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¡Ú¥¿¥¤¥È¥ë¡ÛPersonalizing Split-Ticket Voting (joint work with Matthew S. Shugart)
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Based on the assumptions that nominal votes are more strategic and list votes are more sincere in mixed-member systems (MMSs), the literature argues that a large, positive gap between nominal and list votes should signify the presence of many strategic, split-ticket voters. But this paper argues that both nominal and list votes under MMSs can be systematically biased by the nature of electoral competition: First, nominal votes cast for certain individual candidates could be significantly biased upward, when personalistic electoral competition force them to appeal to personal supporters beyond their partisans; and second, list votes cast for a certain party could be significantly biased downward, when list candidates nominated by the other parties have very attractive personal vote earning attributes (PVEAs) important for local voters. Using a unique dataset on Japan's second chamber, this paper confirms the theoretical argument.

*The paper is available upon request.
*The talk will be given in English.


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