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¡Ú¥¿¥¤¥È¥ë¡ÛBargaining Outside the Shadow of War: Relative Power and Military Threat
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The paper challenges the core conjecture underlying numerous theories
of international security that the stronger a state is, the more
likely it is to threaten others. I argue that, contrary to the
conjecture, states are most likely to threaten to use force when they
are not too weak and not too strong relative to others. To explain
when and how states threaten others, I present a bargaining model of
diplomacy, which introduces bribery as an alternative diplomatic
option, and demonstrate that the ability of the strong to buy off the
weak prevents the strong from actually or potentially threatening the
weak. The strong do what they can, but the weak do not suffer what
they must as long as they remain to be the weak. To test my argument,
I conduct Markov chain Monte Carlo simulations using data on military
dispute initiation.

* The talk will be given in Japanese.




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