

The Paper prepared for the GLOPE II INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, POLITICAL ECONOMY of INSTITUTIONS and EXPECTATIONS III, held at Waseda University, 14 of Jan, 2012.

**Competitive Elections and Electoral Violence: An Empirical Investigation on
Mexican Democratization, 1990-2000.**

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Abstract

This paper explores the impact of out-migration or “exit” of youth on the political peace by analyzing the election-related homicide in Mexico during 1990s. Past researches have revealed that introduction of competitive election often trigger the violent conflicts between competing parties, because the privilege and power of elected officials, such as the power of selectively distributing subsidies, tempt them to use physical violence to assume the power. This paper contends that the elections become less dangerous when people move freely to seek high-wage opportunities, since office-seeking politicians find difficult to hire “labor force” of electoral violence. Statistical analysis based on the country-month homicide rate among Mexican municipal elections do shows that election-related violence decreases as the young people emigrate.

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Since the mid-1980s, a lot of dictatorial government transited to democracy by holding competitive, multi-party elections in the regular basis. However, subsequent course of events are not encouraging for democrats; holding competitive elections triggered violent conflict between opposition and incumbent. The notable cases are experiences of African countries (Straus & Taylor 2009); For example, Kenyan presidential elections held in 2007, Madagascar presidential elections in 2001 or Burundian presidential election in 1993 were followed by the large scale violent conflicts. Election-triggered violent conflicts are also common in the South Asia or South East Asian democracies. Politicians in India in the 1990s, for instance, deliberately incited ethnic riots to win elections (Brass 1997, Wilkinson 2004). So did politicians in Sri Lanka (Höglund & Piyarathne 2009, Devotta, 2005, Spencer 2007), while the demise of Suharto's dictatorship and introduction of competitive elections in Indonesia were a cause of sudden outburst of violent (ethnic or religious) conflicts (Klinke 2007, Varshney 2010, Bertrand 2010). Election-related assassinations and murder were almost rituals in Philippine elections. Looking at Americas, Nicaraguan democracies, established after the bloody civil war, were also rigged with violence in the local level (Cuadra 2004, Anderson 2009), and Costa Rica, one of the most stable democratic county in the continent, experienced Civil war in 1948 after holding controversial

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presidential elections. Historical quantitative evidence shows that the incumbent often refuses to relinquish the power when lost at the ballot box; out of 545 instances where the incumbent lost elections to the opposition since the year of 1800 to 2000, in the 72 cases the transfer of the power is conflictive (Przeworski 2010:120).

A reason that competitive elections trigger violence is simple; elections always generate the winner and loser, and the winner is entitled to implement the policy which damages the interests of the loser within the certain institutional limits. As a result, fearing the defeat at the ballot box, competing parties try to win elections by resorting physical violence against opposition candidates and their supporters. Furthermore, once lost at the ballot box, the defeated may try to overturn the results by force. Thus, election and voting are the most dangerous timing. Borrowing the word by Adam Przeworski, “To the extent that electoral changes reflect the relations of physical force, elections occur under the shadow of violence (Przeworski 2010: 124).

The basic argument contends that elections become stable when the defeats of elections are not devastating to the extent that competing parties want to use violence. The question is, thus, to specify under what conditions the defeat of elections are acceptable to all the political forces. Past scholarly works have given critical importance to two factors; institutions and economic structures. The first school emphasizes that

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the introduction of political institutions which protects the interests of electoral loser and to avoid “winner-takes-all” politics. Specifically, proportional representational electoral system or parliamentary democratic system is superior to the first-past electoral system or presidential democracy in guaranteeing the benefits to the losers (Reilly 2001, Lijphart 1991, Linz 1990). Another school emphasizes economic factors, especially the inequality of the wealth and the degree of economic development. According to this perspective, the winner is the “poor” and the poor redistribute the wealth of the rich. Thus, equitable distribution of income equality deters the electoral loser from resorting violence to overturn or distort electoral outcomes (Acemoglu & Robinson 2006, Boix 2003, Przeworski 2005).

Both of these two theories assume that the “winner” and “loser” are “unitary” agents in the sense that each political force receives the costs and benefits as a single unit, thus assuming away the problem of collective action problem. However, an individual who belongs to the winning side does not necessarily reap the fruits of victory at the election, since each individuals belonging to the victory side still struggle to distribute the pies among them.

In the similar vein, even if an individual belongs to the losing side in the election, he/she has an individual survival strategy to maximize their material interests.

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One such a strategy is “exit” from the current political community. The option of exit from the current political community gives opportunities outside the political community so that the relative costs and benefits of losing and winning elections loose relative importance. The more the youth people emigrate, the less dangerous elections become peaceful.

