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¥Æ¡¼¥Þ¡§Private provision of discrete public goods: the correlated cost case
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¡¡This paper explores the effects of correlated costs between the players of an incomplete information game relating to the private provision of discrete public goods. In such an incomplete information game without a correlation between players, a cut-point strategy is always consistent with rationality. A cut-point strategy is as follows: when the cost is low, each player makes a contribution. However, when a correlation is involved, namely when players' decisions to contribute are linked, this cut-point strategy can be inconsistent with rationality, because there is a new incentive to free ride. Moreover, this incomplete information game with a correlation is more general than that without.

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