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 - validity (true for all possible models)
- Instantaneous Understanding; contents of an information piece can be extracted instantaneously.
- Instantaneous Utility Maximization; maximization of utility is instantaneously made.

More serious and similar omniscience assumptions are:

- a player knows the model which he lives in.
- he can make a plan over a long-horizon such as in the repeated game approach.

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