritage, I argue that the aforementioned "Swedish-ness" is part of interpersonal communication. Different cultures and societies communicate in different ways. Some cultures require a lot of context in order to communicate effectively. If one were to translate interactions in the Japanese language into English, for instance, it would not make much sense because context dictates meaning. This can even happen within the same language. North American English tends to be more clear cut and adheres to formalistic structures, such as greeting people with the question "How are you," even though the goal is not to cultivate a long discussion about how one's interlocutor is feeling at that moment. In Britain, sarcasm and irony are more common in conversation, so when combining these two culturally distinct forms of the same language, miscommunication is a recurrent hiccup. On a deeper-than-surface level, similar miscommunication can occur. Shaking hands, eye contact, body contact, gesticulation, voice volume, and various other aspects of communication can influence at least moderately how concordant or conflictual an interaction can be. Even



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more concealed differences in views on humor, pride, gender roles, and money can lead to emotionally contrary experiences of the same event in different cultural groups. This difference in experience is a factor I assert often contributes to the tensions between the autochthonous population and an out-group attempting to integrate.

This kind of understanding for intercultural differences and willingness to accept outsiders are both immensely helpful in building a society that incorporates immigrants smoothly. At home, people must have the right to practice whatever lifestyle they choose, and as argued above, it is not a good idea to aspire to transform individuals the very moment they cross the border. What is imperative, then, is not to enforce a native set of views and opinions on everyone who enters, but to ensure that people have the tools to live together peacefully. Imposing absolute conformity to the native viewpoints goes against democratic principles like the right to freedom and self-determination. This contradiction is also why such demands would be ineffective, as outsiders are already making concessions by moving to another country, ergo demanding this level of conformity presents additional hurdles to an already strained process. To that end, perhaps the most important instrument is the above mentioned interpersonal and cross-cultural communication skills. When tensions arise, and they most probably will, the gap between different camps must be bridged. Often, when two opposing groups experience animosity, a major part of the issue is lack of mutual understanding. Part of the reason why the LGBTQ+ debate is so polarized in America is that the facts of the topic are abused, misrepresented, and not infrequently ignored. Vocabulary like ‘gender’ and ‘sex’ are often conflated but seldom defined, affording the opportunity to set up strawmen, thwarting any real chance at honest debate. Although the root cause of the societal split is far more complex than lack of understanding, it would certainly make the opening of a dialogue possible, and allow people to approach the problem more effectively and constructively.

The same applies to Europe’s path to an effective integration framework. There is much fear about societal change resulting from immigration, but some of those fears can be dispelled if both sides have the tools to lead a cross-cultural dialogue that is less besmirched by hatred and resistant ignorance. For instance, one contentious aspect of many Middle Eastern countries from which many immigrants come is that they are honor-based societies.<sup>56</sup> The ostensibly post-religious, highly self-critical European communities can therefore present a philosophical discrepancy but also a threat on an emotional level to some people. If left unsaid such discontent can bubble to the surface, which is why a premium must be placed on an open, public discourse, and a safe environment.<sup>57</sup> Argu-

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<sup>56</sup> “The Concept of Honor in Jihadi Culture.” ICT. Accessed November 26, 2023. <https://ict.org.il/the-concept-of-honor-in-jihadi-culture/1>.

<sup>57</sup> Amid the Israel-Hamas War of 2023 there have been several instances of antisemitism at universities, most notably at Columbia University and Harvard University.

ments following the same spirit can be made about pride, specifically national pride, treatment of women and minorities, and constitutionalism and respect for state law in lieu of laws derived from other sources like religion. There is no unitary solution that will solve these troubles. Preferably, this problem should be tackled from all sides.

It can be taken as a given that first generation immigrants will not become indistinguishable from autochthonous members if they are already adults upon arrival. This is because identity largely forms early on and cannot be easily overwritten later in life. Whether complete melding is the goal is itself difficult to tell; what matters most is that autochthonous or not, people must be able to communicate on an emotional level with autochthonous members. Immigrants need not be transformed into excessively patriotic sycophants in order to reside peacefully in another country. Instead, what matters is that they eventually acquire the skills to sustain themselves sans any direct support from the State, and reside as regular members of society. Here, the burden is on the government to provide the necessary resources, including for instance education, housing, finding employment, etc., with the goal that eventually the immigrants integrate and lead independent lives. They should be able to communicate with people to the extent that they can engage with a community, resolve problems, and make friendships with locals. People do not need to – and in fact should not – be forced to sacrifice their traditions or culture unless their exercise directly violates the law of the host society. Examples of traditions that must be given up in a European context could be the enforcing of child marriage, preventing women from seeking work despite their desire to do so, and so on. However, these prohibitions relate more to concrete actions affecting others rather than beliefs or actions like prayer that do not involve anyone other than oneself. Immigrants also should not be forced to build friendships in the host society, although this should certainly be encouraged. This begs the question: how are these circumstances brought about?