This paper approaches the problem of electoral violence from this individualistic perspective. I test quantitatively the political impact of “out-migration” of the youth on the stabilization of democratic elections by investigating the Mexican democratization experience during the 1990s. Mexico during the 1990s was the period of democratic transition from the dictatorial rule by the hegemonic party “Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)”. As in the other countries where the dictatorial regime collapsed, electoral competition became increasingly competitive especially in the local level, and violent electoral conflicts ensued (Villareal 2002). The political assassinations and murders, kidnapping and death threat against the political enemies became common practice. I test if this election-related violence decreases as the people emigrates to the other places. By taking the increase of homicide prior to election as a manifestation of electoral violence, I obtain following findings. First, during the 1990s, the number of homicide increases prior to local elections. Second, the pre-electoral

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increase of homicide is conditional upon the number of out-migration of the youth, lending support to my hypothesis that out-migration lessens the political pressure. While the focus of my study is on the local level elections, and not on the national level, which is most important, I think that the findings have an important implication for the peaceful working of democracy.

This article proceeds as follows. The second section reviews the literature on the micro logic of electoral violence and the effects out-migration and elaborates a hypothesis. The third section, in turn, introduces the political situation of Mexico since 1980 to 1990s. The fourth section is devoted to the empirical research. The fifth section concludes.

A Theory of Electoral Violence and Emigration

Election and Electoral Violence as a Collective Enterprise

Elections are held to generate winner and loser by counting the ballot. Since the victor is entitled to choose and enact a policy which affects the welfare of the defeated, competing political forces may want to use physical violence to win elections. An assassination against competing candidates or intimidation against the opposition

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supporters is one such strategy. Scholars call this election-motivated violence as “electoral violence”, which takes places around electoral timing (Hoglund 2009).

Past scholarly works have revealed two important features of electoral violence; (1) the timing of violence and (2) the needs of organization. First, most of electoral violence takes place before elections, since pre-electoral intimidations and assassinations are effective to affect the outcome by decreasing turnout and attracting neutral voters. Indeed, the experiment in Nigeria conducted by Paul Collier and Pedro C. Vicente show that pre-electoral “thread” decreases the voters’ turnout due to the fear (Collier and Vicente 2011). On the other hand, post-electoral violence is more likely to escalate to the large scale violent conflicts, because the defeated challenge the electoral results (Straus & Taylor 2009).

Further, literature reveals that electoral violence requires an organization. Electoral violence cannot take place unless office-seeking politicians can recruit sufficient number of followers who engage in the production of violence, if necessary, to win elections. While the name varies, researches on the electoral violence have demonstrated that when electoral violence occurs, there are always some kind of armed organization, militia or thugs; it is these armed organizations that engage in the production of electoral violence during electoral campaign to intimidate and assassinate

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political enemies. Laakso (2007), by observing the cause of electoral violence in Tanzania (1995, 2000) and Kenya (1992, 1997, 2002), found that the incumbent political organize the militia during the electoral campaign to oppress the opposition supporters. Indeed, even in the case of turmoil after presidential elections held in 2007 in Kenya, the militia called Jeshis were principal perpetrators of violence (Kagwanja 2009: 379-380). Paramilitary existed during the electoral campaign for Costa Rican presidential elections in 1948, which led to the civil war after the violent electoral campaign (Aguilar Bulgarreli 1969), or the hooligans used by Indian politician in inciting ethnic riots(Brass 1997: 286). At Sierra Leonean elections held after the termination of civil war, politicians recruited ex-soldiers for electoral campaign as a body-guard (Christensen & Utas 2008). Further, it is often noted that these armed organization was comprised by the unemployed youth.

From a point of the unemployed youth who politicians mobilize, however, joining into the armed organization is not necessary advantageous in terms of labor conditions. First, remember that these supporters risk their lives, if electoral violence takes place. Second, material rewards promised by competing politicians are not certain, since electoral outcome is not known until elections held. Thus, from the individual's point of view, not from the "class", or "party", taking part in the election (and electoral

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violence) is not beneficial, even if one in a losing side.

Migration as an Individual Solution and Its Impact

On the other hand, individuals always have an option to go outside the political community to advance their material interests. Furthermore, as long as outside-job opportunity exists, emigration may be superior to the collective engagement in politics in the following two points; the future prospect of advancement with less risk. The important benefit of emigration is greater life opportunity for the future advancements. While engaging politics can very costly and uncertain way to improve one's life, "out-migration" is a relatively cheap strategy for the career seeking citizens. As the developmental economists analyze, in the poorer, agrarian societies, the migration of the poor from the rural to urban areas grants the greater life opportunities. Sociological and anthropological works on the Mexican emigrants showed that childless youth from agrarian, over-crowded rural areas are more likely to emigrate to establish a basis of the future (Massey & Espinosa 1997). The relative value by engaging in politics decreases as the value of emigrate increases or the option of exit is available.

