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¾ÜºÙ | GLOPE II À¯¼£·ÐºÑ³Ø´ðÁÃ¥»¥ß¥Ê¡¼¡Ê¹ñºÝÀ¯¼£·ÐºÑ³ØÀèü¸¦µæA¡Ë ¡Ú¥°¥ë¡¼¥×1¡Û¼Â¸³¡¦À¤ÏÀÄ´ºº¡¦Åý·×ʬÀÏ ¾ì½ê¡§6¹æ´Û313-2¶µ¼¼ ÆâÍÆ¡§¡Ö¥Ñ¥¤¥í¥Ã¥È¼Â¸³¤Î·ë²Ì¤ò¤Õ¤Þ¤¨¤¿¼ÁÌä¹àÌܤκƸ¡Æ¤¤ÈÊó¹ð¡¦µÄÏÀ¤ò¹Ô¤¦¡× ¡Ú¥°¥ë¡¼¥×2¡Û»ý³²Äǽ¤ÊÀ©ÅÙÀ߷פȵ¬ÈÏŪɾ²Á ¾ì½ê¡§6¹æ´Û313¶µ¼¼ ÆâÍÆ¡§²¬ÌîȬÂåÀèÀ¸¡ÊƱ»Ö¼ÒÂç³Ø¡Ë¤Ë¤è¤ë¹ÖµÁ¡§¡Ö¥Õ¥§¥ß¥Ë¥º¥à¤ÈÀ¯¼£¡Ö³Ø¡×¡× ¡Ú¥°¥ë¡¼¥×3¡Û¡§¹ñºÝÀ¯¼£·ÐºÑ¥â¥Ç¥ëʬÀÏ¡¢ ¾ì½ê¡§1¹æ´Û401¶µ¼¼ ÆâÍÆ¡§¸¦µæ¥»¥ß¥Ê¡¼ ¥¿¥¤¥È¥ë¡§¡ÈBayesian Bandwagoning in Unipolar War¡É Êó¹ð¼Ô¡§Keisuke Nakao (College of Business & Economics, University of Hawaii at Hilo) ³µÍ×: While the theoretical literature maintains that strategic coordination is one of the keys for successful rebellion, anti-governmental campaigns are not necessarily coordinated across rebels in observed civil con.icts. To address this discrepancy, we develop a dynamic model of unipolar war, which illustrates contagious patterns of challenges against a hegemonic government. Unlike what existing theories presume, we demonstrate that by virtue of a rebel leader.s "initiative," social consensus on when to defeat the status quo regime is endogenously fermented in the process of war. As the war escalates, more rebels are inclined to "bandwagon" ongoing battles because the government is gradually revealed to be weak and because accumulated challenges further shift the balance of power away from the government. Our theory also addresses why separatist movements often spark o¤ at geographic fringes and can spread eventually to the heartland. The Napoleonic Wars and the Yugoslav Wars exemplify our theory. ¢¨È¯É½ÆâÍÆ¤¬°ìÅÙÊѹ¹¤Ë¤Ê¤ê¤Þ¤·¤¿¡£¾åµ¤ÏÊѹ¹¸å¤Îȯɽ¥¿¥¤¥È¥ë¤Ç¤¹¡£¤´Î±°Õ¤¯¤À¤µ¤¤¡£ ¡Ú¥°¥ë¡¼¥×4¡Û¡§À©ÅÙ¤ÎÀ¸À®¤ÈÀ߷פοôÍýŪ´ðÁÃÉÕ¤± ¾ì½ê¡§6¹æ´Û418¶µ¼¼ ÆâÍÆ¡§¹ÖµÁ¡Ê²ÊÌÜ̾¡ÖÀ¯¼£·ÐºÑ³Ø¤Ø¤ÎºÇŬ²½¥¢¥×¥í¡¼¥Á¡×¡Ë |
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