### **The Role of Education**

A likely starting point is education. Education will enable all people to care for themselves in a society alien to them, and is a method applied in all cultures in order to ensure that living together is possible. Public schools are an essential tool for social cohesion, but I disagree strongly with Tamir's preferred design. Intra-familial education, i.e., how families raise their children, also governs how children grow up to view the world, and although it may have an even stronger effect than schools do, this is a realm to be left alone. Not only would it be difficult to implement, but invading the home in this manner goes against many European values and would likely be illegal. In addition, as previously mentioned, first generation immigrants cannot be changed or molded to fit in as easily as people born into a society, in part due to their upbringing and cultural background. Therefore, the most effective method to achieve integration is to raise the next generation of immigrants as

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in-group members from birth, anchoring them in society, providing them with the skills to navigate the culture, and facilitating integration. Raising children this way should happen across the board and include all backgrounds to ensure that everyone can identify with the community, which must remain inclusive. This approach is part of what enabled the US to be a country of immigrants and the same abstract idea could work for Europe.

The public school system hence appears to be the best starting point. Not so much higher education, but especially preschool and elementary school education (approximately until children reach puberty or roughly 10 or 11 years of age) matter in how people treat others and approach conflict. Before graduating (usually after grade 12), children must be taught to interact with each other constructively. In higher education, the aim is to imbue the students with knowledge and skills regarding specific subjects. On the lower rungs of the ladder, interpersonal skills are in the limelight. In fact, schools already do this. Although hard skills are important and the object of lessons in the classroom, the teacher also acts as a kind of arbitrator who guides the students to be able to perform tasks such as expressing themselves, working together, respecting others, and recognizing the mistakes that they make. The critical addition that will improve cross-cultural communication is incorporating lessons, both directly and passively, into the classroom and broader school environment. This could include programs as diverse as hosting events to showcase different cultures, ensuring that the cafeteria offers food acceptable to all students' diets such as halal and kosher meals, and making students acutely aware that they may have different backgrounds but that this does not diminish their humanity or negate any obligation to engage respectfully with each other. As for the classroom itself, it presents an excellent opportunity to address the historical blemishes that one country has left on another; principally, this will refer to Europe's colonial endeavors. A form of rehabilitation can be attempted using the curricula of schools, though there are limits to what can be achieved in a setting where one teacher deals with many more students, who are still children, simultaneously. For this reason, above all else, teachers must imbue their students with the ability to reflect critically upon the historical reasons for tensions between different cultures, and appreciate that they can be overcome, instead of engendering further conflict. The process of promulgating this set of skills will take time, surely more than a decade. The first cohort of students must be raised within this framework, and from thereon out society will evolve holistically from the bottom up.

While this is not nearly enough to create true harmony, there is cause to hope that it will get the ball rolling. There may be less that can be done for first generation immigrants, but they must in no way be neglected. If they feel lost and isolate themselves for fear of suffering as members of society, the next generation will have lower chances of becoming fully integrated and remain on the periphery. What some countries demand is a certain level of proficiency in the language. Though,

as outlined earlier, this is not enough to engage fully with society, and more will be required to integrate. Skill acquisition comes naturally to children but requires more effort for adults. Communication and social skills are not exempt from this rule. In order to ensure that they can take care of themselves and can be incorporated into the workforce, immigrants need to be given a course on customs and social aspects when they first arrive. This will give authorities an excellent chance to explain common causes of dissatisfaction among compatriots, and how to deal with problems that are encountered (which department to approach with an issue, etc.). To clarify, this is not intended to impose the host society's views on immigrants; rather, it is intended to explain the differences in behavior and what kind of actions lead to which reactions. It remains a priority that immigrants do not feel that they must change their entire identity, but it is of value if they receive a crash course in the culture with which they will have to cope.