The availability of the emigration has important effects on the eruption of electoral violence. Given the existence of profitable jobs outside the community,

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office-seeking politicians are forced to offer higher rewards to their supporters to participate and engage in the violent conflicts. However, the resource of the public office is limited so that politician cannot raise the reward infinitely. Note that, in electoral competition, politicians at the victory side have to gain the majority of electorates so that the required amounts of resource can be very large. The existence of emigration, thus, increases the labor costs for office-seeking politicians to hire and organize supporters. As a result, the lack of supporters hinders politicians from using violence. In sum, exit as an individual solution to the problem is superior to the politics in the sense that exit is relatively cheap strategy, and individuality does not necessitate the post-hoc politics of material distribution.

Hypothesis.

Where the youth emigrate, electoral violence decreases as the relevance of politics decreases.

Mexican Political Contexts since the 1980s

The Introduction of Competitive Elections and Conflicts Concerning the Benefits

This section, by narrating the politics in Mexico since the end of 1970s, makes readers familiar with the Mexican contexts of democratization and electoral conflicts. First of all, note that the Mexico in the 20th century was dominated by a single, hegemonic party called Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) since 1928 until 2000. The dictatorship of Mexico by the PRI was interesting and rather peculiar in the sense that the PRI held presidential, congressional elections periodically, and no individual monopolized the power. However, the PRI monopolized all the state power, including presidency, super-majority of the congressional seats and governorship until late 1980.

The ultimate democratization of Mexico came in 2000, when the presidential candidate of the PRI was defeated at the ballot box in the first time of the history. The succession of the power was smooth, without the conflicts.

Peaceful though the succession of the presidential power, in Mexico electoral conflicts were common phenomena during the democratizing period, roughly from 1980s until 2000. Local conflicts were especially violence-ridden, since the central government of the PRI allowed relatively free electoral competition in the local level. Particularly the Constitutional Amendment adopted in 1983 delegated the administrative jurisdictions concerning the distribution of the state resource, subsidies and public work

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to the local government. Note that Mexico is federal state comprised three-tier government; the national government (presidency and congress), state government and county (*municipios*). Before the constitutional amendment, national government had monopolized all the state power, the amendment strengthened the power of the county. As a result of amendment, political competition in the local, county level political competition intensified. Although the national government never allows the opposition party to assume the power of the state government, the ruling elite of the PRI indeed did enable the opposition to win elections in local, county level.

Since everyday form of the resource distribution was realized through the county government, for citizens the county government became the most important posts. The political competitions for post of county government intensified, as a result of these decentralization and democratization policies. The selected survey conducted in 1977-78 showed the people generally cared about what the county government does, while the interests in the federal or state government was paid less attention(Salinas 1980: 133) A number of case studies conducted by political scientists, sociologists and anthropologists at that time pointed out that the elections were one of the root causes of violent conflicts in the community at that time. As López Monjardín (1986) notes, from the 1970s the political conflicts in the local level intensified. In the urban area, people

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struggle for the provision of the infrastructure, public service or the assignments of the official markets lots. In the rural areas, peasants demanded land distribution (López Monjardín 1986: 7). Anthropologists Jan Rus and George Collier, observing the situation of the High Land of the Chiapas State, one of the most poor place in Mexico, noted that since 1980s

Chiapas's state government began appropriating millions of pesos of "development funds" directly to *ayuntamientos* (county government)(...).But the practice led to increased competition to participate in the *ayuntamientos*--and share their resources. Because the government also worked behind the scenes to assure PRI control of *ayuntamientos*, this in turn fomented intra-communal factionalism throughout the region between "official" groups supported by the government and those who had been excluded.(Rus & Collier 2003: 50).

An anthropologist, Philip Parnell noted that "between 1974 and 1984 one opposition group in each village chose to symbolize its interests by establishing alliance with a political party (PSUM) that opposed their local PRI-aligned opponents." and "(Cartucho (local boss) rule of (community) Betaza was challenged with the election of a

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non-PRI president. In Betaza, the division (of politics between PRI and non-PRI opposition party) apparently produced violence. The new president disappeared and a Cartusho supporter was installed in his place" (Parnell 1988: 81-82). A political Scientist, Jeffrery Rubin, studying the political situation of the Juchitán county, a city of the State of Oaxaca in the beginning of the 1980s, where the left wing political party, COCEI, won the municipal elections. He reported that "a prominent schoolteacher in Juchitán and a supporter of the PRI administration's cultural programs, added that COCEI supports incite violence" (Rubin 1997: 175), and , "local PRI politicians and business people formed new groups to fight movement on the local level(...). The right wing of the PRI organized the Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the People of Juchitán" (Rubin 1999: 190). The Human Rights Watch Americas took the same stance on the local situation in the 1990s, reporting that, in

"Tlacoachistlahuaca, a municipality in southern Guerrero state, has suffered a series of apparently politically motivated murders and impunity, stemming from an electoral disputes(...) Violence in (state of) Chiapas became pronounced in 1995 and 1996, as the political opposition, for the first time, decisively breached the PRI's monopoly on local government"(The Human Right Watch 1997: 25).

