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¾ÜºÙ | GLOPE II ¥é¥ó¥Á¥¿¥¤¥à¥»¥ß¥Ê¡¼ ¡ÚÊó¹ð¼Ô¡Û¹À¥·òÂÀϺ»á¡Ê¥·¥«¥´Âç³ØÂç³Ø±¡À¯¼£³Ø¸¦µæ²Ê¡Ë ¡Ú¥¿¥¤¥È¥ë¡ÛBargaining Outside the Shadow of War: Relative Power and Military Threat ¡Ú¾ì½ê¡Û1¹æ´Û401¶µ¼¼ ¡Ú³µÍ×¡Û The paper challenges the core conjecture underlying numerous theories of international security that the stronger a state is, the more likely it is to threaten others. I argue that, contrary to the conjecture, states are most likely to threaten to use force when they are not too weak and not too strong relative to others. To explain when and how states threaten others, I present a bargaining model of diplomacy, which introduces bribery as an alternative diplomatic option, and demonstrate that the ability of the strong to buy off the weak prevents the strong from actually or potentially threatening the weak. The strong do what they can, but the weak do not suffer what they must as long as they remain to be the weak. To test my argument, I conduct Markov chain Monte Carlo simulations using data on military dispute initiation. * The talk will be given in Japanese. |
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