I predict that this will lead to some tensions early on between individual immigrants and the host society, but believe that these tensions can be overcome by the program itself. The idea is not to enforce views but to establish a cross-cultural dialogue, for which this program would present a perfect starting point. As tension rises, the aim is to resolve the tension using cultural communication skills, which will prepare immigrants for resolving any future tensions independently. For instance, in some cultures there are complex rules of hospitality etiquette regarding who refills a cup when it runs empty. Conflicting expectations about whether the host or the guest has an imperative to refill the cup could lead to frustration and perhaps drive a wedge into the relationship. In teaching intercultural communication, the immigrants would be first made aware of the difference in etiquette between the cultures, and second learn how to approach the problem. They may be taught to first ask why their own expectation was not met, and elaborate the customs they typically follow. The idea is to give people the skills to diffuse grievances and understand them so that they do not take shape.

### **The Societal Approach**

Another matter to discuss is what the host society can do to encourage a gentler integration and limit frictions. Unlike the previous approach which begins once immigrants are residents, this approach favors conditioning the host society to be more welcoming throughout all levels. A first option is to foster a culture that is both welcoming and tolerant in a positive rather than negative sense; as opposed to merely being free of xenophobic violence, a society must enable its immigrants to partake, they must be free to pursue their career or passions without undue impediments. This will have to be initiated largely by elites, the intelligentsia, and leaders. It is their onus to demand that national cultures be constructive and tolerant, and allow for the introduction of others without negative prejudice on a humanitarian basis. Be it on university campuses, in the media, the private

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sector, or celebrities, those with an audience must use this chance to push for greater inclusion and dismiss exclusion and nationalism. More sharply, governments must increase their efforts. There must be more research looking into how cultures can blend peacefully, and integration at large, both of which will require funding. Governments should understand the issues prevalent in their own countries, and form appropriate solutions; this must be implemented on the technical level. An example is that the Meloni government in Italy has compared itself to Mussolini, which could be more than off-putting for immigrants. To combat such a message, Italy could be more vocal about its acceptance of outsiders, and stress that they will not be in any danger. More important yet is that relevant staff improve their soft skills, foremost language. Coinciding with language skills, cultural understanding must be expanded. In order to best deal with and aid immigrants, it is inexorable that workers are trained to understand and communicate with these people.

Moreover, attention is increasingly given to spatial awareness. By this I mean that many cities are compartmentalized by ethnicity, as with the Chinatown examples mentioned earlier. While the dissolution of such communities would be catastrophic, the prevention of further “ghettoization,” as found in the worst-case scenarios like Malmö, should be sought. Diasporic communities are copacetic, but they must not be driven to that threshold by desperation. When a diaspora lacks connection to an established social network, this will lead to enclaves rather than integration. It is important that immigrants are not all shucked and discarded to live in a peripheral part of town, far removed from society’s center. Governments can support immigrants in this challenge by ensuring that affordable housing with the appropriate amenities and, hopefully, a helpful neighborhood community, is available to newcomers. This way, they can feel welcome, and make contacts that enable them to become part of the larger community. Meanwhile, they will uphold a strong mainstream. Mandatory military service can help prevent a military from radicalizing, since new recruits will regularly have to confront the state of the military’s status quo, which creates an awareness for the opinions that circulate in that environment. I believe a similar checks and balances mechanism could be established using the spatial planning described above: by ensuring that immigrants are present in most parts of society, the extremes, i.e., radical ends of the spectrum, are held in weaker positions, serving the stability of society.

On a harsher note, it is also important to deport those few ‘bad apples.’ It is unfortunate but necessary to remove the very few individuals with violent records, or get them the psychiatric help they may need. Removing this burden on legal immigrants will make integration far easier for them and relax social strains. Too often does this mechanism fail, which is why further funding will be welcome in this field as well. This could be seen as a consequence of insufficient constitutionalism in Europe.<sup>68</sup> The fact that political parties throughout the EU are able to base their platforms on hate speech and xenophobia is in many cases an infraction of the constitution. Moreover, hate

speech in general, as well as racially motivated crimes are not dealt with swiftly enough. Europe could use a stronger constitutionalist tradition and should adhere more closely to the values enshrined in the constitutions of its countries. Amid the current political climate, it is unacceptable for actions like the UK's attempt at sending asylum seekers to Rwanda to be advertised. If Europe wants its immigrants to integrate, it must show that it is capable of following up on its side of the bargain as well.