Similar observations are plenty at that time².

Out-migration and Its Political Effects.

However, the surge of emigration was also a result of “dissatisfaction with authoritarian government that has neglected the small-scale business and farming sector”(Roberts et al., 1999: 249). Indeed, the political motivation of emigration was well documented by various authors. For example, a leader of political organization, told once that against the local boss, “On October 30, 1983, after a year of organizing efforts, we decided to peacefully take over the municipal offices and force (local boss) Platón Gil to resign. Unfortunately, he was armed. (...) In April 1984 I fled to Sinaloa State after receiving death threats.(...) Domínguez Santos 2004: 70.

In the similar vein, an anthropologist, Norberto Valdes, studying the reagon of

² In the Triqui region in the state of Oaxaca, politically and electrically motivated conflicts were also rampant after the late 1970s, when a faction of the people establish the organization so-called “CLUB” to challenge traditional boss rule (Parra Mora & Hernández Díaz 1994). “In Juquila, assaults on the town hall by the losing side have become almost a postelection ritual. Because Mexican political institutions rest on a hierarchy of patron-client relations stretching from local communities to the highest level of government, each change in administration causes turmoil as realignments take place within the system.(...)The constant upheavals caused by the politics of patronage are a well-known source of rancor and violence”(Greenberg 1989: 224). “According to the calculation by the PRD, in the state of Michoacán 68 party members killed between 1988 and March 1994, 25 percent of them were PRD municipal officials or municipal candidatea at the time of their murder.(Bruhn 1999:34-35) See also Bobrow-Strain 2007, Díaz Montes 1992, Jaime Bailón 1984, Alonso 1985, Centro Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez 1996, Melger 1990, Hernández Navarro 1999, Velázquez Rivera 1985, Bellinghausen 2008, Álvarez Fabela 2000.

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the Costa Chica of the State of Guerrero, a one of the most dangerous region in Mexico,

cited the reason of emigration from a with surprise, saying

"I was surprised when I was told by Juan, a young Amuzgo family man who

had been an important informant during my field visit, that he had requested a

one-month unpaid leave from his government job in order to try his luck in the

U.S. Labor market.(...) "He has worked for almost fifteen years as a rural agent

for the Ministry of Water Resource and, most recently, with PROCAMPO.(...) He

indicated to me that recent challenges to the ruling party (PRI) and the

trimming of many government programs during the past five years had

convinced him of the need to find other opportunities.(...) he felt that

opportunities in his career with the government were coming to an end and he

saw no local employment prospects that would meet his family's needs."(Valdes

1998: 157).

Indeed, again, a lot of works by anthropologists emphasizes the surge of

emigration as a response to the declining political conditions.

Even more ominously, in October 1994, stories circulated that (county of Chamula's PRI was using municipal funds to acquire automatic weapons and ammunition and had paid one hundred young men one thousand dollars each (...) to become the private army of the local PRI. Armed with automatic weapons and cell phones, these "soldiers" had set up roadblocks throughout western Chamula by spring 1995. Meanwhile, opponents of PRI---particularly (opposition political party) PRD-affiliated Protestants in the western hamlet of Arvensa---were by this point also armed. The inevitable explosion came on November 18, 1995, when PRI's "PROCAMPO" army surrounded the principal concentration of PRO-Protestant houses in Arvensa(...). By late 1995, many Chamulans appear to have finally given up. Emigration from the *municipio*(county), which has been a steady trickle from the 1970s through the early 1990s, suddenly became a flood.(Rus & Collier 2003: 54-5).³

These observations made by anthropologists lend a support the claim that emigration makes electoral conflicts less dangerous by affording an alternative way of living outside the community.

³ For the similar observation in the county of San Pedro Chenalhó, where a "massacre of Acteal", took place, a lot of people abandoned the county. (Eber 2003: 152)

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Empirics

This section analyze the impact of out-migration on the incidents of electorally motivated homicides by testing if there exist a statistical relationship between holding local elections and pre-electoral increase of homicide rates, and interactional effects of the rate of the remaining youth and elections on the occurrence of homicides from 1990 to 2000

Data Structure

The unit of observation is County-Month since 1990, when the complete vital statistics is available in each county, until 2000, when the national government finally relinquished the power to the opposition party

Dependent Variables

The concept of interest is “electoral violence”, a type of violence committed to

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affect the outcome of elections. Since the data on the electoral violence does not exist, I consider statistically significant increase of the number of homicide committed in each county prior to elections as the evidence of electoral violence. Thus, my dependent variable is the number of homicide in each county, the data taken from the Mexican Statistical Departments (INEGI). I created two types of homicide rates. (1) the “raw homicide rate”, which is calculated by the division of the number of homicide by population in each county. (2)The second variable “Logged Homicide Rates” was created by following two steps. First, I take the logged number of homicide, then divided by the population. Figure 1, 2, 3, and 4 show the overall temporal and spatial distribution of homicide in Mexico. As the figure 1 demonstrates, the overall number of homicides since 1990 is decreasing trend after the year of 1992 until the democratization year in 2000. The sudden outburst of homicides after 2008 is a result of “Drug War”, initiated by the government.

