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¾ÜºÙ | GLOPE II ¥é¥ó¥Á¥¿¥¤¥à¥»¥ß¥Ê¡¼ ¡Ú»þ´Ö¡Û12:15¡Á12:50 ¡Ú¾ì½ê¡Û1¹æ´Û401¶µ¼¼ ¡ÚÊó¹ð¼Ô¡ÛÈøºêÆØ»Ê»á¡ÊÁá°ðÅÄÂç³ØÀ¯¼£³Ø¸¦µæ²Ê¡Ë ¡Ú¥¿¥¤¥È¥ë¡ÛScreening for Personal Vote-Earning Attributes in European Parliament Elections in the Run-up to National Elections: Case of Italy in the SixthTerm (2004-2009) of the European Parliament ¡Ú³µÍ×¡Û Why do some Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) run for national election even during the mandate while others do not? I investigated this research topic using an original dataset on MEPs in the sixth term (2004-2009) from Italy, where national elections were held in 2006. Based on the theory of electoral systems, I argue that the open-list proportional representation formula clearly shows which candidates have personal vote-earning attributes. I show that MEPs who demonstrate better personal vote-earning attributes in the European Parliament election are more likely to run for the upcoming national election. *The talk will be given in Japanese. |
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