In line with being tougher on rule-breakers, the European Union should not feel anxious to administer stricter border control. A goal to strive towards is Sarah Song's notion of "controlled borders with open doors."<sup>58</sup> Completely closed borders are economically unviable. Fully open borders are unviable in terms of security, and put added pressure on society since autochthonous populations will resist. In light of expected upticks in asylum seekers, the best course of action is what Song recommends: accommodating those in need while symbolically and accurately reassuring the population that incomers are screened. It also goes hand in hand with the government being more open in accepting new immigrants and refugees, as tighter borders, and, by implication, stricter immigration protocols grant the opportunity to let in more people without worrying that they will have trouble fitting in. This last point will hopefully serve to further assuage the fears of the far right's votership as time progresses and integration proves its merits.

Naturally, this whole idea is founded on the premise that there is the money, sufficient staff, and ability of the State to implement stricter borders effectively, but with the EU's coffers, that should hardly be an issue for most member states. A valid issue is that Turkey exercises a fair share of control over how many people enter Europe, but President Erdoğan can be bargained with, especially now, as recent events involving Finland and Sweden's accession to NATO demonstrate. Erdoğan has an interest in cooperating with the EU and faces some pressure from the United States to align himself with NATO goals due to the recent invasion of Ukraine. The state that would likely have the most difficulty in achieving this feat beside Greece is Italy, which regularly witnesses attempts at crossing the Mediterranean, but if the EU makes a consolidated effort it is certainly not unthinkable that the borders can be secured.

Another idea that could help in this context is cultural institutions that further serve to educate and ease cross-cultural relations. Establishing institutions like the Latin American House or Instituto Cervantes where events, talks, and discussions can be held and broadcast allows for dialogue on an appropriately wide scale. Dissemination on media would make this a tremendous

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<sup>58</sup> Wolfgang Dick, "Es werden die Falschen abgeschoben." 2017, DW. Accessed November 27, 2023. <https://www.dw.com/de/es-werden-die-falschen-abgeschoben/a-381743061>.

<sup>59</sup> Sarah Song, 2018 "Does Justice Require Open Borders?", *Immigration and Democracy*, Oxford Political Theory (New York, 2018; online edn, Oxford Academic, 18 Oct. 2018), <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190909222.003.0005>.

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opportunity to combat the nativist racism that so many foreigners face. It would give both locals and immigrants the chance to exchange views and to maintain a safe haven, ensuring that immigrants have a community to turn to if they experience problems. It would double as a way to discourage immigrants from giving up on integrating. Absent any way of entering society, it is more likely that they will be radicalized, and eschew possibilities to engage with society, which cultural institutes could fight.

## **The Media**

Regulated and reformed media could further manage escalating social tensions. In part, this is unavoidable, as they are often the bearer of bad news, but to regard all criticism of the media as shooting the messenger would be tantamount to willful blindness. Tucker Carlson epitomizes the abuse of what is intended to be free speech in order to propagate hate speech and irascible sentiment, antagonizing and demonizing entire segments of the population. By now, the primary source of information for a lot of people has moved to social media rather than newspapers or news broadcasts, an area with considerably lower regulation. This lack of regulation can be attributed to the novelty of the social media phenomenon. Due to its user count and size, Facebook stands out as a network that has played a role in elections and affected social cleavages. X, formerly Twitter, made headlines weekly for its role in fueling political divisions. Tiktok is only the latest social medium to receive skeptical scrutiny. Aside from security concerns, it has been a platform on which misinformation is relatively easy to spread, and with its users being a younger group than Facebook, on average, the potential of Tiktok to influence its users is not difficult to realize.<sup>(60)</sup> As social media have proved themselves capable of causing considerable harm to social relations and psychological well-being, there is an equal opportunity for the nurture of solidarity, camaraderie, and union.

The aforementioned cross-cultural dialogue to abate miscommunication and solidarity could easily be carried out in an open, public arena, but this does not mean that it should be an unregulated, unprotected space. On the contrary, social media must be regulated, either by the government or by itself. A culture that sets standards much like journalistic practices do is desired, but difficult to police. It can, however, be pressured, as the EU has done to Elon Musk.<sup>(61)</sup> Regardless, part of the argument in favor of social media as the venue for this battle is that if it is not seized by

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<sup>(60)</sup> "TikTok Statistics - Everything You Need to Know [Nov 2022 Update]." 2022. Wallaroo Media. November 20, 2022. [https://wallaroomedia.com/blog/social-media/tiktok-statistics/#:~:text=26%25%20are%20between%20the%20ages;Oberlo. "Facebook Age Demographics." www.oberlo.com. 2023. https://www.oberlo.com/statistics/facebook-age-demographics#:~:text=Facebook%20demographics%20by%20age.](https://wallaroomedia.com/blog/social-media/tiktok-statistics/#:~:text=26%25%20are%20between%20the%20ages;Oberlo.%20Facebook%20Age%20Demographics.%20www.oberlo.com.2023.%20https://www.oberlo.com/statistics/facebook-age-demographics#:~:text=Facebook%20demographics%20by%20age.)