(Figure 1, 2, 3, 4 around here).

Figure 2, 3, and 4 conveys the spatial distribution of the homicides. Firstly, in this period, the raw number of homicide is the most serious problem in the Estado de

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México, which is adjacent to the Capital, Mexico City. However, the grapes also illuminate the large number of homicides in the poorer South East states. Given the small population of these states, compared to the Estado de México, the large number of homicides in these states are noteworthy. Indeed, the case studies cited in the previous sections are all conducted in these poorer states.

Independent Variable

The aim of this paper is to test the effect of out-migration of the youth on the incidence of electoral violence. My independent variable is, thus, an interaction terms of the “3 Months Pre-Elections Timing Dummies” and “the Rate of Emigration”. I expect that as the rate of emigration increases, the pre-electoral increase of homicide rate decreases as well. The “Pre-Election Dummy” is an indicator variable, which takes the value of 1 if the county/national elections were held within subsequent 3 months, including the month when elections are held. Table 2 shows the date of elections; while federal elections are held across the country, the date of county elections are held in each state. As the table demonstrates, the date of elections significantly differs from a state to another, so that the problem of time-trend or seasonality do not exist.

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The other principal independent variable, the “Rate of Youth Emigration” was constructed based on the Census data in 1990 and 2000. I calculate the ratio of remaining youth of 5- 14 years-old cohort in 1990 and 15-24 years-old cohort in 2000. In order to make the interpretation easy, I subtracted 1 from the raw number of remaining youth rate; if the “Rates of Youth Emigration” is 0, there did not exists any out-migration. Positive value is the in-coming of the youth and negative value means the out-migration. Since only two census is available to calculate the remaining youth, the “Rate of Youth Emigration” is constant variable through time from 1990 to 2000, so that it is an equivalent county-specific variable.

Control Variables

Election-Related Control Variables

To show that id the homicide increase in the pre-electoral timing, I add following election related variables; (1) post-county electoral timing variable, (2) pre/post federal electoral timing variable. Theory and case studies predict that these election-related variables are not statistically significant, since intimidation and physical coercion after elections are not expected to affect the electoral outcomes. Federal elections, furthermore,

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Community Level Control Variables

In order to control for the community level general propensity for the violence, following 6 variables are included to the statistical models. First, “population density” data is calculated, since Criminological researches have found that higher population density is conductive to homicides. Second, “Ratio of Budget the Human Resource to the Total Budge” was added to the model in order to measure the degree of “patronage” based on the Governmental survey conducted in 2000.(Base de Datos de la Encuesta Nacional Sobre Desarollo Institucional Municipal 2000). Third, “The Ration of the County Tax to the Total County Budget,” was included to represent the wealth of the county(Indice Desarrollo NAcional 2001). The fourth control variable is the “Ration of Indigenous Population to the Total Population”, because some argued that the co-existence of indigenous and “ladino” people tend to invite violence. Fifth, the “ratio of the number of county police to total number of public servants” is included, since this variable would control for the general danger of the county(Base de Datos de la Encuesta Nacional Sobre Desarollo Institucional Municipal 2000). Last, “Average Marginality of the County” was included as a control. “Marginality Index” is a composite index constructed by the Mexican government to measure the degree of poverty and the

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marginalization. The data is taken in the three times, in 1990, 1995, and 2000, so that I took the average value of these. The problem is that these control variables are all constant through time.

Models

Statistical models are ordinary OLS regressions, with the clustering by the county. In order to control for the time-dependence, I also included “time” variable, which increases monotonically since the Jan of 1990 until Dec of 2000.

Main Results

The results of principal 4 statistical models are shown in the table 3. Dependent variable of model 1 and 3 are “Raw Homicide Rates,” and those of the model 2 and 4 are “Logged Homicide Rate”. While samples of model 1 and 2 are all country, only the county with the rate of the youth is less than 0, immigration-sending county, is used model 3 and model 4. As the table shows, the results generally support our hypothesis. Except for the model 4, the homicide rate increase in the pre-county election timing. Furthermore, the interaction terms of county elections and the youth exit

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variable constantly shows that in the youth-sending communities, the pre-electoral increase of homicide rate is negative. These results suggest that the more the you emigrates, the more peaceful becomes the county election.

