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¾ÜºÙ | ÌÚÍË¥»¥ß¥Ê¡¼ ¡ÚÊó¹ð¼Ô¡Û¡¡Áìëʹ²ð¡ÊNorthwestern University, Kellogg School of Management,MEDSÇî»Î²ÝÄøÂç³Ø±¡À¸¡Ë ¡Ú¥¿¥¤¥È¥ë¡ÛAnti-bullying School Choice Mechanism Design ¡Ú³µ¡¡Í×¡Û The market design approach to school choice has uncovered the desirable properties of the popular mechanisms. However, an educational concern for peer effects, especially the implication of the bullying problems on student assignment has escaped due notice in the literature. This paper first proposes a new framework to study the bullying problems together with school choice. Then it shows that the suitably modified variants of these popular mechanisms have the anti-bullying property (i.e., they systematically separate bullies from their victims, and assign a less preferable school seat to a student if she is involved in an additional bullying episode as a bully) together with other standard desiderata. Finally, by investigating the complementary roles of the market design and anti-bullying program, I discuss the interwoven future perspective of the collaboration between the two fields. ¤³¤Î¸¦µæ¤Ï¡¤³Ø¹»ÁªÂò¤Î¥á¥«¥Ë¥º¥à¤Ë¤ª¤¤¤Æ¡¢¤¤¤¸¤áÌäÂê¤ò¼è¤êÆþ¤ì¤¿¿·¤·¤¤Ê¬ÀϤòÄ󰯤·¤Æ¤¤¤ë¡£´û¸¤Î¥á¥«¥Ë¥º¥à¤ò½¤Àµ¤¹¤ë¤³¤È¤Ë¤è¤ê¡¢¤¤¤¸¤áÌäÂê¤Ë¤âÂбþ¤·¤¿¥á¥«¥Ë¥º¥à¤¬¤Ç¤¤ë¤³¤È¤ò¼¨¤¹¡£Áìëʹ²ð»á¤Ï¥Î¡¼¥¹¥¦¥¨¥¹¥¿¥óÂç³Ø¤ÎÇî»Î²ÝÄø2ǯ¤Î³ØÀ¸¤Ç¤¢¤ê¡¢¤³¤ÎʬÌî¤Î¸¦µæ¤òÀºÎÏŪ¤Ë¿Ê¤á¤Æ¤ª¤ê¡¢º£²ó¤Îµ¢Æü¤Îµ¡²ñ¤ËÊó¹ð¤ò¤·¤Æ¤¤¤¿¤À¤¯¡£ |
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