<sup>(61)</sup> Foo Yoon Chee and Sudip Kar-Gupta, "EU Urges Musk to Tackle Spread of Disinformation on X after Hamas Attack." Reuters. Reuters. October 11, 2023. [https://www.reuters.com/world/eus-breton-warns-musk-about-disinformation-x-after-amas-attack-israel-2023-10-10/.](https://www.reuters.com/world/eus-breton-warns-musk-about-disinformation-x-after-amas-attack-israel-2023-10-10/)

those who wish to nurse an environment of inclusion it might be claimed by the far right, which may constitute a problem for the future success of integration. A more intrinsic reason why social media should be used to the end of supporting integration is that it can reach many people. Social media breaks through class differences and is conspicuously effective at courting the attention and sympathies of the younger generations, and as mentioned previously, the experience of this group is critical to the success of integration. The application of social media, while it will certainly be a laborious task, is not herculean, and more affordable – both financially and in terms of more abstract resources like the workforce – than restructuring the entire education system, a task that should nonetheless be pursued.

## Section V: Conclusion

Since its creation, the European Union has gradually – and at times not so gradually – transformed into a quasi multi-ethnic suprate, with contesting notions of identity tugging in multiple directions at once.<sup>62</sup> At present, the countries comprising the EU are facing extreme demographic shifts, firstly in the form of a rapidly aging population, and secondly through overwhelming numbers of immigrants. In 1996, Deflem and Pampel wrote that there remained at the time many obstacles to postnational identity, mainly on account of differences between the different societies encapsulated within the EU.<sup>63</sup> What one can observe nowadays is the rise of nationalist parties throughout various countries, including, inter alia, Italy, Germany, Spain, and Greece. This can be broadly attributed to the fear and uncertainty many people feel in response to the introduction of “other” people from foreign cultures into the host society. Coupled with fears of replacement and concurrent loss of privileges, this image of cultural and national transformation has motivated a surge in reactionary political movements and a general sense that a traditional national identity must be preserved. Because the conception of a traditional national identity is largely a fiction that countries use to beget unity, the way that Europe interacts with history must be updated.

This refurbishment must occur to some level in education, but education alone is not enough. The media must contribute their fair share of the workload, and aid in establishing a paradigmatic departure from both overemphasizing guilt, and the continued fear mongering surrounding xenophobia. It must also coincide with top-down measures that facilitate the practical aspects to immigration; notably, the government must engage with the environment it grants its immigrants.

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<sup>62</sup> “Statistics on migration to Europe.” *European Commission*. Accessed November 29, 2023. [https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/statistics-migration-europe\\_en1](https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/statistics-migration-europe_en1).

<sup>63</sup> Mathieu Deflem and Fred Pampel, “The Myth of Postnational Identity: Popular Support for European Unification.” *Social Forces* 75, no. 1 (1996): 119–43. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2580759>.



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It must also actively prepare the immigrants' language abilities and more nuanced intercultural communication, which will require legwork on behalf of the State.

The path to a fully integrated Europe remains ahead, with plenty of obstacles still to be overcome. To combat the most imminent and salient of these issues, namely the identity crisis Europe finds itself in, citizens and officials of European states must be given the necessary tools to help immigrants integrate effectively. In the present paper, I laid out that the quintessential path to successful integration will have to be education. Europeans must learn to interact more critically with their history and foster inclusion, while making their countries safer for immigrants by cracking down on hate speech and the far right. I should also stress once more that constitutionalism is one pillar that must be strengthened for such an identity to come about, and it is a prerequisite for many of the developments that this essay demands.

This notion of a pan-European identity has been floating around since the EU's inception, and theoretically, if Europe were more unified, it could aid in creating a strong foundation on which a multicultural society can be sustained. The sense of community that must replace nationality as the source of camaraderie and fellowship may very well be that of a European identity. Whether such a European identity can be created, and if it would serve to rid Europe of its ailments, is nevertheless beyond the scope of this piece, and invites further research.

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