The figure1 graphically shows this relationship; the less youth remains in the county, the more peaceful becomes the pre-electoral timings. The graph also shows that the sign of “pre-county” elections shifts to negative around the exit rate -0.2.

(Table 3 and Figure 4 around here)

Alternative Specifications

Table 3 and 4 shows the additional statistical models to check the robustness of my findings. The table 3 checks if the pre-electoral increase of homicide is a mere time trend or actually correlated to the election timings. The independent variable of models of 5, 6 are interaction of the “youth emigration” and the dummy variables which take 1 if the county elections are held in the following 4, 5, or 6 month. The independent variables of model 7, 8 are interactions of “exit youth” rate and “7-9 month prior to county elections” dummy. As the table shows, I find no statistical correlation in these four models. These results suggest that the pre-electoral increase of homicide rates

found in model 1-4 are indeed due to holding elections.

For further robustness check, I run 4 more models in the Table 4. The independent variable of model 9 is changed from pre-electoral timing to post-electoral timing. However, post-electoral timing variable do not show statistical significance. In the model 10, I substituted the homicide rate for the number of death by accidents divided by the population. The death of accidents is not expected to correlate with the elections. The election variable does not show statistical significance. In model 11 and 12, following the advice by Cindy Kam and Robert Franzese (2007: 104-5), I divide the sample by the rate of the youth emigration. The results support my hypothesis. The overall results of these models clearly support my hypothesis; where the youth can emigrate to find the work, election-related violence does not take place.

Conclusion

“Exit” is an important political weapon for the individuals, especially for the underprivileged who lack the effective methods of “voice” to affect the organization he/she belongs (Hirschman 1970, Warren 2011), since exit is an individualistic strategy cheap to perform. The existence of the “exit” option, thorough which individuals can

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advance pursuit interests, make the very problem that who belongs to the winning and losing side irrelevant for individual perspectives. As a result, election related violence is not likely to take place.

True, the work by Charles Boix (2003) incorporated the exit of the rich or, “capital flight”, into the model as an important stabilizing mechanism of democracy. In the similar vein, Kapur (2010), argued the a cause of stability of Indian democracy can be found in the elite-emigration , since by emigration, old political elites to diversify their economic portfolio by moving abroad for the mobility of “new” political elites drawn from numerically larger but historically marginalized communities, without provoking the sorts of intense intra-elite conflict that led to the breakdown of democracies.”(Kapur 2010: 162). However, the point of my claim is that the exit is also available for the poor or the under-privileged.

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Dataset

Base de datos de la Encuesta Nacional Sobre Desarrollo Institucional Municipal 2000.

Indice Desarrollo Nacional 2001

Instituto Nacional para el Federalismo y el Desarrollo Municipal

Tables and Figures

The Paper prepared for the GLOPE II INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, POLITICAL ECONOMY of INSTITUTIONS and EXPECTATIONS III, held at Waseda University, 14 of Jan, 2012.

The Date of Elections				
Federal	1991/8	1994/8	1997/7	2000/7
Aguascalientes	1992/8	1995/8	1998/10	
Baja California	1992/8	1995/8	1998/7	
Baja California Sur	1990/2	1993/3	1996/2	1999/2
Campeche	1991/11	1994/8	1997/7	2000/7
Coahuila	1990/8	1993/9	1996/11	1999/9
Colima	1991/8	1994/8	1997/7	
Chiapas	1991/8	1995/7	1998/10	
Chihuahua	1992/7	1995/7	1998/7	
Durango	1992/8	1995/7	1998/7	
Guanajuato	1991/12	1994/12	1997/7	2000/7
Guerrero	1993/10	1996/10	1999/2	
Hidalgo	1990/11	1993/11	1996/11	1999/11
Jalisco	1992/2	1995/2	1997/11	2000/11
Estado de México	1990/11	1993/11	1996/2	2000/7
Michoacán	1992/12	1995/11	1998/11	
Morelos	1991/3	1994/3	1997/3	2000/7
Nayarit	1990/6	1993/7	1996/7	1999/7
Nuevo León	1991/11	1994/8	1997/7	2000/7
Oaxaca	1992/11	1995/11	1998/8	
Puebla	1992/11	1995/11	1998/11	
Queretaro	1991/7	1994/8	1997/7	2000/7
Quintana Roo	1990/3	1993/2	1996/2	1999/2
San Luis Potosí	1991/12	1994/12	1997/7	2000/8
Sinaloa	1992/11	1995/11	1998/11	
Sonora	1991/8	1994/8	1997/7	2000/7
Tabasco	1991/11	1994/11	1997/10	2000/10
Tamaulipas	1992/11	1995/11	1998/11	
Tlaxcala	1991/11	1994/11	1998/11	
Veracruz	1991/11	1994/11	1997/10	2000/9
Yucatán	1990/11	1993/11	1995/5	1998/5

Table 1. The Date of Federal and Local Elections by State.

The Paper prepared for the GLOPE II INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, POLITICAL ECONOMY of INSTITUTIONS and EXPECTATIONS III, held at Waseda University, 14 of Jan, 2012.

Variables	Obs.	Mean	S.D	Min	Max
The Rate of Remaining Youth	262452.00	-0.2	0.22	-1	2.06
Standardized Homicide Rates (Log)	262452.00	0.79	3.59	0.00	415.00
Homicide Rates (per10000)	262452.00	1.37	6.10	0.00	600.24
Accident Death (per 10000)	262452.00	5.95	30.93	0.00	2332.76
Time	262452.00	425.24	38.14	360.00	491.00
The number of Municipal Public Servants	262452.00	219.01	620.09	7.00	13202.00
The number of Municipal Police	262452.00	49.07	157.51	0.00	4142.00
Budget for Human Resource/Total Budget	262452.00	23.83	13.85	0.00	87.00
The Percentage of county Tax to Total Expenditures	262452.00	16.33	15.46	0.00	100.00
N of Municipal Police/N of all Public Servants	262452.00	0.23	0.14	0.00	0.93
Population(1000)	262452.00	37.20	103.20	0.16	1650.00
Indigenous Pop (1000)	262452.00	2.36	5.99	0.00	92.47
The Rate of Indigenous Population	262452.00	0.15	0.27	0.00	2.15
Average Marginality (1990,1995,2000)	262452.00	-0.09	0.95	-2.2	3.02

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics.

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The Paper prepared for the GLOPE II INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, POLITICAL ECONOMY of INSTITUTIONS and EXPECTATIONS III, held at Waseda University, 14 of Jan, 2012.

Model	1	2	3	4
Timing	Pre 3mth	Pre 3mth	Pre 3mth	Pre 3mth
Dep.Variable	Homicide (log)	Homicide(raw)	Homicide(log)	Homicide (raw)
Sample	All	All	County with exit	County with exit
Pre-Country Election 3 mth	0.0513*	0.101*	0.101*	0.166*
	(2.33)	(2.32)	(2.28)	(2.01)
Pre-County Elections 3mth *	0.257**	0.452**	0.410*	0.657*
	(2.58)	(2.61)	(2.29)	(2.14)
Pre-Federal Elections 3mth	-0.0475*	-0.0904**	-0.0452*	-0.0853*
	(-2.49)	(-2.82)	(-2.15)	(-2.42)
Pop Density	0.000000544	0.0000816**	-0.00000724	0.0000536*
	(0.07)	(3.80)	(-0.58)	(2.32)
Budget for Human Resource/Total	0.00459**	0.0101***	0.00465**	0.00959**
	(3.20)	(3.74)	(2.96)	(3.26)
County Tax/ Total Expenditure	0.00306**	0.00780***	0.00258*	0.00619**
	(3.02)	(4.09)	(2.29)	(2.95)
Exit Youth Rate	-0.0149	0.203	-0.317*	-0.286
	(-0.16)	(1.13)	(-2.18)	(-1.10)
Time	-0.00232***	-0.00463***	-0.00252***	-0.00501***
	(-8.92)	(-9.42)	(-8.85)	(-9.33)
N of country Police/ N of Total	0.775***	1.378***	0.819***	1.420***
	(4.32)	(4.37)	(4.22)	(4.22)
The rate of Indigenous Pop	-0.883***	-1.625***	-0.884***	-1.635***
	(7.73)	(7.87)	(7.44)	(7.66)
Average Marginality of County	0.441***	0.808***	0.443***	0.811***
	(10.60)	(10.17)	(10.23)	(9.92)
Constant	1.614***	3.013***	1.591***	3.029***
	(11.91)	(11.70)	(10.43)	(10.53)
Obs	262320	262320	235188	235188

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.05, **, p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 3. Principal Results.

The Paper prepared for the GLOPE II INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, POLITICAL ECONOMY of INSTITUTIONS and EXPECTATIONS III, held at Waseda University, 14 of Jan, 2012.

The Paper prepared for the GLOPE II INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, POLITICAL ECONOMY of INSTITUTIONS and EXPECTATIONS III, held at Waseda University, 14 of Jan, 2012.

Model	5	6	7	8
Timing	Pre 4–6 mth	Pre 4–6 mth	Pre 7–9 mth	pre 7–9 mth
Dep.Variable	Homicide (log)	Homicide(raw)	Homicide(log)	Homicide (raw)
Sample	All	All	All	All
Pre-Country Election 4–6 mth	0.0128 (0.52)	0.0217 (0.44)		
Pre-County Elections 4–6 mth *	0.108 (0.93)	0.115 (0.56)		
Pre-County Election 7–9 mth			-0.0106 (-0.35)	-0.0145 (-0.29)
Pre-County Election 7–9 mth * Exit Youth			-0.204 (-1.15)	-0.318 (-1.17)
Pre-Federal Elections 3mth	-0.0454* (-2.36)	-0.0869** (-2.70)	-0.0446* (-2.37)	-0.0849** (-2.69)
Pop Density	0.000000607 (0.08)	0.00000818*** (3.80)	0.000000669 (0.09)	0.00000818*** (3.80)
Budget for Human Resource/Total	0.00459** (3.20)	0.0101*** (3.74)	0.00459** (3.20)	0.0101*** (3.74)
County Tax / Total Expenditure	0.00306** (3.02)	0.00779*** (4.08)	0.00306** (3.02)	0.00779*** (4.08)
Exit Youth Rate	0.00312 (0.03)	0.240 (1.33)	0.0264 (0.28)	0.273 (1.50)
Time	-0.00233*** (-8.94)	-0.00464*** (-9.42)	-0.00232*** (-8.92)	-0.00464*** (-9.41)
N of country Police/ N of Total County	0.775*** (4.32)	1.379*** (4.37)	0.776*** (4.33)	1.381*** (4.37)
The rate of Indigenous Pop	-0.883*** (-7.73)	-1.625*** (-7.87)	-0.883*** (-7.72)	-1.624*** (-7.87)
Average Marginality of County	0.441*** (10.60)	0.808*** (10.17)	0.441*** (10.60)	0.808*** (10.17)
Constant	1.621*** (11.92)	3.025*** (11.70)	1.620*** (11.93)	3.024*** (11.71)
Obs	262320	262320	262320	262320

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.05, **, p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 4. Alternative Specifications.

The Paper prepared for the GLOPE II INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, POLITICAL ECONOMY of INSTITUTIONS and EXPECTATIONS III, held at Waseda University, 14 of Jan, 2012.

Model	9	10	11	12
Timing	Post 3mth	Pre 3mth	Pre 3mth	Pre 3mth
Dep. V	Homicide (log)	Accident(log)	Homicide (log)	Homicide (log)
Sample	All	All	Exit <-.2	Exit>-.2
Pre-Country Elections 3mth		0.11 (0.53)	-0.0441 (-1.46)	0.0513* (2.37)
Pre-County Elections * Exit		0.07 (0.07)		
Pre Federal Elections 3mth	-0.0479* (-2.51)	0.11 (0.66)	-0.0490 (-1.76)	-0.0435* (-2.51)
Pop Density	0.000000607 (0.08)	-0.000659*** (4.04)	-0.00223*** (-6.27)	-0.0000106 (-1.55)
Budge for Human	0.00459** (3.20)	-0.00219 (0.26)	0.00453* (2.37)	0.00418* (1.99)
County Tax /Total	0.00306** (3.02)	-0.0606*** (8.45)	0.00112 (0.76)	0.00451*** (3.66)
Exit Youth Rate	0.00302 (0.03)	-7.867*** (-7.99)	0.393 (1.62)	0.205 (1.41)
Time	-0.00232*** (-8.91)	-0.0121*** (6.30)	-0.00295*** (-8.27)	-0.00110** (-3.22)
N of County Police/ N of	0.775*** (4.32)	1.196 (0.95)	0.962*** (4.22)	0.235 (0.90)
The Rate of Indigenous Pop	-0.883*** (-7.73)	1.574** (2.72)	-0.930*** (-6.70)	-0.591** (-2.92)
Average Marginality	0.441*** (10.60)	-1.321*** (-6.32)	0.495*** (10.05)	0.325*** (4.04)
Post-County Elections	-0.000808 (-0.04)			
Post-County Elections 3mth	0.09 (0.91)			
Constant	1.618*** (11.94)	9.643*** (10.00)	2.149*** (10.32)	1.083*** (5.80)

t statistics in parentheses

The Paper prepared for the GLOPE II INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, POLITICAL ECONOMY of INSTITUTIONS and EXPECTATIONS III, held at Waseda University, 14 of Jan, 2012.

* p<0.05, **, p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 5. Alternative Specifications.




Figure 1. Total Number of Homicide since 1990 until 2009.

Source; INGEI.




Figure 2. Distribution of the Homicide in Mexico in 1992.





Figure 3. Distribution of the Homicide in Mexico in 1995.



The Paper prepared for the GLOPE II INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, POLITICAL ECONOMY of INSTITUTIONS and EXPECTATIONS III, held at Waseda University, 14 of Jan, 2012.

Figure 4. Distribution of the Homicide in Mexico in 2000.




Figure4: Conditional Effects of Pre-electoral Timing Increase of Homicide Rate by the Rate of Out-Migration of the Youth.